Etymologies & Works 2 part 5/6

...whatever a man speaks is held within these ten predicaments. It will also profit toward understanding the books that are applied either to the Rhetoricians or to the Dialecticians. XXVII. ON THE PERIHERMENIAS (ON INTERPRETATION). [1] There follows next the book Perihermenias, exceedingly subtle, and most careful through its various forms and repetitions; of which it is said: Aristotle, when he was writing the Perihermenias,

...used to dip his pen in his mind. [2] Preface to the Perihermenias. For every thing which is one and is signified by one word is signified either by a noun or by a verb; which two parts of speech interpret the whole, whatever the mind has conceived for speaking. For every utterance is the interpreter of the thing conceived in the mind. [3] This Aristotle, a man most skilled in...

...the expression of things and in the making of discourses, calls it Perihermenia, which we call 'interpretation'; namely because it interprets things conceived in the mind by discourses brought forth, through cataphasis and apophasis, that is, affirmation and negation. Through affirmation, as 'a man runs'; through negation, as 'a man does not run.' [4] And so, in these...

...Perihermenias the aforesaid philosopher treats of seven species, that is, of the noun, of the verb, of the discourse, of the enunciation, of affirmation, of negation, of contradiction. [5] A noun is a significant vocal sound by convention, without time, of which no part is significant when separated, as 'Socrates.' A verb is that which signifies time, of which a part...

...signifies nothing separately, but is always a mark of those things which are said of another, as 'he thinks,' 'he disputes.' A discourse (oratio) is a significant vocal sound, some part of which, taken separately, is significant, as 'Socrates disputes.' An enunciative discourse is a significant vocal sound concerning that which either is something or is not, as 'Socrates is,' 'Socrates is not.' [6] Affirmation is the enunciation...

...of something concerning something, as 'Socrates is.' Negation is of something denied from something, as 'Socrates is not.' Contradiction is the opposition of affirmation and negation, as 'Socrates disputes,' 'Socrates does not dispute.' [7] [All these things are treated most minutely, divided and subdivided, in the book of the Perihermenias; concerning which matters let it here suffice to have briefly intimated the definitions, since in...

...in it a fitting explanation is found. [Usefulness.] The usefulness of the Perihermeniae (On Interpretation) is this: that from these expositions syllogisms are formed. Hence too the Analytics are treated. XXVIII. On Dialectical Syllogisms. [1] Next follow the dialectical syllogisms, in which the usefulness and power of the whole art is displayed; and their conclusion greatly assists the reader toward

...pursuing the truth—provided only that there be absent that error of deceiving one's adversary through the sophisms of false conclusions. [2] The figures of categorical, that is, predicative, syllogisms are three. [3] Of the first figure there are nine modes. The first mode is the one that concludes—that is, that gathers—from two universal affirmatives a universal affirmative directly, as: 'Everything just is

honourable; everything honourable is good; therefore everything just is good.' [4] The second mode concludes from a universal affirmative and a universal negative a universal negative directly, as: 'Everything just is honourable; nothing honourable is base; therefore nothing just is base.' [5] The third mode concludes from affirmatives, a particular and a universal, a particular affirmative

directly, as: 'Some just is honourable; all honourable is useful; therefore some just is useful.' [6] The fourth mode concludes from a particular affirmative and a universal negative a particular negative directly, as: 'Some just is honourable; nothing honourable is base; therefore some just is not base.' [7] The fifth mode concludes from

universal affirmatives a particular affirmative by conversion, as: 'All just is honourable; all honourable is good; therefore some good is just.' [8] The sixth mode concludes from a universal affirmative and a universal negative a universal negative by conversion, as: 'All just is honourable; nothing honourable is base; therefore nothing base is just.'

[9] The seventh mode concludes from a particular and a universal affirmative a particular affirmative by conversion, as: 'Some just is honourable; all honourable is useful; therefore some useful is just.' [10] The eighth mode concludes from universals, a negative and an affirmative, a particular negative by conversion, as: 'Nothing base is honourable;

all honourable is just; therefore some base is not just.' [11] The ninth mode concludes from a universal negative and a particular affirmative a particular negative by conversion, as: 'Nothing base is honourable; some honourable is just; therefore some just is not base.' [12] Of the second figure there are four modes. The first mode concludes

from universals, an affirmative and a negative, a universal negative directly, as: 'All just is honourable; nothing base is honourable; therefore nothing base is just.' [13] The second mode concludes from universals, a negative and an affirmative, a universal negative directly, as: 'Nothing base is honourable; all just is honourable; therefore nothing base is just.' [14]

The third mode concludes from a particular affirmative and a universal negative a particular negative directly, as: 'Some just is honourable; nothing base is honourable; therefore some just is not base.' [15] The fourth mode concludes from a particular negative and a universal affirmative a particular negative directly, as: 'Some just

is not base; all evil is base; therefore some just is not evil.' [16] Of the third figure there are six modes. The first mode concludes from universal affirmatives a particular affirmative, both directly and by conversion, as: 'All just is honourable; all honourable is just; all just is good; therefore some honourable is good, and some good is honourable.' [17]

The second mode concludes from affirmatives, a particular and a universal, an affirmative from the particular directly, as: 'Some just is honourable; all just is good; therefore some honourable is good.' [18] The third mode concludes from affirmatives, a universal and a particular, a particular affirmative directly, as: 'All just is honourable; some just

is good; therefore some honourable is good.' [19] The fourth mode concludes from a universal affirmative and a particular negative a particular negative directly, as: 'All just is honourable; no just is evil; therefore some honourable is not evil.' [20] The fifth mode concludes from a particular affirmative and a universal negative a negative

as a particular one, directly, as: 'Some just is honourable; no just is evil; therefore some honourable is not evil.' [21] The sixth mode concludes from a universal affirmative and a particular negative a particular negative directly, as: 'All just is honourable; some just is not evil; therefore some honourable is not evil.' [22] These figures

of categorical syllogisms whoever desires to know fully, let him read the book entitled the Perihermenias of Apuleius, and he will learn what has there been treated more subtly. For these matters, once distinguished and pondered, usefully lead the reader—by the Lord's favour—into the great pathways of understanding. Now let us come, in the following order, to hypothetical syllogisms. [23] The modes of the

hypothetical syllogisms, which are formed with some conclusion, are seven. The first mode is: 'If it is day, it is light; but it is day; therefore it is light.' The second mode is: 'If it is day, it is light; it is not light; therefore it is not day.' The third mode is thus: 'It is not both day and not light; but it is day; therefore it is light.' [24] The fourth mode is thus: 'Either it is day, or it is night; but

it is day; therefore it is not night.' The fifth mode is thus: 'Either it is day, or it is night; but it is not night; therefore it is day.' The sixth mode is thus: 'It is not both day and not light; but it is day; therefore it is not night.' [25] The seventh mode is thus: 'It is not both day and night; but it is not night; therefore it is day.' But if anyone wishes to know more fully the modes of hypothetical syllogisms,

let him read the book of Marius Victorinus entitled On Hypothetical Syllogisms. [26] From here let us proceed to the dialectical kinds of definitions, which excel with such dignity that they can openly display the manifestations of proofs and certain indications of terms. XXIX. On the Division of Definitions, Abridged from the Book of Marius Victorinus. [1] A definition is

a philosophers' instrument which, in expressing things, unfolds what the thing itself is, of what quality it is, and how it ought to consist of its own parts. For it is a brief statement that, by its own proper signification, marks off and concludes the nature of each single thing, separated from what it holds in common with others. The division of definitions comprises fifteen parts. [2] The first species of definition is ousiodes, that is, substantial,

which is properly and truly called a definition, as: 'Man is a rational, mortal animal, capable of sense and instruction.' For this definition, descending through species and differences, arrives at what is proper, and most fully designates what man is. [3] The second species of definition is that which in Greek is called ennoematike, and in Latin is termed a notion (notio), which notion we can express by a common, not

a proper, name. It is always formed in this way: 'Man is that which, by rational conception and exercise, is set above all animals.' For it did not state what man is, but what he does, as though the thing were summoned into recognition by a certain sign. For in this species and in the rest a recognition of the thing is set forth; no substantial explanation is declared; and because that other kind

is substantial, it holds the primacy among all definitions. [4] The third species of definition is that which in Greek is called poiotes, in Latin is called qualitative: because it took its name from quality, in that it plainly shows of what quality that is which exists. Its example is such: 'Man is one who is strong in genius, mighty in the arts and in the knowledge of things, who either chooses what

he ought to do, or by discernment despises what is useless.' For by these qualities man is expressed and defined. [5] The fourth species of definition is that which in Greek is called hypographike, in Latin is named by Tullius (Cicero) 'description' (descriptio), which, employing a circumlocution of words and deeds, declares by a description what the thing is. For it is asked what a miser is, what

a cruel man is, what a debauchee is, and the whole nature of the debauchee, the miser, the cruel man is described; so that, if we wish to define the debauchee, we say: 'A debauchee is one who craves food not necessary but costly and burdensome, awash in delights, ready for lust.' These and other things define the debauchee, but they define by description. This species of definition

is more suited to orators than to dialecticians, because it has latitudes; and this likeness is applied both to good things and to evil ones. [6] The fifth species of definition is that which in Greek we call kata antilexin, in Latin 'by a corresponding word' (ad verbum). This designates the term about whose meaning inquiry is made by another expression, single and particular; and in a way, what that thing is, set in a single word,

it declares by another single word, as: 'To fall silent (conticescere) is to be quiet (tacere).' Likewise when we call a 'boundary' (terminus) an 'end' (finis), or when 'ravaged' (populatas) is interpreted as 'laid waste' (vastatas). [7] The sixth species of definition is that which the Greeks call kata diaphoran, we 'by difference.' But the writers of the arts name it 'concerning the same and the other,' as when it is asked what difference there is between a king and a tyrant, and, a difference being added,

the difference, it is defined what each of them is; that is, a king is moderate and temperate, but a tyrant is impious and harsh. [8] The seventh species of definition is that which the Greeks call kata metaphoran, the Latins 'by transference (metaphor),' as Cicero in the Topics (32): 'The shore is where the wave plays.' This can be treated in various ways: now so as to admonish, now so as to designate, now so as to

blame or to praise. So as to admonish: 'Nobility is the burden of the ancestors' virtue laid upon their descendants.' So as to designate: 'The crown of the head (apex) is the citadel of the body.' So as to praise: 'Youth is the flower of one's age.' So as to blame: 'Riches are a long provision for a short life.' [9] The eighth species of definition is that which the Greeks call kata aphairesin tou enantiou, the Latins 'by the privation of the contrary of that which

is defined': they say, 'The good is that which is not evil. The just is that which is not unjust,' and the like. But we ought to use this kind of definition when the contrary is known, as: 'If the good is that which profits together with honour, then that which is not such is evil.' [10] The ninth species of definition is that which the Greeks call kata hypotyposin, the Latins 'by a certain imaging',