Etymologies & Works 2 part 6/6

as: 'Aeneas is the son of Venus and Anchises.' This is always concerned with individuals, which the Greeks call atoma. [11] The tenth species of definition is that which the Greeks call kata analogian, the Latins 'according to proportion (reason)'; as, if it be asked what an animal is, the answer be: 'Like man.' For the aforesaid example will make clear the thing sought. But this is proper

to a definition: to declare what that is which is sought. [12] The eleventh species of definition is that which the Greeks call kat elleipes holoklerou homoiou genous, the Latins 'by the lack of the full thing from the same genus.' As, if it be asked what a triens (a third) is, the answer be: 'That to which two-thirds (bessis) is lacking, so that it may be a whole (assis).' [13] The twelfth species of definition is that which the Greeks call kata epainon, that

is, 'by praise'; as Tullius (Cicero) in his defence of Cluentius (146): 'Law is the mind and soul and counsel and judgement of the state.' And elsewhere (Phil. 2.113): 'Peace is tranquil liberty.' It is also done by censure, which the Greeks call psogon, as (ibid.): 'Slavery is the last of all evils, to be repelled not only by war, but even by death.' [14] The thirteenth species

of definition is that which the Greeks call kata to pros ti, the Latins 'in relation to something,' as this: 'A father is one who has a son'; 'A master is one who has a slave.' [15] The fourteenth species of definition is kata ton horon, as Cicero in the Rhetoric (De inventione 1.42): 'A genus is that which embraces several parts.' Likewise: 'A part is that which is subordinate to a genus.' [16] The fifteenth species

of definition is that which the Greeks call kata aitiologian, the Latins 'according to the reason of the thing,' as: 'Day is the sun above the earth, night is the sun beneath the earth.' But we ought to know that the aforesaid species of definitions are rightly associated with the Topics, since they are placed among certain arguments and are mentioned in several passages in the Topics. Now let us come to the Topics, which are

the seats of arguments, the springs of meanings, and the origins of expressions. XXX. On the Topics. [1] Topics is the discipline of discovering arguments. The division of the Topics, or of the places from which arguments are drawn, is threefold. For some inhere in the very matter under discussion; others, which are called 'derived,' are known to be somehow drawn from other things; others are taken

from without. The arguments that inhere in the very matter under discussion are divided into three: the first, from the whole; the second, from the part; the third, from the mark (etymology). [2] An argument from the whole is when a definition is applied to that which is in question, as Cicero says (Pro Marcello 26): 'Glory is the praise of right deeds and the renown of great services rendered to the state.' [3] An argument is from the parts when

the one who defends himself either denies the deed, or defends that it was done lawfully. [4] An argument is from the mark (etymology) when some argument is chosen from the force of a name, as Cicero (In Pisonem 19): 'A consul, I say, I was seeking, whom I could not find in that fatted hog.' [5] Derived arguments are those which are known to be somehow drawn from other things. They are fourteen in number; that

first, the argument from conjugates, when a word is inflected from a noun and becomes a verb, as Cicero says that Verres 'swept clean' (everrisse) his province; or a noun from a verb, as a robber (latro) is said 'to rob' (latrocinari). A noun may also come from a noun; Terence (Andria 218): 'It is the interception of madmen (amentium), not of lovers (amantium)'; provided only that the ending of a single appellation differ, being formed in another inflection of the word. [6]

The second, the argument from genus, is when a judgement is made about the whole kind, as Virgil (Aeneid 4.569): 'A fickle and changeable thing (genus) is woman.' [7] The third, the argument from species, is when a species lends credence to a general question, as (Aeneid 7.363): 'Not thus did the Phrygian shepherd make his way into Lacedaemon.' The argument is from likeness when things similar to certain matters are brought forward

(Aeneid 10.333): 'Hand me my darts: my right hand shall hurl none in vain against the Rutulians, the darts that stood fixed in the bodies of the Greeks on the Ilian plains.' [8] The argument is from difference when certain things are separated by a difference, as Virgil (Aeneid 10.581): 'It is not the horses of Diomedes nor the chariot of Achilles that you behold.' The argument is said to be from contraries when things that are at variance

are opposed to one another, it is said to be an argument from contraries, as Virgil (Aeneid 9.95): 'Shall keels made mortal by mortal hand possess an immortal right, and shall you, Aeneas, though safe, pass through uncertain perils?' [9] The argument is said to be from consequents when something inevitably follows a thing once posited, as Virgil (Aeneid 1.529): 'No such violence is in our purpose, nor is so great a pride granted to the vanquished.' The argument from antecedents is

when certain of those things which were done earlier are proved, as Cicero in his defence of Milo (44): 'Since he did not hesitate to disclose what he had planned, can you be in doubt as to what he did?' [10] There is argument from incompatibles, when the objection raised is destroyed by some contrariety, as Cicero (Pro Deiotaro 15): 'He, then, not only delivered from such peril, but—'

enriched with the most ample honour, would he have wished to slay you in your own house?' [11] There is argument from conjugates, when it is shown, with probability, what will come to pass from each given circumstance, as Vergil (Aeneid 8.147): 'If they drive us out, they believe nothing will stand in their way from sending all Hesperia utterly beneath their yoke.' [12] There is argument from causes, when by common custom each matter

is dealt with, as Terence (Andria 582): 'I was somewhat afraid a while ago to guard against you, lest you should do what the common run of slaves is wont to do, deceiving me with tricks.' There is argument from effects, when from the things that have been done something is proved, as Vergil (Aeneid 4.13): 'Fear betrays base-born souls.' [13] There is argument from comparison, when through collation

of persons or of causes the reasoning of the verdict is framed under an imputation, as Vergil (Aeneid 10.81): 'You are able to snatch Aeneas from Grecian hands; and is it a crime that we have given some aid against the Rutulians?' [14] Likewise there are arguments drawn from without, which the Greeks call ATECHNOUS, that is, devoid of art, such as testimony. Testimony, indeed, rests upon fact. [15] This

is divided into five modes: that is, first from the person, second from the authority of nature, third from the times of the authorities, fourth from the sayings and deeds of the ancestors, fifth from tortures. The third of the aforesaid modes, therefore, which is from the times, is derived into eight species. The first by native talent, the second by wealth, the third by age, the fourth by fortune, the fifth by art, the sixth by experience,

the seventh by necessity, the eighth by the concurrence of chance events. All testimony is that which is taken from some external thing to produce belief. It is not any person whatsoever that carries the weight of testimony to produce belief, but he ought to be praiseworthy for uprightness of character. [16] The authority of nature is that which consists chiefly in virtue. There are many testimonies which lend

authority: that is, native talent, wealth, age, fortune, art, experience, necessity, and the concurrence of chance events. From the sayings and deeds of the ancestors credence is sought, when the words and deeds of the men of old are recalled. From tortures credence is furnished, after which no one is thought willing to lie. [17] But those matters which are treated within time, since they are plain by their own names, do not

need definition. It is also to be committed to memory that the Topics commonly furnish arguments to orators, dialecticians, poets, and jurists alike; but when they prove something in a special way, they pertain to rhetoricians, poets, and jurists; whereas when they dispute in a general way, it is manifest that they belong to the philosophers. [18] A truly marvelous kind of work, that there could be gathered into one

whatever the mobility and variety of the human mind, in searching out its perceptions through diverse causes, was able to discover—the free and voluntary understanding being thus comprehended. For wheresoever it turns itself, whatsoever thoughts it enters upon, the mind must needs fall into some one of those things which have been set forth above. XXXI. ON OPPOSITES. [1] There are four kinds of contraries,

which Aristotle calls ANTIKEIMENA, that is, opposites, in that they seem, as it were, to stand in the way of one another from the contrary side, like contraries; and yet not all things that are opposed to one another are contraries, but all are set over against by a contrary. The first kind is that of contraries, which according to Cicero is called 'diverse,' for the reason that they are opposed to one another only contrarily, so that they do not belong to those

to which they are opposed, as wisdom and folly. [2] This kind is divided into three species. For there are some of it which have a middle; and there are some which are without a middle; and there are some which have a middle and yet are without a name, unless one coins some word for it. White and black have a middle, because between them there is often found a pale or dusky colour

is found. [3] They are without a middle whenever one of two things befalls, as health or infirmity. Of these there is no middle. But those whose middles are without a name, as happy and unhappy, have as their middle 'not happy.' The second kind is that of relatives, which are so opposed to one another that they are referred to each other, as double and single. [4] This kind alone of opposites is referred to itself.

For there is no 'greater' unless it be referred to a 'less,' nor 'single' unless to 'double.' For a relative is so opposed to a relative that this very thing which is opposed either belongs to that to which it is opposed, or is referred to it in whatever manner. For the half is opposed to the double, and is the half of that double, yet is so opposed to it that it belongs to that to which it is opposed. [5] Thus too the small is opposed to the great,

so that that very small thing is small in relation to the great to which it is opposed. For the aforesaid things which are called contraries are so opposed to one another that they do not belong to those to which they are opposed, nor are they referred to them in any manner; since indeed iniquity is so contrary to justice that the iniquity is not of that same justice, nor is there iniquity in relation to it. [6] The third kind is that of opposites, namely state (habitus)

or deprivation. This kind Cicero calls 'privation,' by which he shows that someone had possessed something whereof he is now deprived. Of it there are three species: the first of which is in the thing itself, the second in place, the third in a fitting time. In the thing, as blindness and sight. In place, as the place of blindness and of sight is in the eyes. In a fitting time, as one does not call an infant toothless—him for whom

his young age has as yet denied teeth. For he is not deprived of teeth which he has not yet had. [7] The fourth kind is opposed by affirmation and negation, as 'Socrates disputes,' 'Socrates does not dispute.' This differs from the foregoing in that those can be stated singly, whereas these cannot be stated except conjointly. This fourth kind among the dialecticians has much

conflict, and is called by them 'strongly opposed,' since it does not even admit a third. [8] For of those others certain ones can have a third, as in contraries white and black. The third of these is neither white nor black, but dusky or pale. So too in relatives, as many and few. The third of these is neither many nor few, but middling. In state or deprivation, as sight and blindness. The third of these is neither blindness nor sight, but bleariness. So then 'he reads,' 'he does not read': this has no third.