Letters & Polemics (CSEL) 29

BOOK ONE. The first question, most beloved brother Pollentius, of those which, writing to me as though consulting me, you have treated, is what the Apostle says: 「But to those who are in wedlock I command—not I, but the Lord—that the wife depart not from her husband; but if she depart, that she remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband;」

「and the husband is not to put away his wife」—whether it is to be so understood that he is understood to have forbidden her to marry who has departed from her husband without cause of fornication (for this you hold), or whether, as I held in those books which many years ago I wrote On the Gospel Discourse which the Savior had on the mountain according to Matthew, he commanded those to remain unmarried who have withdrawn from their husbands for that one cause which alone is permitted, that is, of fornication. For it seems to you that a woman then departing from her husband ought not to marry, if she has departed compelled by no fornication of the husband; and you do not observe that, if her husband has had no cause of fornication, she ought not, having departed, to remain unmarried, but ought not to depart at all.

For assuredly, to her who is commanded that, if she depart from her husband, she remain unmarried, the license is taken away not of departing but of marrying. But if this is so, then license is given to women who wish to be continent to await no consent of their husbands, so that what was said—「that the wife depart not from her husband」—would seem to have been enjoined upon those who are able to choose not continence but such a divorce whereby it would be lawful for them to enter into the marriages of others. Accordingly, those who love to desire no intercourse, to endure no wedlock, will be permitted to leave their husbands even without any cause of fornication and to remain unmarried according to the Apostle.

And husbands likewise—since the case is equal in both—if they should wish to be continent, will forsake their wives even without their consent and will remain without any marriages. For then, as you suppose, it would be lawful for them to seek other unions, if the divorce arose from a cause of fornication. But when this cause is absent, it remains, according to what you suppose, that either the spouse depart not from the spouse, or, if he depart, remain without marriage, or return to the former union. With no cause of fornication existing, therefore, it will be lawful for any spouse to choose one of three: either not to depart from the spouse, or, if he depart, so to remain, or, if he remain not so, not to seek another but to render himself to the former.

And where is that which the same Apostle willed—that spouses should not, even for a time, that they may be free for prayer, defraud one another of the carnal debt except by consent? How will that stand which he says: 「But on account of fornications, let each man have his own wife, and let each woman have her own husband. Let the husband render the debt to his wife, and likewise also the wife to the husband. The wife has not power over her own body, but the husband; likewise also the husband has not power over his own body, but the wife」? How will this be true, unless because, the spouse being unwilling, it is not lawful for the spouse to be continent? For if it is lawful for a woman so to dismiss her husband that she remain unmarried, then not the husband has, but she herself has, power over her own body: which is understood also of the husband. Then, when it was said:

「Whoever shall put away his wife, save for the cause of fornication, makes her to commit adultery,」 how are we to understand it as said, unless that it is forbidden a man to put away his wife if no cause of fornication has arisen? And it is said why—namely, lest he make her to commit adultery; assuredly for this reason, because, even if she herself have not put him away but have been put away, she will be an adulteress if she marry. On account of this so great evil, therefore, it is not lawful for a man to put away his wife except from a cause of fornication. For then he does not by dismissing make her an adulteress, but dismisses an adulteress. What then? If, therefore, he say: 「I do indeed dismiss my wife without any cause of fornication, but I will remain continent,」 shall we for that reason say that he has done with impunity what he has done?

Who will dare to say this, who understands the will of the Lord speaking these things? For He willed that a spouse should not be dismissed even for the cause of continence, who excepted the sole cause of fornication. Let us return, therefore, to the very words of the Apostle, saying: 「But to those who are in wedlock I command—not I, but the Lord—that the wife depart not from her husband; but if she depart, that she remain unmarried」; and let us as it were interrogate him and, as though he were present, consult him in a certain manner: Why did you say, O Apostle, 「but if she depart, that she remain unmarried」? Is it lawful to depart, or is it not lawful? If it is not lawful, why do you command her who departs to remain unmarried? But if it is lawful, then assuredly there is some cause by which it may be lawful.

But this, when sought, is not found except the one which alone the Savior excepted, that is, the cause of fornication. And through this the Apostle does not command a woman, if she depart, to remain unmarried, except her who departs from her husband for that cause by which alone it was lawful for her to depart from her husband. For where it is said: 「I command not to depart; but if she depart, to remain unmarried,」 far be it that she should act against this command who so departs as to remain unmarried. Unless, therefore, she be understood for whom it is lawful to depart—and it is not lawful except when the husband is fornicating—how is she commanded to remain unmarried if she depart? Who is there who would say: 「If a woman depart from a husband who is not fornicating, let her remain unmarried,」

since it is by no means lawful for her to depart except from a fornicating husband? How much, therefore, this notion of yours is opposed to the conjugal bond—where the Lord willed that continence itself should not be undertaken except by equal accord and consent—I think you now understand. But let us set forth the matter itself a little more openly and, as it were, place it before our eyes. Behold, continence has pleased a woman; it does not please her husband. The woman has departed from him and has begun to live continently—she indeed about to remain chaste, but about to make (what the Lord does not will) an adulterous husband: who, since he will not contain himself, will seek another. What are we to say to the woman, except what sound doctrine says to the Church? Render the debt to your husband, lest, while you seek whence you may be the more honored, he find whence he may be damned.

For this we would say also to him, if, you being unwilling to be continent, he had wished to be so. For you have not power over your own body, but he; just as neither has he power over his own body, but you. 「Do not defraud one another, except by consent.」 When we shall have said these things and many more of this kind which pertain to this matter, does it please you that the woman should answer us out of this your reasoning: 「I hear the Apostle saying: 'I command that the wife depart not from her husband; but if she depart, that she remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband.' Behold, I have departed; I do not wish to be reconciled to my husband, but I remain unmarried. For he did not say: if she depart, let her remain unmarried until she be reconciled to her husband, but 'let her remain,' he says, 'unmarried or be reconciled to her husband.' Let her do this,' he says, 'or that.'

He permitted one of two to be chosen, but did not compel into either of these two. To remain unmarried I choose, and thus I fulfill the command. Rebuke, reprove, chide, use what severity you will—if I shall have married.」 What shall I gainsay to her except: You do not understand the Apostle well? For he would not have commanded that a woman, if she departed from her husband, remain unmarried, except her to whom it had been lawful to depart—that is, for that one cause which is there for this reason left unspoken, because it is most well known, namely, of fornication. For this alone God the Master excepted, when He was speaking of the wife to be dismissed, and gave to understand that such a form was to be observed by the husband also, since not only the woman has not power over her own body, but the husband;

but likewise also the husband has not power over his own body, but the woman. Since, therefore, you cannot accuse your husband of fornication, how do you think to excuse yourself, in that you depart from him by not marrying, from whom it is not at all lawful for you to depart? When the woman shall have heard these things from us, I think that you would not wish her to answer thus, so as to say that she therefore remains unmarried because she departed without any fornication of the husband; for if he had committed fornication, it would have been lawful for her not only to depart but even to marry. By no means would she say this, since you yourself were abashed to give this license to women. For you said: 「If a husband dismiss an adulterous wife and take another, the woman only will bear the reproach.」

「But if a woman dismiss her husband for the aforesaid cause and take another, not the husband only, but also the woman will bear the reproach.」 Rendering the reason of this your opinion, you say: 「For they will say that she departed for this reason, that she might join another husband to herself, even if perchance he be such as the one from whom she departed; for it is exceedingly easy for men to rush into this vice of disease. But if she dismiss even that one too and marry another, they will say more and more that she has sought a multitude of husbands.」 Having rendered this reason, you conclude and say: 「These things, then, being handled or even discussed, it behooves a woman either to bear with her husband or to remain unmarried.」

You have clearly given good counsel to women: that, although they know it to be permitted them, if they dismiss adulterous husbands, to be joined to others, they nevertheless should not do so on account of the reproach, but should rather bear with even adulterous husbands, lest they seem by this occasion to wish to mingle with many, seeing that it is difficult for a woman not to find one to marry such as was the one she dismissed, since men are very much inclined to this disease. When, therefore, we say that even to that woman who has dismissed a fornicating husband it is not lawful to marry another, but you say that it is indeed lawful but not expedient, we both without doubt say that she who dismisses a fornicating husband ought not to marry.

But this is the difference: that we, when both spouses are Christians, say to the woman that, if she has departed from a fornicating husband, it is not lawful to marry another, but from a husband who is not fornicating it is not at all lawful to depart; but you say that, if a woman has departed from a husband who is not fornicating, it is not lawful for her to marry another on account of the command; but if she has departed from a fornicating one, it is not expedient for her to marry on account of the reproach. And so you allow a woman not about to marry to depart from her husband, whether he be fornicating or not fornicating. But the blessed Apostle—nay, through the Apostle the Lord—since He does not permit a woman to depart from a husband who is not fornicating, it remains that He forbids her, if she has departed, to marry, whom He permits to depart from a fornicating one.

For of her concerning whom it is said: 「If she depart from her husband, let her not marry,」 she is permitted to depart on this condition, that she marry not. If, therefore, she shall have chosen not to marry, there is no reason why she should be forbidden to depart, just as she of whom it is said: 「If she contain not herself, let her marry,」 is permitted, of course, not to contain herself on this condition, that she nevertheless marry. If, therefore, she shall have chosen to marry, she cannot be compelled to be continent. As, therefore, this incontinent woman is compelled to marry, that what she does not contain may not be damnable, so that woman departing from her husband is compelled to remain unmarried, that what she does in departing may not be blameworthy. But blameworthily does she depart from a husband who is not fornicating, even if she shall have remained unmarried.

She, then, is commanded to remain unmarried if she departs — she who departs from a fornicating husband. Since these things stand thus, if we were to understand the Apostle in such a way as to say to women, 'Do not depart even from chaste husbands in such a manner that, if you should wish to depart, you may remain unmarried,' then all to whom continence is pleasing would think it permitted to them to depart even without their husbands' consent. But since without doubt we ought not to allow this, it remains that we must show that what was said — 'if she departs, let her remain unmarried' — was said of the woman described.

We have learned that it is indeed permitted to her to depart from a fornicating husband, lest, if we should teach otherwise, we throw Christian marriages into confusion under the pretext of continence, and, against the Lord's most merciful precept, drive incontinent husbands who are dismissed by continent wives, or incontinent wives dismissed by continent husbands, into adultery. Therefore that saying of the Lord — which He spoke not indeed in the very sermon that was being expounded by us, but nevertheless elsewhere: 'Whoever shall dismiss his wife except for the cause of fornication and shall marry another, commits adultery' — if it is to be understood in this way, namely that whoever for the cause of fornication ...

... dismisses his wife and marries another does not commit adultery, then it does not appear that the case of husband and wife is of equal form, seeing that a woman, even if she departs from her husband for the cause of fornication and marries another, commits adultery, whereas a man, if for the same cause he dismisses his wife and marries another, does not commit adultery. But if the form is equal in both, then each commits adultery — if he joins himself to another — even when he has separated himself from a fornicating spouse. That the form in this matter is truly equal for husband and wife, the Apostle shows there (a point which must often be recalled) where, when he had said, 'The wife has not power over her own body, but the husband,' he added and said, 'Likewise also the husband has not power over his own body, but the wife.'

'Why then,' you ask, 'did the Lord interpose the cause of fornication, and not rather say generally: Whoever dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery — if he too is an adulterer who dismisses a fornicating wife and marries another?' I believe it is because the Lord wished to point out that which is the greater. For who denies that it is a greater adultery to dismiss a non-fornicating wife and marry another, than if one dismisses a fornicating wife and then marries another? Not that the latter is not adultery, but that it is less, when, after a fornicating wife is dismissed, another is married. For the Apostle James too, using a similar manner of speech, says: 'To him therefore who knows to do good and does it not, to him it is sin.'

Is it then no sin for him too who does not know to do good and therefore does not do it? Surely it is sin; but this is graver, if he both knows and does not do it — nor is the former no sin because it is less. So that we may say both in the same manner: just as 'whoever dismisses his wife, except for the cause of fornication, and marries another, commits adultery,' so 'whoever knows to do good and does it not, sins.' But just as here it cannot rightly be said, 'Therefore if he does not know, he does not sin' — for there are sins even of the ignorant, though lesser than those of the knowing — so neither there can it rightly be said, 'Therefore if for the cause of fornication he dismisses his wife and marries another, he does not commit adultery.'

For there is adultery even in those who marry others after leaving their former wives on account of fornication, but assuredly a lesser one than in those who dismiss their wives not on account of fornication and marry others. Indeed, just as it was said, 'To him who knows to do good and does it not, to him it is sin,' so in the same manner it can also be said: 'To him who dismisses his wife without the cause of fornication and marries another, there is adultery.' As therefore, if we say, 'Whoever marries a woman dismissed by her husband apart from the cause of fornication, commits adultery,' we without doubt speak truly, and yet not on that account do we absolve from this crime the man who marries a woman dismissed on account of fornication, but we in no way doubt that both are adulterers — so likewise him ...

... who apart from the cause of fornication dismisses his wife and marries another, we pronounce him an adulterer; nor yet on that account do we defend from the stain of this sin him who on account of the cause of fornication dismisses his wife and marries another. For both, though the one is graver than the other, we nonetheless recognize to be adulterers. For no one is so absurd as to deny that he is an adulterer who marries a woman whom her husband has cast off on account of the cause of fornication, while he calls that man an adulterer who marries a woman who has been cast off apart from the cause of fornication. Since therefore both these men are adulterers — whence, when we say:

'Whoever marries a woman dismissed by her husband apart from the cause of fornication commits adultery,' we speak indeed of one of them, and yet not on that account do we deny that he commits adultery who marries the woman whom her husband dismissed on account of the cause of fornication — so, since both are adulterers, namely both he who dismisses his wife apart from the cause of fornication and marries another, and he who, having dismissed his wife on account of the cause of fornication, joins himself to another, assuredly when we read of one of them, we ought not so to understand it as if by this the other is denied to be an adulterer, because the one is expressly stated.

But if the evangelist Matthew, because he expressed one case and was silent about the other, made this hard to understand, did not the others generally embrace this same thing in such a way that it can be understood of either? For according to Mark it is thus written: 'Whoever dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery against her; and if a wife dismisses her husband and marries another, she commits adultery'; according to Luke thus: 'Everyone who dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery; and he who marries her that is dismissed by her husband commits adultery.' Who then are we, that we should say: there is one who commits adultery by dismissing his wife and marrying another, and there is one who, doing this, does not commit adultery — when the Gospel says that everyone who does this commits adultery?

Accordingly, if whoever does this — that is, everyone who does this, namely dismisses his wife and marries another — commits adultery, without doubt both are there: both he who dismisses his wife apart from the cause of fornication and he who does so on account of the cause of fornication; for this is what 'whoever dismisses' means, that is, 'everyone who dismisses.' But — as, I know not why, it seemed to you — when I was quoting the words of the Gospel according to Matthew, I did not omit what is written, 'and marries another,' and so say only 'commits adultery'; rather I set down those words which are read in that lengthy sermon which the Lord delivered on the mount; for it was this that I had undertaken to treat. Which words are there read as I set them down, that is:

'Whoever dismisses his wife, except for the cause of fornication, makes her commit adultery; and he who marries her that is loosed from her husband commits adultery.' Where, even if certain copies have the same sense rendered in differing words, they nonetheless do not diverge from what is understood. For some indeed have 'whoever dismisses,' others 'everyone who dismisses'; and likewise some 'except for the cause of fornication,' others 'apart from the cause of fornication,' others 'unless on account of the cause of fornication'; again some 'he who marries her that is loosed from her husband commits adultery,' others 'he who marries her that is dismissed by her husband commits adultery.' In which I think you see that it makes no difference to one and the same meaning.

Although that last clause — that is, 'he who marries her that is dismissed by her husband commits adultery' — some codices, both Greek and Latin, do not have in that sermon which the Lord delivered on the mount. I believe the reason is that even there this sense could be thought to have been unfolded by what was said above: 'makes her commit adultery'; for how does the dismissed woman become an adulteress, unless he who marries her becomes an adulterer? But the words which you yourself set down — from which it seemed to you that he does not commit adultery who dismisses his wife on account of the cause of fornication and marries another — were indeed obscurely placed. Hence I do not wonder that the reader labors in understanding them; but they are not in that sermon of the Lord which was then being treated by me when I wrote those things which, when you read them, disturbed you.

For elsewhere the same Matthew related that the Lord said these things, not when he made that lengthy sermon on the mount, but when he was asked by the Pharisees whether it was lawful to dismiss a wife for any cause whatsoever. But what is less clearly understood in Matthew can be understood in the other evangelists. Wherefore, when we read in the Gospel according to Matthew, 'Whoever dismisses his wife unless for fornication' — or, as is rather read in the Greek, 'apart from the cause of fornication' — 'and marries another, commits adultery,' we ought not straightway to suppose that he does not commit adultery who dismisses his wife on account of the cause of fornication and marries another, but should still remain in doubt, until we consult the Gospel according to the other evangelists by whom this was narrated.

What then? What if in Matthew not indeed the whole of what pertains to this matter was stated, but a part was stated in such a way that the whole was to be understood from the part — which Mark and Luke, as if explaining, preferred to state in full, so that the complete meaning might be clear? Since therefore, first not doubting that what is read in Matthew is true — 'Whoever dismisses his wife apart from the cause of fornication and marries another commits adultery' — if we ask whether only that man commits adultery by marrying another wife who dismissed his former wife apart from the cause of fornication, or everyone who, having dismissed his wife, marries another, so that there too is included even he who dismisses a fornicating wife — will it not according to Mark be answered us:

'Why do you ask whether the one is an adulterer and the other is not? Whoever dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery.' Will it not also according to Luke be said to us: 'Why do you doubt whether he who dismisses his wife on account of the cause of fornication and marries another does not commit adultery? Everyone who dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery.'

And by this, since it is not right that we should say the evangelists, though speaking of one matter in differing words, dissent from one sense and the same meaning, it remains that we understand Matthew to have wished to signify the whole by a part, yet to have held the same meaning: that of one who dismisses his wife and marries another a certain one indeed commits adultery — namely he who dismisses her apart from fornication — while a certain one does not commit adultery — namely he who dismisses her on account of fornication — but that everyone who dismisses his wife and marries another is by no means to be doubted to commit adultery. For that too which follows according to Luke — 'he who marries her that is dismissed by her husband commits adultery' — how is it true?

How does he commit adultery, unless because she whom he married, while he lives from whom she was dismissed, is still another man's wife? For if he now unites with his own wife, not with another's, surely he does not commit adultery; but he does commit adultery. Therefore she with whom he unites is another's. Furthermore, if she is another's, that is, belongs to him from whom she was dismissed — even if she was dismissed on account of the cause of fornication — she has not yet ceased to be the wife of him who dismisses her. But if she had ceased to be his, she now belongs to him whom she has married as another husband; and if she is his, he is to be judged not an adulterer but a husband. But since Scripture calls him not a husband but an adulterer, she still belongs to him by whom she was cast off even for the cause of fornication.

And therefore whatever woman he himself, after she is dismissed, marries, because he lies with one who has another husband, she is an adulteress. And how can it come about that he too is not an adulterer, who, it is clear, commits adultery with the woman whom he has married? Now let us at last consider that which the Apostle says: 'But to the rest speak I, not the Lord' — intending, namely, to speak of unequal marriages, that is, where both had not been Christians. This seemed to me to have been said by him by way of admonition. For because a faithful spouse could lawfully leave an unbelieving spouse, therefore it is not the Lord but the Apostle who forbids this to be done. For what the Lord forbids is by no means lawful to do.

The Apostle therefore admonishes — a thing which could be the occasion of winning many — that faithful spouses should not use the permitted liberty in leaving their unbelieving partners. But to you it seems that unbelievers too may not lawfully be dismissed by the faithful, because the Apostle forbids this, whereas I say it is lawful. For he does not forbid it, but rather it is not expedient, wherefore the Apostle admonishes that it not be done: and he also gives a reason why it is not expedient to do it, although it be lawful. 'For what do you know, O wife,' he says, 'whether you shall save your husband? or how do you know, O husband, whether you shall save your wife?' — since he had also said above: 'For the unbelieving husband is sanctified in the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified in the brother,' that is, in the Christian; 'otherwise your children,' he says, 'would be unclean;

but now they are holy.' Thus, by examples too which had already occurred, he seems to have exhorted toward the winning of spouses and children for Christ. Why then it is not expedient that even unbelieving spouses be dismissed by the faithful, the reason is clearly expressed. For the Apostle forbids withdrawal from unbelieving spouses not because the conjugal bond must be preserved with such persons, but that they may be gained in Christ. But many things are to be done not because the law commands, but out of free charity; and those are the more pleasing among our services which, though we might lawfully not expend them, we nevertheless expend for the sake of love.

Hence the Lord himself first, when he had shown that he did not owe the tribute, nevertheless paid it, lest he should scandalize those whom, bearing manhood, he was counseling unto eternal salvation. But now how the Apostle commends these things, his own words testify, where he says: 'For though I be free from all men, I have made myself the servant of all, that I might gain the more,' when a little above he had said: 'Have we not power to eat and to drink? Have we not power to lead about a sister, a wife, as also the rest of the apostles, and the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas? Or I only and Barnabas, have we not power to forbear working? Who ever serves as a soldier at his own charges? Who plants a vineyard and eats not of its fruit?

Who feeds a flock and does not partake of the milk of the flock?' And a little after he says: 'If others are partakers of this power over you, are not we rather? Yet we have not used this power, but suffer all things, lest we should give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ.' Then after a few words he says: 'What then shall be my reward? That, preaching the Gospel, I may present the Gospel without charge, that I abuse not my power in the Gospel.' And he immediately subjoins what I recalled a little before: 'For though I be free from all men, I have made myself the servant of all, that I might gain the more.' Likewise in another place, concerning certain things which pertain to food, he says: 'All things are lawful for me, but not all things are expedient; all things are lawful for me, but I will not be brought under the power of any.'

'Meats for the belly, and the belly for meats; but God shall destroy both it and them.' Again elsewhere concerning this same thing: 'All things are lawful, but not all things are expedient; all things are lawful, but not all things edify. Let no one seek his own, but that which is another's.' And to show whence he was speaking, he says: 'Whatever is sold in the shambles, eat, asking no question for conscience' sake.' And yet elsewhere he says: 'I will not eat flesh forever, lest I scandalize my brother'; and likewise elsewhere: 'All things indeed are clean, but it is evil for the man who eats with offense.' For what is 'all things are lawful' is the same as 'all things indeed are clean';

and what is 'but not all things are expedient' is the same as 'but it is evil for the man who eats with offense.' Thus he shows that those things which are lawful — that is, forbidden by no precept of the Lord — are, according as it is expedient, to be handled rather not by the prescription of law but by the counsel of charity. These are the things which are dispensed more abundantly to the wounded man who, brought by that Samaritan's compassion, was to be cared for at the inn. And therefore they are said not to be commanded by the Lord, although it is by the Lord that they are admonished to be offered, so that they may be understood to be the more pleasing the more they are shown to be undue. But those things which among these are such that, though they be lawful, they are not expedient, of them it cannot be said, 'This is good, but that is better,' as it was said: 'He who gives in marriage does well;

and he who does not give in marriage does better.' For there both are lawful, and this is expedient at one time, that at another. For to those who do not contain themselves, it is assuredly expedient to marry, and what is lawful is expedient; but to those who have vowed continence, it is neither lawful nor expedient. Furthermore, to depart from an unbelieving spouse is lawful, but not expedient; but to remain with him, if he consents to cohabit, is both lawful and expedient, because, if it were not lawful, it could not be expedient. Something therefore can be lawful and not expedient; but that which is not lawful cannot be expedient. And by this, not all things that are lawful are expedient, but all things unlawful are not expedient.

For just as everyone who is redeemed by the blood of Christ is a man, yet not everyone who is a man is also redeemed by the blood of Christ, so everything that is not lawful is not expedient, yet not everything that is not expedient is also not lawful. For there are indeed lawful things which are not expedient, as we have learned on the Apostle's testimony. But between that which is unlawful and therefore not expedient, and that which is lawful and yet not expedient, what the difference is, it is difficult to define by any universal rule. For one might too readily say: everything that it is not expedient to do is sin; but every sin is unlawful; therefore everything that is not expedient is unlawful.

And then where will be those things which the Apostle said are lawful but not expedient, if everything that is not expedient is not lawful? Wherefore, since we cannot doubt that the Apostle spoke truly, and dare not say that some sins are lawful, it remains for us to say that something is done which is not expedient, and yet, if it is lawful, is not sin — although, since it is not expedient, it is assuredly not to be done. But if it seems absurd that something be done which is not expedient and that he who did it be said to have sinned, it must be understood that this is absurd from the custom of speech: which extends so widely that we say even beasts of burden, though they be devoid of reason, ought nevertheless commonly to be beaten when they 'sin';

but to sin, properly speaking, belongs to none but him who uses the rational choice of the will, which among all mortal living creatures is divinely bestowed upon man alone. But it is one thing when we speak properly, and another when we borrow words by transferring or misapplying them from other things. Let us therefore, if we can, strive to distinguish by some fixed limit between that which is lawful and not expedient, and that which is not lawful and therefore not expedient either. Those things seem to me to be lawful and not expedient which are indeed permitted by the justice that is before God, but on account of the offense of men, lest by this they be hindered from salvation, are to be avoided;

but those to be not lawful and therefore not expedient which are so forbidden by justice itself that they are not to be done, even if they should be praised by those to whose notice they were brought. But if this is so, therefore only unlawful things are forbidden by the Lord, so that those which are lawful and not expedient may be guarded against not by the bond of law, but by the free beneficence of love. Wherefore, if it were not lawful to dismiss an unbelieving spouse, the Lord would forbid this to be done, nor would the Apostle in forbidding it say, 'I speak, not the Lord.' For if on account of the fornication of the flesh a person is permitted to be separated from a spouse, how much more is fornication of the mind — that is, of unbelief — to be detested in a spouse, concerning which it is written: 'For behold, they that put themselves far from you shall perish;

you have destroyed everyone who goes a-whoring from you!' But because it is lawful in such a way that it is not expedient — lest, on account of the separations of spouses, men be offended and shrink from the very doctrine of salvation by which unlawful things are forbidden, and thus remain worse and doomed to perish in the same unbelief — the Apostle intervenes and by admonishing forbids that to be done which is so lawful that it is not expedient. For thus faithful men or women are neither forbidden by the Lord to withdraw from unbelieving wives or husbands, nor are they commanded to. For if they were commanded to dismiss such spouses, there would be no room for the counsel of the admonishing Apostle that this should not be done. For in no way would a good servant forbid to be done what the Lord commands.

For once the Lord commanded this through the prophet Ezra, and it was done: the Israelites dismissed their foreign wives, all who at that time were able to have them, through whom it came about that they themselves were seduced to strange gods, rather than that those women were gained for the true God through their husbands. For not yet had so great a grace of the Savior shone forth, and that multitude of the people still gaped after the temporal promises of the Old Testament. And therefore, since they saw those earthly goods which they sought from the Lord as a great thing abounding even to those who worshiped many false gods, by the blandishments of their wives they first shrank from offending them, and were then led on even to worship them. Whence the Lord had commanded through holy Moses that no one should marry a foreign wife.

Rightly therefore, when the Lord forbade, did they dismiss, when the Lord commanded, the wives whom they had married. But when the Gospel had begun to be preached to the Gentiles, it found Gentiles already joined to Gentiles as spouses: from among whom, if both did not believe, but one, man or woman, and the unbeliever consented to dwell with the believer, the believer ought neither to be forbidden by the Lord to dismiss the unbeliever, nor to be commanded to — not forbidden, namely, because justice permits departure from a fornicator, and the fornication of an unbelieving person is greater in the heart, nor can there be said to be true chastity of that person with a spouse, because 'everything that is not of faith is sin'; although the believer has true chastity even with an unbelieving spouse who does not have it.

And therefore the faithful ought not to be commanded to be separated from the unbelievers, because the Gentiles were not both joined together against the Lord's command. Since therefore the Lord neither forbids nor commands a believer to depart from an unbeliever, therefore it is the Apostle, not the Lord, who says that one should not depart — the Apostle assuredly having the Holy Spirit, in whom he could give useful and faithful counsel. Hence, when he had said concerning a woman whose husband had died, 'But she shall be more blessed if she so remain, according to my counsel,' lest anyone should think this counsel, as though human and not divine, ought to be despised, he added: 'and I think that I too have the Spirit of God.'

Accordingly, it must be understood that even those very things which are not commanded by the Lord, but are usefully persuaded by his holy servant, are persuaded by the inspiration of the same Lord. Far be it that any catholic should say that, when the Holy Spirit persuades, the Lord does not persuade, since the Spirit too is Lord and the works of the Trinity are inseparable. Yet he says: 'But concerning virgins I have no precept of the Lord, but I give counsel' — not that we should think this counsel foreign to the Lord, since he immediately follows and says: 'as one that has obtained mercy so as to be faithful.' Therefore according to God he gives faithful counsel in that Spirit of whom he says: 'and I think that I too have the Spirit of God.'

But nevertheless, one thing is the command of the Lord commanding, and another is the faithful counsel of a fellow-servant according to the mercy of charity, which is inspired and granted to him by the Lord. There it is not lawful to do otherwise; here, however, it is lawful, yet in such a way that the very lawful thing is partly indeed expedient, partly not expedient. It is expedient then, when it is not only permitted by the justice that is before the Lord, but also no hindrance to salvation is thereby brought upon men: as when the Apostle gives counsel to virgins not to marry, whereof he testifies that he has no precept of the Lord — it being lawful to do otherwise, that is, to marry and to hold the good of marriage, though a lesser good than that of continence.

And this very lawful thing is even expedient, since it received the frailty of the flesh — which would otherwise rush into things forbidden and unlawful — with the honorableness of marriage, so as to hinder no one from salvation, although it would be more expedient and more honorable if the virgin should seize upon the counsel to which the precept does not compel her. But then the lawful thing is not expedient, when it is indeed permitted, but the use of that very power brings to others a hindrance to salvation. Such is — the thing of which we have now long been speaking — the departure of a faithful spouse from an unbelieving one, which the Lord does not forbid by a precept of law, because before him it is not unjust, but which the Apostle forbids by the counsel of charity, because it brings to unbelievers a hindrance to salvation:

not only because those who are offended are most perniciously scandalized, but also because, when they fall into other marriages while those live from whom they are dismissed, being bound by adulterous ties they are with the greatest difficulty loosed. Therefore here, where that which is lawful is not expedient, it cannot be said, 'If he dismisses the unbeliever, he does well; if he does not dismiss, he does better,' as it was said, 'He who gives in marriage does well; and he who does not give in marriage does better,' since there both are not only equally lawful — whence no one is compelled to any of these by a precept of the Lord — but also both are expedient, one less, the other more, whence to that which is more expedient whoever can grasp it is invited by the counsel of the Apostle.

But in this matter, where it is asked about dismissing or not dismissing an unbelieving spouse, both are indeed equally lawful by the justice that is before the Lord, and therefore the Lord forbids neither of these; but not both are expedient on account of the infirmities of men, and therefore the Apostle forbids that which is not expedient, the Lord giving him free room to forbid, since neither does the Lord forbid what the Apostle admonishes, nor does the Lord command what the Apostle forbids. And unless it were so, the Apostle would neither admonish anything against the Lord's prohibition, nor forbid anything against his command.

Accordingly, in these two cases — one concerning marrying or not marrying, the other concerning dismissing or not dismissing an unbelieving spouse — something is alike in the words of the Apostle, something unlike. Alike indeed is that which both there he says, 'I have no precept of the Lord, but I give counsel,' and here he says, 'I speak, not the Lord.' For what 'I have no precept of the Lord' is, such is 'the Lord does not say'; and what 'I give counsel' is, such is 'I speak.' But that is unlike, because concerning marrying and not marrying it can be said that this is done well, that better, since both are expedient, one less, the other more;

but concerning dismissing or not dismissing an unbelieving spouse, since one of these is not expedient, the other expedient, it ought not to be said, 'He who dismisses does well, and he who does not dismiss does better,' but it ought to be said, 'Let him not dismiss, because although it is lawful, it is not expedient.' Thus therefore we can say that it is better not to dismiss an unbelieving spouse, although it be also lawful to dismiss, just as we rightly say that that is better which is both lawful and expedient than that which is lawful but not expedient.

For these reasons it came about that, in expounding the Lord's discourse—that lengthy one which He delivered on the mountain—when I came to the question of dismissing or not dismissing spouses, having brought in the apostolic testimonies as well, I said that it was the advice of the Apostle and not a command of the Lord where he says: 'To the rest speak I, not the Lord,' admonishing those who had unbelieving spouses not to dismiss them if they consented to dwell with them. This surely had to be a matter of admonition, not of command, because men are not to be forbidden to do what is lawful, even though it be not expedient, with the same weight with which they are forbidden things unlawful. But if somewhere the Apostle even those things which are to be commanded...

...he deigned to admonish, he did this out of consideration for weakness, not out of any prejudice against the binding force of a command. Hence if he said, 'I write not these things to confound you, but as my dearest sons I admonish you,' what difficulty is there where he says, 'I speak, not the Lord'? Likewise where he says, 'Behold, I Paul say unto you, that if you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing'—did he here too say, 'I speak, not the Lord'? These cases, therefore, are not alike, because even in those matters which the Lord commands it is neither unworthy nor contrary if the Apostle admonishes to the same effect. For we admonish those whom we hold dear to do the precepts or commands of the Lord. But when he says, 'I speak, not the Lord,' he sufficiently shows that the Lord does not forbid what he himself was forbidding;

but the Lord would have forbidden it, if it had been unlawful. Therefore, according to what we have long discussed and thoroughly examined above, it was lawful by way of justice, yet it was also lawful to be left undone out of free goodwill. But you, who hold that what the Lord does not forbid but the Apostle does is in this way not permitted, just as what the Lord forbids is not permitted—when you wished to explain what he meant by saying 'I speak, not the Lord,' since he was addressing the faithful who had unbelieving spouses, you said: 'Because the Lord commanded that marriages of differing religion should not be joined together to one another,' and you adduced this very testimony of the Lord who says:

'You shall not take a wife for your son from the daughters of foreigners, lest she draw him away after their gods and his soul perish.' You added also the words of the Apostle, where he said: 'The woman is bound as long as her husband lives; but if her husband be dead, she is set free; let her marry whom she will, only in the Lord.' This you expounded so as to add, 'that is, a Christian.' Then you went on and said: 'This, then, is the precept of the Lord both in the Old and in the New Testament, that only marriages of one religion and faith should remain joined to one another.'

If, then, this is the Lord's precept in the Old Testament as well as in the New, and the Lord commands this, and the Apostle teaches this—that only marriages of one religion and faith should remain joined—why, contrary to this command of the Lord, contrary to his own teaching, contrary to the precept of the Old and New Testament, does the Apostle command that marriages of differing faith should remain joined? 'Because,' you say, 'Paul, the preacher and apostle of the Gentiles, not only admonishes but also commands those already established in marriage, that if one of the spouses had come to believe, he should not dismiss the other, who does not believe but nevertheless consents to dwell with him.' By these words of yours you show plainly enough that the one thing is different from the other.

For the former concerns those marriages that are first being joined to one another, that a woman should not marry a man not of her religion, nor a man take such a woman to wife. This, as you say, God commands, the Apostle teaches, and both Testaments enjoin. But who would deny that this second matter is different, where the question is not of those to be joined but of those already joined? For both were of one and the same unbelief when they were joined; but when the Gospel came, the one without the other, or the other without the one, believed. If, then, this second case is a different thing—as appears without any scruple of doubt—why does not the Lord, like the Apostle, command that the believer remain in marriage with the unbeliever? Unless perchance in this place there is no force in what He Himself says so confidently:

'Do you wish to receive a proof of Him who speaks in me, Christ?' And Christ is surely the Lord. Do you understand what I am saying? Or shall I dwell somewhat more diligently upon explaining this? Attend, that we may set forth the matter itself in plainer speech, as something to be considered as though set before our eyes. Behold, two spouses of one unbelief; so they were when they were joined. There is no question about these that pertains to that command of the Lord, and to the apostolic teaching, and to the precept of the Old and New Testament, whereby the believer is forbidden to join marriage with the unbeliever. Now they are spouses and both are still unbelievers; they are still such as they were before they were joined, and such as they were when joined.

The preacher of the Gospel comes; one of them, either the man or the woman, believes, yet in such a way that the unbeliever consents to dwell with the believer. Does the Lord command the believer not to dismiss the unbeliever, or does He not command it? If you say 'He commands it,' the Apostle protests: 'I speak, not the Lord.' If you say 'He does not command it,' I ask the reason. And you will not give me that reason which you put in your letter: 'Because the Lord forbids the faithful to be joined to unbelievers.' For here that reason has no place at all; we are speaking of those already joined, not of those to be joined.

If, then, you have not found a reason why the Lord should not forbid what the Apostle forbids—for you now see, as I suppose, that it is not the same reason as the one you had supposed it to be—see whether perhaps it be that reason which has seemed good to me, both to be put forward then and to be defended now: namely, that we should understand the Lord to be saying what involves before Him a justice by no means to be transgressed, that is, He either commands or forbids in such a way that it is not at all lawful to do otherwise; but what He so leaves to the power of the willing person that it is neither done nor omitted unlawfully, He gives room to the counsel of His own servants, that they should rather persuade what they have seen to be expedient. Let this, then, be held first and above all, that unlawful things be not committed.

But where something is lawful in such a way that to do otherwise is not unlawful, let what is expedient be done (or what is more expedient). Those things, therefore, which the Lord says as Lord—that is, not by the counsel of one admonishing, but by the authority of one ruling—it is not lawful not to do, and therefore neither is it expedient. The Lord accordingly commanded that a wife should not depart from her husband; but if she departs (for that cause, of course, for which it is lawful to depart), she should remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband. For a woman, while her husband lives, is bound by law to her married husband; and while her husband lives she shall be called an adulteress if she be with another man, since the woman is bound as long as her husband lives. Hence if a wife dismisses her husband and marries another, she commits adultery, and he who marries a woman dismissed by her husband commits adultery.

And therefore, by the same precept of the Lord, let the husband also not dismiss his wife, since he who dismisses his wife save for the cause of fornication makes her commit adultery. But if he has dismissed her for this cause, let him too remain thus; for everyone who dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery. These ordinances of the Lord are to be kept without any retraction. For they have this justice which is before Him, whether men approve or disapprove. And therefore it ought not to be said, on account of men's offense, or lest men be hindered from that salvation which is in Christ, that they are not to be kept. For what Christian would dare to say: 'Lest I offend men, or that I may gain men for Christ, I will make my wife commit adultery, so that I myself may become an adulterer'?

For it can happen that, when a Christian has dismissed an adulterous wife, he is so tempted that some woman who has not yet believed, desiring to enter into marriage with him, promises that she will become a Christian—not deceitfully, but truly intending to do so if she marries him. To him, then, now refusing this marriage, that tempter may suggest: 'The Lord said, Whoever dismisses his wife save for the cause of fornication and marries another commits adultery; but you, who dismissed your wife for the cause of fornication, if you marry another, will not commit adultery.'

To one making such suggestions, let him with an instructed heart reply that, while indeed he who has dismissed his wife save for the cause of fornication and married another commits adultery more grievously, yet he too who, having dismissed a fornicating wife, has joined another to himself, does not therefore not commit adultery, merely because he leaves an adulteress: just as he who marries a woman dismissed save for the cause of fornication commits adultery; nor does he who marries a woman whom he finds to have been dismissed save for the cause of fornication therefore not commit adultery. And on this account, what was set down somewhat obscurely in Matthew—since the whole was signified by a part—has been expounded in the other Evangelists, who expressed the whole generally, as it is read in Mark:

'Whoever dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery'; and in Luke: 'Everyone who dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery.' For they did not say that some who dismiss their wives and marry others commit adultery, and others do not; but 'Whoever dismisses'—they said that absolutely everyone who dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery, without any exception. But if that Christian should thus answer the tempter, understanding that it was indeed lawful for him to dismiss the adulteress, but not lawful to marry another, what then? What if that tempter says: 'Commit this sin, that you may gain a soul for Christ—the soul of a woman set in the death of unbelief, who is ready, if she marries you, to become a Christian'?

What else ought a Christian to answer to these things and to say, but that he cannot—if he did this—escape the judgment which the Apostle mentioned, where he says: 'And as some affirm that we say, Let us do evil, that good may come; whose condemnation is just'? And how could she be soundly made a Christian, who with the man by whom she is married would be an adulteress?

But not only must one not commit adultery—which not merely someone, but everyone who dismisses his wife and marries another does, even if he married for the sake of making her a Christian—but also whoever, not being bound to a wife, has vowed continence to God, ought in no way to sin by this compensation, so as to believe that a wife is to be married by him because she who seeks marriage with him has promised that she will become a Christian. For what was lawful for anyone before he had vowed, when he has vowed that he will never do it, will not be lawful;

provided, however, that he has vowed what ought to be vowed, such as perpetual virginity, or continence after marriage has been experienced, by those loosed from the marriage bond, or by faithful and chaste spouses who vow by mutual consent and release to one another the debts of the flesh—which it is not lawful for one to vow without the other. These things, then, and any others that are most rightly vowed, when men have vowed them, are on no condition to be broken, since they vowed them on no condition; for this too is to be understood as the Lord's precept, where it is read: 'Vow and pay to the Lord your God.'

Hence the Apostle, concerning certain women who vow continence and afterward wish to marry—which was surely lawful for them before they had vowed—says: 'having damnation, because they have made void their first faith.' Nothing, then, that is unlawful is expedient, and nothing that the Lord forbids is lawful. But in those matters which, with no precept of the Lord constraining, are left to one's own power, let the Apostle be heard admonishing and counseling in the Holy Spirit, that either the better things be embraced, or those things that are not expedient be avoided. There let him be heard saying: 'I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel,' and: 'I speak, not the Lord.' There, if he who hears chooses the better things:

'Are you loosed from a wife? Seek not a wife'—since even if he takes a wife, he does not sin; there, let a virgin not marry; for he who gives not in marriage does better, and he who gives in marriage does well; there, let a woman be more blessed by so remaining, who, her husband being dead, has it in her power to marry whom she will, only in the Lord. This can be taken in two ways: either remaining a Christian, or marrying a Christian.

For I do not recall its having been declared without ambiguity, in the time of the revealed New Testament, either in the Gospel or in any apostolic writings, whether the Lord forbade the faithful to be joined to unbelievers—although the most blessed Cyprian does not doubt on this point, nor does he reckon among light sins the joining of the bond of matrimony with unbelievers, and says that this is to prostitute the members of Christ to the Gentiles. But since concerning those who are already joined there is a different question, let the Apostle here too be heard saying: 'If any brother has an unbelieving wife, and she consents to dwell with him, let him not dismiss her;'

and the woman who has an unbelieving husband, and he consents to dwell with her, let her not dismiss her husband. And let this be so heard that, although it be lawful to do it—since the Lord does not say this—yet let it not be done, because it is not expedient. For that not all things which are lawful are expedient, the Apostle most plainly teaches, as we have already shown above. Yet on account of any kind of fornication whatsoever, whether of flesh or of spirit—where unbelief too is understood—both the husband being dismissed it is not lawful for the wife to marry another, and the wife being dismissed it is not lawful to marry another, since the Lord says, with no exception made: 'If a wife dismisses her husband and marries another, she commits adultery,' and: 'Everyone who dismisses his wife and marries another commits adultery.'

Having treated and discussed these matters according to my small measure, I am nevertheless not unaware that the question concerning marriages is most obscure and most intricate. Nor do I dare to profess that I have as yet unraveled all its recesses, whether in this work or in another, or that I am even now able, if pressed, to unravel them. But as for that matter on which you think I should be consulted in another paper, I too would take care to disentangle it separately, if it seemed otherwise to me than it did to you; but since our opinion is the same, there is no need to dispute further on this point.

To catechumens, therefore, who are set in the last extremity of this life, if by sickness or by some mishap they are so overcome that, although they still live, they nevertheless cannot ask baptism for themselves or answer the questions put to them, let it profit them that their will, being already known through their Christian faith, is manifest, so that they may be baptized in the same manner as infants are baptized, whose will has as yet appeared not at all. Yet we ought not on that account to condemn those who act more timidly than it seems to us they ought to act, lest we be judged to have wished to pass judgment more rashly than cautiously concerning the money entrusted to a fellow servant. For in such cases that saying of the Apostle is much to be regarded, where he says: 'Each one of us shall give account of himself to God. Let us not therefore judge one another any more.'

For there are those who think that in these matters, or even in others, that must be observed which we read the Lord to have said: 'Do not give what is holy to dogs, neither cast your pearls before swine.' And, revering these words of the Savior, they do not dare to baptize those who could not answer for themselves, lest perchance they act contrary to their will's choice. But this cannot be said of little children, in whom there is as yet no use of reason.

But not only is it incredible that a catechumen should not wish to be baptized even at the end of this life, but also, if his will is uncertain, it is far better to give to one unwilling than to deny to one willing, where whether he wills or is unwilling does not so appear, that yet it is more credible that he, if he could, would rather have said that he wished to receive those sacraments, without which he has already believed that he ought not to depart from the body. But if the Lord, where He says 'Do not give what is holy to dogs,' had wished this to be understood which these men think must be guarded against, He would not Himself have given to His own betrayer that which he, unworthy among the worthy, received to his own ruin, without fault of the giver.

Hence, when the Lord said this, we must believe that He wished to signify that unclean hearts do not bear the light of spiritual understanding. And if a teacher forces upon them things to be borne which they do not rightly receive—because they do not grasp them—they either tear them with the bites of censure or trample them by contempt. For if the blessed Apostle says that he gave milk, not solid food, even to those already reborn in Christ but still little ones—'for you were not yet able,' he says, 'nor indeed are you even now able'—if, finally, the Lord Himself said to His chosen apostles, 'I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now,' how much less can the unclean minds of the impious endure whatever is said about the incorporeal light!

But that our discourse may rather be brought to a close upon that from which it took its beginning: I think that not only other catechumens, but even those very persons who, joined to the marriages of living spouses, retain adulterous unions—though while sound in body we do not admit them to baptism—yet, if they lie in despair of life and cannot answer for themselves, are to be baptized, so that this sin too, along with the rest, may be washed away by the laver of regeneration. For who knows whether perhaps they had resolved to be held back by the enticement of adulterous flesh only until baptism? But if, recovered from that despair, they should be able to live, they will either do what they had resolved, or, being instructed, will obey, or of the contemners will come to pass what ought also to come to pass concerning such as have been baptized.