Letters & Polemics (CSEL) 41

VIII. THE BOOK ON THE NATURE OF THE GOOD. The highest good, than which there is nothing higher, is God; and therefore it is an unchangeable good; therefore truly eternal and truly immortal. All other goods are only from Him, but not of Him. For what is of Him is what He Himself is; but the things which were made by Him are not what He Himself is. And therefore, if He alone is unchangeable, all things that He made, because He made them out of nothing, are changeable. For He is so omnipotent that He can make good things even out of nothing — that is, out of that which is not at all — both great and small, both heavenly and earthly, both spiritual and corporeal. But because He is also just, He did not make equal to that which He begot of Himself the things which He made out of nothing.

Since, therefore, all goods, whether great or small, through whatever grades of things, cannot be except from God; and since every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good: every nature cannot be except from the highest and true God — because all goods, even those not highest but near to the highest good, and again all goods even the lowest, which are far from the highest good, cannot be except from the highest good itself. Every spirit, therefore, even a changeable one, and every body is from God: this is all created nature. For every nature is either spirit or body. The unchangeable Spirit is God; changeable spirit is created nature, but better than body;

but body is not spirit — except that the wind, because it is invisible to us and yet its force, which is not small, is felt, is in a certain other manner called 'spirit.' Now, for the sake of those who, since they cannot understand that every nature — that is, every spirit and every body — is by nature good, are moved by the iniquity of spirit and the mortality of body, and on this account attempt to introduce another nature of malignant spirit and of mortal body which God did not make: we think that they can be led to the understanding of what we say. For they confess that no good can be except from the highest and true God, which is both true, and sufficient for their correction, if they are willing to attend to it.

For we Catholic Christians worship God, from whom all goods are, whether great or small; from whom is all measure, whether great or small; from whom every form, whether great or small; from whom every order, whether great or small. For all things, the more they are measured, formed, and ordered, the more surely are they good; but the less they are measured, the less formed, the less ordered they are, the less good they are. These three, then — measure, form, and order — to say nothing of the innumerable things which are shown to pertain to these three, these three therefore, measure, form, order, are as it were general goods in the things made by God, whether in spirit or in body.

God, therefore, is above every measure of the creature, above every form, above every order — and not above by spaces of place, but by ineffable and singular power, from whom is all measure, all form, all order. These three, where they are great, are great goods; where they are small, are small goods; where they are none, there is no good. And again these three, where they are great, are great natures; where they are small, are small natures; where they are none, there is no nature. Every nature, therefore, is good. Accordingly, when it is asked whence evil comes, one must first ask what evil is: which is nothing else than the corruption either of natural measure, or of form, or of order. That nature, then, is called evil which is corrupted;

for uncorrupted it is certainly good. But even the corrupted itself, insofar as it is a nature, is good; insofar as it is corrupted, it is evil. Now it can happen that a certain nature, which is more excellently ordered in natural measure and form, may even when corrupted be still better than another which is incorrupt but is more lowly ordered in lesser natural measure and form. Just as in the estimation of men, according to the quality which lies open to the sight, corrupted gold is certainly better than incorrupt silver, and corrupted silver is better than incorrupt lead: so also in more powerful and spiritual natures, a rational spirit corrupted through an evil will is better than an irrational one incorrupt;

and any spirit, even corrupted, is better than any body, even incorrupt. For a nature which, when present to a body, furnishes it with life, is better than that to which life is furnished. But however much the created spirit of life may be corrupted, it can furnish life to a body; and therefore, though corrupt, it is better than that body, however incorrupt. But corruption, if it should take away all measure, all form, all order from corruptible things, no nature will remain. And therefore every nature which cannot be corrupted is the highest good, as God is. But every nature which can be corrupted is itself also some good: for corruption could not harm it except by taking away and diminishing what is good.

But to the most excellent creatures — that is, to rational spirits — God granted this: that if they are unwilling, they cannot be corrupted; that is, if they preserve obedience under the Lord their God and so cleave to His incorruptible beauty; but if they are unwilling to preserve obedience, then, since willingly they are corrupted in sins, unwillingly they are corrupted in punishments. For God is such a good that it is well with no one who forsakes Him; and among the things made by God, the rational nature is so great a good that there is no good by which it is made blessed except God. Sinners, therefore, are set in order among punishments: which ordering, because it does not befit their nature, is therefore penalty; but because it befits their fault, it is therefore justice.

But the rest, which were made out of nothing, which are certainly inferior to the rational spirit, can be neither blessed nor wretched. Yet because according to their measure and form they too are good, and could not be — though lesser and least goods — except from the highest good, God, they are so ordered that the weaker yield to the stronger, the less able to the more able, the less powerful to the more powerful, and thus earthly things are in concord with the heavenly, as things subject to those that excel them. And there comes to be, in things departing and succeeding, a certain temporal beauty in its own kind, so that not even the very things which die, or cease to be what they were, disfigure or disturb the measure, form, and order of the whole creation:

just as a well-composed discourse is certainly beautiful, although in it the syllables and all the sounds run past as if by being born and dying. But of what kind and how great a penalty is owed to each fault is a matter of the divine judgment, not the human: which judgment, even when it is remitted to the converted, is great goodness with God; and when it is paid as owed, there is no iniquity with God, because a nature is better ordered so that it justly grieves in punishment than that it should rejoice with impunity in sin. Yet even so, having some measure and form and order, in whatever extremity it is still some good: which if they be wholly withdrawn and utterly consumed, there will therefore be no good, because no nature will remain.

All corruptible natures, therefore, would not be natures at all unless they were from God; nor would they be corruptible if they were of Him, because they would be what He Himself is. Therefore, in whatever measure, whatever form, whatever order they are, it is because God is He by whom they were made; but they are not unchangeable because it is nothing out of which they were made. For it is a sacrilegious audacity to equate nothing and God, if we should wish that which was made by Him out of nothing to be such as that which was born of God. Wherefore neither can any harm be done to the nature of God at all, nor can any harm be done unjustly to any nature under God, because even when some do harm unjustly by sinning, the unjust will is imputed to them; but the power by which they are permitted to do harm

is only from God, who knows — even when they themselves know not — what those ought to suffer to whom He permits them to do harm. All these things being so plain, so certain, if those who introduce another nature which God did not make were willing to attend to them, they would not be filled with such great blasphemies as to place such great goods in the highest evil, and such great evils in God. For it suffices, as I said above, for their correction, if they are willing to attend to it, that the truth compels them, even unwilling, to confess that all goods whatever are only from God. Therefore great goods are not from one and small goods from another, but both great and small goods are only from the highest good, which is God. Let us therefore recall goods as great as we can, which it is worthy to attribute to God the author.

And when these are taken away, let us see whether any nature will remain. All life, both great and small; all power, both great and small; all safety, both great and small; all memory, both great and small; all understanding, both great and small; all tranquillity, both great and small; all virtue, both great and small; all abundance, both great and small; all sense, both great and small; all light, both great and small; all sweetness, both great and small; all measure, both great and small; all beauty, both great and small.

All peace, both great and small, and whatever things similar to these can be found, and above all those things which are found throughout all things, whether spiritual or corporeal; all measure, all form, all order, both great and small, are from the Lord God. Whoever chooses to make evil use of all these goods will pay the penalty by the divine judgment; but where none of these is present at all, no nature will remain. Yet among all these things, whatever things are small are, in comparison with greater things, called by contrary names: just as in the human figure, because there is greater beauty, in comparison with it the beauty of the ape is called ugliness. And it deceives the imprudent, as though the one were good and the other evil;

and they do not attend to the ape's own proper measure in its body: the symmetry of its members on both sides, the harmony of its parts, the preservation of its wholeness, and the rest, which it would be tedious to enumerate. But, so that what we are saying may be understood and satisfaction may be given even to the very slow — or even that the obstinate, who resist truth most openly, may be compelled to confess what is true — let them be asked whether corruption can harm the body of an ape. If it can, so as to make it more hideous, what does it diminish except the good of beauty? Hence something will remain as long as the nature of the body subsists; accordingly, if by the good being consumed the nature is consumed, then the nature is good. Thus too we call the slow contrary to the swift; yet a thing that does not move at all cannot even be called slow.

So too we call a low voice contrary to a high one, or a rough voice contrary to a melodious one; but if you take away entirely every kind of voice, there is silence where there is no voice — which silence, precisely because there is no voice, is nevertheless wont to be set over against voice as its contrary. So too the bright and the dark are called two contraries; yet even dark things have something of light, and if they were entirely without it, there is darkness, which is the absence of light, just as silence is the absence of voice. Yet even these privations of things are so ordered within the universe of nature that to those who consider wisely they hold their alternating turns not unbecomingly. For God, by not illuminating certain places and times, made the darkness as fittingly as the day.

For if we, by withholding the voice, becomingly interpose silence in our speaking, how much more does He becomingly make the privations of certain things, as the perfect Artificer of all things? Hence also in the hymn of the three children even light and darkness praise God — that is, they beget His praise in the hearts of those who consider well. Therefore no nature is evil in so far as it is nature; but to each nature nothing is evil except the diminishing of its good. And if by diminishing it were consumed away, then just as no good, so no nature would be left — not only such a nature as the Manichaeans introduce, in which so many goods are found that their excessive blindness is astonishing, but even such as anyone at all might introduce. For not even that matter which the ancients called hyle is to be called evil.

I do not mean that which Manichaeus, in his most senseless folly, not knowing what he says, calls hyle — the fashioner of bodies (whence it was rightly said to him that he introduces another god; for no one can fashion and create bodies except God: for they are not created unless measure and form and order subsist in them, which cannot be, nor be good, except from God — a point which I think even they now confess). Rather, by hyle I mean a certain wholly formless matter, without quality, from which those qualities that we perceive are formed, as the ancients said. For from this too wood is in Greek called hyle, because it is fit for those who work, not so that it should itself make anything, but so that from it something may be made.

Therefore not even this hyle is to be called evil, which can be perceived by no form, but can scarcely be conceived by the total privation of form. For it too has the capacity to receive forms; for if it could not receive the form imposed by the artificer, it certainly would not be called matter at all. Moreover, if form is some good — whence those who excel in it are called shapely (formosi), as from beauty of form (species) they are called comely (speciosi) — then without doubt the capacity for form is also some good; just as, because wisdom is a good, no one doubts that to be capable of wisdom is a good. And because every good is from God, no one ought to doubt that even this matter, if there is any, is not except from God. Magnificently, therefore, and divinely did our God say to His servant: 'I am who I am,' and:

'Thou shalt say to the children of Israel: He who is hath sent me to you.' For He truly is, because He is unchangeable; for every change causes that which was not to be. Truly, then, He is who is unchangeable; the rest, which were made by Him, received their being from Him, each according to its own measure. Therefore to Him who supremely is, nothing can be contrary except that which is not; and through this, just as from Him is everything that is good, so from Him is everything that is natural, since everything that naturally is, is good. And so every nature is good, and every good is from God; therefore every nature is from God. But pain — which some judge to be especially an evil — whether it be in the soul or in the body, cannot itself exist except in good natures.

For this very thing, that it resists so as to feel pain, in a certain way refuses to cease to be what it was, because it was some good. But when it is forced toward the better, the pain is useful; when toward the worse, it is useless. In the soul, therefore, pain is produced by the will resisting a greater power; in the body, pain is produced by the sense resisting a more powerful body. But there are evils without pain that are worse; for it is worse to rejoice in iniquity than to grieve at corruption. Yet even such rejoicing cannot exist except from the attainment of lower goods; but iniquity is the abandonment of better goods. Likewise in the body, a wound with pain is better than putrefaction without pain, which is specifically called corruption:

which the Lord's dead flesh did not see — that is, did not undergo — as it had been foretold in prophecy: 'Neither wilt thou give thy Holy One to see corruption.' For who denies that He was wounded by the piercing of the nails and struck by the lance? But even that which is properly called by all the corruption of the body — that is, putrefaction itself — if it still has something to consume deeply, the corruption grows by diminishing the good. But if it consumes it utterly, then just as no good, so no nature will remain, because now the corruption will have nothing to corrupt. And therefore not even the putrefaction itself will be, because there will be nothing at all where it might be.

Indeed, for this reason things that are small and slight are already, by common usage of speech, called moderate (modica), because some measure (modus) remains in them, without which they would now be not moderate but altogether nothing. But those things which, on account of excessive advance, are called immoderate, are blamed by that very excess; yet even they, being under God, who 'has arranged all things in measure and number and weight,' must necessarily be restrained by some measure. But God must not be said to have measure, lest it be thought that an end of Him is being spoken of. Nor for that reason is He immoderate, He by whom measure is bestowed on all things, that they may be able to exist in some measure. Nor again ought God to be called moderate, as though He had received measure from someone.

But if we say that He is the supreme measure, perhaps we say something, provided that in what we call supreme measure we understand the supreme good. For every measure, in so far as it is measure, is good: whence all things measured, modest, and modified cannot be spoken of without praise, although under another understanding we set measure for end, and say 'no measure' where there is no end — which is sometimes said with praise, as it is said: 'and of His kingdom there shall be no end.' For it could also be said, 'there shall be no measure,' so that measure would be understood as put for end; for he who reigns in no measure certainly does not reign at all.

An evil measure, then, or an evil form, or an evil order are so called either because they are less than they ought to have been, or because they are not accommodated to those things to which they ought to be accommodated: so that they are called evil because they are alien and unfitting — as if someone were said to have acted in no good manner (measure) because he did less than he ought, or because he acted as in such a matter he ought not to have acted, or more than was fitting, or unsuitably: so that the very thing which is censured as done in an evil manner is justly censured for no other reason than that measure was not there preserved.

Likewise a form is called evil either in comparison with a more shapely and more beautiful one, because this is a lesser form and that a greater — not in bulk, but in comeliness — or because it does not suit this thing to which it is applied, so that it appears alien and unfitting: as if a naked man were to walk about in the marketplace, which gives no offense if he be seen in the bath. Similarly order too is then called evil when order itself is less preserved: whence there is not order there, but rather disorder is the evil, when either less is ordered than ought to be, or not as it ought. Yet where there is some measure, some form, some order, there is some good and some nature; but where there is no measure, no form, no order, there is no good, no nature.

These things, which our faith holds and which reason has in some fashion traced out, must be fortified by the testimonies of the divine Scriptures, so that those who cannot attain them by a lesser understanding may believe the divine authority, and on this account may deserve to understand; while those who do understand, but are less instructed in the Church's writings, may not think that we are rather bringing these things forth from our own understanding than that they are in those books. And so, that God is unchangeable is thus written in the Psalms: 'Thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed; but Thou art the selfsame'; and in the book of Wisdom, concerning Wisdom itself: 'remaining in herself, she reneweth all things.' Whence also the apostle Paul: 'to the invisible, incorruptible, only God'; and the apostle James:

'every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no change nor shadow of a moment.' Likewise, that what He begot of Himself is that which He Himself is, is thus briefly stated by the Son Himself: 'I and the Father are one.' But that the Son was not made — seeing that all things were made through Him — is thus written: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God; the same was in the beginning with God. All things were made through Him, and without Him was made nothing' — that is, nothing was made without Him.

For the ravings of men are not to be heeded, who suppose that in this place 'nothing' is to be understood as something, and think that someone can for this reason be driven to a folly of this kind, because 'nothing' (nihil) is placed at the end of the sentence. 'Therefore,' they say, 'it was made, and therefore, because it was made, that nothing is something'; for they have lost their sense through the zeal of contradicting, and do not understand that it makes no difference whether it is said 'without Him nothing was made' or 'without Him was made nothing' — because even if it were said in that order, 'without Him nothing was made,' they could none the less say that that nothing is something, because it was made.

For as regards that which really is something, what difference does it make whether it be said 'without him a house was made' or 'without him was made a house,' so long as it is understood that something was made without him, which something a house is? So then, because it is said 'without Him was made nothing,' since nothing at all is not something — when it is truly and properly said — whether it be said 'without Him was made nothing' or 'without Him nothing was made' or 'nothing was made,' it makes no difference. But who would wish to speak with men who, at this very thing which I said, 'it makes no difference,' are able to say: 'therefore it makes some difference (something), because that nothing is something'?

But those who have a sound brain see the most manifest fact, that the same thing is understood when I said 'it makes no difference (nihil interest)' as would be understood if I were to say 'interest nihil.' But these men — if to someone they should say, 'What have you done?' and he should answer that he has done nothing — it follows that they slander him, saying: 'You have therefore done something, because you have done nothing; for that nothing is something.' But they have the Lord Himself too placing this word at the end of a sentence, where He says: 'and in secret I have spoken nothing.' Let them therefore read, and be silent. Since, then, God made all things which He did not beget of Himself, but made through His Word, not from those things which already were, but from those which were not at all — that is, from nothing — the apostle thus says:

'who calls the things that are not, as though they were.' But more plainly it is written in the book of Maccabees: 'I beseech thee, my son, look upon heaven and earth and all that is in them; behold and know that God made us out of things that were not.' And that which is written in the Psalm: 'He Himself spoke, and they were made' — it is manifest that He did not beget these things of Himself, but made them by His word and command; but what was not of Himself was assuredly from nothing. For there was nothing else out of which He might make them. Concerning which the apostle says most plainly: 'For of Him and through Him and in Him are all things.'

But 'of Him' (ex ipso) does not signify the same as 'from Him' (de ipso). For that which is of Him can be said to be 'ex ipso'; but not everything which is 'ex ipso' is rightly said to be 'de ipso.' For heaven and earth are 'ex ipso,' because He made them, but not 'de ipso,' because not of His substance. Just as some man, if he beget a son and make a house — of him is the son, of him is the house; but the son is from him (de ipso), the house from earth and wood. But this is because he is a man, who cannot make anything out of nothing; whereas God, of whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things, had no need of any matter which He Himself had not made, to assist His omnipotence.

But when we hear 'all things of Him and through Him and in Him,' we ought certainly to understand all natures that naturally are. For sins are not of Him, which do not preserve nature but vitiate it. And that these sins are from the will of those who sin, Holy Scripture testifies in many ways, especially in that place where the apostle says: 'But dost thou think this, O man, who judgest those who do such things and doest them, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God? Or dost thou despise the riches of His goodness and patience and long-suffering, being ignorant that the patience of God leads thee to repentance?'

'but according to thy hardness and impenitent heart thou treasurest up to thyself wrath in the day of wrath and of the revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to every man according to his works.' And yet, although in God are all things which He founded, those who sin do not defile Him, of whose wisdom it is said: 'she reacheth everywhere by reason of her purity, and no defiled thing cometh into her.' For it is fitting that, just as we believe God to be incorruptible and unchangeable, so we should consequently believe Him also to be incapable of defilement. But that He Himself made even the least goods — that is, the earthly and mortal — is understood without doubt from that place of the apostle, where, speaking of the members of our flesh, he says: 'because if one member be glorified, all the members rejoice with it;'

'and if one member suffers, all the members suffer with it.' There too he says this: 'God has set the members, each one of them in the body, as He willed'; and: 'God has tempered the body, giving more abundant honor to that which lacked it, that there should be no schism in the body, but that the members should be alike careful one for another.' But this which the apostle thus praises in the measure and form and order of the members of the flesh, you find in the flesh of all animals, both the greatest and the least, since all flesh is reckoned among earthly goods and thereby among the least. Likewise, that to each fault such and so great a penalty is due, belongs to the divine judgment, not the human, as it is thus written: 'O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God!

'how unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out!' Likewise, that by the goodness of God sins are forgiven to the converted, this very thing — that Christ was sent — sufficiently shows, who died for us not in His own nature, wherein He is God, but in ours, which He assumed of a woman. This goodness of God toward us, and His love, the apostle thus proclaims: 'God commendeth His charity toward us,' he says, 'in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us; much more then, being now justified by His blood, shall we be saved from wrath through Him. For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by His life.'

But that even when the deserved penalty is rendered to sinners there is no iniquity with God, he thus says: 'What shall we say? Is God unjust, who inflicts wrath?' And in one place he briefly noted that both goodness and severity are from Him, saying: 'Behold therefore the goodness and severity of God: toward them indeed that fell, severity; but toward thee, goodness, if thou continue in goodness.' Likewise, that even the power of those who do harm is not except from God, it is thus written, Wisdom speaking: 'By me kings reign, and tyrants through me hold the earth.' The apostle also says: 'For there is no power except from God.' And that this is done worthily is written in the book of Job: 'He maketh a hypocrite to reign,' he says, 'because of the perversity of the people.'

And concerning the people of Israel God says: 'I gave them a king in my wrath.' For it is not unjust that, when the wicked receive the power of doing harm, the patience of the good should be tested and the iniquity of the evil punished. For through the power given to the devil, Job too was tested, that he might appear just; and Peter was tempted, lest he should presume upon himself; and Paul was buffeted, lest he should exalt himself; and Judas was condemned, so that he hanged himself. Since, therefore, through the power which He gave to the devil, God Himself did all things justly, yet not for these things justly done, but for the unjust will of doing harm, which was the devil's own, punishment shall be rendered to him in the end, when it shall be said to the impious who have persevered in consenting to his wickedness:

'Depart into the eternal fire, which my Father has prepared for the devil and his angels.' But that even the evil angels themselves were not created evil by God, but became evil by sinning, Peter thus says in his epistle: 'For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but thrusting them into the prisons of the gloom of hell, delivered them to be reserved unto judgment to be punished.' Hence Peter shows that the penalty of the last judgment is still owed to them, concerning which the Lord says: 'Depart into the eternal fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels.'

although they have already received, as a penal place, this lower region — that is, this lower gloomy air as a prison — which, however, because it too is called 'heaven,' is not that heaven in which the stars are, but this lower one, by whose murk the clouds are massed together, and where the birds fly about — for the cloudy region too is called heaven, and the flying creatures are called 'the birds of heaven.' According to this, the apostle Paul names these same iniquitous angels, against whom, as envious of us, we fight by living piously, 'the spiritual forces of wickedness in the heavenly places.' And lest this be understood of those higher heavens, he plainly says elsewhere: 'according to the prince of the power of this air, who now works in the children of unbelief.'

Likewise, that sin or iniquity is not the seeking of evil natures, but the abandonment of better ones, is thus found written in the Scriptures: 'every creature of God is good'; and thereby also every tree which God planted in paradise is assuredly good. Man therefore did not seek an evil nature when he touched the forbidden tree, but by abandoning that which was better he himself committed a deed made evil. For the Creator is better than any creature which He founded, whose command was not to be abandoned so that the forbidden thing should be touched — however good — since, the better being abandoned, the good of the creature was sought, which was touched against the Creator's command.

God, then, had not planted an evil tree in paradise, but He Himself was the better, who forbade it to be touched. For He had forbidden it for this purpose: to show that the nature of the rational soul ought not to be in its own power, but subject to God, and to keep the order of its own salvation through obedience, and to corrupt it through disobedience. Hence also He so named the tree which He forbade to be touched, 'the tree of the discernment of good and evil,' because when the soul had touched it against the prohibition, it would experience the penalty of sin, and in that way would discern what difference there is between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience.

For who would be so foolish as to think that a creature of God, planted above all in paradise, should be censured — since not even those very thorns and thistles, which the earth, according to God's judicial will, brought forth for the sinner to wear himself out upon in labor, are rightly censured? For such plants too have their own measure and form and order, which whoever soberly considers will find worthy of praise; but they are evils to that nature which it was fitting should thus be restrained by the merit of sin. Sin, therefore, as I said, is not the seeking of an evil nature, but the abandonment of a better one; and thus the deed itself is the evil, not that nature which the sinner ill uses. For it is evil to make evil use of a good.

Whence the apostle censures certain men condemned by the divine judgment, who 'worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator.' For he does not censure the creature — which whoever does, does injury to the Creator — but those who made evil use of a good, having abandoned the better. Accordingly, if all natures were to preserve their own proper measure and form and order, there would be no evil; but if anyone should choose to make evil use of these goods, not even so does he overcome the will of God, who knows how justly to order even the unjust, so that if they, through the iniquity of their own will, have made evil use of His goods, He, through the justice of His power, may make good use of their evils, rightly ordering in penalties those who have perversely ordered themselves in sins.

For not even that eternal fire itself, which is to torment the impious, is an evil nature, having its own measure and form and order, depraved by no iniquity; but it is an evil torment to the damned, to whose sins it is due. For neither is this light of ours an evil nature because it torments sore eyes. But the eternal fire is not eternal as God is eternal, because, although it be without end, it is nevertheless not without beginning; whereas God is even without beginning. Then, although it be applied everlastingly to the punishments of sinners, it is nevertheless a changeable nature. But that is true eternity which is true immortality; this is that supreme immutability which God alone has, who cannot at all be changed. For it is one thing not to be changed,

when it could be changed, but quite another thing to be utterly unable to be changed. Just as, therefore, a man is called good, yet not as God is, of whom it is said: 'None is good but one, God'; and as a soul is called immortal, yet not as God is, of whom it is said: 'He alone has immortality'; and as a man is called wise, yet not as God is, of whom it is said: 'to God alone wise' — so is fire called eternal, yet not as God is, of whom alone the immortality is true eternity. Since these things are so according to the catholic faith and sound doctrine and the truth manifest to the understanding, neither can anyone harm the nature of God, nor does the nature of God unjustly harm anyone, nor does it suffer anyone to harm with impunity;

'for he who does harm,' says the apostle, 'shall receive back that which he did wrongfully; and there is no respect of persons with God.' If the Manichaeans were willing to consider this without the pernicious zeal of defending their error, and with the fear of God, they would not most wickedly blaspheme by introducing two natures, one good, which they call God, the other evil, which God did not make — thus erring, thus raving, nay rather thus going mad, so that they do not see that even in what they call the nature of the supreme evil they place so many goods, where they place life, power, health, memory, understanding, temperance, virtue, abundance, sense, light, sweetness, measures, numbers, peace, measure, form, order; while in what they call the supreme good they place so many evils:

death, sickness, forgetfulness, folly, disturbance, powerlessness, want, stupidity, blindness, pain, iniquity, disgrace, war, immoderation, deformity, perversity. For they say that the princes of darkness both lived in their own nature and were saved in their own kingdom and remembered and understood. For they say that the prince of darkness so harangued them that he could neither have said such things himself, nor have been heard by those to whom he spoke, without memory and understanding:

and that he had a temperance suited to his soul and body, and reigned by the virtue of his power, and had stores of his elements and of fertility, and perceived one another and the light neighboring him, and had eyes with which they might behold that light from afar — which eyes assuredly could not see light without some light, whence they too are rightly called 'lights'; and that they had the full enjoyment of the sweetness of their pleasure, and were bounded by measured members and dwellings. But unless some beauty, of whatever kind, had been there, they would neither love their consorts, nor would their bodies consist of the congruity of parts: which, where it is not present, those things cannot come to pass which they rave were done there.

And unless there were some peace there, they would not obey their prince. Unless there were measure there, they would do nothing else than eat or drink or rage or whatever else, without any satiety; although not even those who did this would be defined by their own forms, unless there were measure there. But now they say that these did such things as they cannot deny that they had measures suited to themselves in all their actions. But if form had not been there, no natural quality would subsist there. If no order had been there, some would not rule and others be subjected, they would not live congruously in their elements, nor finally would they have their members disposed in their own places, so that they might do all those things which these men vainly fable.

But as for the nature of God: if they do not say it is dead, what, according to their vanity, does Christ raise up? If they do not say it is sick, what does He heal? If they do not say it is forgetful, of what does He remind it? If they do not say it is foolish, what does He teach it? If they do not say it is disturbed, what does He restore? If it was not conquered and captured, what does He set free? If it is not in want, whom does He succor? If it has not lost sense, what does He quicken? If it is not blinded, what does He enlighten? If it is not in pain, what does He revive? If it is not iniquitous, what does He correct through precepts? If it is not disgraced, what does He cleanse? If it is not at war, to whom does He promise peace? If it is not immoderate, on whom does He impose the measure of the law? If it is not deformed, what does He re-form? If it is not perverse, what does He amend?

For they say that all these things are bestowed by Christ not upon that thing which was made by God and depraved by its own choice through sinning, but upon the very nature, the very substance of God, which is that which God is. What can be compared to these blasphemies? Nothing whatever. But if the errors of other perverse sects be considered — and if, moreover, this error be compared with itself on the other side, of which we have not yet spoken — it is convicted of blaspheming against the nature of God still far more grievously and execrably.

For they say that there are also certain souls which they hold to be of the substance of God and of altogether the same nature, souls which did not sin of their own accord but were overcome and crushed by the race of darkness (which they call an evil nature), a race to which they descended not willingly but by the Father's command in order to make war on it; and these souls, they say, are fixed forever to a horrible globe of darkness. Thus, according to their sacrilegious idle talk, God freed a certain part of himself from a great evil, and again condemned a certain part of himself which he could not free from the enemy, and over that very conquered enemy he moreover triumphed. O the wicked and incredible audacity of believing such things about God, of speaking them, of proclaiming them! And this they attempt to defend.

So that with closed eyes they rush into worse things. They say that the admixture of the evil nature causes these things, so that God's good nature suffers such great evils; for by itself and in itself it could not and cannot suffer any of these things. As though the incorruptible nature were to be praised because it does no harm to itself, and not rather because nothing can harm it from any quarter. Furthermore, if the nature of darkness harmed the nature of God, and the nature of God harmed the nature of darkness, then there are two evils that harmed each other; and the race of darkness was of a better disposition, because even if it harmed, it harmed unwillingly — for it did not wish to harm, but to enjoy the good of God. God, however, wished to extinguish it, as Manichaeus most openly raves in the letter of his ruinous 'Foundation.'

For he forgot what he had said a little before: 'And so those most splendid kingdoms of the same one were founded upon a bright and blessed land, so that they can never be moved or shaken by anyone.' Afterward he said: 'But the Father of the most blessed light, knowing the great ruin and devastation which was rising up from the darkness and threatening to fall upon his holy realms, unless he should set against it some outstanding and glorious deity, mighty in power, whereby he might at once overcome and destroy the stock of darkness, so that, when it was extinguished, perpetual rest might be prepared for the inhabitants of the light.' Behold, he feared the ruin and devastation threatening his realms. Yet surely they had been founded upon the bright and blessed land in such a way that they could never be moved or shaken by anyone.

Behold, out of fear he wished to do harm to the neighboring race, which he attempted to destroy and extinguish — 'so that perpetual rest might be prepared for the inhabitants of the light.' Why did he not add 'and perpetual bondage'? Or were those souls, which he fixes forever in the globe of darkness, not inhabitants of the light — the very souls of whom he plainly says that they suffered themselves to stray from their former luminous nature? Here too, unwillingly, he was forced to say that they sinned by free will — he who refuses to place sin anywhere except in the necessity of a contrary nature, everywhere not knowing what he says, and as it were already himself shut up in the globe of darkness which he has fashioned, seeking a way out and finding none.

But let him say what he will to the seduced and wretched, by whom he is honored far more than Christ, so that at this price he may sell them such long and such sacrilegious fables. Let him say what he will, let him shut up the race of darkness in a globe as in a prison, and fix on the outside the nature of light, to which he had promised perpetual rest from the extinguished enemy: behold, the penalty of the light is worse than that of the darkness, the penalty of the divine nature worse than that of the hostile race. For that race, even if it is within in darkness, it belongs to its nature to dwell in darkness; but the souls, which are that which God is, will not be able to be received back, as he says. They will be alienated from those peaceful kingdoms and from the life and liberty of the holy light, and will be fixed in the aforesaid horrible globe.

'Whence also,' he says, 'these same souls will cleave to those things which they loved, left behind in the same globe of darkness, procuring this for themselves by their own deserts.' Surely there is no free choice of the will here. See how, in his madness, he does not know what he says, and by speaking things contrary to himself he wages a worse war against himself than against God's own race of darkness. Furthermore, if the souls of the light are condemned for this reason, because they loved darkness, then the race of darkness is unjustly condemned, which loved light. And the race of darkness indeed loved the light from the beginning, which it wished to possess, though by violence, not to extinguish; whereas the nature of light in the war wished to extinguish the darkness; therefore it loved them only after being conquered. Choose which you will:

whether it loved the darkness compelled by necessity, or seduced in its will. If by necessity, why is it condemned? If by will, why is the nature of God caught in so great an iniquity? If by necessity, the nature of God was compelled to love the darkness — therefore it was conquered, it did not conquer; if by will, why do these wretches now hesitate to attribute a will to sin to the nature which God made out of nothing, rather than assign it to the light which he begot? What then? If we should also show that, before the admixture of evil — which in their utter madness they have believed, though it was fabulously invented — there were great evils in the very nature of light which they speak of, what will it seem could be added to these blasphemies? For there, before there was any fighting, there was a harsh and inescapable necessity of fighting.

Behold now a great evil, before evil was mingled with good. Let them say whence this came, when as yet no admixture had been made. But if there was no necessity, then there was will. Whence then this so great evil, that God himself should wish to harm his own nature, which could not be harmed by the enemy, by sending it forth to be cruelly mingled, basely purged, and unjustly condemned? Behold how great an evil of a pernicious and harmful and most monstrous will, before any evil from the contrary race was mingled in. Or did he perhaps not know that this would befall his members, that they should love the darkness and become enemies to the holy light, as he himself says — that is, enemies not only to their God, but even to the Father, from whom they came?

Whence then in God this so great evil of ignorance, before any evil from the contrary race was mingled in? But if he knew this was going to happen, then either there was in him an everlasting cruelty, if he grieved not at all over the future defilement and condemnation of his own nature, or an everlasting misery, if he did grieve. Whence too this so great evil of your supreme good, before any admixture of your supreme evil? That very particle of his own nature, which is fixed in the eternal bondage of that globe — if it did not know this was hanging over it, then even so there was in the nature of God an everlasting ignorance; but if it did know, an everlasting misery. Whence this so great evil, before any evil from the contrary race was mingled in?

Or did he perhaps rejoice out of great love, because through its punishment perpetual rest was being prepared for the rest of the inhabitants of the light? How wicked it is to say that the nature of God is thus succored by the nature of God — let him who sees this anathematize it. But if he did this at least in such a way that this nature did not become an enemy to the light, he could perhaps be praised, not as the nature of God, but as some man who for his native land was willing to suffer some evil — an evil which indeed could be for a time, not forever. But now they say that fixing in the globe of darkness is eternal, and not of some mere thing, but of the nature of God. And surely it was a most iniquitous and execrable and unspeakably sacrilegious joy, if the nature of God rejoiced that it would love the darkness and become an enemy of the holy light.

Whence this so monstrous and wicked evil, before any evil from the contrary race was mingled in? Who could bear so perverse and so impious a madness — to attribute such great goods to the supreme evil, and to the supreme good, which God is, such great evils? And now indeed, in that they say this very part of God's nature is everywhere mingled — in the heavens, on the earth, beneath the earth, in all bodies dry and moist, in all flesh, in...

...in all the seeds of trees, of herbs, of men, of animals — not present by the power of divinity to administer and govern all things without any bond, inviolably and incorruptibly, as we say of God, but bound, oppressed, polluted, which they say is loosed, freed, and purged not only through the course of the sun and moon and the powers of light, but also through their own 'elect': how many sacrilegious and incredible foulnesses this kind of most abominable error persuades them to — even if it does not fully persuade — is horrible to tell.

For they say that the powers of light are transfigured into beautiful males and set against the females of the race of darkness, and again that the same powers of light are transfigured into beautiful females and set against the males of the race of darkness, so that by their beauty they may inflame the most filthy lust of the princes of darkness, and in this way the vital substance — that is, the nature of God, which they say is held bound in their bodies — being loosed from their members by that lust, may flee and, being taken up or purged, be set free. This the unhappy people read, this they say, this they hear, this they believe, and this is set down in the seventh book of their 'Treasure' — for so they call a certain writing of Manichaeus, in which these blasphemies are recorded — in these words:

'Then that blessed Father, who has ships of light as his abodes and dwellings according to their magnitudes, out of the clemency implanted in him brings aid, by which his vital substance is stripped and freed from the impious fetters, the straits, and the anguishes. And so by his invisible nod he transfigures those powers of his which are held in this most glorious ship, and makes them appear to the adverse powers which are set in order in the several tracts of the heavens.

'And since these adverse powers consist of both sexes, male and female, therefore he bids the aforesaid powers to appear, partly in the form of beardless boys to the adverse race of females, partly in the form of luminous virgins to the contrary race of males, knowing that all those hostile powers, on account of the deadly and most filthy concupiscence innate in them, are most easily captured, and by those very most beautiful forms which appear are enslaved, and in this way dissolved. But know that this same blessed Father of ours is the very same as also his own powers, which for a necessary cause he transforms into the undefiled likeness of boys and virgins. He uses them as his own weapons, and through them fulfills his will.

'And the ships of light are full of these divine powers, which are set against the infernal races after the manner of a marriage-union, and which with alacrity and ease accomplish in that same instant whatever they have conceived. And so, when reason demands that these same holy powers appear to males, straightway they display their own figure in the garb of most beautiful virgins. Again, when it comes to females, laying aside the forms of virgins, they show the form of beardless boys.'

'But by this comely sight their ardor and concupiscence grows, and in this way the bond of their most wicked thoughts is loosed, and the living soul, which was held in their members, being on this occasion released, escapes and mingles with its own most pure air, where, being utterly washed, the souls ascend to the ships of light, which are prepared for their conveyance and for the crossing over to their own homeland. But that part which still carries the stains of the adverse race descends piecemeal through the heats and warmths, and is mingled with the trees and the other plants and all crops, and is dyed with diverse colors.'

'And in the way that from this great and most glorious ship the figures of boys and virgins appear to the contrary powers which dwell in the heavens and which have a fiery nature, and from this comely appearance the part of life which is held in their members, being released, is drawn down through the heats to the earth: in the same way also that most lofty power which dwells in the ship of the vital waters appears, in the likeness of boys and holy virgins, through its own angels, to those powers whose nature is cold and moist, and which are set in order in the heavens. And indeed to those which are female, the form of boys appears in them, but to the males, that of virgins.'

'But by this change and variety of the divine and most beautiful persons, the princes of the moist and cold stock, whether male or female, are dissolved, and that which is vital in them flees; but that which has settled down, being released, is drawn down to the earth through the colds and is mingled with all the kinds of the earth.' Who could bear this? Who could believe this — I do not say that it is so, but even that it could be said? Behold those who fear to anathematize Manichaeus who teaches this, and do not fear to believe in a God who does these things and suffers these things! And through their own 'elect' they say that this same commingled part and nature of God is purged, namely by eating and drinking, because they say it is held bound in all foods:

and when these things are taken by the 'elect' as by holy men, by eating and drinking for the refreshment of the body, they are, through their holiness, loosed, sealed, and freed. Nor do the wretches consider how not incongruously it is believed of them — what they vainly deny — unless they anathematize those same books and cease to be Manichaeans. For if, as they say, in all seeds there is a bound part of God, and it is purged by the 'elect' through eating: who would not fittingly believe that they do what they read in their 'Treasure' takes place between the powers of heaven and the princes of darkness — since they even say that their own flesh is of the race of darkness, and do not hesitate to believe and affirm that that vital substance, the part of God, is held bound in it?

If indeed this must be loosed and purged by eating, as their deadly error compels them to confess, who does not see — indeed, who would not shudder — what great foulness and how abominable a thing follows? For they say that Adam, the first man, was created by certain princes of the race of darkness in such a way that the light might be held by them, lest it should flee. For in the letter which they call 'the Foundation,' Manichaeus wrote thus how the prince of darkness — whom they bring in as the father of the first man — spoke and acted toward the rest of his companions, the other princes of darkness: 'With wicked devices, therefore, he said to those who were present: What does this great light which is rising seem to you? Behold how it moves the pole, how it shakes very many powers.'

'Wherefore it is rather fitting that you should hand over to me that portion of light which you have in your own strength: for thus shall I fashion the image of that great one who appeared in glory, through which we shall be able to reign, being at last freed from the intercourse of darkness.' Hearing these things and deliberating long among themselves, they thought it most just to furnish what was demanded. For they did not trust that they would hold the same light continually: whence they judged it better to offer it to their prince, in no way despairing that they would reign in the same manner. In what way, then, they furnished the same light which they had, must be considered. For this too is sprinkled through all the divine scriptures and heavenly mysteries; but to the wise it is not at all difficult to know how it was given;

for it is openly and plainly known by him who is willing to look upon it truly and faithfully. Since the throng of those who had gathered was of mixed sort, namely of females and males, he impelled them to come together among themselves. In which coupling some of the males sowed, and some of the females were made pregnant. And the offspring were like those who had begotten them, obtaining the many powers of their parents as the first to possess them. Their prince, taking these as a special gift, rejoiced. And just as even now we see the nature that forms bodies taking its powers from evil to give shape, so also the aforesaid prince, receiving the offspring of his companions, which had the senses, the prudence, the light of their parents, procreated together with them in the generation, devoured it;

and having taken very many powers from food of this kind, in which there was not only strength, but much more of cunning and depraved sense from the savage mind of the begetters, he summoned to himself his own consort, springing from that same stock from which he himself was; and having coupled with her, he sowed, as the others did, the abundance of the evils which he had devoured, himself also adding not a little from his own thought and power, so that he might be the shaper and describer of the sense of all those things which he had poured forth; and his consort received these things, as well-tilled earth is wont to receive seed. For in her were constructed and woven together the images of all the heavenly and earthly powers, so that what was being formed might obtain the likeness of a full world.

O wicked monster! O accursed perdition and ruin of deceived souls! I pass over saying what this is concerning the nature of God, that it should be so bound. Let the wretched, deceived and poisoned with deadly error, at least attend to this: that if by the coupling of males and females the part of God is bound, which they profess to loose and purge by eating, the necessity of this so abominable error compels them not only from bread and herbs and fruits, which alone they seem openly to take, but from there too to loose and purge the part of God, whence through intercourse it can, if it be conceived in a woman's womb, be bound together.