[I 1] Now then let us inquire more diligently, so far as God grants, into what we deferred a little before: whether each single person in the Trinity can also be called, by itself and not together with the other two, God, or great, or wise, or true, or omnipotent, or just, and whatever else can be said of God, not relatively but with respect to itself; or whether these things are not said except when the Trinity is understood. For this makes the question, because it is written: 'Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God'—whether the Father is so the father of his own wisdom and power that he is wise by this wisdom which he begot, and powerful by this power which he begot; and because he is always powerful and wise, he always begot power and wisdom.
For we had said: if it is so, why is he not also the father of his own greatness by which he is great, and of his goodness by which he is good, and of his justice by which he is just, and of other such if there are any? Or if all these are understood by many names in the same wisdom and power, so that that is greatness which is power, that goodness which is wisdom, and again that wisdom which is power, as we have already treated, let us remember that when I name any one of these, it is to be taken as if I mentioned them all. It is asked, then, whether the Father is wise even singly, and is himself his own wisdom, or is wise in the way in which he is speaking.
For he is speaking by the Word which he begot—not by a word which is uttered and sounds and passes away, but by the Word which 'was with God, and God was the Word, and all things were made through him,' by the Word equal to himself, by which he always and unchangeably utters himself. For he himself is not the Word, just as he is not the Son nor the Image. But speaking (apart from those temporal voices of God which come to be in the creature, for they sound and pass away)—speaking, then, by that coeternal Word, he is understood not as single, but with that Word itself, without which he is assuredly not speaking.
Is he then also wise as he is speaking, so that his wisdom is as the Word is, and to be the Word is the same as to be wisdom, and this too is to be power, so that power and wisdom and the Word are the same thing and are said relatively, as are Son and Image; and is he not powerful or wise singly, but with that very power and wisdom which he begot, just as he is not speaking singly but by that Word and with that Word which he begot, and thus great by and with that greatness which he begot?
And if he is not great by one thing and God by another, but great by that whereby he is God—because to him to be great is not one thing and to be God another—it follows that he is not God singly either, but by and with that deity which he begot, so that the Son is the deity of the Father just as he is the wisdom and power of the Father, and just as he is the Word and Image of the Father. And because to him to be is not one thing and to be God another, so let the Son also be the essence of the Father just as he is his Word and Image.
And through this, even setting aside that which is 'Father,' the Father would not be anything except because there is a Son to him; so that not only that which is called 'Father' (which manifestly is said not with respect to himself but relatively to the Son, and is therefore Father because there is a Son to him), but altogether that he is that which he is with respect to himself, is so because he begot his own essence. For just as he is great by no other than the greatness which he begot, so also he is by no other than the essence which he begot, because to him to be is not one thing and to be great another. Is the Father, then, so the father of his own essence, as he is the father of his own greatness, as he is the father of his own power and wisdom? For his greatness is the same as his power, and the same essence as his greatness. This disputation was born from what is written:
'That Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God.' Wherefore our discourse is straitened into these narrows, when we desire to speak the ineffable, so that either we say that Christ is not the power of God and the wisdom of God, and thus shamelessly and impiously resist the Apostle; or we confess that Christ is indeed the power of God and the wisdom of God, but that his Father is not the father of his own power and wisdom, which is no less impious (for thus he will not even be the Father of Christ, since Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God); or that the Father is not powerful by his own power nor wise by his own wisdom—which who would dare to say?—
or that in the Father to be is one thing and to be wise another, so that he is not wise by that very thing whereby he is—which is wont to be understood of the soul, which is now unwise, now wise, as being a mutable nature and not supremely and perfectly simple; or that the Father is not anything with respect to himself, and that not only that he is Father, but altogether that he is, is said relatively to the Son. How then is the Son of the same essence as the Father, since with respect to himself he is not even essence, nor is at all with respect to himself, but even to be is to him relative to the Son? But rather much more they are of one and the same essence, because the essence of the Father and of the Son is one and the same, since to the Father to be is not with respect to himself but relative to the Son—the essence which he begot, and by which essence he is whatever he is.
Neither, then, is with respect to himself, and each is said relatively to the other. Or is the Father alone said not only what he is called 'Father,' but altogether whatever he is called, relatively to the Son, while the Son is said both with respect to himself and to the Father? And if it is so, what is said of him with respect to himself? Is it essence itself? But the Son is the essence of the Father, as he is the power and wisdom of the Father, as the Word of the Father and the Image of the Father. Or if the Son is called essence with respect to himself, while the Father is not essence but the begetter of essence, and is not with respect to himself but by that very essence which he begot—just as he is great by that very greatness which he begot—then the Son also is called greatness with respect to himself, and therefore also power and wisdom and Word and Image. But what is more absurd than that an image should be said with respect to itself?
Or if Image and Word are not the same thing as power and wisdom, but those are said relatively while these are said with respect to itself, not to another, then the Father begins to be wise not by that wisdom which he begot, because he cannot himself be said relatively to it while it is not said relatively to him. For all things that are said relatively are said to one another. It remains, therefore, that the Son too, even as essence, is said relatively to the Father. From which is deduced a most unexpected sense: that essence itself is not essence, or at any rate that, when 'essence' is said, not essence but something relative is indicated. Just as when 'lord' is said, not essence is indicated but the relative which is referred to a servant;
but when 'man' is said, or anything such as is said with respect to itself and not to another, then essence is indicated; a man, therefore, when he is called lord, the man himself is essence, but 'lord' is said relatively; for 'man' is said with respect to himself, 'lord' with respect to a servant. But in this matter of which we are treating, if essence itself is said relatively, essence itself is not essence. Add to this that every essence which is said relatively is also something apart from the relative, as a man who is lord and a man who is servant, and a horse which is a beast of burden, and a coin which is a pledge; man and horse and coin are said with respect to themselves and are substances or essences; but lord and servant and beast of burden and pledge are said relatively to something.
But if there were not a man, that is, some substance, there would not be one who could be called lord relatively; and if there were not a horse, some essence, there would not be that which could be called a beast of burden relatively; so if a coin were not some substance, neither could a pledge be said relatively. Wherefore, if the Father too is not anything with respect to himself, there is altogether no one who could be said relatively to another. For a colour is not referred to something coloured as its colour, nor is colour said with respect to itself at all, but is always the colour of something coloured; while that thing of which it is the colour, even if it is referred to the colour by that whereby it is called coloured, yet that which is called body is said with respect to itself: is it in any way thus to be thought that the Father is not said anything with respect to himself, but that whatever is said is said to the Son?
But the same Son is said both with respect to himself and to the Father, since 'great greatness' and 'powerful power' are said with respect to itself, and greatness and power are said of the great and powerful Father, by which the Father is great and powerful. Not so, then; but each is substance, and each one substance. And as it is absurd to say that the white is not whiteness, so it is absurd to say that the wise is not wisdom; and as whiteness is called white with respect to itself, so wisdom is called wise with respect to itself. But the whiteness of a body is not essence, since the body itself is essence and that whiteness its quality, whence the body is also called white by it, to which to be is not the same as to be white.
For there form is one thing and colour another, and both are not in themselves but in some mass, which mass is neither form nor colour but is formed and coloured. But wisdom is both wise and is wise by its very self. And since whatever soul is made wise by participation in wisdom, if it again grows foolish, wisdom nevertheless remains in itself; nor when the soul is changed into folly is wisdom changed. It is not in him who is made wise by it as whiteness is in a body which is white from it; for when the body is changed into another colour, that whiteness will not remain and will altogether cease to be.
But if the Father too, who begot wisdom, is made wise by it, and to be is not the same to him as to be wise, then the Son is his quality, not his offspring, and there will no longer be the supreme simplicity there. But far be it that it should be so, since there truly is there a supremely simple essence; therefore to be there is the same as to be wise. And if to be there is the same as to be wise, the Father is not wise by that wisdom which he begot; otherwise it is not he that begot it, but it that begot him. For what else do we say when we say 'to be is to him the same as to be wise,' than 'he is by that whereby he is wise'? Wherefore, that which is the cause to him of being wise is itself the cause to him of being. Accordingly, if the wisdom which he begot is the cause to him of being wise, it is also the cause to him of being.
Which cannot happen except by begetting him or making him. But no one would in any way call wisdom the mother or the maker of the Father. For what is more insane? Therefore the Father himself also is wisdom, and the Son is called the wisdom of the Father in the same way as he is called the light of the Father—that is, that as light from light, and both one light, so wisdom from wisdom is understood, and both one wisdom. Therefore also one essence, because there to be is the same as to be wise. For what to wisdom is to be wise, and to power to be able, and to eternity to be eternal, and to justice to be just, and to greatness to be great, this to essence is to be itself.
And because in that simplicity to be wise is nothing other than to be, wisdom there is the same as essence. [II 3] The Father, therefore, and the Son together are one essence and one greatness and one truth and one wisdom. But the Father and the Son together are not both one Word, because they are not together both one Son. For as the Son is referred to the Father, and is not said with respect to himself, so also the Word is referred to him whose Word it is, when it is called Word. For he is Son by that whereby he is Word, and Word by that whereby he is Son. Since therefore the Father and the Son together are assuredly not one Son, it follows that the Father and the Son together are not both one Word.
And therefore he is not Word by that whereby he is wisdom, because 'Word' is not said with respect to itself but only relatively to him whose Word it is, as the Son to the Father; but wisdom is said by that whereby it is essence. And therefore, because it is one essence, it is one wisdom. But since the Word too is wisdom, yet is not Word by that whereby it is wisdom (for 'Word' is understood relatively, 'wisdom' essentially), let us take it that when 'Word' is said, it is as if 'born wisdom' were said, so that it is both Son and Image. And when these two things are said, that is, 'born wisdom,' in one of them, that which is 'born,' both Word and Image and Son are understood, and in all these names essence is not shown, because they are said relatively;
but in the other, which is 'wisdom,' since it is also said with respect to itself (for it is wise by its very self), essence too is demonstrated, and this to it is to be that which is to be wise. Whence the Father and the Son together are one wisdom, because one essence, and severally wisdom from wisdom, as essence from essence. Wherefore, not because the Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Father, or the one unbegotten and the other begotten, are they therefore not one essence, because by these names their relatives are shown. But both together are one wisdom and one essence, where to be is the same as to be wise; but both are not together Word or Son, because to be is not the same as to be Word or to be Son, as we have already sufficiently shown that these are said relatively.
[III 4] Why then in the Scriptures is almost nothing anywhere said of wisdom except to show it as begotten or created by God? Begotten, namely, as that through which all things were made; but created or made, as in men, when they are turned toward that which is not created and made but begotten, and are enlightened; for in them there comes to be something which is called their wisdom. Or as the Scriptures foretell or narrate that 'the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us'; for in this way Christ was made wisdom, because he was made man.
Is it not for this reason that in those books Wisdom does not speak, nor is anything said of her, except what shows her to be born of God or made by him — although the Father himself is also Wisdom — because it was that Wisdom which had to be commended to us and imitated by us, by whose imitation we are formed? For the Father utters her so that she may be his Word, not in the way that a sounding word is uttered from the mouth or is thought before its pronouncement (for the latter is completed within intervals of time, whereas the former is eternal); and by enlightening us he tells us, both concerning himself and concerning the Father, what must be told to men. Therefore he says: 'No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and him to whom the Son wills to reveal him' — because the Father reveals through the Son, that is, through his Word.
For if this word which we utter, though temporal and transient, shows both itself and that of which we speak, how much more the Word of God, through whom all things were made, which so shows the Father as the Father is, because it too so is, and this is what the Father is, inasmuch as he is Wisdom and Essence? For inasmuch as he is the Word, he is not what the Father is, because the Word is not the Father, and 'Word' is said relatively, just as 'Son,' which is certainly not the Father. And therefore Christ is 'the power and wisdom of God,' because from the Father who is power and wisdom he too is power and wisdom, as light from the Father who is light, and 'the fountain of life' with God the Father who is likewise the fountain of life.
'For with you,' it says, 'is the fountain of life; in your light we shall see light,' because, as the Father has life in himself, so he has given to the Son to have life in himself; and 'that was the true light which enlightens every man coming into this world,' and this light was the Word with God, but the Word also was God. 'Now God is light, and in him there are no darknesses at all' — light, however, not corporeal but spiritual; nor spiritual in such a way that it was made by illumination, as it was said to the apostles, 'You are the light of the world,' but the light which enlightens every man, that very and supreme Wisdom, God, of whom we now treat.
Therefore the Son is Wisdom of the Father who is Wisdom, as light of light and God of God, so that the Father alone is light and the Son alone is light, and the Father alone is God and the Son alone is God; therefore the Father alone is Wisdom and the Son alone is Wisdom. And as both together are one light and one God, so both are one Wisdom. But the Son 'was made for us wisdom from God, and righteousness and sanctification,' because in time we turn ourselves to him, that is, from some point of time, so that we may abide with him for eternity. And he himself, from a certain point of time, 'the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.'
For this reason, therefore, when in the Scriptures something is pronounced or narrated concerning Wisdom, whether she herself is speaking or something is said about her, it is chiefly the Son who is intimated to us. By the example of this image let us too not depart from God, since we too are the image of God — not indeed an equal one, being made by the Father through the Son, not born of the Father as she is; and we are so because we are enlightened by the light, whereas she is so because she is the light that enlightens; and therefore she, without an example, is an example to us. For she does not imitate anyone going before her toward the Father, from whom she is never in any way separable, since she is the very same thing as he from whom she is.
But we, striving, imitate the one who abides, and follow the one who stands, and walking in him we press on toward him, because he was made for us a temporal way through his humility, he who is our eternal habitation through his divinity.
For inasmuch as he — being 'in the form of God and equal to God,' and himself God — offers an example to the pure intellectual spirits who have not fallen through pride, so that he might offer that same example of returning even to fallen man, who because of the uncleanness of his sins and the penalty of mortality could not see God: he 'emptied himself,' not by changing his divinity, but by taking on our mutability, and 'taking the form of a servant' he came to us into this world, he who was in this world, since 'the world was made through him' — that he might be an example to those looking upward at God, an example to those below marvelling at man, an example to the healthy for persevering, an example to the sick for growing well again, an example to the dying for not fearing, an example to the dead for rising again, himself 'holding the primacy in all things.'
For since man ought to follow none but God unto blessedness, yet could not perceive God, by following God made man he would follow at once both the one he could perceive and the one he ought to follow. Let us therefore love him and cleave to him, 'through the charity poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.' It is no wonder, then, if for the sake of the example which the image equal to the Father offers to us, that we may be reformed to the image of God, when Scripture speaks of Wisdom it speaks of the Son, whom we follow by living wisely — although the Father also is Wisdom, as he is light and God. The Holy Spirit too, whether he be the supreme charity joining both together and subjoining us, which is therefore not unfittingly said, because it is written:
'God is charity,' how is he not also himself Wisdom, since he is light, seeing that 'God is light'? Or whether the essence of the Holy Spirit is to be named singly and properly in some other way, since he is God, he is surely light, and since he is light, he is surely Wisdom. That the Holy Spirit is God, Scripture proclaims through the Apostle who says: 'Do you not know that you are the temple of God?' And immediately he added: 'and the Spirit of God dwells in you.' For God dwells in his temple. For the Spirit of God does not dwell in the temple of God as a servant, since in another place he says more evidently: 'Do you not know that your bodies are the temple of the Holy Spirit within you, whom you have from God, and you are not your own? For you were bought with a great price.'
'Therefore glorify God in your body.' Now what is Wisdom but a spiritual and unchangeable light? For that sun too is light, but corporeal; and the spiritual creature is light, but not unchangeable. The Father, therefore, is light; the Son is light; the Holy Spirit is light; yet together they are not three lights but one light. And therefore the Father is Wisdom, the Son is Wisdom, the Holy Spirit is Wisdom; and together they are not three wisdoms, but one Wisdom; and because in that realm to be is the same as to be wise, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one essence. Nor is it anything else there to be than to be God. One God, therefore, are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.
[IV 7] And so, for the sake of speaking about ineffable things, that we might in some way express what we can by no means fully utter, it has been said by our Greeks 'one essence, three substances,' but by the Latins 'one essence or substance, three persons,' because, as we have already said, in our language, that is Latin, 'essence' is not customarily understood otherwise than 'substance.' And provided that what is said be understood at least as in a riddle, it seemed good to speak thus, so that something might be said when it was asked what the three are — which three the true faith declares to be, since it says that the Father is not the Son, and that the Holy Spirit, who is the gift of God, is neither the Father nor the Son.
When, therefore, it is asked what three, or which three, we betake ourselves to finding some special or general name by which we may embrace these three; but none occurs to the mind, because the surpassing eminence of the Godhead exceeds the capacity of ordinary speech. For God is more truly thought than he is uttered, and he more truly is than he is thought. For when we say that Jacob is not the same as Abraham, and that Isaac is neither Abraham nor Jacob, we surely confess that there are three, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. But when it is asked what three, we answer 'three men,' calling them plurally by a special name; or by a general name, if we should say 'three animals' (for man, as the ancients defined, is a rational, mortal animal);
or, as our Scriptures are wont to speak, 'three souls,' when it is pleasing to name the whole from its better part, that is from the soul — although both body and soul is the whole man. For thus it is said that 'seventy-five souls' went down into Egypt with Jacob, meaning that many men. Likewise, when we say that your horse is not the same as mine, and that a third belonging to someone else is neither mine nor yours, we confess that there are three, and to one asking 'what three,' we answer 'three horses' by a special name, but by a general name 'three animals.' And again, when we say that an ox is not a horse, and that a dog is neither an ox nor a horse, we speak of three certain things;
and to those inquiring what three, we no longer say by a special name 'three horses' or 'three oxen' or 'three dogs,' since they are not contained under the same species, but by a general name 'three animals,' or by a higher genus, 'three substances' or 'three creatures' or 'three natures.' Now whatever things are enunciated in the plural number specially by one name can also be enunciated generally; but not all things which are generally called by one name can we also call specially by one name. For 'three horses,' which is a special name, we also call 'three animals'; but a horse and an ox and a dog we call only 'three animals' or 'substances,' which are general names, and whatever else can be said of them generally;
but 'three horses' or 'oxen' or 'dogs,' which are special terms, we cannot use of them. For those things we enunciate by one name, though in the plural, which have in common that which is signified by that name. For Abraham and Isaac and Jacob have in common that which is 'man,' and so they are called 'three men'; a horse also and an ox and a dog have in common that which is 'animal,' therefore they are called 'three animals.' Thus of certain three laurels we say also 'three trees'; but of a laurel and a myrtle and an olive, only 'three trees' or 'three substances or natures.' And thus of three stones we say also 'three bodies'; but of a stone and a piece of wood and iron, only 'three bodies,' or by whatever still higher general name they can be called.
Therefore, since the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three, let us ask what the three are, what they have in common. For that which the Father is, is not common to them, so that they should be Fathers to one another, as friends, since they are called relatively to each other, can be called 'three friends' because they are so to one another; but this is not so there, because there only the Father is Father, and Father not of two but of the one and only Son. Nor are there three Sons, since there the Father is not a Son, nor is the Holy Spirit. Nor are there three Holy Spirits, since the Holy Spirit also, in the proper signification by which he is also called the gift of God, is neither the Father nor the Son. What, then, are the three? For if three persons, that which 'person' is, is common to them.
Therefore this name 'person' is to them either special or general, if we regard the custom of speaking. But where there is no diversity of nature, several things are so enunciated generally that they can also be enunciated specially. For a difference of nature is what makes it that a laurel and a myrtle and an olive, or a horse and an ox and a dog, are not called by a special name — these 'three laurels,' or those 'three oxen' — but by a general one, both these 'three trees,' and those 'three animals.' But here, where there is no diversity of essence, these three ought to have a special name also, which nevertheless is not found. For 'person' is a general name to such a degree that even a man can be called this, though there is so great a difference between a man and God.
Then, within that same general term, if we say 'three persons' for this reason, that that which 'person' is is common to them (otherwise they can in no way be so called, just as they are not called 'three Sons' because that which 'Son' is is not common to them), why do we not also say 'three Gods'? For certainly, because the Father is a person and the Son is a person and the Holy Spirit is a person, therefore they are three persons. Since, then, the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God, why are they not three Gods?
Or, since on account of the ineffable conjunction these three together are one God, why not also one person, so that we might likewise be unable to say 'three persons,' though we call each single one a person, just as we cannot say 'three Gods,' though we call each single one God, whether Father or Son or Holy Spirit? Is it because Scripture does not say 'three Gods'? But neither do we find that Scripture anywhere mentions 'three persons.'
Is it because Scripture calls these three neither three persons nor one person (for we read of 'the person of the Lord,' not 'the person the Lord') that for this reason it has been permitted, by the necessity of speaking and disputing, to say 'three persons' — not because Scripture says so, but because Scripture does not contradict it, whereas if we were to say 'three Gods,' Scripture would contradict, saying: 'Hear, O Israel: the Lord your God is one God'? Why, then, is it not permitted to say 'three essences' either, which likewise Scripture, as it does not say, so neither contradicts? For if 'essence' is a special name common to the three, why should they not be called 'three essences,' as Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are 'three men,' since 'man' is a special name common to all men?
But if 'essence' is not a special name but a general one, since a man and a beast and a tree and a star and an angel are called 'essence,' why are these not called 'three essences,' as three horses are called 'three animals' and three laurels are called 'three trees' and three stones 'three bodies'? Or if, on account of the unity of the Trinity, they are not called 'three essences' but 'one essence,' why, on account of the same unity, are they not called not 'three substances' or 'three persons' but 'one substance' and 'one person'? For as common to them is the name of 'essence,' so that each single one is called 'essence,' so common to them is the term 'substance' or 'person.'
For what we have said concerning 'persons' according to our usage, this must be understood concerning 'substances' according to the usage of the Greeks. For they say 'three substances, one essence' in the same way that we say 'three persons, one essence or substance.' What, then, remains? Shall we confess that these terms were brought forth by the necessity of speaking, when there was need of a copious disputation against the snares or errors of the heretics? For when human poverty tried to bring forth in speech, for the perception of men, that which it holds in the inner chamber of the mind as far as its grasp allows concerning the Lord God its Creator, whether through pious faith or through some understanding of any sort, it feared to say 'three essences,' lest any diversity should be understood in that supreme equality.
Again, it could not say that they are not three certain things — which, because Sabellius said it, he fell into heresy. For it is most certainly known both from the Scriptures what must be piously believed, and it is grasped by the gaze of the mind with undoubting perception, that the Father is, and the Son is, and the Holy Spirit is, and that the Son is not the same as the Father, nor is the Holy Spirit the same as the Father or the Son. It sought what to call the three, and said 'substances' or 'persons,' by which names it wished not diversity to be understood, but singleness to be denied, so that not only unity should be there understood from what is called 'one essence,' but also Trinity from what are called 'three substances or persons.'
For if to be God is the same as to subsist, then three substances ought no more to be spoken of than three essences are spoken of; just as, because to be God is the same as to be wise, so, as we do not say three essences, neither do we say three wisdoms. For thus, because for him to be God is the same as to be, it is no more lawful to say three essences than three Gods. But if to be God is one thing, to subsist another — as to be God is one thing, to be Father or to be Lord another (for what he is is said with respect to himself, but 'Father' is said with respect to the Son and 'Lord' with respect to the creature that serves; therefore he subsists relatively, as he begets relatively and rules relatively) — then substance will no longer be substance, since it will be relative.
For just as from that which is 'to be' comes the name 'essence,' so from that which is 'to subsist' we call it 'substance.' But it is absurd that substance should be spoken of relatively; for every thing subsists with respect to itself. How much more God — [V 10] if indeed it is fitting that God be said to subsist? For 'to subsist' is rightly understood of those things in which, as subjects, are those things which are said to be in some subject, as color or shape in a body. For a body subsists, and therefore is a substance; but those things are in the subsisting and underlying body, which are not substances but are in a substance;
and therefore if either that color or that shape should cease to be, they do not deprive the body of being a body, since to retain this or that shape or color is not the same for it as to be. Therefore mutable and non-simple things are properly called substances. But if God subsists so that he can properly be called a substance, there is in him something as in a subject, and he is not simple, for whom to be is the same as whatever is said of him with respect to himself, such as 'great,' 'omnipotent,' 'good,' and if anything of this kind is said of God not unfittingly. But it is impious to say that God subsists and underlies his own goodness, and that goodness is not a substance or rather an essence, and that God himself is not his own goodness, but that it is in him as in a subject.
Whence it is manifest that God is called 'substance' by an abuse of the term, so that by a more customary name 'essence' may be understood, which is truly and properly said, so that perhaps God alone ought to be called 'essence.' For he alone truly is, because he is unchangeable, and this his name he declared to his servant Moses when he said: 'I am who I am,' and 'You shall say to them: He who is has sent me to you.' Yet whether it be called 'essence,' which is said properly, or 'substance,' which is said by abuse, both are said with respect to himself, not relatively to something. Hence for God to be is the same as to subsist, and therefore if the Trinity is one essence, it is also one substance. Perhaps, then, 'three persons' is more fittingly said than 'three substances.'
[VI 11] But lest this too should seem to favor us, let us inquire; although they too, if they wished, just as they say 'three substances,' *treis hypostaseis, could say 'three persons,' *tria prosopa. But they preferred that word which perhaps, according to the custom of their own language, was more aptly said. For in the case of 'persons' too the same reasoning holds; for it is not one thing for God to be, and another to be a person, but altogether the same. For if 'to be' is said with respect to himself, but 'person' relatively. Thus let us say 'three persons,' the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, just as some are called 'three friends' or 'three kinsmen' or 'three neighbors,' because they are so with respect to one another, not because each of them is so with respect to himself.
Wherefore any one of them is friend of the other two, or kinsman or neighbor, because these names have a relative signification. What then? Does it please us to say that the Father is the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, or that the Son is the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, or that the Holy Spirit is the person of the Father and of the Son? But neither is 'person' anywhere wont to be so said, nor, in this Trinity, when we say 'the person of the Father,' do we mean anything other than the substance of the Father. Wherefore, as the substance of the Father is the Father himself, not in that he is Father but in that he is, so also the person of the Father is nothing other than the Father himself. For 'person' is said with respect to himself, not with respect to the Son or the Holy Spirit;
just as 'God' and 'great' and 'good' and 'just' and anything else of this kind is said with respect to himself. And as for him to be is the same as to be God, or to be great, or to be good, so for him to be is the same as to be a person. Why, then, do we not say that these three together are one person, as they are one essence and one God, but say 'three persons,' though we do not say 'three Gods' or 'three essences,' except because we wish some one term at least to serve this signification by which the Trinity is understood, lest we should be altogether silent when asked what three, since we confessed that there are three?
For if 'essence' is the genus, and 'substance' or 'person' the species, as some think (I pass over what I have already said, that they ought to be called 'three essences' as they are called 'three substances or persons,' just as 'three horses' are called 'three animals,' since 'horse' is a species and 'animal' a genus. For neither is the species there said in the plural and the genus in the singular, as though it were said 'three horses, one animal,' but as 'three horses' by a special name, so 'three animals' by a general name.
But if they say that by the name of 'substance' or 'person' not a species is signified but something singular and individual, so that 'substance' or 'person' is not said as 'man' is said, which is common to all men, but as 'this man' is said — such as Abraham, such as Isaac, such as Jacob, or if there be any other who could even be pointed out present with the finger — then in this way too the same reasoning will follow for them. For as Abraham, Isaac, Jacob are called 'three individuals,' so 'three men' and 'three souls.' Why then, if we discuss these things too according to genus and species and individual, are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit not so called 'three essences' as 'three substances or persons'? But this, as I said, I pass over).
This I say: if 'essence' is a genus, then one essence no longer has species, just as, because 'animal' is a genus, one animal no longer has species. The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, therefore, are not three species of one essence. But if 'essence' is a species, as 'man' is a species, and those three which we call substances or persons commonly have the same species in the way that Abraham and Isaac and Jacob commonly have the species which is called 'man' (not as 'man' is subdivided into Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, so one man can also be subdivided into some single men; for it altogether cannot, since one man is already a single man): why, then, is one essence subdivided into three substances or persons?
For if 'essence' is a species, as 'man' is, then one essence is as one man. Or, as we say that some three men of the same sex, of the same bodily constitution, and of the same disposition of mind are one nature (for they are three men but one nature), do we likewise there say 'three substances, one essence,' or 'three persons, one substance or essence'? This indeed is in some way similar, because the ancients also who spoke Latin, before they had these names — which came into use not long ago, that is 'essence' or 'substance' — used to say 'nature' for these. Therefore we say these things not according to genus and species, but as according to a common and identical matter.
Just as, if three statues were made from the same gold, we would say 'three statues, one gold,' yet we would not call gold the genus and statues the species; nor gold the species and statues the individuals. For no species passes beyond its own individuals so as to comprehend something outside them. For when I have defined what 'man' is, which is a special name, the single individual men, which are individuals, are contained by the same definition, nor does anything pertain to it which is not a man. But when I have defined 'gold,' not only statues, if they be of gold, but also rings and whatever else may be of gold, will pertain to gold. And even if nothing be made of it, it is called gold, because even if they were not of gold, they would not for that reason cease to be statues.
Likewise no species exceeds the definition of its own genus. For when I have defined 'animal,' since 'horse' is a species of this genus, every horse is an animal; but not every statue is gold. Therefore, although in three golden statues we rightly say 'three statues, one gold,' yet we do not say it in such a way as to understand gold as the genus and statues as the species. Nor, then, do we call the Trinity 'three persons or substances, one essence and one God' as though three certain things subsist out of one matter, even if whatever that is were unfolded in these three; for there is nothing else of that essence besides this Trinity. Yet we say 'three persons of the same essence,' or 'three persons, one essence';
but we do not say 'three persons out of the same essence,' as if there were one thing there which is essence and another which is person, as we can say 'three statues out of the same gold'; for there it is one thing to be gold, another to be statues. And when 'three men, one nature' or 'three men of the same nature' are spoken of, they can also be called 'three men out of the same nature,' since out of the same nature other such men can also come to exist; but in that essence of the Trinity, in no way can any other person whatsoever come to exist out of the same essence. Furthermore, in these things one man is not as much as three men together, and two men are something more than one man;
and in equal statues there is more gold in three together than in single ones, and less gold in one than in two. But in God it is not so; for the Father and the Son together are not a greater essence than the Father alone or the Son alone, but those three substances or persons together, if they are to be so called, are equal to the single ones — which the animal man does not perceive. For he cannot think except of masses and spaces, whether small or great, phantasms flitting in his mind like images of bodies.
From which uncleanness, until he be purged, let him believe in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, one God, alone, great, omnipotent, good, just, merciful, Creator of all things visible and invisible, and whatever can be worthily and truly said of him according to human capacity. Nor, when he hears 'the Father alone is God,' let him separate the Son or the Holy Spirit from him; for with him he is the only God, with whom he is also one God — since when we hear that the Son also is the only God, we must accept it without any separation of the Father or the Holy Spirit.
And so let him speak of 'one essence' in such a way that he does not suppose one to be greater or better than another, or in any part diverse; yet not so that the Father himself should be both the Son and the Holy Spirit, and whatever else the single ones are called with respect to one another, as 'Word,' which is said only of the Son, or 'gift,' which is said only of the Holy Spirit. For which reason they also admit the plural number, as it is written in the Gospel: 'I and the Father are one.' He said both 'one' and 'are'; 'one' according to essence, because they are the same God; 'are' according to the relative, because that one is Father, this one Son. Sometimes even the unity of essence is passed over in silence, and the relatives alone are mentioned in the plural: 'We will come to him, I and the Father, and will make our abode with him.'
'We will come and make our dwelling' is a plural in number, because it was foretold, 'I and the Father'—that is, the Son and the Father—which are terms spoken relatively to one another. Sometimes it is done wholly in a hidden way, as in Genesis: 'Let us make man to our own image and likeness.' Both 'let us make' and 'our own' are spoken in the plural, and they must not be taken otherwise than from what is relative. For it was not that gods might make him, nor to the image and likeness of gods, but that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit might make him; therefore to the image of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, so that man might subsist as the image of God—and God is Trinity.
But since that image of God was not made wholly equal, being not born of Him but created by Him, to signify this it is an image in such a way that it is 'to the image'—that is, it is not made equal by parity, but approaches Him by a certain likeness. For one draws near to God not by intervals of place but by likeness, and withdraws from Him by unlikeness. There are indeed those who so distinguish that they would have the Son to be the Image, but man to be not the image but 'to the image.' Yet the Apostle refutes them, saying: 'A man indeed ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God.' He did not say 'to the image' but 'image.' Yet this image, when elsewhere it is said to be 'to the image,' is not said as though with reference to the Son, whose image is equal to the Father;
otherwise it would not say 'to our image.' For how could it say 'our,' when the Son is the image of the Father alone? But on account of that unequal likeness, as we have said, man was called 'to the image'; and therefore 'our,' so that man might be the image of the Trinity—not equal to the Trinity as the Son is to the Father, but approaching it, as was said, by a certain likeness, just as among things far apart a certain nearness is signified, not of place but of a kind of imitation. For to this end it is also said: 'Be renewed in the newness of your mind'; and to the same it says: 'Be therefore imitators of God, as most beloved sons.' For it is said to the new man: 'who is renewed unto the knowledge of God according to the image of Him that created him.'
Or if, for the sake of the necessity of discussion, it now be permitted—even apart from the relative names—to admit the plural number, so that when it is asked what the three are, one may answer with a single name and say three substances or persons: let no masses or intervals be conceived, no distance of any degree of unlikeness whatever, nor let it be understood that one is anything other than another, or even a little less in any manner whatsoever than another, in such a way that there be neither confusion of persons nor such distinction whereby anything should be unequal. But if this cannot be grasped by the understanding, let it be held by faith, until He shine forth in our hearts who said through the prophet: 'Unless you believe, you shall not understand.'