Works (City of God, On the Trinity, etc.) 8

Those of quicker and better ability, for whom the preceding books more than suffice for this matter, ought patiently and calmly to bear with me as I strive rather diligently to tear up and root out those depraved and ancient opinions, hostile to the truth of true religion, which the long-standing error of the human race has fixed the more deeply and tenaciously in darkened minds; and as I, according to my small measure, cooperate with the help of that grace which, being the true God, is alone able to do this. Nor, for the sake of others, should they think superfluous what they already feel to be unnecessary for themselves.

A matter exceedingly great is at stake, when the true and truly holy Godhead is proclaimed as to be sought and worshipped—although from it are furnished to us the aids necessary even for this frailty which we now bear—yet not for the sake of the transitory vapour of mortal life, but for the sake of the blessed life, which is none other than eternal.

This divinity, or, if I may so speak, deity (for our writers do not now shrink from using this word, so as to render more expressly from the Greek what they call theotēs)—this divinity, then, or deity, is not to be found in that theology which they call civil, which Marcus Varro expounded in sixteen volumes; that is, one does not attain to the felicity of eternal life by the worship of such gods as the states have appointed to be worshipped, and in whatever manner. Whoever has not yet been persuaded of this by the sixth book, which we have just completed, when perhaps he has read this present one, will have nothing further to desire for the settling of this question.

For it may happen that someone should suppose at least the select and chief gods, whom Varro embraced in his last volume and of whom we have said too little, ought to be worshipped for the sake of the blessed life, which is none other than eternal. In this matter I do not say what Tertullian remarked, perhaps more wittily than truly: If gods are chosen like onions, then surely the rest are judged worthless. I do not say this; for I see that even from the select ones some are further chosen for something greater and more excellent, just as in warfare, when recruits have been selected, from these too some are chosen for some greater feat of arms; and when men are chosen in the church to be set over others, the rest are not thereby rejected, since all good faithful are rightly called the elect.

In a building, cornerstones are chosen, without the rest being rejected, which are assigned to other parts of the structure. Grapes are chosen for eating, nor are the others rejected which we leave for drinking. There is no need to run through many examples, since the matter is plain. Wherefore, not because certain gods have been selected out of many is either he who wrote of them, or their worshippers, or the gods themselves to be blamed; but rather it is to be observed who exactly these are, and for what purpose they seem to have been selected. These select gods, at any rate, Varro commends in the compass of a single book:

Janus, Jupiter, Saturn, Genius, Mercury, Apollo, Mars, Vulcan, Neptune, Sol, Orcus, Father Liber, Tellus, Ceres, Juno, Luna, Diana, Minerva, Venus, Vesta—in all some twenty, of whom twelve are male and eight female. Are these deities said to be select because of their greater administrations in the world, or because they became better known to the peoples and greater worship was rendered to them? If it is because greater works are administered by them in the world, we ought not to have found them among that, as it were, plebeian multitude of deities assigned to petty little tasks.

For first, Janus himself, when a conception is begun—whence all those works take their beginning, minutely distributed among minute deities—opens the entrance for receiving the seed. There too is Saturn, on account of the seed itself; there Liber, who frees the male by the emission of seed; there Libera, whom they also identify with Venus, who confers this same benefit upon the woman, that she too may be freed by the emission of seed. All these are of those who are called select. But there too is the goddess Mena, who presides over the menstrual flows, though a daughter of Jupiter, yet ignoble.

And this province of the menstrual flows the same author, in his book of the select gods, assigns to Juno herself, who among the select gods is even queen, and here, as Juno Lucina, together with this same Mena, her stepdaughter, presides over the same blood. There too are two obscure ones I know not whom, Vitumnus and Sentinus, of whom the one bestows life, the other sense, upon the offspring. And truly they render far more, ignoble as they are, than all those so many magnates and select ones. For assuredly, without life and sense, what is that whole thing which is carried in the womb but some most abject thing, comparable to mud and dust?

[III] What cause, then, compelled so many select gods to these least of tasks, where in the sharing of this bounty they are surpassed by Vitumnus and Sentinus, whom an obscure reputation conceals? For the select Janus confers the entrance and, as it were, the door for the seed; the select Saturn confers the seed itself; the select Liber confers the emission of that same seed in males; Libera, who is Ceres or Venus, confers this same in females; the select Juno confers—and this not alone, but together with Mena, daughter of Jupiter—the menstrual flows for the increase of what has been conceived; and Vitumnus, obscure and ignoble, confers life; Sentinus, obscure and ignoble, confers sense;

which two things are so much more excellent than those others, by as much as they themselves surpass them in understanding and reason. For just as those beings which reason and understand are assuredly superior to those which live and feel like cattle without understanding and reason, so too those things which are endowed with life and sense are deservedly preferred to those which neither live nor feel. Accordingly, among the select gods, Vitumnus the life-giver and Sentinus the sense-giver ought to have been reckoned rather than Janus the admitter of seed, and Saturn the giver or sower of seed, and Liber and Libera the stirrers-up or emitters of seed;

seeds which it is unworthy to consider unless they attain to life and sense—gifts that are not given by the select gods, but by certain unknown ones neglected in comparison with the dignity of those. But if it is answered that Janus has power over all beginnings, and therefore that even the opening for conception is not undeservedly attributed to him; and Saturn over all seeds, and therefore that the seeding of man too cannot be sundered from his operation; and Liber and Libera over all emissions of seed, and therefore that they also preside over what pertains to the reproduction of men; and Juno over all purgings and births, and therefore that she is not absent from the purgings of women and the births of men:

then let them ask what they will answer concerning Vitumnus and Sentinus—whether they wish these too to have power over all things that live and feel. If they grant this, let them consider how much more sublimely they will be placing them. For to be born from seeds is in the earth and from the earth; but to live and to feel they suppose belongs even to the starry gods. If, however, they say that to Vitumnus and Sentinus only these things are attributed which grow to life in the flesh and are aided by the senses: why does not that God who makes all things live and feel grant life and sense to the flesh also, bestowing this gift by a universal operation upon births as well? and what need is there of Vitumnus and Sentinus?

But if by him who universally presides over life and the senses these fleshly matters, as the lowest and meanest, have been committed to these as it were to servants: were those select gods so destitute of a household that they could not find any to whom they too might commit these things, but with all their nobility, for which they seemed worthy to be chosen, were compelled to do their work with ignoble ones? Juno is select and queen, and "both sister and consort of Jupiter"; yet she is Iterduca (guide of the journey) to boys, and does her work with the most ignoble goddesses Abeona and Adeona. There too they have placed the goddess Mens, who gives boys a good mind, and among the select ones she is not placed—as though anything greater could be bestowed upon man;

but Juno is placed there, because she is Iterduca and Domiduca (leader home)—as though it were of any profit to take a journey and be led home, if the mind be not good, the goddess of which gift these selectors placed least of all among the select deities. She assuredly ought to have been preferred even to Minerva, to whom, through these petty tasks, they attributed the memory of boys. For who would doubt that it is far better to have a good mind than a memory however vast? For no one is evil who has a good mind; whereas certain most wicked men have a marvellous memory, so much the worse as they are the less able to forget what they wickedly devise. And yet Minerva is among the select gods; but the goddess Mens a vile throng has buried. What shall I say of Virtue? what of Felicity?

concerning whom we have already said much in the fourth book; who, though they held them as goddesses, would give them no place among the select gods, where they gave a place to Mars and Orcus, the one the worker of deaths, the other the receiver. Since therefore in these petty tasks, which are minutely distributed among many gods, we see even the select ones themselves working, as it were, a senate together with the plebs, and find that by certain gods, who were by no means thought worthy of selection, far greater and better things are administered than by those who are called select: it remains to conclude that they were named select and chief not on account of more excellent administrations in the world, but because it came about that they became better known to the peoples.

Whence even Varro himself says that to certain father-gods and mother-goddesses, as to men, ignobility had befallen. If, therefore, Felicity perhaps for this reason ought not to have been among the select gods, that they attained to that nobility not by merit but by chance: then at least among them, or rather before them, Fortune should have been placed, whom they say to be a goddess who confers her gifts upon each not by rational arrangement, but as it may chance to fall out. She ought to have held the summit among the select gods, since in them she especially showed what she could do; seeing that we behold them chosen not by pre-eminent virtue, nor by rational felicity, but, as their worshippers think concerning her, by the reckless power of Fortune.

For the most eloquent Sallust too perhaps had regard even to the gods themselves when he said: "But assuredly Fortune bears sway in every matter; she makes all things famous or obscure according to caprice rather than according to truth." For they cannot find a reason why Venus should have been made famous and Virtue obscured, when the deities of both were consecrated by these people, and their merits are not to be compared. Or if Venus deserved to be ennobled because more people seek her—for more seek Venus than Virtue—why was the goddess Minerva made famous and the goddess Money (Pecunia) obscured?

seeing that in the human race greed allures more than skill, and even among those who are skilled you will rarely find a man who does not have his art up for sale at a money price, and that for the sake of which something is done is always esteemed more than that which is done for the sake of something else. If, then, this selection of gods was made by the judgment of the foolish multitude, why was not the goddess Money preferred to Minerva, since it is on account of money that there are many craftsmen? But if this distinction belongs to the few wise, why was not Virtue preferred to Venus, since reason far prefers her?

At any rate, as I said, Fortune herself, who, as those who ascribe most to her think, bears sway in every matter and makes all things famous or obscure according to caprice rather than according to truth—if she has had such power even over the gods, that by her reckless judgment she made famous whom she would and obscured whom she would—ought to have held a chief place among the select ones, she who is of so pre-eminent a power even over the gods themselves. Or, that she might not be able to be there, is even Fortune herself to be supposed to have had nothing else but adverse fortune? She then was adverse to herself, who, while making others noble, was not herself ennobled.

[IV] But any seeker after nobility and renown might congratulate these select gods and call them fortunate, did he not see them selected rather for insults than for honours. For that lowest throng their very ignobility covered, lest it be overwhelmed with reproaches. We laugh indeed when we see them, by the figments of human opinions, distributed among tasks parceled out among themselves, like petty toll-farmers of the revenues, or like craftsmen in the silversmiths' quarter, where a single little vessel, in order that it may come forth finished, passes through many artisans, though it could have been finished by one skilled workman.

But it was thought that provision could be made for the multitude of workers only by this means, that individuals should learn the separate parts of the craft quickly and easily, lest all should be forced to become masters in one whole craft slowly and with difficulty. Nevertheless, scarcely any of the non-select gods is found who has drawn upon himself an infamous reputation by some crime; but scarcely any of the select ones who has not received upon himself the mark of some notable disgrace. The former descended to the humble works of the latter; the latter did not come to the sublime crimes of the former. Concerning Janus indeed nothing readily occurs to me that pertains to disgrace. And perhaps he was such a one, that he lived more innocently and more remote from misdeeds and enormities. He kindly received the fugitive Saturn;

he shared his kingdom with his guest, so that each even founded his own city, the one the Janiculum, the other Saturnia. But those who in the worship of the gods seek out every sort of unseemliness, when they found a life less base in him, disfigured him with the monstrous deformity of his image, making him now two-faced, now even four-faced, as it were twin. Or perhaps they wished that, since very many of the select gods had by committing shameful deeds lost their 'face' (frons, forehead/shame), the more innocent this one was, the more 'faced' (frontosus) he should appear. [V] But let us rather hear their physical interpretations, by which they attempt to color the baseness of a most wretched error with the appearance, as it were, of loftier doctrine.

First, Varro commends these interpretations by saying that the ancients fashioned the images of the gods, and their emblems and adornments, so that those who had approached the mysteries of the doctrine, when they had observed them with their eyes, might behold with the mind the soul of the world and its parts, that is, the true gods; and that those who made images in the form of a man seem to have followed this reasoning, that the mind of mortals, which is in the human body, is most like the immortal mind; just as if vessels were set up for the purpose of denoting the gods, and in the temple of Liber a wine-jar (oenophorum) were placed, which would signify wine, by that which contains signifying that which is contained;

so through an image which had the human form, the rational soul is signified, because in that kind of vessel, as it were, that nature is wont to be contained, of which nature they hold that a god or gods exist. These are the mysteries of the doctrine which that most learned man had penetrated, whence he might bring these things forth into the light. But, O most acute man, have you in these mysteries of doctrine lost that prudence by which it soberly seemed to you that those who first set up images for the peoples both took away fear from their fellow-citizens and added error, and that the ancient Romans observed the gods more chastely without images? For these were your authorities, that you dared to say these things against the later Romans.

For if those most ancient men too had worshipped images, perhaps you would have suppressed by the silence of fear that whole opinion about images not being set up—true for the meantime—and would have proclaimed the more loquaciously and loftily, in figments of this pernicious and vain kind, these mysteries of doctrine. Yet your soul, so learned and ingenious (wherein we greatly grieve for you), by these mysteries of doctrine could in no way arrive at its God—that is, at Him by whom it was made, not with whom it was made, nor whose portion it is, but whose creation it is; nor who is the soul of all things, but who made every soul, by whose sole illumination the soul becomes blessed, if it be not ungrateful to His grace. But what these mysteries of doctrine are, and how they are to be esteemed, what follows will show.

Meanwhile this most learned man confesses that the soul of the world and its parts are the true gods; whence it is understood that his whole theology, that is, that very natural theology to which he ascribes so much, could extend itself even to the nature of the rational soul. For concerning the natural theology he prefaces very little in this book, which he wrote last, concerning the select gods; in which we shall see whether, by physiological interpretations, he can refer the civil to this natural. If he can, the whole will be natural: and what need was there to sever the civil from it with so great a care of distinction? But if it is separated by a correct discrimination:

since not even that which pleases him as natural is true (for it reaches as far as the soul, not as far as the true God who made even the soul), how much more abject and false is this civil theology, which is chiefly occupied about the nature of bodies, as its very interpretations will demonstrate—of which it behooves me to record some necessary ones—drawn out and unfolded by them with such great diligence. [VI] The same Varro, then, still prefacing concerning natural theology, says that he judges God to be the soul of the world, whom the Greeks call kosmos, and that this world itself is God; but that, just as a wise man, though he is composed of body and soul, is yet called wise from the soul, so the world is called God from the soul, though it is composed of soul and body.

Here he seems in some way to confess one God; but in order to introduce even more, he adds that the world is divided into two parts, heaven and earth; and heaven in two ways, into ether and air; but earth into water and land; of which the highest is ether, the second air, the third water, the lowest earth; all which four parts are full of souls—in ether and air of immortal ones, in water and earth of mortal ones. And from the highest circuit of heaven to the circle of the moon are ethereal souls, the stars and constellations, and these heavenly gods are not only understood to be, but even seen; but between the orbit of the moon and the summits of clouds and winds are aerial souls, but these are seen by the mind, not by the eyes, and are called heroes and lares and genii.

This, evidently, is the natural theology briefly propounded in that preface, which pleased not only him but many philosophers; concerning which it must then be more diligently discussed, when, with the help of the true God, I shall have completed what remains concerning the civil, as far as pertains to the select gods. [VII] Janus, then, from whom he took his beginning, I ask who exactly he is. It is answered: He is the world. This is plainly a brief and open answer. Why, then, are the beginnings of things said to pertain to him, but the ends to another, whom they call Terminus? For on account of beginnings and ends they declare that two months are dedicated to these two gods, besides those ten of which Martius is the head down to December—January to Janus, February to Terminus.

Therefore they say the Terminalia are celebrated in the same month of February, when the purificatory rite is performed, which they call Februm, whence the month received its name. Does it follow, then, that to the world, which is Janus, the beginnings of things pertain but the ends do not, so that another god had to be set over them? Do they not confess that all things which they say come to be in this world are also brought to an end in this same world? What is this vanity, to give the one a half power in his work, a double face in his image? Would they not interpret this two-faced god far more elegantly, if they said the same one was both Janus and Terminus, and gave one face to beginnings, the other to ends? For whoever works ought to attend to both; for in every movement of his action, he who does not look back to the beginning does not look forward to the end.

Whence it is necessary that the forward-looking intention be connected with the memory that looks back; for whoever has forgotten what he began will not find how to finish it. But if they thought that the blessed life is begun in this world but perfected outside the world, and therefore attributed to Janus, that is, to the world, only the power over beginnings: assuredly they would prefer Terminus to him and would not alienate him from the select gods. Although even now, when in these two gods the beginnings and ends of temporal things are treated, more honor ought to have been given to Terminus. For there is greater gladness when any matter is perfected;

but beginnings are full of anxiety until they are brought to their end, which he who begins anything especially seeks, aims at, awaits, longs for, nor does he exult over a thing begun unless it be brought to a term. [VIII] But now let the interpretation of the two-faced image be brought forth. They say he has two faces, before and behind, because our gape, when we open the mouth, seems like the world; whence the Greeks also call the palate ouranon (heaven), and some Latin poets, he says, have called the palate 'heaven'; from which gaping of the mouth there is an entrance both outward toward the teeth and inward toward the throat. Behold to what the world has been brought on account of a word for our palate, whether Greek or poetic. But what has this to do with the soul, what with eternal life?

Is this god to be worshipped merely on account of the saliva, for the swallowing of part and the spitting out of part of which each door of the palate is opened beneath the 'heaven'? What, moreover, is more absurd than not to find in the world itself two doors set opposite each other, through which it might either admit something into itself inward or emit it from itself outward, and yet to wish to compose from our mouth and throat—whose likeness the world does not have—an image of the world in Janus on account of the palate alone, whose likeness Janus does not have? But when they make him four-faced and call him Janus Geminus, they interpret this of the four parts of the world, as if the world looked outward through all its faces as Janus does.

Then, if Janus is the world, and the world consists of four parts, the image of the two-faced Janus is false; or if it is true for this reason, that the whole world is also wont to be understood by the name of East and West, would anyone—when we name the two other parts, North and South—say the world is twin, as they call the four-faced Janus 'Janus Geminus'? They have no way at all whereby to interpret four doors, which might lie open to those entering and going out, after the likeness of the world, as concerning the two-faced one they found at least in the mouth of man something they might allege—unless perhaps Neptune should come to their aid and hold out a fish, whose throat, besides the gape of the mouth and gullet, lies open also on the right and left.

And yet no soul escapes this vanity through so many doors, except the one that hears Truth saying: I am the door. [IX] But let them expound whom they wish Jove—who is also called Jupiter—to be understood as. "He is a god," they say, "having power over the causes by which anything comes to be in the world." How great this is, that most noble verse of Virgil attests: Happy is he who has been able to know the causes of things. But why is Janus set before him? Let that most acute and learned man answer us this. "Because with Janus," he says, "are the first things, with Jove the highest. Deservedly, therefore, is Jupiter held to be king of all.

For first things are surpassed by highest things, because, although first things precede in time, highest things excel in dignity." But this would be rightly said, if the firsts and the highests of things done were being distinguished; as the beginning of a deed is to set out, the highest to arrive; the beginning of a deed the commencement of learning, the highest the full attainment of the doctrine; and thus in all things the firsts are the beginnings and the highests are the ends. But this business has already been discussed between Janus and Terminus. The causes, however, which are given to Jove, are efficient causes, not effects; nor can it in any way come to pass that they be anticipated in time by the deeds or the beginnings of deeds. For the thing which makes is always prior to that which is made.

Wherefore, if the beginnings of things done pertain to Janus, they are not on that account prior to the efficient causes which they attribute to Jove. For as nothing comes to be, so nothing is begun in order to come to be, without a making cause having preceded. If the peoples call this god, in whose power are all the causes of all created natures and natural things, by the name of Jupiter, and yet worship him with such great insults and such wicked charges of crime, they bind themselves with a fouler sacrilege than if they thought there were no god at all.

Whence it would be better for them to call some other by the name of Jupiter, one worthy of base and shameful honors, substituting a vain figment which they might rather blaspheme (just as a stone is said to have been substituted for Saturn, which he might devour in place of his son), than to call this god both the thunderer and the adulterer, both the ruler of the whole world and one dissolute through so many defilements, and one holding the highest causes of all natures and natural things and yet not holding good causes for himself. Next I ask what place among the gods they now assign to this Jupiter, if Janus is the world. For he defined the true gods to be the soul of the world and its parts; and by this, whatever is not this is assuredly, according to them, not a true god.

Will they then say that Jupiter is the soul of the world, so that Janus is its body, that is, this visible world? If they say this, there will be no way in which they can call Janus a god, since the body of the world is not a god even according to themselves, but the soul of the world and its parts. Whence the same man says most plainly that he judges God to be the soul of the world, and this very world to be God; but that, just as a wise man, though he is of soul and body, is yet called wise from the soul, so the world is called God from the soul, though it is of soul and body. Accordingly, the body of the world alone is not God, but either its soul alone, or soul and body together, yet in such a way that it is God not from the body but from the soul.

If, then, Janus is the world and Janus is a god, will they say that Jupiter, in order that he may be a god, is some part of Janus? For they are more wont to attribute the universe to Jove; whence is the saying: All things are full of Jove. Therefore Jupiter also, in order that he may be a god and especially king of the gods, they cannot reckon to be any other than the world, so that, according to them, he may reign over the other gods as over his own parts. To this same opinion the same Varro also expounds certain verses of Valerius Soranus in that book which he wrote separately from these concerning the worship of the gods; which verses are these: Almighty Jupiter, begetter of kings and of things and of gods, and mother of the gods, one god and all. But they are expounded in the same book thus:

Since they held the male to be the one who emits seed and the female the one who receives it, and that Jupiter is the world, and that he emits all seeds from himself and receives them back into himself: 'With good reason,' he says, 'did Soranus write that Jupiter is progenitor and genetrix; and with no less reason that the one and the all are the same; for the world is one, and in that one all things exist.' If, then, both Janus is the world and Jupiter is the world, and there is but one world, why are Janus and Jupiter two gods? Why do they have temples apart, altars apart, different rites, unlike images? If it is because the power of first beginnings is one thing and the power of causes another, and the former received the name of Janus, the latter the name of Jupiter:

if one man should have two powers or two skills in different matters, would he, because the power of each is distinct, therefore be called two judges or two craftsmen? So likewise, though one God himself possess the power over first beginnings and himself the power over causes, is he therefore of necessity to be thought two gods, because first beginnings and causes are two things? But if they hold this to be just, let them then say that Jupiter himself is as many gods as the surnames they have given him on account of his many powers, since all the things from which those surnames are drawn are many and various — of which I recall but a few.

They called him Victor, Invictus, Opitulus, Impulsor, Stator, Centumpeda, Supinalis, Tigillus, Almus, Ruminus, and others which it would be tedious to enumerate. But these surnames they imposed upon one god on account of diverse causes and powers, and yet they did not on account of so many things compel him to be so many gods: because he conquered all things, because he was conquered by none, because he brought help to the needy, because he had the power of driving forward, of halting, of making firm, of laying prostrate, because like a little beam he held together and upheld the world, because he nourished all things, because with the 'ruma,' that is, the teat, he nourished the animals. Among these, as we observe, some are great, some trifling; and yet one and the same is said to do both.

I think the causes of things and their first beginnings are more nearly akin to each other — on account of which they willed the one world to be two gods, Jupiter and Janus — than are the holding together of the world and the giving of the teat to animals; and yet on account of these two works, so widely differing between themselves in power and dignity, they were not forced to be two gods; but one Jupiter was called Tigillus on account of the one, and Ruminus on account of the other. I will not say that to offer the teat to sucking animals might have better befitted Juno than Jupiter — especially since there was also the goddess Rumina, who might lend him aid or service in this task. For I reflect that it could be answered that Juno herself is nothing else than Jupiter, according to those verses of Valerius Soranus, where it is said:

'Jupiter almighty, progenitor and genetrix of kings and things and gods.' Why then was he also called Ruminus, when to those who inquire more diligently he may perhaps be found to be also that goddess Rumina herself? For if it seemed rightly unworthy of the majesty of the gods that in one ear of grain one should attend to the care of the little joint of the stalk and another to that of the husk: how much more unworthy is it that one lowly thing — namely, that animals be nourished at the teat — should be cared for by the power of two gods, of whom one is Jupiter, the very king of all, and that he should do this not even with his own consort, but with some ignoble Rumina or other — unless it be that he himself is also Rumina herself; Ruminus perhaps for the sucking males, Rumina for the females.

I might indeed say that they were unwilling to impose a feminine name on Jupiter, were it not that in those verses he is called 'progenitor and genetrix,' and that among his other surnames I read that he was also called Pecunia (Money) — a goddess whom we find among their lesser deities and mentioned in the fourth book. But since both males and females possess money, why he was not called both Pecunia and Pecunius, just as Rumina and Ruminus, let them see to it. How elegantly, forsooth, they rendered the reason of this name! 'And he is called Pecunia (Money),' he says, 'because all things are his.' O grand reason for a divine name! Nay rather, he whose all things are is most basely and most insultingly styled Money.

For in comparison with all that is contained in heaven and earth, what is money among all things whatsoever that are possessed by men under the name of money? But doubtless it was avarice that imposed this name upon Jupiter, so that whoever loves money might seem to himself to be loving not just any god, but the very king of all. It would be a far different thing, however, if he were called Riches. For riches are one thing, money another. For we call wise, just, and good men rich, though they have no money or but little; for they are rather rich in virtues, through which even in the very necessities of bodily things what they have is enough for them: but we call the covetous poor, ever gaping and needy;

for they may possess money never so great, yet in whatever abundance of it they cannot fail to be in want. And we rightly call the true God himself rich, yet not in money, but in omnipotence. And so the moneyed are called rich; but inwardly they are needy, if they are covetous: likewise those lacking money are called poor; but inwardly they are rich, if they are wise. Of what sort, then, ought this theology to be to a wise man, wherein the king of the gods received the name of that thing 'which no wise man has ever coveted'? For how much more easily, if by this doctrine something were profitably learned that pertained to eternal life, would the god who rules the world be called by them not Money but Wisdom, the love of which purges from the filth of avarice, that is, from the love of money!

But why say more of this Jupiter, to whom perhaps the rest are to be referred, so that the opinion of a multitude of gods may remain empty, since he himself is all of them — whether when they are reckoned his parts or his powers, or when the force of the soul, which they suppose to be diffused through all things, received as it were the names of many gods from the parts of this mass into which this visible world rises up, and from the manifold administration of nature? For what is Saturn too? 'One of the chief gods,' he says, 'in whose keeping is the dominion over all sowings.' Is not the exposition of those verses of Valerius Soranus to this effect, that Jupiter is the world, and that he emits all seeds from himself and receives them back into himself? He, then, it is in whose keeping is the dominion over all sowings.

What is Genius? 'A god,' he says, 'who is set over and has power over all things that are to be begotten.' Whom else do they believe to have this power than the world, to which it was said, 'Jupiter, progenitor and genetrix'? And when in another place he says that a genius is the rational soul of each individual, and therefore there are single ones for single persons, but that such a soul of the world is God: he brings it back to this very same point, namely that the soul of the world itself is to be believed to be, as it were, the universal genius. This, therefore, is he whom they call Jupiter. For if every genius is a god, and every man's soul is a genius, it follows that every man's soul is a god;

but if the very absurdity of this compels even them to shrink from it, it remains that they call singularly and pre-eminently God the Genius whom they call the soul of the world, and thereby Jupiter. But Mercury and Mars they could not find how to refer to any parts of the world and works of God that are in the elements, and therefore they set them at least over the works of men, as ministers of speaking and of waging war. Of these, if Mercury wields power over the speech even of the gods, then he lords it over the very king of the gods too, if Jupiter speaks according to his will, or received from him the faculty of speaking; which is surely absurd.

But if to him is ascribed power over human speech only, it is not credible that Jupiter should have been willing to descend to suckling with the teat not only children but also cattle — whence he was surnamed Ruminus — and yet should have been unwilling that the care of our speech, whereby we excel the cattle, should pertain to him; and thus one and the same is Jupiter and Mercury. But if speech itself is said to be Mercury, as those things which they interpret concerning him show (for he is said to be called Mercury as it were 'medius currens' — running between — because speech runs midway between men; hence Hermes in Greek, because speech, or interpretation, which surely pertains to speech, is called hermeneia;

hence too he presides over merchandise, because between sellers and buyers speech passes as a go-between; the wings on his head and feet signify that speech is borne winged through the air; he is called a messenger, because through speech all thoughts are announced — if, then, Mercury is speech itself, then even by their own confession he is not a god. But when they make gods for themselves of those who are not even demons, by supplicating unclean spirits they become possessed by those who are not gods but demons. Likewise, because they could not find for Mars either any element or part of the world where he might do works of nature of whatever sort, they said he was the god of war, which is a work of men, and not a thing to be desired. If, therefore, Felicity should give perpetual peace, Mars would have nothing to do.

But if war itself is Mars, as speech is Mercury: would that, as it is manifest that he is not a god, so likewise there might be no war, which is even falsely called a god. Unless perchance these gods are those stars which they have called by their names. For a certain star they call Mercury, and likewise a certain one Mars. But there also is that one which they call Jupiter, and yet to them the world is Jupiter; there is the one they call Saturn, and yet to him they besides assign no small substance, namely of all seeds; there too is that most brilliant of all, which is called by them Venus, and yet they hold this same Venus to be also the Moon; although concerning that most resplendent star Juno and Venus contend among them as over a golden apple.

For Lucifer (the morning star) some say belongs to Venus, some to Juno; but, as is usual, Venus prevails. For far more attribute that star to Venus, so that scarcely any of them is found who thinks otherwise. But who would not laugh, when they call Jupiter the king of all, seeing that his star is surpassed in brilliance by so great a degree by the star of Venus? For it ought to have been more resplendent than the rest by as much as he himself is more powerful. They reply that it seems so because that star which is thought dimmer is higher and far more remote from the earth. If, then, a greater dignity has merited a higher place, why is Saturn there higher than Jupiter?

Or could the vanity of the fable, which makes Jupiter king, not reach even to the stars, and was Saturn — who could not prevail in his own kingdom nor in the Capitol — at least permitted to hold sway in heaven? But why did Janus not receive some star? If it be because he is the world and all are in him: Jupiter's too is the world, and yet he has one. Or did the fellow arrange his own case as best he could, and in place of the one star which he does not have among the constellations, receive so many faces on earth? Then, if it is only on account of the stars that they suppose Mercury and Mars to be parts of the world — that they might be able to hold them as gods, since speech and war are surely not parts of the world but acts of men:

why for Aries and Taurus and Cancer and Scorpio and the rest of this kind, which they count as celestial signs and which consist not of single stars but each of several, and which they declare to be placed higher than these in the summit of heaven, where a more constant motion affords the stars an unwandering course — why for these did they make no altars, no rites, no temples, nor hold them as gods, not, I say, among these select ones, but not even among those, as it were, plebeian ones?

Although they would have Apollo to be a diviner and physician, yet in order to place him in some part of the world, they said he was also the sun itself; and Diana his sister they likewise made the moon and the guardian of ways (whence they also would have her a virgin, because a way brings forth nothing); and therefore both have arrows, because these two heavenly bodies stretch their rays from heaven all the way to the earth. Vulcan they would have to be the fire of the world, Neptune the waters of the world, the father Vitis — that is, Orcus — the earthly and lowest part of the world. Liber and Ceres they set over seeds, the one over the masculine, the other over the feminine; or the one over the moisture, the other over the dryness of seeds.

And all this, of course, is referred wholly to the world, that is, to Jupiter, who was for that reason called 'progenitor and genetrix,' because he emits all seeds from himself and receives them back into himself. Since indeed they would have the same Ceres to be also the Great Mother, whom they say is nothing else than the earth, and they hold her to be Juno as well, and therefore assign to her the secondary causes of things, although to Jupiter it was said 'progenitor and genetrix of the gods,' because according to them the whole world itself is Jupiter's; Minerva too, because they set her over human arts and could not find even a star where they might place her, they said was either the highest aether or even the moon.

Vesta too they for that reason held to be the greatest of goddesses, because she is the earth herself; although they believed that the lighter fire of the world — which pertains to the easy uses of men, and not the more violent, such as is Vulcan's — was to be assigned to her. And by all this they would have all these select gods to be this world: in some cases the whole, in some cases parts of it — the whole, as Jupiter; parts of it, as Genius, as the Great Mother, as the Sun and Moon, or rather Apollo and Diana. And sometimes they make one god many things, sometimes one thing many gods. For one god is many things, as Jupiter himself; for the whole world is held and called Jupiter, and heaven alone is Jupiter, and a single star alone is held and called Jupiter;

and likewise Juno is the mistress of secondary causes, and Juno is the air, and Juno is the earth, and, if she should prevail over Venus, Juno is the star. Similarly Minerva is the highest aether, and Minerva is likewise the moon, which they suppose to be at the lowest limit of the aether. But they make one thing many gods thus: both Janus is the world and Jupiter is; so too Juno is the earth and the Great Mother and Ceres. And just as these things which I have mentioned by way of example, so they do not explain the rest but rather entangle it; as the impulse of a wandering opinion has driven them, so hither and thither, this way and that, they leap in and leap back, so that Varro himself preferred to doubt of everything rather than to affirm anything.

For of the last three books, having finished the first concerning the certain gods, when he had entered upon speaking of the uncertain gods in the second, he says: 'Since in this little book I shall set down doubtful opinions concerning the gods, I ought not to be blamed. For whoever shall think that judgment ought and can be passed, when he has heard, will do it himself. I can more readily be brought to call into doubt what I said in the first book, than to direct toward some sum-total all that I shall write down in this one.' Thus he made uncertain not only this book concerning the uncertain gods, but also that one concerning the certain.

Moreover, in this third book concerning the select gods, after he had prefaced what he thought ought to be prefaced from natural theology, being about to enter upon the vanities and lying insanities of this civil theology, where not only did the truth of things not lead him, but even the authority of his forefathers pressed upon him, he says: 'Concerning the public gods of the Roman people, to whom they dedicated shrines and marked them out adorned with many statues, I shall write in this book — but, as Xenophanes of Colophon writes, I shall set down what I think, not what I would maintain. For it belongs to man to hold such opinions, to God to know.' Trembling, therefore, he promises a discourse of things not comprehended nor most firmly believed, but merely opined and to be doubted, being about to speak of those things which were instituted by men.

For not as he knew that the world exists, that heaven and earth exist, heaven gleaming with stars, earth fertile with seeds, and other such things, and just as he believed with a firm steadfastness of mind that this whole mass and nature is ruled and administered by a certain invisible and all-powerful force — so could he not affirm concerning Janus that he was the world itself, nor discover concerning Saturn how he was both the father of Jupiter and made subject to Jupiter's reign, and other such things.

Concerning these things a more credible account is given when they are declared to have been men, and to each of them, by those who wished them to be gods by flattery, out of his character, morals, deeds, and fortunes sacred and solemn rites were established — and these, gradually creeping in through the souls of men, who are like the demons and greedy of frivolous things, were spread far and wide, the lies of poets adorning them and deceitful spirits seducing men toward them. For it could more easily have come to pass that an impious youth, fearing to be slain by an impious father and greedy of kingship, should have driven his father from the kingdom, than that which this man interprets — namely that Saturn the father was overcome by Jupiter the son because the cause, which pertains to Jupiter, is prior to the seed, which pertains to Saturn.

For if this were so, Saturn would never have been prior, nor would he be the father of Jupiter. For the seed always precedes the cause — no, the cause precedes the seed, and is never begotten of the seed. But when they endeavor to honor most empty fables, or the deeds of men, with as it were natural interpretations, even the most acute men suffer such straits that we are compelled to grieve over their vanity too. 'They said,' he tells us, 'that Saturn was wont to devour what was born of him, because the seeds return to the place whence they were born. And that a clod was cast to him to be devoured in place of Jupiter, signifies,' he says, 'that when men began to sow, the fruits were covered over by human hands before the usefulness of plowing was discovered.' Saturn, then, ought to have been called the earth itself, not the seeds;

for it is she who in a certain manner devours what she has begotten, since the seeds born of her return to be received back into her. And as for his being said to have received a clod in place of Jupiter, what does this avail toward the fact that the seed was covered with a clod by the hands of men? Was it therefore not, like the rest, devoured, because it was covered with a clod? For this is stated as though he who set the clod against it had taken away the seed — just as they report that when the clod was offered to Saturn, Jupiter was taken away — and not rather that the clod, by covering the seed, made it be devoured the more diligently. Then in this way the seed is Jupiter, not the cause of the seed, as was being said a little before. But what are men to do who, when they interpret foolish things, do not find what may be said wisely?

'He has a sickle,' he says, 'on account of agriculture.' Surely during his reign there was as yet no agriculture, and therefore his earlier times are spoken of, as this same man interprets the little fables, because the first men lived on those seeds which the earth brought forth of its own accord. Or did he receive a sickle after losing his scepter, so that he who in the first times had been an idle king, when his son reigned, might become a toilsome laborer? Then he says that by some, boys were wont to be sacrificed to him, as by the Carthaginians, and by some even grown men, as by the Gauls, because of all seeds the best kind is the human race. Of this most cruel vanity what need is there to say more?

Let us rather observe and hold fast to this: that these interpretations are not to be referred to the true God, the living, incorporeal, and unchangeable nature, from whom eternal blessed life is to be sought; but that their ends lie in things corporeal, temporal, changeable, and mortal. 'That Saturn is said in the fables to have castrated his father Heaven,' he says, 'signifies that the divine seed is in Saturn's keeping, not in Heaven's.' This is so, as far as can be understood, because nothing is born in the heaven from seeds. But lo — if Saturn is the son of Heaven, he is the son of Jupiter. For they affirm innumerable times and diligently that Jupiter is Heaven. Thus these things, which do not come from the truth, for the most part overthrow themselves with none to push them.

He says he was called Chronos, which by a Greek word signifies a span of time, without which, he says, seed cannot be fruitful. These and many other things are said concerning Saturn, and all are referred to seed. But at least Saturn, with such great power as this, would suffice for seeds; what need is there for other gods besides toward these matters, especially Liber and Libera, that is, Ceres? Concerning whom again, so far as pertains to seed, he says as much as if he had said nothing of Saturn. But in the rites of Ceres those Eleusinian mysteries are celebrated, which among the Athenians were the most renowned. Of these this man interprets nothing, save what pertains to the grain which Ceres discovered, and to Proserpine, whom she lost when Orcus carried her off;

and this very Proserpine, he says, signifies the fecundity of seeds; which, when at a certain time it had been lacking and the earth mourned with that same barrenness, there arose the opinion that Orcus had carried off the daughter of Ceres — that is, fecundity itself, which was called Proserpine from 'creeping forth' (proserpere) — and had detained her among the dead; and since this matter had been solemnized with public mourning, then, because that same fecundity returned, joy arose at Proserpine's restoration, and from this solemn rites were established. He says, moreover, that many things are handed down in her mysteries which pertain to nothing but the discovery of crops.

But now, to what depth of foulness the rites of Liber have descended — whom they set over the liquid seeds, and thereby not only over the juices of fruits, of which wine in a certain manner holds the primacy, but also over the seeds of animals — it irks me indeed to tell, on account of the length of the discourse; but on account of the proud dullness of these men it irks me not. Among other things, which I am forced to pass over since they are many, he says that in the crossroads of Italy certain rites of Liber were celebrated with such license of foulness that in his honor the shameful male parts were worshiped — not even with any somewhat more modest secrecy, but with wantonness exulting in the open.

For this shameful member, during the festival days of Liber, was placed with great honor upon little carts and carried about, first in the country at the crossroads, and afterward even into the city. But in the town of Lavinium a whole month was assigned to Liber, during whose days all used the most disgraceful words, until that member had been carried across the forum and came to rest in its own place. Upon this dishonorable member it was necessary for a most honorable matron publicly to place a crown. Thus, forsooth, the god Liber had to be appeased for the success of the seeds; thus was enchantment to be driven off from the fields — so that a matron was compelled to do in public what not even a harlot should have been permitted to do in the theater, if matrons were looking on.

On account of these things Saturn alone was not believed able to suffice for the seeds, so that the unclean soul might find occasions for multiplying gods, and — deservedly forsaken by the one true God because of its uncleanness, and prostituted through many false gods out of a greed for greater uncleanness — might name these sacrileges as sacred rites, and might offer itself to be violated and polluted by the throngs of filthy demons. Now surely Neptune already had Salacia as his wife, whom they said to be the lower water of the sea: to what end was Venilia also joined to him, unless that, without any cause of necessary rites, by the mere lust of a prostituted soul, the inviting of demons might be multiplied?

But let the interpretation of that illustrious theology be brought forth, which by the reason it renders may check us from this reproach. 'Venilia,' he says, 'is the wave which comes to the shore; Salacia, that which returns to the deep.' Why, then, are two goddesses made, when it is one wave that comes and returns? Assuredly it is the very lust, boiling over into many divinities, that is mad. For although the water is not doubled which goes and returns, yet by occasion of this vanity, with two demons invited, the soul is the more befouled — the soul which goes and does not return.

I beseech you, Varro, or you others who have read such writings of men so learned and boast that you have learned something great — interpret this for me: I will not say according to that eternal and unchangeable nature, who alone is God, but at least according to the soul of the world and its parts, which you suppose to be true gods. That you have made Neptune a god for us — the part of the soul of the world that pervades the sea — is an error of a more or less tolerable kind. Are then the wave coming to the shore and returning to the deep two parts of the world, or two parts of the soul of the world? Who among you is so foolish as to think this wise?

Why, then, did they make you two goddesses, unless because it was provided by your wise forefathers, not that more gods should rule you, but that more demons — which rejoice in these vanities and falsehoods — should possess you? But why did that Salacia, by this interpretation, lose the lower part of the sea, in which she was subject to her husband? For just now, when you declare her to be the refluent wave, you placed her on the surface. Or was it because he took Venilia as a concubine that, enraged, she shut out her own husband from the upper regions of the sea? Surely there is one earth, which indeed Ditanus filled with his own evils, yet is itself a great body among the elements and the lowest part of the world. Why do they will her to be a goddess? Is it because she is fertile?

Why, then, are not rather those men gods who make her more fertile by cultivation — but when they plow, not when they adore? But, they say, the part of the soul of the world which pervades her makes her a goddess. As though the soul were not more evident in men — concerning which it is no question whether it exists; and yet men are not held to be gods, and, what is grievously to be lamented, they are by a wonderful and wretched error made subject to worshiping and adoring those who are not gods and than whom they themselves are better. And certainly the same Varro, in the same book on the select gods, affirms that there are three grades of soul in all and the whole of nature: one which passes through all the parts of the body that live and has no sensation, but only the vital vigor for living;

this force, he says, permeates in our body into the bones, nails, and hair; just as in the world trees are nourished without sensation and grow and in a certain manner of their own live: the second grade of soul, in which there is sensation; this force reaches into the eyes, ears, nostrils, mouth, and touch: the third grade is the highest of soul, which is called the mind (animus), in which intelligence pre-eminently resides; of this all mortals except man are devoid. This part of the soul of the world, he says, is God, but in us it is called Genius. And there are in the world stones and the earth which we see, into which sensation does not permeate, like the bones and nails of God; but the sun, moon, and stars, which we perceive and by which he himself perceives, are his senses; and the aether, moreover, is his mind;

the force of which, when it reaches into the heavenly bodies, makes those too gods, and through that part of it which permeates into the earth, makes the goddess Tellus; but that which thence permeates into the sea and ocean, is the god Neptune. Let him, therefore, return from this which he supposes to be natural theology — into which, as though for the sake of rest, wearied, he had gone out from these circuitous windings and turnings; let him return, I say, let him return to the civil theology; here I still hold him, meanwhile I deal with this. I do not yet say that, if earth and stones are like our bones and nails, they likewise have no intelligence, just as they lack sensation;

Or, if our bones and nails are said to possess intelligence for the reason that they exist within a man who possesses intelligence, then he who calls these things gods within the world is as foolish as the man who calls the bones and nails within us human beings. But such matters must perhaps be argued with the philosophers; for the present, however, I wish to keep to this man as a political theologian. For it may well be that, although he seems to have wished to lift his head up a little, as it were, into that liberty of natural theology, yet, still turning over this present book and thinking himself engaged within it, he glanced back to it from there and said this for the very purpose that his ancestors, or other states, might not be believed to have worshipped Earth and Neptune in vain. But this is what I say:

if that part of the world-soul which pervades the earth, being one thing just as the earth is one, why did he not also make it one goddess, whom he calls Tellus? But if he did so, where will Orcus be, the brother of Jupiter and Neptune, whom they call Father Dis? Where will his consort Proserpina be, who, according to another opinion set down in these same books, is held to be not the fertility of the earth but its lower part? For if they say that the part of the world-soul, when it pervades the upper part of the earth, makes the god Father Dis, but when it pervades the lower, makes the goddess Proserpina, then what will that Tellus be? For thus the whole of what she herself was has been divided into these two parts and gods, so that one cannot find what the third one, she herself, is, or where she is;

unless someone should say that these gods together, Orcus and Proserpina, are the one goddess Tellus, and that they are not now three, but either one or two; and yet they are called three, are held to be three, are worshipped with their own altars, their own shrines, rites, images, and priests, and through these things also with their own deceiving demons who defile the prostituted soul. Let it further be answered: what part of the earth does the part of the world-soul pervade so as to make the god Tellumo? 'No part,' he says, 'but one and the same earth possesses a twofold power, both masculine, in that it produces seeds, and feminine, in that it receives and nourishes them; hence from the power of the female it was called Tellus, from that of the male, Tellumo.'