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but Father is said in relation to the Son, whereas beginning is said in relation to all things that are from him. Likewise the Son is said relatively; relatively too he is called Word and Image, and in all these titles he is referred to the Father; yet none of these is the Father called. And the Son is called beginning; for when it was said to him, 'Who art thou?' he answered, 'The Beginning, who also speak unto you.' But is he the beginning of the Father? Rather he willed to show himself the Creator when he said that he was the beginning, just as the Father too is the beginning of the creature, because from him are all things. For Creator too is said relatively to the creature, as master to servant.
And therefore when we say both that the Father is the beginning and that the Son is the beginning, we do not say two beginnings of the creature, because the Father and the Son together are one beginning to the creature, just as one Creator, just as one God. But if whatever remains in itself and begets or produces something is the beginning to that thing which it begets or to that which it produces, we cannot deny that the Holy Spirit also is rightly called beginning, since we do not separate him from the appellation of Creator. And it is written of him that he works, and assuredly he works while remaining in himself; for he is not changed and turned into any of the things which he works. And behold what he works: 'But to each one,' he says, 'is given the manifestation of the Spirit for profit.'
For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit; to another faith in the same Spirit; to another the gift of healings in the one Spirit; to another the working of miracles; to another prophecy; to another the discerning of spirits; to another kinds of tongues. But all these one and the same Spirit works, dividing to each his own as he wills—assuredly as God. For who can work such great things but God? And it is the same God who works all things in all. For even if we are questioned singly about the Holy Spirit, we most truly answer that he is God, and together with the Father and the Son he is one God. One beginning, then, is God said to be in relation to the creature, not two or three beginnings.
But as regards their mutual relation within the Trinity: if the begetter is beginning to that which it begets, the Father is beginning to the Son, because he begot him. But whether the Father is also beginning to the Holy Spirit, since it is said, 'He proceedeth from the Father,' is no small question. For if it be so, he will now be beginning not only to that which he begets or makes, but also to that which he gives. Here too there shines forth, so far as it can, that which is wont to trouble many: why the Holy Spirit is not also the Son, since he too goes forth from the Father, as is read in the Gospel. For he goes forth not as one born, but as one given, and therefore he is not called Son, because he was neither born as the Only-begotten, nor made so as to be born by grace into adoption as we are.
For that which is born of the Father is referred to the Father alone when he is called Son, and therefore he is the Son of the Father and not also ours. But that which is given is referred both to him who gave and to those to whom he gave; and so the Holy Spirit is called not only of the Father and the Son who gave, but also ours who have received—just as the salvation of the Lord who gives salvation is said, yet the same is also our salvation who have received it. He is therefore the Spirit both of God who gave and ours who received. Not that Spirit of ours by which we are (for that is the spirit of man which is in him), but ours in another way, in which we say also, 'Give us our bread.' Although even that spirit which is called man's we have assuredly received. 'For what hast thou,' he says, 'that thou hast not received?'
But it is one thing that we received in order to be, another that we received in order to be holy. Hence it is written also of John that he would come 'in the spirit and power of Elias'; the spirit of Elias was spoken of, but it was the Holy Spirit which Elias received. This is to be understood also of Moses, when the Lord says to him: 'I will take of thy spirit and give to them'—that is, I will give them of the Holy Spirit which I have already given to thee.
If, then, that which is given also has as its beginning him from whom it is given, because it did not receive from any other source that which proceeds from him, it must be confessed that the Father and the Son are the beginning of the Holy Spirit—not two beginnings, but as the Father and the Son are one God and, in relation to the creature, one Creator and one Lord, so in relation to the Holy Spirit they are one beginning; but in relation to the creature the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one beginning, as one Creator and one Lord. But more inwardly it is asked whether, just as the Son has not only that he is Son by being born, but altogether that he is, so the Holy Spirit too, by the fact that he is given, has not only that he is a gift, but altogether that he is;
whether, then, he existed before he was given but was not yet a gift, or whether by the very fact that God was about to give him he was already a gift even before he was given. But if he does not proceed except when he is given, he certainly would not proceed before there was one to whom he might be given. How then did that very substance already exist, if it is not except because it is given—whereas the Son has by being born not only that he is Son, which is said relatively, but altogether that the very substance is? Or does the Holy Spirit always proceed, and proceed not from time but from eternity, yet because he so proceeded as to be giveable, he was already a gift even before there was one to whom he might be given? For it is understood in one way when he is called gift, in another when he is called given. For a gift can exist even before it is given;
but 'the given' cannot in any way be spoken of unless it has been given. Nor let it trouble anyone that the Holy Spirit, though he is coeternal with the Father and the Son, is nevertheless said to be something from time—as, for example, this very thing which we have called 'given.' For everlastingly is he the Spirit a gift, but temporally 'given.' For even a lord is not called so except when he begins to have a servant, so that this relative appellation too belongs to God from time; for the creature of which he is Lord is not everlasting. How, then, shall we maintain that not even these relatives are accidents, since nothing befalls God temporally because he is not mutable, as we treated at the outset of this discussion?
Behold, that he is Lord he does not have everlastingly, lest we be compelled to say that the creature also is everlasting; for he would not everlastingly be Lord unless the creature also everlastingly served. But just as there cannot be a servant who has no master, so neither a master who has no servant.
And whoever there be who says that God alone is indeed eternal, but that the times are not eternal on account of their variety and mutability, and yet that the times did not begin to be in time (for there was no time before times began, and therefore it did not befall God in time to be Lord, since he was the Lord of the very times which certainly were not made in time)—of him whose Lord he certainly is, namely man, who was made in time, whose Lord he certainly was not before there was one over whom he might be Lord: assuredly, even that he should be man's Lord befell God from time; and, that all controversy may seem to be removed, assuredly, that he should be thy Lord or mine, who have but now begun to be, befell God from time.
Or if, on account of the obscure question concerning the soul, this too seems uncertain, what of his being Lord of the people of Israel? For although the nature of the soul which that people possessed already existed—how, we do not inquire—yet that people did not yet exist, and it is evident when it began to be. Lastly, that he should be Lord of this tree and of this harvest befell from time, for they have but now begun to be. For although the matter itself already existed, yet it is one thing to be lord of the matter, another to be lord of a nature already made. For at one time is a man lord of the wood, and at another time lord of the chest fashioned from that very wood, which certainly did not exist when he was already lord of the wood.
How then shall we maintain that nothing is said of God according to accident, except because nothing befalls his very nature whereby it might be changed, so that those are relative accidents which come to pass with some change of the things concerning which they are said? As a friend is said relatively, for he does not begin to be so except when he has begun to love; there comes about, then, some change of will that he should be called a friend. But a coin, when it is called a price, is said relatively, and yet it is not changed when it began to be a price, nor when it is called a pledge, and the like.
If, then, a coin can, with no change of itself, be so often called relatively that neither when it begins to be so called nor when it ceases does any change come about in its nature or form by which it is a coin, how much more easily ought we to understand concerning that immutable substance of God, that something is so said relatively of it in relation to the creature that, although it begins to be said temporally, yet it is understood to have befallen not the very substance of God, but that creature in relation to which it is said? 'Lord,' he says, 'thou art become a refuge for us.' God, therefore, is called our refuge relatively; for he is referred to us; and he then becomes our refuge when we flee to him. Does anything then come about in his nature which was not there before we fled to him? In us, therefore, some change comes about;
for we were worse before we fled to him, and by fleeing to him we are made better; but in him there is no change. So too he begins to be our Father when we are regenerated by his grace, since 'he gave us power to become sons of God.' Our substance, therefore, is changed for the better when we are made his sons; and at the same time he too begins to be our Father, yet without any change of his substance. What, therefore, God begins to be called temporally, which he was not called before, is manifestly said relatively, yet not according to an accident of God, as though something befell him, but plainly according to an accident of that in relation to which God begins to be called something relatively. And that a friend of God begins to be righteous—he himself is changed;
but far be it that God should temporally love someone as with a new love which was not in him before, with whom neither have past things passed away nor are future things yet to be done. And so he loved all his saints before the foundation of the world, even as he predestined them; but when they are converted and find him, then they are said to begin to be loved by him—so that it may be said in the way in which what is said can be grasped by human affection. So also, when he is said to be angry with the wicked and gentle with the good, it is they who are changed, not he; just as light is harsh to weak eyes but gentle to strong ones, by their change, of course, not its own.