The one true God, almighty, from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things—him I have prayed, and I pray, that in refuting and confuting your heresy, O Manicheans (to whom you have perhaps clung more imprudently than maliciously), he may give me a mind at peace and tranquil, and thinking more of your correction than of your ruin. For although the Lord through his servants overthrows the kingdoms of error, yet he commands that the men themselves, insofar as they are men, be rather amended than destroyed. And whatever is divinely avenged before that last judgment—whether through the wicked or through the righteous, whether through the ignorant or the knowing, whether secretly or openly—must be believed to avail not for the destruction of men, but for their healing;
and those who spurn this healing are being prepared for the utmost punishment. Wherefore, since in this universe of things there are some which avail for bodily punishment—such as fire and poison and disease and other things of this kind—others by which within himself a man is punished not by the torments of his body but by the snares of his own desires, such as loss, exile, bereavement, insult, and the like; while certain others are not torments but as it were poultices and soothings for the ailing, such as consolations, exhortations, disputations, and whatever else there is: of all these, some things the supreme justice of God works even through the wicked who know not, but some through the good who know.
It was therefore ours to choose and desire the better things, that we might have an approach to your correction—not in strife and rivalry and persecutions, but by gently consoling, kindly exhorting, mildly disputing. As it is written: 'The servant of the Lord must not strive, but be gentle unto all men, apt to teach, patient, in meekness correcting those who think differently.' It was therefore ours to be willing to seek out these parts; it is God's to grant to those who will and ask that which is good. Let those rage against you who know not with what labor the truth is found and how difficult it is to guard against errors; let those rage against you who know not how rare and arduous it is to overcome carnal phantasms by the serenity of a devout mind;
let those rage against you who know not with how great difficulty the eye of the inward man is healed, that it may be able to behold its own sun—not that sun which you worship, shining and radiant with celestial body to fleshly eyes both of men and of beasts, but that of which it was said through the prophet: The sun of righteousness has risen for me, and of which it was said in the Gospel: There was the true light, which enlightens every man that comes into this world—: let those rage against you who know not with what sighings and groanings it comes to pass that God may be understood even in the very least degree; lastly, let those rage against you who have never been deceived by such an error as that by which they see you deceived. But I,
who, long and greatly tossed about, was at last able to look upon what that sincerity is which is perceived without the recounting of an empty fable; who scarcely, wretched man, deserved by the Lord's help to overcome the vain imaginations of my mind, gathered from various opinions and errors; who submitted myself, though so tardily, to the most merciful Physician calling and caressing me to wipe away the fog of the mind; who long wept that the unchangeable and unstainable substance might deign, in accord with the divine books, to persuade itself to me inwardly;
who, finally, both curiously sought and attentively heard and rashly believed all those fabrications which hold you entangled and bound by long habit, and urgently persuaded of them whomever I could, and against others pertinaciously and spiritedly defended them: I can by no means rage against you, whom I ought now to bear, just as I bore myself at that time, and to deal with you with as great patience as my neighbors dealt with me when I was raving and blind in your dogma. But that you may more easily grow gentle and not oppose me with a hostile spirit ruinous to yourselves, I must obtain this from you, whoever be the judge, that on both sides all arrogance be laid aside. Let none of us say that he has already found the truth;
let us so seek it as if it were unknown to both parties. For thus it can be sought diligently and harmoniously, if by no rash presumption it be believed to have been found and known. But if I cannot obtain this from you, grant me at least this: that I may hear you now for the first time as though unknown, and now for the first time examine you. I think what I ask is just, provided this condition indeed be observed: that I neither pray with you, nor hold assemblies, nor accept the name of Manichean, unless you shall have given me, concerning all things pertaining to the salvation of the soul, a clear reasoning without any fog.
For in the catholic Church—to say nothing of that most sincere wisdom, to the knowledge of which few spiritual men attain in this life, so as to know it, in the very least part indeed (because they are men), yet without doubt—for the rest of the multitude, it is not liveliness of understanding but simplicity of believing that makes them most safe—to pass over, then, this wisdom, which you do not believe to be in the catholic Church: there are many other things which most justly hold me in her bosom. The consent of peoples and nations holds me; the authority holds me, begun by miracles, nourished by hope, increased by charity, made firm by antiquity;
the succession of priests holds me, from the very see of Peter the apostle—to whom the Lord after his resurrection entrusted the feeding of his sheep—down to the present episcopate; lastly, the very name of catholic holds me, which not without cause this Church alone, among so many heresies, has so obtained that, although all heretics wish to be called catholics, yet to any stranger asking where the meeting of the catholic Church is, no heretic would dare to point out his own basilica or house. Therefore these many and so great most dear bonds of the Christian name rightly hold a man believing in the catholic Church, even if, on account of the slowness of our understanding or the merit of our life, the truth does not yet show itself most openly.
But among you, where there is none of these things to invite and hold me, only the promise of truth resounds. If indeed it is shown so manifestly that it cannot come into doubt, it is to be preferred to all those things by which I am held in the catholic Church; but if it is only promised and not exhibited, no one shall move me from that faith which binds my mind by so many and so great ties to the Christian religion. Let us see, then, what Manichaeus teaches me, and let us above all consider that book which you call the Epistle of the Foundation, wherein almost the whole of what you believe is contained. For it was read to us wretches at that time, and we were said by you to be enlightened. It certainly begins thus:
'Manichaeus, apostle of Jesus Christ, by the providence of God the Father. These are wholesome words from a perennial and living fountain.' Now with good patience, if you please, attend to what I ask. I do not believe this man to be an apostle of Christ. I beg you, do not be angry and begin to revile. For you know that I have resolved to believe nothing rashly asserted by you. I ask therefore: who is this Manichaeus? You will answer: An apostle of Christ. I do not believe it; you will have nothing left to say or do. For you were promising the knowledge of the truth, and now you compel me to believe what I do not know. Perhaps you are about to read me the Gospel and thence attempt to establish the person of Manichaeus. But if you were to find someone who does not yet believe the Gospel, what would you do to him who said to you:
'I do not believe'? I indeed would not believe the Gospel, unless the authority of the catholic Church moved me. Those therefore whom I obeyed when they said: 'Believe the Gospel,' why should I not obey them when they say to me: 'Do not believe the Manicheans'? Choose what you will. If you say: 'Believe the catholics,' they warn me to accord no faith to you; wherefore, believing them, I cannot but disbelieve you. If you say: 'Do not believe the catholics,' you will not act rightly in compelling me by the Gospel to the faith of Manichaeus, since I believed the Gospel itself through the catholics preaching it. But if you say:
'You rightly believed the catholics when they praised the Gospel, but you did not rightly believe them when they blamed Manichaeus'—do you think me so foolish that, no reason being rendered, I should believe what you wish and not believe what you do not wish? Far more justly and cautiously do I act if, since I once believed the catholics, I do not pass over to you, unless you bid me not to believe but make me most openly and most manifestly to know something. Wherefore, if you are going to render me a reason, dismiss the Gospel. If you hold to the Gospel, let me hold to those at whose bidding I believed the Gospel, and at their command I shall by no means believe you.
But if perchance you were able to find in the Gospel something most manifest concerning the apostleship of Manichaeus, you would weaken for me the authority of the catholics, who bid me not to believe you; and that authority being weakened, I could then no longer believe even the Gospel, since it was through them that I had believed it. Thus nothing will avail with me, whatever you bring forth from there. Wherefore, if nothing manifest concerning the apostleship of Manichaeus is found in the Gospel, I shall believe the catholics rather than you. But if you read there something manifest in favor of Manichaeus, I shall believe neither them nor you: not them, because they lied to me about you; but not you either, because you offer me a Scripture which I had believed through them who lied to me. But far be it that I should not believe the Gospel.
For, believing in the Gospel, I do not find how I could also believe in you; for the names of the apostles which are read there do not include among themselves the name of Manichaeus. But who succeeded into the place of the betrayer of Christ, we read in the Acts of the Apostles; and I must of necessity believe that book, if I believe the Gospel, since the catholic authority commends both Scriptures to me alike. In the same book we also hold the most widely known account of the calling and apostleship of Paul. Read to me now, if you can, in the Gospel where Manichaeus is called an apostle, or in some other book to which I confess I already give credence. Or will you read to me that passage where the Lord promised the apostles the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete?
Concerning this passage, consider how many and how great are the things which call me back and deter me from believing Manichaeus. For I ask why the beginning of this epistle is 'Manichaeus, an apostle of Jesus Christ,' and not 'the Paraclete, an apostle of Jesus Christ.' But if the Paraclete, sent by Christ, sent Manichaeus, why do I read 'Manichaeus, an apostle of Jesus Christ,' and not rather 'Manichaeus, an apostle of the Paraclete'? If you say that he who is also the Holy Spirit is himself Christ, you contradict Scripture itself, where the Lord says: 'And I will send you another Paraclete.' But if you think the name of Christ is rightly placed not because he who is also the Paraclete is himself Christ, but because both are of the same substance, that is—
—not because he is one person, but because they are one thing, then Paul too could have said, 'Paul, an apostle of God the Father,' since the Lord said, 'I and the Father are one.' Yet nowhere does he say this, nor does any of the apostles write himself an apostle of the Father. What then does this novelty intend? Does it not seem to you to smell of some deceit or other? Certainly, if he judged it to make no difference, why does he not name himself in some epistles an apostle of Christ and in others of the Paraclete? But I have heard 'of Christ' always, as often as I have heard it, and 'of the Paraclete' not even once. What cause for this do we suppose there is, except that pride, the mother of all heretics, drove the man to wish to seem not sent by the Paraclete, but so taken up that he himself might be called the Paraclete?
Just as Jesus Christ the man was sent—not by the Son of God, that is, the power and wisdom of God through whom all things were made—but was so taken up, according to the catholic faith, that he himself was the Son of God, that is, that in him the very wisdom of God appeared to heal sinners: so this man wished it to seem that he was taken up by the Holy Spirit whom Christ promised, so that now, when we hear 'Manichaeus, the Holy Spirit,' we should understand 'an apostle of Jesus Christ,' that is, one sent by Jesus Christ who promised that he would send him. What singular audacity is this, and what unspeakable sacrilege!
But nevertheless I ask: since the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are, even by our own confession, joined together in no unequal nature, why is it that you do not think it shameful to proclaim that a man, Manichaeus, taken up by the Holy Spirit, was born from both sexes, yet you dread to believe that a man, taken up by the only-begotten Wisdom of God, was born of a virgin? If human flesh, if the intercourse of a man, if the womb of a woman could not defile the Holy Spirit, how could a virgin's womb defile the Wisdom of God? This Manichaeus, then, who glories in the Holy Spirit and in the reading of the Gospel, must of necessity concede to you either that he was sent by the Holy Spirit or that he was taken up by it. If he was sent, let him call himself an apostle of the Paraclete;
if he was taken up, let him concede a human mother to him whom the only-begotten Son of God took up, if he concedes a father to him whom the Holy Spirit took up. Let him believe that the Word of God was not polluted by the virginity of Mary, if he exhorts us to believe that the Holy Spirit could not be polluted by the intercourse of his parents. But if you say that Manichaeus was taken up by the Holy Spirit not in the womb nor before the womb, but when already born, it is enough that you confess he had flesh begotten of man and woman.
For since you do not fear the inward parts and blood of Manichaeus coming from human intercourse, and the entrails full of dung which that flesh carried, and yet do not believe that the Holy Spirit—by whom you believe that man was taken up—was contaminated by all these things: why should I shrink from a virginal womb and untouched genitals, and not rather believe that the Wisdom of God, having taken up a man in those very maternal inward parts, remained immaculate and pure? Wherefore, since whether your Manichaeus affirms himself sent or taken up by the Paraclete, he will be able to make good none of these claims, I am now more cautious and believe him neither sent nor taken up. For as to what he added, saying 'by the providence of God the Father,' what else did he aim at, once Jesus Christ had been named,
—of whom he says he is the apostle—and 'God the Father,' by whose providence he says he was sent by the Son, except that we should believe the Holy Spirit himself to be the third? For thus he writes: 'Manichaeus, an apostle of Jesus Christ, by the providence of God the Father.' The Holy Spirit is not named, who most of all ought to have been named by him who commends his own apostleship to us by the promise of the Paraclete, so as to press the unlearned with Gospel authority. And when this is asked of you, you reply of course that, once Manichaeus the apostle is named, the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, is named, because he deigned to come in him.
I ask therefore, as I said above, why you shudder when the catholic Church says that he in whom the divine Wisdom came was born of a virgin, whereas you do not at all shudder that he in whom you proclaim the Holy Spirit to have come was born of a woman mingled with a man. What else, then, am I to suspect—I know not—except that this Manichaeus, who through the name of Christ seeks entry into the minds of the unlearned, wished to be worshipped in place of Christ himself? Whence I infer this, I shall say briefly. When I often asked you, in that time when I used to listen to you, what the reason was—
—that you for the most part celebrated the Lord's Pascha with no observance, or now and then with a very lukewarm celebration by a few, appointing no vigils, no more prolonged fast for the hearers, and no more festive preparation at all; whereas your Bema—that is, the day on which Manichaeus was killed—you would attend with great honours, its tribunal set up with five steps and adorned with costly cloths, set out in full view and offered to those who worshipped. When I asked this, the answer was given that the day of passion of him who had truly suffered ought to be celebrated; but that Christ, who had not been born, and had shown to human eyes not true but only feigned flesh, had not undergone but had feigned his passion. Who would not groan that men—
—who wish to be called Christians, that they fear lest truth be defiled by a virgin's womb, yet do not fear falsehood? But, to return to the matter, who would not suspect, upon careful attention, that Manichaeus denied that Christ was born of a woman and had a human body precisely for this reason: lest his passion—which is now the most festive season of the whole world—should be celebrated by those who believed in him, and lest so great a devotion should honour, with a longed-for solemnity, the day of his death? For this was what pleased us most in that celebration of the Bema, that it was observed in place of the Pascha, since we the more vehemently desired that festal day once the other—which used to be the sweetest—had been taken away. Perhaps you may say to me: When, then, did the Paraclete promised by the Lord come?
Here, if I had nothing else to believe, I would more readily wait for him as still to come than grant that he had come through Manichaeus. But as it is, since in the Acts of the Apostles the coming of the Holy Spirit is most manifestly proclaimed, what necessity compels me to believe heretics so perilously and so easily? For in the book mentioned it is thus written: 'The former discourse, O Theophilus, we made concerning all that Jesus began to do and to teach, on the day on which, through the Holy Spirit, he chose the apostles and commanded them to preach the Gospel,'
'to whom also, after his passion, he showed himself alive by many proofs, being seen by them over forty days and speaking of the kingdom of God'—how he conversed with them and commanded them not to depart from Jerusalem, but to await the promise of the Father, 'which you have heard,' he says, 'from my mouth; for John indeed baptized with water, but you shall begin to be baptized with the Holy Spirit,' which also you shall receive not many days from now, up to Pentecost. They indeed, when they had come together, questioned him, saying: 'Lord, if at this time you will present yourself again, and when will the kingdom of Israel?' But he said: 'No one can know the time which the Father has placed in his own power;'
'but you shall receive the power of the Holy Spirit coming upon you, and you shall be my witnesses at Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria, and even to the whole earth.' Behold, you have where he reminded the disciples of the paternal promise, which they had heard from his mouth concerning the Holy Spirit that was to come. Now let us see when he was sent. For a little after it follows and says: 'At that time, when the day of Pentecost was fulfilled, they were all with one accord together in one place; and suddenly there was made a sound from heaven, as of a violent rushing wind, and it filled the whole place in which they were sitting; and there appeared to them divided tongues, as it were of fire, which also sat upon each one of them.'
'And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in tongues, as the Spirit gave them to utter. Now there were dwelling at Jerusalem Jews, men out of every nation which is under heaven. And when this voice was made, a crowd came together and was confounded, because each one heard them speaking in his own speech and in his own tongues. And they were astonished and marvelled, saying to one another: Are not all these who speak Galileans by nation? And how do we recognize in them the speech in which we were born? Parthians, Medes, Elamites, and those who inhabit Mesopotamia, Armenia and Cappadocia, Pontus, Asia, Phrygia and Pamphylia, Egypt and the regions of Africa which is toward Cyrene;'
'and those who had come as Romans and Jews, both native-born and proselytes, Cretans and Arabs—they heard them speaking in their own tongues the mighty works of God. And they were astonished and hesitated on account of what had happened, saying: What does this mean to be? But others mocked, saying: These are all full of new wine.' Behold where the Holy Spirit came. What more do you wish? If Scriptures are to be believed, why should I not rather believe these which are confirmed by the most robust authority, which, together with the Gospel itself—where we equally believe the Holy Spirit was promised—deserved to become known to the peoples, to be commended to posterity, and to be proclaimed?
When therefore I read these Acts of the Apostles, joined to the Gospel by equal authority, I find that the Holy Spirit was not only promised to those true apostles, but also so manifestly sent that no room was left on this matter for errors. For the glorification of our Lord among men is his resurrection from the dead and his ascension into heaven. And it is written in the Gospel according to John: 'But the Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified.' If, then, the Spirit was not yet given for this reason, that Jesus was not yet glorified, then, Jesus being glorified, of necessity he was at once given. And on account of that very twofold glorification—according to the man and according to God—the Holy Spirit too was given twice:
once after he had risen from the dead, when he breathed upon the face of the disciples, saying, 'Receive the Holy Spirit'; and again after he had ascended into heaven, ten days having passed—which number signifies perfection, since to the number seven, by which all created things stand established, is added the Trinity of the Creator. Concerning these matters many things are treated piously and cautiously among spiritual men. But I will not depart from my proposal; for I undertook first to deal with you in such a way that I should not teach you—which perhaps you deem arrogant—but as though I myself were eager to learn from you what for nine years I could not learn. Wherefore I have writings in which to believe concerning the coming of the Holy Spirit;
and if you forbid me to believe these, lest I rashly believe what I do not know—for so you are wont to admonish—then far less will I believe your writings. Wherefore, either take away all books from our midst and by argument lay open the truth about which I cannot doubt, or bring forth such books as impose upon me with no arrogance what I am to believe, but display without fraud what I am to learn. Perhaps, you say, this epistle too is such. I do not wish, then, to linger any longer on its threshold: let us look at the interior. 'These,' it says, 'are wholesome words from the perennial and living fountain; and whoever shall have heard them, and first believed them, and then shall have kept what they instill, shall never be subject to death, but shall enjoy eternal and glorious life.'
'For assuredly he is to be judged blessed, who shall have been instructed by this divine knowledge, being liberated through which he shall remain in life everlasting.' And this, as you see, is a promise, not yet an exhibition of the truth; and you too can most easily observe that under such a veil any errors whatever may be painted over, so that they may secretly creep into the minds of the unlearned through an adorned doorway. For if it said: 'These are pestilential words from a poisonous fountain; and whoever shall have heard them, and first believed them, and then shall have kept what they instill, shall never be restored to life, but shall be afflicted with a penal and wretched death—for assuredly he is to be judged wretched, who shall have been ensnared by this infernal ignorance,'
'—being drowned through which he shall remain in everlasting torments'—if, then, it said this, it would speak the truth, but it would not only win no reader for this book, but would stir up into the greatest hatred all into whose hands it might fall. Wherefore let us pass on to what follows, and let not those words deceive us which can be common to good and bad, learned and unlearned. What then follows? 'Peace,' it says, 'of the invisible God, and knowledge of the truth, be with the holy and dearest brethren, who alike believe and serve the heavenly commandments.' So be it, as it says. For this too is a kindly and most acceptable wish. Only let us remember that these things can be said both by good teachers and by deceivers.
And so, if he said nothing but such things, I would grant that it should be read and embraced by all. Nor would I disapprove of those things which follow to this effect; for he adds: 'But may the right hand of light also protect you and rescue you from every malign incursion and from the snares of the world.' And in general, whatever is written in the beginning of this epistle, until the matter itself is reached, I do not wish to censure, lest much labour be consumed on lesser things. Now, then, let us look at the man's most evident promise. 'Concerning that, therefore,' he says, 'most beloved brother Patticius, which you signified to me, saying that you desired to know of what sort is the birth of Adam and Eve—whether they were brought forth by a word, or begotten in body—you shall be answered as is fitting.'
'For concerning these matters it has been inserted and recorded in various Scriptures and revelations by very many, in differing ways. Wherefore the truth of this matter, as it stands, is unknown to nearly all nations and to all who have even long and much disputed about it. For if it had fallen to them to know manifestly about the generation of Adam and Eve, they would never be subject to corruption and death.' He promises us, therefore, manifest knowledge of this matter, that we may not be subjected to corruption and death. And if that is still too little, see what follows. 'Of necessity, therefore,' he says, 'more things must first be recalled, so that this mystery may be reached without any ambiguity.'
This is what I was saying, that the truth ought thus to be demonstrated to me, so that I may reach it without any ambiguity. But if he himself did not promise this, I ought nevertheless to demand and insist upon it, that for so great a reward of most evident and most certain knowledge I should not be ashamed to become a Manichaean from a catholic Christian, whoever might contradict. Now, therefore, let us hear what he brings forward. 'Whence, if it seems good to you,' he says, 'listen first to what things existed before the constitution of the world, and in what manner the battle was waged, so that you may be able to separate the nature of light and of darkness.' Now he has set forth things incredible and altogether false. For who would believe that any battle was joined before the constitution of the world?
And yet, if it were credible, we should want not to believe it, but to know it. For he who says that the Persians and Scythians warred with each other many years ago says a credible thing, yet one which we can believe as either heard or read, not know as experienced and grasped. Since, then, I would repudiate this man if he said any such thing—for he did not promise things I should be compelled to believe, but things I could know without any ambiguity—how shall I not repudiate him when he says things not only uncertain but even incredible? But what if by some reasonings he will make these things clear and known? Let us hear then, if we can, with all patience and gentleness, what follows.
'These indeed,' he says, 'in the beginning were two substances divided from each other. And the empire of light God the Father held in his holy stock, everlasting, magnificent in power, true by his very nature, ever exulting in his proper eternity, containing within himself wisdom and vital senses, through which he also comprehended the twelve members of his light—the overflowing riches, namely, of his own kingdom. And in each of his members are stored thousands of innumerable and immense treasures.'
'But the Father himself, preeminent in his own praise, incomprehensible in greatness, has joined to himself blessed and glorious ages, to be estimated neither by number nor by extent, with whom the same holy and illustrious Father and Begetter dwells, none in his kingdoms being set as either needy or lowly among his notables. And so his most splendid kingdoms are founded upon the shining and blessed earth, so that they can never by any be either moved or shaken.' Whence is he going to prove these things to me, or whence did he himself learn them? Do not terrify me with the name of the Paraclete. First, because I approached, made more fearful by you yourselves, not to believe things unknown but to know things certain.
For you know how vehemently you are wont to mock those who believe rashly, especially since he himself, who has now begun to narrate uncertain things, promised full and firm knowledge a little before. Next, because, if faith is to be commanded of me, that Scripture rather terrifies me, where I read that the Holy Spirit came and inspired the apostles, to whom the Lord had promised he would send him. Wherefore, either prove to me that the things he says are true, so that you may show what I cannot believe, or prove to me that he who says them is the Holy Spirit, so that I may believe what you cannot show. For I profess the catholic faith and presume that through it I shall arrive at certain knowledge;
but you, who try to shake my faith, hand over certain knowledge, if you can, so that you may convince me that I have rashly believed what I did believe. There are two things which you offer me: one, when you say that it is the Holy Spirit who speaks, and the other, when you say that the things he speaks are manifest. Both of these I ought to know from you without any doubt; but I am not greedy—teach me one of these. Show that this is the Holy Spirit, and I will believe that the things he says are true, even if I do not know them; or show that the things he says are true, and I will believe that he is the Holy Spirit, even if I do not know it. Can there be any fairer or more benevolent dealing with you? But you are able to show neither this nor that. You have chosen nothing else but to praise what you believe and to mock what I believe.
When, therefore, I in turn shall have praised what I believe and mocked what you believe, what do you suppose is to be judged by us, or what is to be done, except that we leave behind those who invite us to know certain things and afterward command that we believe uncertain things—and follow those who invite us first to believe what we are not yet able to behold, so that, made stronger by that very faith, we may deserve to understand what we believe, no longer by men, but by God himself inwardly illuminating and strengthening our mind? And since I have asked whence he may prove it to me, now I ask whence he himself has come to know it.
If he says that it was revealed to him by the Holy Spirit and that his own mind was divinely illuminated, so that he might know as certain and manifest the things he says, he himself indicates what the difference is between knowing and believing. For he himself knows, to whom these things are shown most openly; but to those to whom he narrates them, he does not instill knowledge, but persuades to credulity. And whoever rashly consents to him is made a Manichaean, not by knowing certain things, but by believing uncertain things—just as he once deceived us, unlearned young men. He ought therefore not to have promised us knowledge, nor manifest cognition, nor an arrival at what is sought without any ambiguity,
—an arrival, without any ambiguity, at what is sought; but rather he ought to have said that these things were shown to him, but that those to whom they are narrated ought to believe him concerning what they do not know. But if he said this, who would not reply to him: If, then, I am going to believe things unknown, why should I not rather believe those things which are now celebrated by the consent of learned and unlearned alike and are confirmed among all peoples by the weightiest authority? Fearing lest this be said to him, he pours out fogs upon the unlearned, first promising the knowledge of certain things, and afterward commanding the belief of uncertain things. Yet if it be said to him that he should at least teach that these things were shown to him, he likewise fails, and commands us to believe this too. Who would endure such deceit and such pride?
What? If, with the help of God our Lord, I shall have shown that the things he says are not only uncertain but even false, what more wretched thing can be found than this superstition, which not only does not exhibit the knowledge and truth which it promises, but says things which are vehemently contrary to knowledge and truth? This will appear more manifestly in what follows. For he speaks thus: 'Along one part and side of that illustrious and holy earth was the land of darkness, deep and of immense magnitude, in which dwelt fiery bodies—pestilential kinds, that is. Here were infinite shadows flowing from the same nature, immeasurable, with their own offspring; beyond which were miry and turbid waters with their inhabitants;'
'within which were horrible and violent winds with their prince and progenitors. Again, a fiery and corruptible region with its leaders and nations. In like manner, further within, a race full of gloom and smoke, in which dwelt the monstrous prince of all and leader, having around him innumerable princes, of all of whom he himself was the mind and origin: and these were the five natures of the pestilential land.' If he said that the nature of God was an airy or even ethereal body, he would assuredly be laughed at by all who are able—with whatever keenness of a now more serene mind—to behold the nature of wisdom and truth, extended and diffused through no spaces of places, great and magnificent without any mass, neither lesser in a part nor greater in a part, but through all things equal to the supreme Father,
having neither one thing here and another elsewhere, but everywhere whole, everywhere present. But what shall I say of truth and wisdom, which surpass all the powers of the soul—since the very nature of the soul, which is found to be mutable, in no way occupies the spaces of places with any mass of its own? For whatever is of any thickness whatever cannot but be diminished part by part, having one thing here and another elsewhere. For a finger is less than the whole hand, and one finger is less than two, and this finger is in one place, that in another, and the rest of the hand in another. Which we see not only in the jointed masses of bodies, but even this part of the earth is not there where that part is, because each thing occupies its own place;
and a smaller part of a liquid is in a smaller place, and a greater in a greater; and one part is around the bottom, another around the rims of the cup. Likewise the parts of air each fill their own places. Nor can it come to pass that the air with which this house is filled can have with it, in the same house, also that air which the neighbours have. And of light itself, one part is poured through this window, another through that, and a greater through a greater, a lesser through a lesser. Nor can there be at all any body—whether celestial or terrestrial or airy or watery—which is not less in a part than in the whole:
nor could it in any way have in the place of this part another part at the same time, but, having one thing here and another elsewhere, it is stretched out through any spaces of places whatever by a mass that is distant and divided, or rather, so to speak, sectile. But the nature of the soul—even if that power of it be not considered by which it understands truth, but that lower power by which it holds together the body and perceives in the body—is in no way found to be stretched out through the spaces of places by any mass. For it is wholly present to the several particles of its body, since it wholly perceives in the several parts; nor is a lesser part of it in the finger and a greater in the arm, just as the finger itself is smaller than the arm, but everywhere it is as great, because everywhere it is whole. For when a finger is touched,
it does not perceive throughout the whole body, and yet it wholly perceives. For that touch does not escape the whole; which would not happen unless it were wholly present. Nor is it so wholly present, when the finger is touched and it perceives in the finger, that it should for the rest desert the body and gather itself together to that one place in which it perceives. But when the hand wholly perceives in the finger, if another place be touched in the foot, it does not there cease to perceive wholly; and thus in the several distant places it is wholly present at the same time, not deserting the one so as to be whole in the other, nor holding both in such a way as to have one part here and another elsewhere, but sufficing to exhibit itself wholly to the several places at the same time, since—because it wholly perceives in the several parts—it sufficiently shows that it is not held by the spaces of places. What?
What if we consider its memory—not of intelligible things, but of these corporeal ones, which even beasts are perceived to have? For beasts too proceed without error through known places, and beasts return to their own lairs, and dogs recognize the bodies of their masters, and while sleeping they often mutter and sometimes burst into barking—which they could in no way do, unless images of things seen, or somehow perceived through the body, were turning in their memory. Who could worthily consider where those images are received, where they are carried, or where they are formed? For if they could not be greater than the quantity of our body could hold, one might say that within the very spaces of its own body, by which the soul too is enclosed,
the soul shapes and preserves these images. But as it is, since the body occupies a very tiny portion of the earth, the mind revolves images of immense regions and of heaven and earth, which, departing and succeeding in troops, do not make it cramped; and hence it shows itself not to be diffused through places, because it is not, as it were, captured by the images of the greatest places, but rather captures them—not by any fold or recess, but by an ineffable power, by which it is permitted to them both to add whatever it will and to take away, and to contract them into a narrow space and to expand them through immense extents, and to arrange them as it wishes, and to disturb and multiply them, and to reduce them to fewness or singularity. What now shall I say of that power—
By what faculty is truth understood — that faculty by which, when the very images drawn from bodily sense set themselves up in place of truth, they are resisted with great vigour? By what faculty is it seen that the true Carthage, for instance, is one thing, and that which a man fashions by thinking and, according to his own pleasure, changes with complete ease is another; that from this same ease there come the innumerable worlds through which the thought of Epicurus wandered without number; and — not to pursue many examples — that from this same ease there come both that earth of light spread abroad through infinite spaces and the five dens of the race of darkness with their inhabitants, in which the Manichaeans have dared to usurp for their phantasms the name of truth? What then is this power that discerns these things?
Assuredly, however great it be, it is both greater than all these things and is conceived without any such imagining of material things. Find spaces for it, if you can; spread it out through places; stretch it by the swelling of an infinite mass. Assuredly, if you think rightly, you cannot. For whatever such thing occurs to you, you judge by that very act of thinking that it can be cut into parts, and there you make one part smaller and another larger, as much as you please; but that very faculty by which you judge these things you perceive to be above them — not by loftiness of place, but by the dignity of its power. Wherefore, if the soul, so often changeable — whether by the crowd of its varied wills, or by its affections bending itself according to the abundance or want of things, or by the innumerable plays of phantasms themselves,
or by forgetfulness and memory, or by learning and ignorance — if, then, you perceive that the soul, as I said, though so often changeable by these and suchlike motions, is nevertheless not spread out and extended through places, but by the vigour of its power surpasses all such spaces, what must be thought or judged concerning God himself, who, abiding unshaken and unchangeable above all rational minds, bestows on each what is to be bestowed? Him the soul dares more easily to utter than to see, and the more sincerely it has been able to see him, the less does it utter him.
Yet if, as the phantasms of the Manichaeans clamour, he were bounded on one side by place and stretched on the others through immeasurable space, then however many little portions and innumerable fragments there might be in him, some greater, some smaller, they would be measured according to the thinker's arbitrary will, so that, for example, a two-foot part in him would be eight parts smaller than a ten-foot part. For this must necessarily befall all natures which, being diffused through such spaces, cannot be wholly everywhere — which is not found in the soul itself, and which is shamefully and basely believed of it by those who lack the strength to consider these matters.
Nevertheless, with carnal minds one must perhaps not proceed thus, but rather descend to the thoughts of those who, in their thinking, either do not dare or are not yet able to pursue an incorporeal and spiritual nature — so much so that they do not even consider their own thought by that same thought and find it, though it occupies no space of place, judging concerning the very spaces of place. Let us therefore descend to their manner of perceiving and ask them: on which part, or on which side, according as the Manichaean says, was the land of darkness alongside that illustrious and holy land? For he says, "On one part and side," but does not say which part or which side — right or left. But whichever they choose, this at least is manifest: that one is not said to be one side
unless there is where there is another side. But where there are either three or more sides, either the circuit of a figure is understood to be bounded on every side, or, if on some part it lies open into the immeasurable, it must nevertheless be bounded by those which are called sides. Let them tell us, then: on the other side, or on the other sides, what was joined to the land of light, if on one side there was the race of darkness? They do not say; but when they are pressed to say it, they say that the other sides of that land which they call the land of light are infinite — that is, that it is stretched out through infinite spaces and confined by no limit. Nor do they understand that then these are no longer sides — a thing most obvious even to any slow wits; for they would be sides only if they were bounded by their limits. "What is it to me," he says, "if there are no sides?"
But when you said "on one part and side," you compelled another part too, or parts, and another side, or sides, to be understood. For if there was only one side, it ought to have been said simply "alongside the side," not "alongside one side." Just as in our body we rightly say that something is alongside one eye, because there is another eye, or alongside one breast, because there is another. But if we should say alongside one nose or alongside one navel, when there is no other, we shall be laughed at by learned and unlearned alike. But I do not press you with words; for perhaps you meant "one" as "only." What, then, was alongside that side of the land which you call illustrious and holy? "The land," he says, "of darkness." What? Do you at least grant concerning this land that it was corporeal?
You must needs say this, since you assert that all bodies derive their origin thence. What then, I ask? Though slow, though carnal men, have you never even at any time noticed this — that these two lands could not be joined to each other by sides unless each were corporeal? Why then was it told us, perverted as we were by some blindness, that only the land of darkness had been or was corporeal, but that the one which was called the land of light ought to be believed incorporeal and spiritual? Let us at last wake up, good men, at least when admonished — which is very easy. Let us attend to the fact that two lands cannot be joined to each other by sides unless each is a body. Or if we are too gross and dull even for these things, I ask:
whether the land of darkness itself also had one side and the rest infinite, like the land of light. They do not believe so, for they fear lest it should seem equal to God. They say therefore that it is immeasurable in depth and in length; but upward, above it, they affirm spaces of infinite emptiness. And lest even it should seem to hold a single measure while the land of light held a double, they narrow it on two sides as well — as if, say, a single loaf (for what is being said can more easily be seen thus) were formed crosswise into four squares, of which three were white, one black. Now from the three white ones remove the distinction and make them infinite both upward and downward and everywhere behind: thus by them is the land of light believed to be.
But that black square make infinite downward and behind, while having above itself an immeasurable emptiness: thus they suppose the land of darkness to be. But these things they display, as it were as secrets, only to those who inquire very attentively and eagerly. Nevertheless, if it is so, it appears that the land of darkness is touched by the land of light on two sides; and surely if it is touched by two, it also touches by two. Certainly the land of darkness was alongside one side. Then how foul the figure of the land of light appears! — like a cloven hoof pinched below by a certain black wedge, bounded only there where it is cleft, gaping too and lying open above with an emptiness set between: whatever there is immeasurably upward from the surface of the land of darkness.
Then how much better is shown the figure of the land of darkness itself, since indeed the one cleaves, the other is cleft; the one is inserted, the other lies open between; the one gives place within itself to no emptiness, the other is not loose only in its lower part, where it is filled up by the hostile wedge. Unlearned men, then, and greedy, when they assign greater honour to a multitude of parts than to unity, so as to give six parts to the land of light — three downward, three upward — they preferred that the land of light be penetrated rather than penetrate. For by such a figure, even though they deny it to be commingled, yet they cannot deny it to be penetrated. Compare now the men of the catholic faith, though not spiritual,
in whom, as far as the mind can in this life, one discerns that the divine substance and nature is stretched out by no spaces of place, figured by no dimensions of outline. But compare our carnal and little ones, who, on hearing certain members of our body spoken of allegorically — as when the eyes of God and the ears of God are mentioned, and who by the license of imagination are wont to figure God to themselves under the form of a human body — compare these now with those Manichaeans, who are wont to describe these trifles to attentive and curious men as though they were great secrets; and consider which of them feel more tolerably and more honourably concerning God: whether those who think of him under a human form endowed with the highest dignity in its own kind, or those
who think of him as diffused in an infinite mass, yet not on every side, but infinite and dense in three squares, while cleft on one side — lying open, gaping, loose above with emptiness, wedged below with the land of darkness; or, if it is better so to speak, open above by its own nature, entered below by an alien one? Behold, I laugh together with you at carnal men, who cannot yet think spiritual things, judging God to be of human form; but do you too laugh with me, if you can, at those who imagine so misshapen and base a fissure or rent of God — so emptily gaping above, so dishonourably stopped up below — with a most pitiable act of thought; since there is also this difference, that those carnal men who think of God in human form,
if content within the bosom of the catholic Church, where they must be nourished with milk, do not cast themselves headlong into rash opinions, but there nourish a pious zeal of seeking — there let them seek that they may receive, there let them knock that it may be opened to them — begin to understand the allegories and parables of the Scriptures spiritually, and gradually to perceive that the divine powers are fittingly named now by the term of ears, now of eyes, now of hands or feet or even of wings and feathers, of shield too and sword and helmet and the rest of such innumerable things. The more they advance in this understanding, the more they are confirmed to be catholics; whereas the Manichaeans, once they have abandoned the imagining of that figure, will not be able to be Manichaeans.
For they ascribe this as something proper and pre-eminent to the praises of their founder: that they say those divine mysteries which were placed figuratively in the books by the ancients were reserved to be unravelled and shown by him who was to come last; and that on this account, after this man, no teacher would henceforth come from God, because he had said nothing through figures and allegories, since he both opened up the ancient things which had been such, and set forth his own plainly and manifestly. These men, then, have no interpretations to which they may resort, when it is read to them concerning their founder: "But alongside one part and side of that illustrious and holy land was the land of darkness."
Wherever they turn, it is inevitable that, cramped by the misery of their phantasms, they fall into clefts, or abrupt truncations and junctures, or most base props — things which it is most wretched to believe not, I will say, of the unchangeable nature of God, but of any incorporeal nature whatever, however changeable, as the soul is. And yet, if I could not strain myself toward higher things, nor unfold my thoughts out of the false imaginings which, fixed by memory, I carry through the bodily senses, into the liberty and sincerity of a spiritual nature, how much better would I think of God under the form of a human body than affix to him that black wedge of his lower cleft, and, finding no way to plug up his upper vastest looseness,
whence I might stop it up, and so leave it lying open and gaping with an immeasurable emptiness — how much better would that be! What is more foul than that opinion? What more dark can be said or feigned than this error? Then I wish it to be told me — since I read of God the Father and of his kingdoms founded above the luminous and blessed land — whether the Father and his kingdoms and the land are of one and the same substance and nature. And if it is so, then it is no longer some other nature, as it were a body of God, that the wedge of the race of darkness cleaves and penetrates — which itself would already be most base with unspeakable deformity — but the very nature of God altogether that the wedge of the land of darkness cleaves and penetrates.
I beg you, consider these things — you are men — I beg you, consider these things and flee them; and tear out and drive away from your faith the sacrileges of such phantasms with breasts rent, if it can be done. Or will you say that those three are not of one and the same nature, but that the Father is of one, the kingdoms of another, the land of another, so that each has its own diverse natures and substances, ranked by grades of excellence? But if that is true, then Manichaeus ought to have proclaimed not two, but four natures. If, however, the Father and the kingdoms have one nature, but the land alone a different one, then three natures ought to have been proclaimed.
Or if for this reason he preferred to say two — because the land of darkness does not pertain to God — I ask, how does the land of light pertain to God? For if it both has a different nature and he neither begot it nor made it, then it does not pertain to him, and his kingdoms are situated in another's domain. Or if it pertains for this reason, that it is near, then let the land of darkness pertain too, which touches the land of light not only by nearness, but even furrows it through by penetration. But if he begot it, it ought not to be believed to have a different nature; for what God begot, that ought to be believed to be what God is, just as concerning the only-begotten Son it is believed in the catholic faith.
And so necessity recalls you to fleeing and detesting that baseness, so that it is not a land, as it were another and diverse, but the very nature of God that the black wedge cleaves. But if God did not beget it, but made it, I ask, whence did he make it? If out of himself, what else is that than to have begotten it? If out of some alien nature, I ask, whether good or evil. If good, then there was some good nature which did not pertain to God — which you will in no way dare to say. But if evil, then that race of darkness was not the only evil nature. Or perhaps God had already taken from it some part which he might convert into the land of light and establish his kingdoms upon it? Then he would have done it out of the whole, so that even long ago there would have been no evil nature at all.
But if he did not make the land of light out of an alien substance, it remains that he made it out of nothing. Wherefore, if you are now persuaded that Almighty God can make something good out of nothing, come into the catholic Church and learn that all the natures which God made and founded are ranked by grades of excellence from the highest to the lowest, all good, but some more excellent than others; and that they were made out of nothing, since God the Artificer, by his wisdom, wrought, so to speak, potentially, so that what was not might be, and, insofar as it existed, might be good; but insofar as it should be defective, might show that it was not begotten of God, but made by him out of nothing.
For if you consider it, you find nothing that holds you back: since you can neither say that the land of light which you describe is this which God is — lest the foulness of that square be crammed into the very nature of God; nor that it was begotten of him — lest none the less it be compelled to be understood as this which God is, and return to the same deformity; nor that it is alien from him — lest we press you to say that he placed his kingdoms in another's domain, and to speak not of two but of three natures; nor that it was made by him out of an alien substance — lest either there be another good besides God, or an evil besides the race of darkness. It remains, therefore, for you to confess that God made the land of light out of nothing — and you are unwilling to believe it.
But if God could make out of nothing some great good, which nevertheless would be inferior to himself, he could also — because he is good and envies no good — make another good which would be inferior to that former one; he could make a third too, to which the second would be preferred; and then he could lead the order of created natures down to the lowest good, until the universe of them should not flow away uncertain with an indefinite number, but stand fixed, bounded by a certain limit. But if you are unwilling to confess that God made even this land of light out of nothing, there will be no way out by which you may escape such basenesses and such sacrilegious opinions.
Or at least see — since it is free for carnal thought to imagine phantasms of whatever kind it pleases — whether perhaps you can find some other figure for this conjunction of the two lands, lest so detestable and abominable an appearance of things present itself to the mind: namely, that the land of God — whether it be of the same nature as God, or of a different one, in which nevertheless the kingdoms of God are founded — lies with so vast a mass through the immeasurable, that it lies with limbs stretched out and laid open through the infinite, by which, most foully and most basely, it receives from the lower part even that crammed-in wedge of the land of darkness, itself of immeasurable magnitude. But whatever other figure you may find,
by which these two lands may be joined to each other, you certainly cannot blot out the writings of Manichaeus — I do not say others in which he described these things more expressly (for perhaps, because they are known to fewer, they may seem to have less danger) — but these very ones now under discussion, of the Epistle of the Foundation, which is wont to be most well known to nearly all who among you are called the enlightened. For here it is written thus: "But alongside one part and side of that illustrious and holy land was the land of darkness, deep and of immeasurable magnitude." What do we wait for further? For we hold what was alongside the side.
Now feign figures however you please and describe outlines of whatever sort; that immeasurable mass of the land of darkness was assuredly joined to the land of light either by a straight side, or by a curved, or by a crooked one. But if by a crooked one, then that holy land too has a crooked side; for if it has a straight side and is touched by the crooked side of this one, then certain deep caverns lie open between, empty through the infinite, and there was no longer emptiness only above the land of darkness, as we used to hear. But if it is so, how much better would it have been that the land of light should remove itself somewhat farther off, and that so great an emptiness should lie between, so that it could not be touched at all in any part by the land of darkness!
Nay rather, so great a space of empty depth might lie open that, if any wickedness of that race should arise — even if the princes of darkness should rashly wish to leap across into that land (since bodies cannot fly unless they are borne up by corporeal air) — being cast headlong through that void and, because it would be infinite downward, never at any time reaching any bottom, then, even if they could always live, yet, while they are always borne downward, they could never do harm. But if it was joined by a curved side, then the land of light too received it misshapenly in a curved bosom. Or if this one was curved inward as it were in the shape of a theatre, it embraced the curved part of the land of light, received in such a bosom, with a coupling no less misshapen.
Or if this one had a curved side and that one a straight, it did not touch it with its whole side. And it would surely have been better, as I said above, that it should touch in no part, and that so great a void should lie between, so as both to separate the two lands by a just interval, and to permit the rash and wicked, cast headlong through the infinite, to do no harm. But if a straight side touched a straight side, I do not indeed see any receptacles or gaping openings, but I plainly see so great a peace and so great a concord of each land with itself, that a greater conjunction could not be.
For what is more beautiful, what more fitting, than that straight should be so coupled to straight, that no bosom or bend on any part should break apart or sever a natural and stable jointure of place through infinite space and from infinite eternity? And these straight sides of each land, even if they were separated by an interposed void, would not only be beautiful in themselves, because they were so straight, but even with an interval interposed between they would so agree together, that on this side and on that the equal straightnesses, even with no conjunction, yet by their very likeness would come together into one beauty.
But when this conjunction is added, what more concordant and more peaceful than each of these two lands, and what indeed more beautiful even than that very coupling of two straight sides could be said or thought — I do not find. What am I to do with minds most wretched, perverted by error and entangled by habit? For these men do not know what they say, when they say these things; for they do not attend. I beg you: no one presses you, no one drives you into a contest, no one insults past errors — except one who has not experienced the divine mercy so as to be free of errors. Let us only work at this, that they be at some time ended. Look a little, without animosity and bitterness — we are all men; let us hate not ourselves, but errors and falsehoods — I beg you, look a little.
God of mercies, help those who look, and to those who seek the truth kindle an inward light. For what do we understand, if we do not understand that the straight is better than the crooked? I ask you therefore, if you receive it calmly and modestly: the straight side of the land of darkness, which is joined to the straight side of the land of light — if someone were to deprave it, would he take away no beauty from it? You must needs confess, if you are unwilling to bark, that not only would beauty be taken from it if it were depraved, but even that beauty which it was able to have in common with the straight side of the land of light. Taking this away, then, and making from straight what is crooked, so that what agreed should be at variance and what was congruous should recoil — would he thereby take away any substance?
So then learn that evil is not a substance, but that, just as in a body by a change of form for the worse the beauty is lost, or rather diminished, and what before was called beautiful is called foul, and the body which before had pleased displeases: so in the soul the grace of a right will, by which one lives piously and justly, is depraved by a will changed for the worse; and by this sin the soul is made wretched, which by the honourableness of a right will used to obtain blessedness — with no substance added or taken away. Then consider this also: that even if we grant, for other causes, that the side of the land of darkness is evil — because it is obscure, because it is dark, or whatever else can be said — yet in that which is straight it is not evil.
As therefore I grant that there is something of evil in its colour, so it is necessary that you too grant that there is something of good in its straightness. It is therefore impious to alienate this good, however much of it there is, from God the Artificer, from whom, unless we believe that all good which is in any nature whatever comes, we err most perniciously. How, then, does he both say that this land is the supreme evil — in the straightness of whose side I find, so far as pertains to body, a good of no small beauty — and wills it to be utterly alien from the Almighty and best God, when that very good which we find in it, to whom else is it to be ascribed but to the Author of all good things, if we are not to find one? "But it was evil," he says, "even that side." Suppose it to be evil:
it would certainly be worse if it were not straight, but distorted. How then is it the supreme evil, than which something worse can be conceived? Then there must necessarily be something of good, by the lack of which any thing whatever becomes worse; and by the lack of straightness that side would become worse: there is therefore in it something of good — straightness. And you will never tell me whence it is in it, unless you betake yourself to Him from whom, be they great or small, we must confess that all things nevertheless are good. But let us now pass from the consideration of this side to other matters. "There dwelt," he says, "in that land fiery bodies, namely pestilential kinds." When he says "dwelt," he wishes them certainly to be understood as animate and living.
But lest we seem to wish to cavil over a word, let us attend to how he distributes all those inhabitants of that land into five living kinds. "Here," he says, "were infinite darknesses, flowing from the same nature, inestimable, with their own offspring; beyond which were waters, muddy and turbid, with their inhabitants; more inward than which were winds horrible and violent, with their prince and progenitors. Again a region fiery and corruptible, with its leaders and nations. In like manner, further inward, a race full of gloom and smoke, in which dwelt the monstrous prince of all and leader, having about him innumerable princes, of all of whom he himself was the mind and origin: and these were the five natures of the pestilential land."
We observe five natures as it were parts of one nature, which he calls the pestilential land. These are: darkness, waters, winds, fire, smoke; which five natures he so orders, that darkness, from which he begins to count, is outermost of the rest. Within the darkness he places the waters; within the waters, the winds; within the winds, the fire; within the fire, the smoke. And these five natures each had their own kinds of inhabitants, which are none the less five. For I ask whether there was one kind of dwellers in all five natures, or diverse kinds, as the natures themselves are diverse. They answer that they were diverse, and teach thus from other books: that the darknesses had serpents; the waters, swimming things, such as fishes are;
the winds, flying things, such as birds are; the fire, four-footed things, such as horses, lions, and the rest of this kind; the smoke, two-footed things, such as men are. Who then ordered these things? Who distributed and distinguished them? Who gave number, quality, forms, life? For all these things are good in themselves, nor is it found whence they should be assigned to each nature except by God, the Author of all good things.
For it is not as when the poets are wont to describe chaos, or in some way to introduce a certain formless matter without form, without quality, without measures, without number and weight, without order and distinction — some confused I-know-not-what, and altogether devoid of every quality (whence certain Greek teachers call it apoion, "quality-less") — it is not thus, then, that these men try to introduce what they call the land of darkness, but altogether otherwise, and far diversely and contrariwise they join side to side and align them:
they number five natures, distinguish, order, set them forth by their proper qualities, nor do they permit them to be deserted and unfruitful, but fill them with their own inhabitants and assign to these very ones forms suited to them and accommodated to their dwellings, and — what excels all — life. To enumerate such great goods and to say that they are alien from God, the Author of all good things, is neither to recognize in things so great a good of order, nor in oneself so great an evil of error. "But," he says, "those five kinds inhabiting those natures were savage and pestilential." As if I had praised the savagery and pestilence in them! Behold, I with you censure the things which you charge to be evil in them; do you with me praise the things which you yourself recall as good in them:
thus you will see that you wish to set up, as the supreme and utmost evil, goods mingled with evils. There I censure the pestilence with you; there I praise the health with you — for those kinds could not have been born, nor nourished, nor have inhabited that land without some health. There I censure the darkness with you; there I praise the fecundity with you — for you call the darknesses "inestimable," and yet you add "with their own offspring," although darkness is not corporeal, and this whole name is the absence of light, just as nakedness is to lack clothing and emptiness is to be void of the fullness of body; and therefore the darknesses could beget nothing, although a dark land — that is, a land lacking light — could beget something. But for the present let us pass this over.
Yet where offspring come to be, there is also a balance suited to well-being, and a certain rhythmic harmony orders the limbs of the newborn and builds them up into a unity, so that they answer to one another by the peace of proper measure. Who would not understand that all these things deserve greater praise than the darkness deserves blame? Blame there with me the turbid mire of the waters, but praise there with me the very form and quality of the waters, and the well-matched limbs of the swimming creatures that dwell in them, the life that contains and governs the body, and every balance fitted to the health of its own kind.
For however much you censure the muddy and turbid waters, still, by the very fact that you say such waters were able both to beget and to sustain their living things, you cannot take away from them the form of a body of whatever sort and the correspondence of parts by which they are shaped and made peaceful into a single quality; for if you took this away, there would be no body at all — and all these things, if you are a man, you perceive to be praiseworthy. And however much you exaggerate the savagery of those inhabitants and their onslaughts of tearing and devastation upon one another, still you do not strip from them the rhythmic bounds of their forms, by which each of their bodies is made peaceful through the symmetry of its limbs, nor the balance of health, nor the governance of the soul that draws the parts of its own body together into a unity of friendship and concord;
if you look upon these things with human perception, you see that more is worthy of praise than is worthy of the blame given to what displeases. Blame there with me the terror of the winds, but praise there with me the breathable and nourishing nature of those very winds, and the form of a body of parts joined together and diffused in mutual fittingness — by all which things they were able to beget their inhabitants, to nourish them, and to sustain them in health; and in these inhabitants, besides all else that has been praised in all living creatures by the higher reasoning, praise too what is properly theirs: swift and easy passages wherever they will and to whatever place they will, and the concordant effort of their wings in flight, and their evenly matched motion.
Blame there with me the corruptive power of fire, but praise there with me the generative fire and its vigorous, timely tempering for the newborn — that they might grow together, be perfected in their proper numbers and outlines, and be able to live and dwell there; all which things you recognize to be wondrous and praiseworthy not only in the habitation of fire, but also in the very inhabitants. Blame there with me the obscurity of smoke and the monstrousness of the prince who, as you say, dwelt within it; but praise there with me the fact that even in the smoke itself you find no part unlike the rest, whereby within its own kind it keeps the correspondence and measure of its parts among themselves, so that by a certain unity it is what it is — a thing no one considers soberly without praising it with wonder. What then?
You even attribute to the smoke a force and power of generating, since you assign to it likewise inhabitant-princes, so that — a thing we have never seen here — there the smoke is fruitful and provides a wholesome dwelling for its inhabitants. And when in the very prince of the smoke you noticed his monstrousness alone, which you might blame, ought you not to have attended to the rest, which would compel you to praise his nature? For he had a soul and a body, the soul giving life, the body inspired with life; while the soul governed, the body obeyed; the soul went before, the body followed; the soul held together, the body did not dissolve; the soul moved it into rhythmic numbers, the body was made stable by the rhythmic framework of its limbs. Does not, in this one prince, either an ordered peace or a peaceful order move you to praise?
But what has been said of one, this may be understood of the rest. Yet, you say, he was fierce and monstrous toward others. I do not praise this, but rather those great things which you refuse to attend to. And whoever has rashly believed the Manichaean, if he but looks upon and considers these things when admonished, recognizes without doubt that, when he speaks of these natures, he speaks of certain good things — but not of the highest and unmade goods, such as is God the one Trinity, nor of those made goods that are sublimely ordered, such as the holy angels and the most blessed powers, but of the lowest goods, ordered according to the measure of their kind at the bottom of things:
which, when compared with higher things, are judged blameworthy by the unskilled; and while it is considered how much of the good that belongs to those higher things is lacking to these, the very absence of that good bears the name of evil. And I, for my part, discuss these natures in this way because those things are named which are known to us in this world. For we know darkness, waters, winds, fire, smoke; we know also creeping animals, swimming, flying, four-footed, two-footed — among which,
with the exception of darkness — which, as I said, is nothing else than the absence of light, discerned by the eyes through not-seeing, just as silence is discerned by the ears through not-hearing; not because darkness is something, but because light is not there, just as it is not because silence is something, but because sound is not there — darkness, then, excepted from this enumeration, the rest are natures and known to all, whose form, since it is praiseworthy and good insofar as it exists, no prudent man alienates from God the author of all good things. For that Manichaean, in that he wished to arrange the natures he learned of here within his phantasms as though in a race of darkness, is proved to be wholly false: first, because darkness can beget nothing, as has been said.
But, he says, that darkness was not such as you know here. Whence then do you teach me about it? Or does so wordy a promiser of doctrine perhaps force me to believe? But grant that I believe you. Yet this I know: that if those things had no form of any kind, as these here do not, they could beget nothing; but if they had form, they were better. You, however, when you say they were not such, wish, as it were, that some worse things be believed. You could equally say that silence — which is to the ears as darkness is to the eyes — begot there some deaf or dumb animals, so that, when someone told you that silence is no nature, you might answer, 「But not silence such as you know here,」 in order to say to those whom you had once deceived into believing you whatever you pleased.
Although that which led him to feign that creeping things were born in the darkness could indeed have been rightly observed in the very first beginnings of things being born. But there are serpents that see so keenly and so rejoice in the presence of light that they seem to give the weightiest testimony against him. Then it was easy for him to discern the swimming things in the waters here and transfer them to those phantasms; and likewise the flying things in the winds, since the pushing of this thicker air, in which birds fly, is called wind. But how it came into his mind to feign four-footed animals in fire, I do not know. And yet he did not say this without reason, but attended too little and erred exceedingly.
For they are wont to give this reason: that four-footed animals are gluttonous and burn much for mating. But many men surpass any four-footed beast in their gluttony — men who are certainly two-footed, whom he says are sons not of fire but of smoke. And nothing is easily found more gluttonous than geese; and these, whether he places them in smoke because they are two-footed, or in waters because they love to swim, or in winds because they are feathered and sometimes fly, certainly do not, by his own distinction, belong to fire. As for what pertains to the heat of mating, I believe he had noticed neighing horses, often carried off to the mares with the reins bitten through:
but while, having noticed this, he wished to write it down quickly, he did not attend to the wall-sparrow, in comparison with which any stallion is found to be most frigid. But when they are asked why he arranged the two-footed in the smoke, they answer that the two-footed kind is haughty and proud; for from this, they say, men draw their origin; and since smoke, globular and as it were swollen, rises into the air, they observed, not absurdly, that it is like the proud. This observation ought to have sufficed for supplying some likeness concerning proud men, for either forming or understanding an allegory; not, however, for it to be believed that two-footed animals are born in smoke and from smoke.
For they ought equally to be born in dust, since often it rises into the sky with no less sweep and elevation; and in mists, since these are frequently exhaled from the earth in such a way that they even make it uncertain to those looking from afar whether they be smoke or mists. Finally, why in the case of waters and winds was the argument drawn from the endurance of dwelling to the inhabitants? Because we see that both the swimming things live in the waters and the flying things in the winds. But fire and smoke did not deter the lying man, so that he should be ashamed to establish there such inhabitants than which nothing more absurd could be established. For fire burns and destroys the four-footed, and smoke suffocates and kills the two-footed.
Or from this at least he is compelled to admit that he says these natures were better in the race of darkness — the very place where he wishes all things to be believed worse. For indeed there fire begot the four-footed and nourished it and sustained it harmlessly, or even most conveniently. Likewise smoke had brought forth its two-footed offspring in a most gentle bosom, and had reared them and sustained them not only without harm but life-givingly and indulgently, right up to that supreme rule. Thus these lies are shown, by the observation of the things seen in the world — but observation conceived with too little diligence and too little skill by carnal sense, brought forth from phantasms, and issued and set down in rashness — to have increased the number of heretics.
But they must rather be pressed by that other line of argument, that they may understand, if they can, how truly it is said in the Catholic Church that God is the author of all natures. Of which kind I was treating above, when I said: I blame with you plague, blindness, turbid muddiness, horrible violence, corruptibility, the monstrousness of princes, and the like; but praise you with me the form, the distinction, the ordering, the peace, the unity of forms, the correspondences of limbs and the rhythmic symmetries, the vital breathings and nourishments, the balance of health, the rule and governance of the soul and the service of bodies, the likeness and concord of parts in the several natures — whether those that dwelt or those that were dwelt in — and other things of this sort.
For so they understand, if only they will attend without obstinacy, that they are now mingling both good and evil when they speak of that land where they believed the sole and highest evil to have been; and thus, if those things enumerated as evils be taken away, those goods which have been praised remain without any blame; but if the goods themselves be taken away, no nature remains. From which he now sees, who can see, that every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good — because out of one and the same thing, in which both I found what to praise and he what to blame, if the things that are good be taken away, no nature will exist; but if the things that displease be taken away, the nature will remain uncorrupted.
Take away from the waters that they be muddy and turbid, and there remain pure and tranquil waters; take away from the waters the concord of parts, and there will be no waters. If, then, when that evil is removed a purer nature remains, but when the good is withdrawn no nature at all remains, then that which it has of good is what makes the nature there; whereas that which is evil is not nature, but against nature. Take away from the winds the terror and excessive force that displeases you, and you can conceive gentle and moderate winds; take away from the winds the likeness of parts by which their body is joined into unity and made peaceful with itself so as to be a body, and there will be no nature underlying that you might conceive. It would be long to pursue the rest;
but it is manifest to those who judge with no partisan bias that, when these natures are recalled to mind, certain things are joined to them by which they displease; and when we withdraw these, the natures remain better. Whence it is understood that they, insofar as they are natures, are good, because when you have withdrawn from them in turn all that they have of good, no natures will remain. Consider also, you who wish to judge rightly, that monstrous prince too; from whom, if his monstrousness be taken away, mark how many praiseworthy things will remain: the framework of the body, the correspondence of limbs on this side and that, the unity of form and the peace of the parts woven together with one another, the order and disposition of the ruling and quickening and serving soul, and of the quickened and serving body.
If all these things be taken away, and any others I may perhaps have enumerated too little, absolutely no nature will subsist. But perhaps you will say that those evils cannot be taken away from such natures, and that therefore they must be accepted as natural. It is not now asked what can or cannot be taken away, but it is surely no small light for understanding that all natures, insofar as they are natures, are good — that those goods can be conceived without those evils, whereas without those goods no nature can be conceived. For without the disturbance of mud I can conceive waters, but without the peace of joined-together parts no form of body occurs to the mind, nor can it in any way be perceived.
And on this account not even those muddy waters could exist without that good, by which good it came about that some corporeal nature could exist. For as to what you say — that those evils cannot be taken away from such natures — the answer is that those goods too cannot be taken away from such natures. Why then, on account of the evils which you judge cannot be taken away, do you wish to call these things natural evils, but on account of the goods which you are convicted of not being able to take away, refuse to call them natural goods? It remains that you should ask — for this is wont to be the last word — whence come those evils which I too said displeased me. I shall answer, perhaps.
— if you first say whence come those goods which you too are compelled to praise, unless you wish to be of a most absurd heart. But why should I ask this, since we both confess that all goods whatsoever, of whatever number and greatness, are from the one God, who is supremely good? Resist, then, yourselves the Manichaean, who supposed so many and so great goods as we have recalled and justly praised — the peace and concord of parts in each single nature, the health and vigor of living creatures, and the rest which it now wearies me to repeat — to be in the fabricated land of darkness in such a way that he tried to alienate them from that God whom he confesses to be the author of all goods.
For he did not see those goods, while he attended to this alone — what displeased; just as if someone, terrified by the roar of a lion and beholding it dragging and rending apart the bodies of cattle or of men, whatever it had seized, should by a certain childish weakness of soul be struck with so great a fear that, beholding only the ferocity and savagery of the lion, and utterly neglecting and passing over its other qualities, he should cry out that the nature of that living creature is not merely an evil but a great evil — the more exaggeratedly, of course, the more timidly; whereas, if with its ferocity tamed he should see the lion led about gentle, especially if he had never before been terrified by that beast, then he would be at leisure, secure and unafraid, to consider and praise the beauty of the lion.
Of which I shall say nothing except what pertains most to the point: that it can happen that some nature gives offense on account of some quality and is born into total hatred, though it is manifest that the form of a true and living beast is far better, even when it terrifies in the woods, than that of an imitated and feigned one, when it is praised as painted on a wall. Let him, therefore, not deceive us by this error nor make us blind to considering the forms of natures, when he censures certain things in them in such a way as to compel us to be displeased in every part with that which he cannot censure in every part. And in this way, composing our mind to a fair judgment, let us now ask whence, together with those goods, come the evils which I too said I disapproved.
This we shall see more easily if we can gather everything under one name. For who would doubt that the whole of what is called evil is nothing else than corruption? Various evils can indeed be named by various names, but that which is the evil of all things in which any evil can be observed is corruption. But the corruption of a skilled soul is called unskillfulness; the corruption of a prudent one, imprudence; the corruption of a just one, injustice; the corruption of a brave one, cowardice; the corruption of a calm and tranquil one, desire or fear or sadness or vainglory; then in an animate body the corruption of health is pain and disease; the corruption of strength is weariness; the corruption of rest is toil;
then in the body itself alone, the corruption of beauty is ugliness; the corruption of straightness is crookedness; the corruption of order is perversity; the corruption of wholeness is a splitting or breaking or diminishing. It would be long and difficult to name individually all the corruptions both of these things which I have recalled and of countless others; since many that are spoken of in the body can also be spoken of in the soul, and they are innumerable, in which corruption holds its proper names. Nevertheless it is now easy to see that corruption harms nothing except in that it weakens the natural state, and therefore that it is not a nature, but against nature.
But if in things no evil is found except corruption, and corruption is not a nature, then assuredly no nature is evil. But if perhaps you are not able to understand this, attend to this: that everything which is corrupted is diminished by some good, because if it were not corrupted it would be incorrupt; but if indeed it could not be corrupted at all, it would be incorruptible. Now it is necessary that either incorruption or incorruptibility be a good, if corruption is an evil. But now no question is raised concerning the incorruptible nature; the discussion is about those things which can be corrupted, which, while they are not corrupted, can be called incorrupt, but cannot be called incorruptible.
For that alone is properly called incorruptible which not only is not corrupted, but also can in no part be corrupted. Whatever things, then, are incorrupt and yet can be corrupted, when they have begun to be corrupted, are by that very fact diminished in the good by which they were incorrupt — and indeed in a great good, since corruption is a great evil; and as long as corruption can be increased in them, so long do they have the good by which they may be diminished. Wherefore those natures which he feigns to have been in the land of darkness either could be corrupted or could not. If they could not, they were incorruptible, than which good there is nothing higher. If they could, they were either being corrupted or were not being corrupted;
if they were not being corrupted, they were incorrupt — which we see cannot be said without great praise; but if they were being corrupted, they were being diminished in that so great good; if they were being diminished in some good, they had a good by which they might be diminished. But if they had a good, those natures were not the highest evil, and every fable of the Manichaean is false. But since we have inquired what evil is, and have recognized that this is not a nature but against nature, we must consequently inquire whence it comes; and had he done this, he would perhaps have slid less into the straits of so great an error. For over-hastily and preposterously he inquired whence it was, when he had not first inquired what it was;
and therefore nothing could occur to him as he inquired except empty phantasms, of which a mind much fed on carnal senses is with difficulty divested. Someone will therefore say, no longer desiring to contend but not to err: Whence comes this corruption, which we have found to be, as it were, the general evil of good but nevertheless corruptible things? He who inquires thus quickly finds, seeking the truth with great ardor and knocking with constant, pious perseverance. For through men some reminder can be given by the signs of words; but there is one true master who teaches — the incorruptible Truth itself, the only inward master:
who was also made outward, that he might recall us from outward things to inward ones, and, taking the form of a servant, that his sublimity might become known to those rising up, he deigned to appear lowly to those lying prostrate. In his name let us be suppliants, and imploring through him the mercy of the Father, let us inquire into these things. For, first, a very brief answer can be given to those who ask whence corruption is, when it is said: from this, that these natures, which can be corrupted, were not begotten of God, but made by him out of nothing; which, since the higher reasoning has shown them to be good, no one can rightly say 「God should not have made goods」; but if he shall say 「He should have made them supremely good,」 he must understand that the supreme good is he himself who made these goods.
What evil, you say, would come about if these things too were made supremely good? And yet, if any one of us were to ask — God the Father having been received and believed to be the supreme good — whether there were some other supreme good from whom it might piously seem to us that we exist, we could in no way rightly answer except: from God the Father, who is supremely good. That, therefore, which is of him, let us remember to have been born of him, not made by him out of nothing; and therefore to be supremely, that is incorruptibly, good; and we see that it is unjustly demanded that those things he made out of nothing should be as supremely good as he is supremely good whom he begot of himself: whom, unless he had begotten one, he would not have begotten that which he himself is, since he himself is one.
Wherefore for the only-begotten Son, through whom all goods were made by the Father out of nothing, brothers are unskillfully and impiously sought, except from that in which he deigned to appear in man. For on this account he is called in the Scriptures both only-begotten and firstborn: only-begotten of the Father, firstborn from the dead. And 「we beheld,」 it says, 「his glory, as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth」; and Paul says: 「that he himself might be the firstborn among many brethren.」 But if we should say 「Let those goods no longer exist which were made out of nothing, but let there be only the nature of God,」 we shall be begrudging so great goods, and it is an impious utterance to think it an injury not to be that which God is, and on that account to be unwilling that any good exist, because God is set above it.
I beseech you, bear it, O nature of the rational soul, that you are somewhat less than God is — and so much less that after him there is nothing better than you; bear it, I say, and grow gentle toward him, lest he yet drive you back into the lowest places, where through penal straits again and again the good that you are grows cheap to you. You are proud against God if you are indignant that he goes before you, and you think all too insolently of him if you do not ineffably rejoice that you are so great a good that he alone is more excellent. This being established and made firm, do not say: God ought to have made me the only nature; I would not that after me any good should be made. For that which is good after God did not, on that account, have to be the last of all.
And from this it especially appears how great a dignity he has bestowed on you: that God, who alone by nature has dominion over you, made other goods over which you too might have dominion. Nor should you wonder that these do not now in every way serve you and sometimes even torment you, because your Lord has greater power over those things that serve you than you yourself have — as over the servants of his servants. What wonder then, if to you when you sin — that is, when you do not obey your Lord — the things over which you had dominion have been made penal? For what is so just, and what more just, than God? For human nature merited this in Adam, of whom there is now no place to dispute;
but nevertheless the just Ruler is approved both by just rewards and by just punishments — by the blessedness of those who live rightly and the penalty of those who sin. Yet you have not been abandoned without mercy, you who by fixed measures of things and times are called to return. Thus by the right governance of the Most High Creator it has come even to earthly goods, which are corrupted and reformed, so that you might have consolations mingled with your punishment: that you might both praise God, delighted by the order of goods, and take refuge in him, exercised by the experiences of evils. So, insofar as earthly things serve you, they teach you that you are their mistress; but insofar as they are troublesome, they teach you to serve your Lord.
Wherefore, although corruption is an evil, and although it is not from the Creator of natures, but comes from this — that they were made out of nothing — yet it too, under him who rules and governs all that he has made, has been so ordered that it harms none but the lowest natures, for the punishment of the damned and the exercise and admonition of those returning, that they may cleave to the incorruptible God and remain incorrupt — which is our one good, as it is said through the prophet: 「But for me it is good to cleave to God.」 Nor should you say: God should not have made corruptible natures. For insofar as they are natures, God made them; but insofar as they are corruptible, God did not make them; for corruption is not from him who alone is incorruptible.
If you grasp these things, give thanks to God; if you do not grasp them, be still and do not rashly condemn what is not yet understood, and as a suppliant attend to him who is the light of the mind, that you may understand. For when it is said 「corruptible nature,」 not one but two names are spoken. Likewise when it is said 「God made it」 out of nothing, we hear not one but two names. Render therefore to these single things those single things, so that when you hear 「nature,」 it belongs to God, and when you hear 「corruptible,」 it belongs to nothing; yet in such a way that the corruptions themselves, though they are not of God's art, are nevertheless in his power to be disposed according to the order of things and the merits of souls. Therefore we rightly say that both reward and punishment are from him.
For he made corruption in such a way that he can deliver to corruption the one who has merited to be corrupted — that is, the one who has begun to corrupt himself by sinning — so that he who willingly committed a flattering corruption may unwillingly feel a tormenting one. For not only in the Old Testament is it written: 「I make good things and create evils,」 but more evidently in the New, where the Lord says: 「Fear not those who kill the body and after that have no more that they can do, but fear him who, when he has killed the body, has power to send the soul into hell.」 And that to voluntary corruption is added, by divine judgment, a penal corruption, the apostle Paul most manifestly attests, when he says: 「For the temple of God is holy, which you are;」
whoever corrupts the temple of God, him will God corrupt. And if this had been said in the Old Law, with what invectives these men would make their onslaught, accusing God as if a corrupter! Fearing which word, many Latin translators were unwilling to say 「will corrupt,」 but said 「God will destroy him,」 and, not deviating from the matter itself, they avoided the offense of the term. And yet these men would inveigh no less against a destroyer God, if they found this in the Old Law or the prophets. But they are convicted by the Greek copies, in which it is most plainly written: 「Whoever corrupts the temple of God, him will God corrupt.」 And if anyone should ask them how it is said, lest God be thought a corrupter, they at once explain that 「will corrupt」 is said for:
「will deliver to corruption,」 or in whatever other way they can. With which disposition, if they were toward the Old Law, they would both understand many wonderful things there, and would not tear apart with hatred what is not yet understood, but would defer to it with honor. But if anyone does not yet believe that corruption is from nothing, let him set before himself these two, 「to be」 and 「not to be,」 as it were from different sides, for the sake of understanding — that, since we walk slowly with the slow, we may then place something as it were in the middle, say the body of a living creature, and let him ask this with himself: while that body is being formed and born, while its form is increasing, is nourished, grows strong, is strengthened, is adorned, is made firm — insofar as it endures and insofar as it is made stable, toward which side does it tend, toward being or toward not-being?
He will not doubt that there is indeed something present even in the first rudiments of a thing, but that the more it is established and made firm by form, appearance, and vigour, the more it comes to be, so that it exists and tends toward that side on which being is placed. Now, then, let it begin to be corrupted; let all that stable condition be weakened, let its powers grow faint, let its strength wither, let its form be marred, let the framework of its members fall apart, let the concord of its parts waste away and dissolve. Let it seek even now, through this corruption, whither it tends, whether toward being or toward not being; and I do not think a man is so blind and dull as to doubt what he himself should answer, or not to perceive that the more each thing is corrupted, the more it tends toward destruction; and everything that tends toward destruction tends toward not being.
Since, therefore, God is to be believed to exist unchangeably and incorruptibly, while that which is called nothing is manifestly not to be at all; and since you have set before yourself these two, being and not-being, and have come to know that the more a thing's appearance is increased, the more it tends to be, and the more its corruption is increased, the more it tends not to be: why do you hesitate to say, in each corruptible nature, what in it is from God and what is from nothing, seeing that its appearance is according to nature, but its corruption is against nature? For since increased appearance compels it to be, we confess that God supremely is; but since increased corruption compels it not to be, and it is agreed that what is not is nothing:
Why, I say, do you hesitate to say, in the corruptible nature which you call both a nature and corruptible, what is from God and what is from nothing? And why do you seek a nature contrary to God, whom, if you confess to be supremely, you see that nothing is contrary to Him? Why then, you say, does corruption take away what God gave to a nature? It does not take it away except where God permits; and He permits it there where He judges it most ordered and most just, according to the grades of things and the merits of souls. For even the appearance of an uttered sound passes away and is destroyed in silence; and yet our speech is carried on both by the departure and succession of passing words, and is fittingly and pleasantly distinguished by measured intervals of silence.
So too is the lowest beauty of temporal natures, which is accomplished by the passing of things and is distinguished by the death of things that are being born. If our sense and memory could grasp the order and measures of this beauty, it would so please us that we would not dare to call corruptions even those defects by which it is distinguished; but as for the fact that we labour under a portion of that beauty, while the temporal things which we love, flowing away, forsake us, we are paying the penalties of our sins and are admonished to love things eternal. Let us not, therefore, seek in this beauty what it has not received; it is lowest precisely because it has not received what we seek; and in that which it has received, let us praise God, because He has given so great a good of appearance even to this lowest thing.
Yet let us not cleave to it as lovers of it, but pass beyond it as praisers of God, so that, set above it, we may judge concerning it, and not, bound within it, be judged in it. And let us hasten toward that Good which neither ranges through places nor is rolled along by time, and from which all local and temporal natures receive their appearance and form. To see it, let us cleanse our heart through faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, who said: Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God. For those eyes are not to be prepared for beholding that Good by which this light diffused through places is beheld — light that is not everywhere whole, but has one part here and another elsewhere.
Rather, let us purge that gaze and keen vision by which is discerned, as far as is permitted in this life, what is just, what is pious, what is the beauty of wisdom: which whoever discerns, prefers it far above the fullness of all local spaces, and perceives that, in order to discern these things, the gaze of his mind is not diffused through spaces of places, but is made steadfast by an incorporeal power.
And since phantasms are very hostile to this gaze — phantasms which our imaginative thought, drawn from carnal sense, turns over and holds fast — let us detest that heresy which, following the belief in its own phantasms, has scattered and diffused the divine substance through spaces of places, however infinite, as though it were a formless mass, and has cut it off on one side so as to find a place for evil; for it could not see that evil is not a nature but is against nature, and it adorned evil itself with so much appearance and forms and peace of parts, thriving in each several nature, that — since without these goods it could conceive of no nature — those evils which it there censures are buried under the abundance of innumerable goods. But let this be the end of this volume;