書信與論戰集（CSEL） 第 60 章

CHAPTERS. I. On the Academics, three books. II. On the Happy Life, one book. III. On Order, two books. IV. Soliloquies, two books. V. On the Immortality of the Soul, one book. VI. On the Morals of the Catholic Church and on the Morals of the Manicheans, two books. VII. On the Greatness of the Soul, one book. VIII. On Free Will, three books. IX. On Genesis against the Manicheans, two books. X. On Music, six books. XI. On the Teacher, one book. XII. On True Religion, one book. XIII. On the Usefulness of Believing, one book. XIV. On the Two Souls, one book. XV. Against Fortunatus the Manichean, one book. XVI. On Faith and the Creed, one book. XVII. On Genesis according to the Letter, one book. XVIII. On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount, two books. XIX. A Psalm against the Party of Donatus, one book.

XX. Against the Letter of Donatus the Heretic, one book. XXI. Against Adimantus, disciple of Mani, one book. XXII. An Exposition of Certain Propositions from the Apostle's Letter to the Romans, one book. XXIII. An Exposition of the Letter to the Galatians, one book. XXIV. An Incomplete Exposition of the Letter to the Romans, one book. XXV. On Eighty-Three Different Questions, one book. XXVI. On Lying, one book. Here begins the second book. XXVII. To Simplicianus, two books. XXVIII. Against the Letter of Mani, one book. XXIX. On the Contest, one book. XXX. On Christian Doctrine, four books. XXXI. Against the Party of Donatus, two books. XXXII. Confessions, thirteen books. XXXIII. Against Faustus the Manichean, thirty-three books. XXXIV. Against Felix the Manichean, two books.

XXXV. On the Nature of the Good, one book. XXXVI. Against Secundinus the Manichean, one book. XXXVII. Against Hilarus, one book. XXXVIII. Questions on the Gospels, two books. XXXIX. Notes on Job, one book. XL. On the Catechizing of the Uninstructed, one book. XLI. On the Trinity, fifteen books. XLII. On the Agreement of the Evangelists, four books. XLIII. Against the Letter of Parmenianus, three books. XLIV. On Baptism, seven books. XLV. Against What Centurius Brought from the Donatists, one book. XLVI. To the Inquiries of Januarius, two books. XLVII. On the Work of Monks, one book. XLVIII. On the Good of Marriage, one book. XLIX. On Holy Virginity, one book. L. On Genesis according to the Letter, twelve books. LI. Against the Letters of Petilianus, three books. LII.

To Cresconius the grammarian, four books. LIII. Of Proofs and Testimonies against the Donatists, one book. LIV. Against a Certain Unknown Donatist, one book. LV. An Admonition to the Donatists concerning the Maximianists, one book. LVI. On the Divination of Demons, one book. LVII. Questions Expounded against the Pagans, six in number. LVIII. An Exposition of the Letter of James to the Twelve Tribes. LIX. On the Merits and Remission of Sins and on the Baptism of Infants, three books. LX. On the One Baptism, one book. LXI. On the Maximianists, one book. LXII. On the Grace of the New Testament, one book. LXIII. On the Spirit and the Letter, one book. LXIV. On Faith and Works, one book. LXV. A Brief of the Conference, one book. LXVI. After the Conference, against the Donatists, one book. LXVII.

On Seeing God, one book. LXVIII. On Nature and Grace, one book. LXIX. On the City of God, twenty-two books. LXX. To Orosius the presbyter, one book. LXXI. To Jerome the presbyter, two books. LXXII. To Emeritus, bishop of the Donatists, one book. LXXIII. On the Deeds of Pelagius, one book. LXXIV. On the Correction of the Donatists, one book. LXXV. On the Presence of God, one book. LXXVI. Against Pelagius and Caelestius, two books. LXXVII. The Proceedings with Emeritus, one book. LXXVIII. Against the Sermon of the Arians, one book. LXXIX. On Marriage and Concupiscence, to Valerius, two books. LXXX. Books of Locutions, seven books. LXXXI. Books of Questions, seven books. LXXXII. On the Soul and Its Origin, four books. LXXXIII. To Pollentius, two books. LXXXIV.

Against an Adversary of the Law, two books. LXXXV. Against Gaudentius, bishop of the Donatists, two books. LXXXVI. Against Lying, one book. LXXXVII. Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, four books. LXXXVIII. Against Julian, six books. LXXXIX. On Faith, Hope, and Charity, one book. XC. On the Care to be Taken for the Dead, to Paulinus, one book. XCI. On the Eight Questions of Dulcitius, one book. XCII. To Valentinus, on Grace and Free Will, one book. XCIII. To the same as above, on Rebuke and Grace, one book. PROLOGUE.

For a long time now I have been intending and preparing to do what I now, with the Lord's help, undertake, since I judge it ought not to be put off—namely, to review my little works, whether in books, or in letters, or in treatises, with a certain judicial severity, and to mark with, as it were, a censor's pen whatever offends me. For no one, unless he be imprudent, will dare to reprove me on the ground that I reprove my own errors. But if he says that those things ought not to have been said by me which would afterwards even displease me, he speaks the truth and takes my side. For he is a reprover of the very things of which I too am a reprover. For I ought not to reprove them, if I ought to have said them. But let each one receive as he will this which I do;

yet in this matter too I ought to have regard to that apostolic saying, where he says: 'If we judged ourselves, we should not be judged by the Lord.' That too which is written—'From much speaking you shall not escape sin'—terrifies me greatly, not because I have written much, or because many things also which were not dictated have nevertheless been written down as spoken by me—for far be it that it should be reckoned much speaking, when necessary things are said, however great the multitude and length of words in which they are said—but I fear that saying of Holy Scripture for this reason: that even from so many of my disputations, without doubt many things can be gathered which, if not false, at least may seem, or even be proved, to be unnecessary.

But whom of his faithful has Christ not terrified, where he says: 'Every idle word that a man shall speak, he shall render an account for it in the day of judgment'? Whence also his apostle James says: 'Let every man be swift to hear, but slow to speak'; and in another place he says: 'Be not many masters, my brethren, knowing that you receive the greater judgment. For in many things we all offend. If any man offend not in word, he is a perfect man.'

I do not arrogate this perfection to myself even now, when I am an old man—how much less when as a young man I had begun to write or to speak before the people, and so much was granted to me that, wherever in my presence there was need to speak to the people, I was very rarely permitted to be silent and to listen to others, or to be swift to hear but slow to speak. It remains, therefore, that I should judge myself under one Master, whose judgment concerning my offenses I desire to escape. But I reckon that men become many masters when they hold diverse and mutually opposed views. Yet when all say the same thing, and say what is true, they do not depart from the mastership of the one true Master. They offend, however, not when they say many things of his, but when they add things of their own.

For thus indeed from much speaking they fall even into false speaking. But it has pleased me to write these things, so that I may put them into the hands of men from whom I cannot recall and emend those things which I have already published. Nor do I indeed pass over those things which I wrote when I was already a catechumen—though I had abandoned the hope which I bore as an earthly one, yet was still puffed up with the habit of secular letters—since these too have gone forth into the notice of those who copy and read them, and are read with profit, if pardon is granted for some things, or, if pardon is not granted, one nevertheless does not cling to the errors. Wherefore, whoever shall read these things, let them not imitate me when I err, but when I advance toward what is better.

For whoever reads my little works in the order in which they were written will perhaps find how I made progress in writing. And that he may be able to do this, I shall take care in this work, as far as I can, that he may know that same order. CHAPTER I. ON THE ACADEMICS, THREE BOOKS.

When, therefore, I had abandoned both what I had attained in the desires of this world and what I desired to attain, and had betaken myself to the leisure of the Christian life, I first wrote—not yet baptized—against the Academics, or concerning the Academics, in order that I might remove from my mind, by whatever arguments I could, since they were disturbing me, those arguments of theirs which they press upon many, bringing despair of finding the truth, and forbidding anyone to assent to any matter and to approve anything at all as though it were manifest and certain—for the wise man, since all things seem to them obscure and uncertain. And this was done by the Lord's mercy and help.

But in those same three books of mine it does not please me that I so often invoke fortune—although I did not mean by this name any goddess to be understood, but the fortuitous outcome of things, whether in our body or in external goods or evils. Whence come also those words which no religious scruple forbids one to say: 'perhaps' (forte), 'perchance' (forsan), 'peradventure' (forsitan), 'maybe' (fortasse), 'by chance' (fortuito)—which nevertheless must all be referred back to divine providence. This too I did not there pass over in silence, saying: 'For perhaps that which is commonly called fortune is governed by a certain hidden order, and we call nothing else chance in things save that whose reason and cause is secret.' I did indeed say this, yet it repents me that I there named fortune thus, since I see that men have it as a very bad habit,

namely that where they ought to say 'God willed this,' they say 'Fortune willed this.' And as for what I said in a certain place: 'It is so arranged, whether for our merits or for the necessity of nature, that a divine mind cleaving to mortal things is by no means received by the harbor of philosophy,' and so on—either neither of these two things ought to have been said, since even so the sense could be sound, or it was enough to say 'for our merits,' as it is true that misery is derived from Adam, and not to add 'or for the necessity of nature,' since indeed the harsh necessity of our nature has arisen by the merit of preceding iniquity. And likewise as to what I said there:

'that nothing at all is to be worshiped, and that whatever is discerned by mortal eyes, whatever any sense attains, is to be wholly cast away'—words ought to have been added, so that it might be said: 'whatever the sense of the mortal body attains'; for there is also a sense of the mind. But I was then speaking after the manner of those who call nothing sense except that of the body, and nothing sensible except corporeal things. And so wherever I spoke thus, the ambiguity is too little avoided except among those who are accustomed to this manner of speaking. Again I said: 'What else do you think it is to live blessedly, save to live according to that which is best in man?' And a little later, explaining what I said was best in man:

'Who,' I said, 'would doubt that the best thing of man is nothing other than that part of the soul which it befits to rule, and to which the other things that are in man should submit? This, that you may not demand another definition, can be called mind or reason.' This indeed is true—for as far as pertains to the nature of man, there is nothing in him better than mind and reason—but he who wishes to live blessedly ought not to live according to it. Otherwise he lives according to man, whereas one ought to live according to God, so that he may be able to attain to blessedness, for the sake of obtaining which the mind ought not to be content with itself, but our mind must be made subject to God. Again, replying to him with whom I was disputing: 'Here plainly,' I said, 'you do not err;

and I would gladly wish, that it may be an omen to you for the rest.' Though this was said not in earnest but in jest, I would nevertheless prefer not to have used that word. For I do not recall having read of an 'omen' either in our sacred writings or in the discourse of any ecclesiastical debater—although 'abomination' is derived from it, which is constantly found in the divine books. But in the second book that quasi-fable about philocalia and philosophy is downright inept and insipid—namely, that they are sisters and born of the same parent.

For either that which is called philocalia exists only in trifles, and on this account is by no reason a sister to philosophy; or, if this name is to be honored on the ground that, translated into Latin, it signifies the love of beauty, and there is a true and highest beauty of wisdom, then that very same philocalia in incorporeal and highest things is identical with philosophy, and they are in no way like two sisters. In another place, when I was treating of the soul, I said: 'more securely about to return to heaven.' But I should have said 'about to go' rather than 'about to return' more securely, on account of those who think that human souls, for the merits of their sins, have fallen or been cast down from heaven and are thrust into these bodies.

But I did not hesitate to say it for this reason, that I said 'to heaven' as though I were saying 'to God,' who is the soul's author and founder—just as the blessed Cyprian did not hesitate to say: 'For since we possess a body from earth and a spirit from heaven, we ourselves are earth and heaven.' And in the book of Ecclesiastes it is written: 'Let the spirit return to God, who gave it'—which is of course to be understood in such a way that no resistance is made to the Apostle, who says that those not yet born had done nothing good or evil. Without controversy, then, a certain original region of the soul's blessedness is God himself, who did not indeed beget it out of himself, but created it out of no other thing, just as he created the body out of earth.

For as to its origin, whereby it comes to be in a body—whether it is from that one which was first created, when man was made into a living soul, or whether individual souls are likewise made for individual persons—I neither then knew nor as yet do I know. In the third book: 'If you ask what seems to me,' I said, 'I judge the highest good of man to be in the mind.' I would have said more truly: 'in God'; for the mind enjoys him, so as to be blessed, as its own highest good. Nor does that please me which I said: 'It is clear that one should swear by everything divine.'

Likewise, as to what I said about the Academics—that they knew the truth, the likeness of which they called the truthlike (verisimile), and that I called this very truthlike a falsehood which they approved—this was said wrongly for two reasons: either because that would be false which was in some way like some truth (since in its own kind this too is true), or because they approved as truthlike those false things (since they approved nothing at all and affirmed that the wise man approves nothing). But because they also called this very truthlike 'the probable,' hence it came about that I spoke of them thus. Also the very praise by which I exalted Plato, or the Platonists, or the Academic philosophers so highly as one ought not to exalt impious men, has not undeservedly displeased me,

especially since Christian doctrine must be defended against their great errors. That too—when in comparison with the arguments of Cicero, which he used in his Academic books, I called my own refutations 'trifles' (by which I had refuted those arguments by most certain reasoning)—although it was said in jest and was rather spoken with irony, ought nevertheless not to have been said. This work thus begins: 'O would that, Romanianus, a man fitted for himself...' CHAPTER II. ON THE HAPPY LIFE, ONE BOOK. It happened that I wrote the book On the Happy Life not after the books On the Academics, but among them. For it arose on the occasion of my birthday and was completed in a disputation of three days, as I myself sufficiently indicate.

In which book it was agreed among us, who were inquiring together, that there is no happy life save the perfect knowledge of God. But it displeases me there that I attributed to Mallius Theodorus, to whom I dedicated the book itself, more than I ought—although he was a learned and Christian man—and that I there too often named fortune, and that I said the happy life dwells, during the time of this life, in the mind of the wise man alone, however his body may fare; whereas the Apostle hopes for the perfect knowledge of God, that is, than which none greater can belong to man, in the future life, which alone is to be called the happy life, where also the body, incorruptible and immortal, will be made subject to its own spirit without any trouble or resistance.

Indeed I found this book interrupted in our codex, and lacking not a little, and thus was it copied out by certain brethren; nor had I as yet found it whole in anyone's possession, from which I might emend it, when I was making these retractations. This book thus begins: 'If a course to the harbor of philosophy...' CHAPTER III. ON ORDER, TWO BOOKS. During the same period, indeed among those which were written On the Academics, I also wrote two books On Order, in which a great question is treated: whether the order of divine providence contains all good and evil things.

But when I saw that the matter was quite difficult to understand, and that those with whom I was dealing could scarcely be led by disputation to its perception, I preferred to speak of the order of study, whereby one can advance from corporeal to incorporeal things. But in these books too there displeases me the frequently interposed term 'fortune'; and that I did not add 'of the body' when I named the sense of the body; and that I attributed much to the liberal disciplines, of which many holy men are much ignorant, while some indeed know them and are not holy; and that I mentioned the Muses, though in jest, as though they were certain goddesses; and that I called admiration a vice; and that I said philosophers not endowed with true piety had shone with the light of virtue;

and that I commended two worlds, one sensible, the other intelligible—not in the person of Plato or of the Platonists, but in my own—as though the Lord too had wished to signify this, because he does not say, 'My kingdom is not of the world,' but 'My kingdom is not of this world,' although it can be found said also by some other manner of speaking; and, if another world than this was signified by the Lord Christ, that one could more fittingly be understood in which there will be a new heaven and a new earth, when that shall be fulfilled which we pray, saying: 'Thy kingdom come.' Nor indeed did Plato err in this, in that he said there is an intelligible world—provided we should choose to attend not to the term, which in that matter is unaccustomed to ecclesiastical usage, but to the thing itself.

For he called that the intelligible world—the very eternal and unchangeable reason by which God made the world. And whoever denies that this exists, it follows that he must say either that God made irrationally what he made, or that, when he was making it, or before he made it, he did not know what he was making, if the reason of making was not with him. But if it was, as indeed it was, Plato seems to have called that very thing the intelligible world. Yet we would not use that name if we were already sufficiently instructed in ecclesiastical letters. Nor does that please me, that when I had said, 'The utmost effort must be given to the best morals,' I straightway added: 'For our God will not otherwise be able to hear us; but those who live well he will most easily hear.'

For it was said as though God does not hear sinners; which indeed one said in the Gospel—but he who had not yet known Christ, by whom he had already been enlightened in body. Nor does that please me, that I gave so much praise to the philosopher Pythagoras that one who hears or reads this might suppose me to have believed there are no errors in Pythagorean doctrine, whereas there are many, and those capital ones. This work thus begins: 'Concerning the order of things, Zenobius...' CHAPTER IV. SOLILOQUIES, TWO BOOKS. Amid these things I also wrote two volumes, according to my zeal and love of investigating the truth by reason, concerning those matters which I most desired to know—questioning myself and answering myself, as though we were two, reason and I, when I was alone.

Whence I named this work Soliloquies; but it remained unfinished, yet in such a way that in the first book there was inquiry and it somehow appeared what sort of person he ought to be who wishes to perceive wisdom, which is of course perceived not by the sense of the body but by the mind; and by a certain reasoning at the end of the book it is gathered that those things which truly are, are immortal; while in the second book the matter of the immortality of the soul is long treated but not brought to completion. In these books indeed I do not approve what I said in the prayer: 'O God, who hast willed that none but the pure should know the truth.' For it can be answered that many even not pure know many true things; nor was it here defined what the truth is which none but the pure can know, and what it is to know. That too which is there set down:

'O God, whose kingdom is the whole world, which the sense knows not'—if God is to be understood, words ought to have been added, so that it might be said: 'which the sense of the mortal body knows not.' But if the world is meant, which the sense knows not, that one is rightly understood which is to be with the new heaven and the new earth; yet here too those words ought to have been added, so that it might be said: 'the sense of the mortal body.' But I was still speaking in that manner in which the sense is properly called that of the body; nor need this be constantly repeated, which I have already said above about it, but this must be borne in mind wherever this manner of speaking is found in my writings. And where I said of the Father and the Son: 'He who begets and he whom he begets are one thing (unum est),' it ought to have been said: 'are one (unum sunt),' just as Truth itself openly speaks, saying:

'I and the Father are one (unum sumus).' Nor does that please me, that I said the soul is already blessed in this life once God is understood—unless perhaps in hope. Likewise what I said, that 'one does not arrive at the conjunction with wisdom by one way alone,' does not sound well, as though there were another way besides Christ, who said: 'I am the way.' This offense to religious ears was therefore to be avoided, although there is one universal way, and other ways besides, of which we also sing in the Psalm: 'Make known to me thy ways, O Lord, and teach me thy paths.' In that which was there said, 'these sensible things are wholly to be fled,' care ought to have been taken lest we be thought to hold that opinion of Porphyry the false philosopher, whereby he said that every body is to be fled. But I did not say 'all sensible things,' but:

'these,' that is, corruptible things; but this rather ought to have been said, that such sensible things will not be sensible in the new heaven and new earth of the world to come. Likewise in a certain place I said that those unskilled in the liberal disciplines 'without doubt draw them out from within themselves, buried in oblivion, by learning, and in a certain way dig them up again.' But this too I disapprove. For it is more credible that even those unskilled in certain disciplines answer truly about them, when they are well questioned, for this reason: that the light of eternal reason is present to them, whenever they are able to grasp it, wherein they behold these immutable truths—not because they had once known them and had forgotten, as seemed good to Plato or to such men.

Against their opinion, so far as the work I had undertaken gave me occasion, I discoursed in the twelfth book of On the Trinity. This work begins thus: 'A great and varied matter has for a long time occupied me.' CHAPTER V. ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL, ONE BOOK. After the books of the Soliloquies, when I had now returned from the countryside to Milan, I wrote a book On the Immortality of the Soul, which I had intended to serve me as a kind of memorandum for finishing the Soliloquies, which had remained incomplete. But somehow, against my will, it passed into people's hands and is reckoned among my little works. Because of the intricacy and brevity of its reasonings it is so obscure that even my own concentration grows weary when it is read, and it is scarcely understood even by myself.

Then, thinking of nothing other than human minds, I said in a certain argument of that same book: 'Nor can there be knowledge in him who learns nothing'; and likewise in another place I said: 'Nor does knowledge embrace any thing except what pertains to some branch of learning'; nor does it come to mind that God does not learn the disciplines and yet possesses knowledge of all things, in which there is also foreknowledge of things to come. Of this same kind is also what was there said: that there is no life with reason belonging to any but the soul—for indeed God does not have life without reason, since with Him there is both the highest life and the highest reason. And somewhat earlier I said that that which is understood is always of such a kind—when it is understood—as also the mind, which certainly is not always of such a kind.

But when I said that the mind cannot on that account be separated from the eternal reason, because it is not joined to it by place, I certainly would not have said it if I had then been so instructed in the sacred letters as to recall what is written: 'Your sins separate between you and God.' From this it is given to understand that a separation can also be spoken of even of those things which had been joined not by place but incorporeally. What it means, too, that I said—'if the soul lacks a body, it is not in this world'—I could not remember. For surely the souls of the dead either do not lack a body, or are not in this world? As though indeed the lower regions were not in this world! But because it can lack a body for its good, perhaps by the name of 'body' I meant bodily plagues.

If this is so, I used the word too extravagantly. That too was rashly said: that by the supreme Essence a bodily form is bestowed through the soul, by which a body is what it is, in so far as it is; that therefore a body subsists through the soul and exists by the very thing by which it is animated, whether universally, as the world, or particularly, as each single animal within the world—all this was said entirely rashly. This book begins thus: 'If somewhere there is a discipline.' About the same time when I was at Milan about to receive baptism, I also attempted to write books on the liberal disciplines, questioning those who were with me and were not averse to studies of this kind, desiring by means of corporeal things either to arrive at, or to lead others to, incorporeal things by certain fixed steps, as it were.

But of these I was able to complete only the book on grammar, which I afterwards lost from our cabinet, and six volumes on music, as far as concerns that part which is called rhythm. But these same six books I wrote when I was already baptized and had already returned from Italy to Africa; for I had only begun that discipline at Milan. Of the other five disciplines likewise begun there—of dialectic, of rhetoric, of geometry, of arithmetic, of philosophy—only the beginnings remained, which nevertheless we also lost, though I suppose they are held by some. CHAPTER VI. ON THE MORALS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND ON THE MORALS OF THE MANICHEES, TWO BOOKS.

Now, being already baptized, when I was at Rome and could not bear in silence the boasting of the Manichees about their false and deceitful continence or abstinence, by which, to deceive the ignorant, they set themselves above true Christians, to whom they are not to be compared, I wrote two books, one On the Morals of the Catholic Church and the other On the Morals of the Manichees. In that one, then, which is On the Morals of the Catholic Church, where I set down a testimony in which is read, 'For Your sake we are afflicted all the day long; we are counted as sheep,' the faultiness of our codex misled me, being then less mindful of the Scriptures, in which I was not yet practiced. For other codices of the same version do not have:

'for Your sake we are afflicted,' but 'for Your sake we are put to death,' which others rendered by one word, 'we are mortified.' That this is truer, the Greek books show, from which language the translation of the ancient divine Scriptures was made into Latin according to the Septuagint translators. And yet, according to these words—that is, 'for Your sake we are afflicted'—I said many things in my discussion which I do not reprove as false in the matters themselves; but nonetheless that harmony of the Old and New Scriptures which I desired to demonstrate, I certainly did not demonstrate from these words at least. But whence the error crept upon me, I have said; from other testimonies, however, I sufficiently showed the same harmony.

And a little later I set down a testimony from the book of Wisdom according to our codex, in which was written: 'For wisdom teaches sobriety, and justice, and virtue'; and according to these words I discoursed on matters that were indeed true, but discovered by occasion of the faulty text. For what is truer than that wisdom teaches the truth of contemplation—which I supposed to be signified by the name of sobriety—and the uprightness of action, which I wished to be understood by the two others, by justice and virtue—when the more accurate codices of the same version have: 'For it teaches sobriety and wisdom and justice and virtue'?

For by all these the Latin translator named those four virtues which are especially wont to be on the lips of the philosophers, calling temperance 'sobriety,' imposing on prudence the name 'wisdom,' expressing fortitude by the word 'virtue,' and rendering justice alone by its own name. But these four virtues, named in the same book of Wisdom by their own names, as they are called by the Greeks, we long afterwards found in the Greek codices. Likewise, as to what I set down from the book of Solomon—'Vanity of vain things, said Ecclesiastes'—I did indeed read this in many codices, but the Greek does not have it; rather it has:

'Vanity of vanities,' which I afterwards saw, and I found those Latin texts to be truer which have 'of vanities,' not 'of vain things.' Yet whatever I discoursed on the occasion of this faulty text appears to be true in the matters themselves. But as to what I said—that Him whom we wish to know, that is God, we should first love with full charity—it would be better to say 'sincere' rather than 'full,' unless perhaps one supposes that the love of God will not be greater when we shall see face to face. Let it therefore be so taken as though 'full' were said in the sense that no greater can be, so long as we walk by faith; for it will be fuller—nay, fullest—but through vision.

Likewise, what I said about those who come to the aid of the needy, that they are called merciful, even if they are wise to such a degree that they are no longer disturbed by any grief of mind—this is not to be so taken as though I had determined that such wise men exist in this life; for I did not say 'when they are,' but I said 'even if they should be.' In another place, where I said: 'Now indeed, when this human love has nourished and strengthened the mind clinging to its own breasts, it has become fit to follow God';

'when His majesty, in so great a part as suffices for the mind while it is an inhabitant of this earth, has begun to open itself, so great an ardor of charity is born and so great a blaze of divine love arises, that, all vices being burned away in the sanctified and purified man, it sufficiently appears how divinely it was said, I am a consuming fire'—the Pelagians may think that I said this perfection can be attained in this mortal life. But let them not think so.

For the ardor of charity, made fit by following God and so great that it consumes all vices, can be born and grow in this life; but to accomplish that for which it is born—namely, that no vice remain in a man—it cannot consequently do here, although so great a thing is accomplished by that same ardor of charity where it can be accomplished and when it can be accomplished: that, just as the laver of regeneration purges from the guilt of all the sins which human birth drew in and iniquity contracted, so that perfection may purge from the stain of all vices, without which human weakness cannot be in this age. As is also to be understood what the Apostle said:

'Christ loved the Church and gave Himself up for her, cleansing her by the laver of water in the word, that He might present to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing.' For this is the laver of water in the word by which the Church is cleansed. But since the whole Church, so long as it is here, says, 'Forgive us our debts,' it is certainly not here without spot or wrinkle or any such thing; yet from what it here receives, it is brought to that glory which is not here, and to perfection. In another book, whose title is On the Morals of the Manichees, there is that which I said:

'The goodness of God so orders all deficient things that they may be where they can most fittingly be, until by ordered movements they run back to that from which they fell'—this is not to be so taken as though all things run back to that from which they fell, as it seemed to Origen, but those things which do run back. For they will not run back to God from whom they fell, who shall be punished with everlasting fire, although all deficient things are so ordered that they may be where they can most fittingly be, because even those who do not run back are most fittingly in punishment. In another place: 'Hardly anyone,' I said, 'doubts concerning beetles that they arise from mud rolled into a ball by them and covered over'—although many doubt whether this example is true, and many have not even heard of it.

This work begins thus: 'In other books I think we have dealt sufficiently.' CHAPTER VII. ON THE GREATNESS OF THE SOUL, ONE BOOK. In the same city I wrote a dialogue in which many things are inquired into and discussed concerning the soul—that is, whence it is, of what quality it is, how great it is, why it was given to the body, of what quality it becomes when it comes to the body, of what quality when it departs. But because how great it is was very carefully and subtly discussed, that we might show, if we could, that it is not of bodily magnitude and yet is something great, from this one inquiry the whole book received its name, so that it was called On the Greatness of the Soul.

In that book, what I said—that all the arts seem to me to be brought along by the soul itself, and that what is called learning is nothing other than remembering and recalling—is not to be so taken as though it were thereby proved that the soul once lived either in another body or elsewhere, whether in a body or outside a body, and that the things which, when questioned, it answers, though it did not learn them here, it had learned before in another life.

For it can happen, as I have already said above in this work, that it can do this because it is of an intelligible nature, so that it is connected not only with intelligible but also with immutable things, having been made in such an order that, when it moves itself toward those things to which it is connected, or toward itself, in so far as it sees them, in so far it answers truly concerning them. Nor indeed did it bring along and hold with itself all the arts in that way; for concerning the arts which pertain to the bodily senses—such as much of medicine, such as all of astrology—it cannot speak except what it has learned here. But those things which the intelligence alone grasps, on account of what I said, it answers when it has been well questioned, either by itself or by another, and has recalled. In another place:

'I would wish,' I said, 'to say more on this and to bind myself, while as it were enjoining upon you that I should do nothing else than be restored to myself, to whom I most owe myself'—where I seem rather that I ought to have said, 'be restored to God, to whom I most owe myself.' But because a man must first be restored to himself, so that from there, having as it were made a step, he may rise from it and be lifted up to God, just as that younger son first returned to himself and then said, 'I will arise and go to my father,' I therefore spoke thus. Then presently I added: 'and thus to become a friendly servant to the Lord.' What I therefore said—'to whom I most owe myself'—I referred to men; for I owe myself more to myself than to other men, although to God more than to myself. This book begins thus:

'Since I see that you abound in leisure.' CHAPTER VIII. ON FREE WILL, THREE BOOKS. While we were still tarrying at Rome, we wished to inquire by discussion whence evil is, and we discussed in such a way that, if we could, that which concerning this matter we, subject to the divine authority, believed, might—so far as by discussing, with God's help, we could accomplish it—be brought by reason considered and thoroughly examined even to our own understanding. And since it was established among us, the reason having been carefully discussed, that evil did not arise except from the free choice of the will, the three books which that same discussion brought forth were called On Free Will. Of these I completed the second and third in Africa, when I had now been ordained a presbyter at Hippo Regius, as I was then able.

In these books so many things were discussed that certain incidental questions, which I either could not unravel or which required a long discourse for the present, were so deferred that, on either side, or on all sides of those same questions—in which it did not appear which better agreed with the truth—our reasoning was nonetheless concluded to this end: that, whichever of them should be true, God was to be believed, or even shown, worthy of praise.

For that discussion was undertaken on account of those who deny that the origin of evil is drawn from the free choice of the will, and who contend that God, if it is so, the creator of all natures, is to be blamed—wishing thereby, according to the error of their impiety (for they are Manichees), to introduce a certain immutable nature of evil, coeternal with God. But of the grace of God, by which He has so predestined His elect that He Himself also prepares the wills of those who already use free choice in them, nothing was discussed in these books, because the question proposed did not concern that. But where a place occurred for making mention of this grace, it was mentioned in passing, not defended by laborious reasoning as though the matter were there being treated.

For it is one thing to inquire whence evil is, and another to inquire whence one may return to the former good, or attain to a greater good. Wherefore let the new heretics, the Pelagians, who so assert the free choice of the will that they leave no place for the grace of God—since they assert that it is given according to our merits—not exalt themselves as though I had pleaded their cause, because I said many things in these books on behalf of free will which the cause of that discussion demanded. For I said in the first book that evil deeds are avenged by the justice of God, and I added: 'For they would not be justly avenged unless they were done by the will.' Likewise, when I was showing that the good will itself is so great a good that it is deservedly to be preferred to all bodily and external goods, I said:

'You see therefore now, as I think, that it is established in our will that we should either enjoy or lack so great and so true a good; for what is so situated in the will as the will itself?' And in another place: 'What reason, then, is there,' I said, 'why we should think it must be doubted that, even if we were never wise before, we nonetheless by our will merit and lead a praiseworthy and blessed life, and by our will a base and wretched one?' And likewise in another place: 'From which it is concluded,' I said, 'that whoever wishes to live rightly and honorably, if he wishes this in preference to fleeting things, attains so great a thing with such great ease that to have what he willed is for him nothing other than the very willing.' And likewise elsewhere I said:

'For that eternal law—to the consideration of which it is now time to return—has established this by immutable stability: that in the will there should be merit, but in blessedness and misery reward and punishment.' And in another place: 'What each one,' I said, 'chooses to pursue and embrace is established to be placed in the will.' And in the second book: 'For man himself,' I said, 'in so far as he is man, is some good, because he can, when he wills, live rightly.' And in another place I said: 'that right conduct cannot be done except by that same free choice of the will.' And in the third book:

'What need is there to inquire,' I said, 'whence arises that movement by which the will is turned away from the immutable good to the changeable good, since we confess that it is only of the mind, and voluntary, and on that account culpable; and every profitable teaching about this matter avails to this: that, this movement being reproved and restrained, we may turn our will from a temporal fall to enjoying the everlasting good?' And in another place: 'Obscurely,' I said, 'the truth cries out concerning you. For you could not perceive that anything is in our power except what we do when we will. Wherefore nothing is so much in our power as the will itself. For it, indeed, with no interval, is at hand as soon as we will.' Likewise in another place:

'For if you,' I said, 'are praised for seeing what you ought to do, when you do not see it except in Him who is the immutable truth, how much more He who both commanded the willing, and furnished the power, and did not permit unwilling refusal to go unpunished?' Then I subjoined, saying: 'For if each one owes what he has received, and man was so made that he necessarily sins, then he owes it that he should sin. But when he sins, he does what he owes; which, if it is wicked to say, no one is compelled by his own nature to sin.' And again: 'What at last can be,' I said, 'the cause of the will prior to the will? For either it too is a will, and one does not depart from this root of the will, or it is not a will and has no sin.

Either therefore the will is the first cause of sinning, or no sin is the first cause of sinning; nor is there anyone to whom sin may be imputed except the sinner. There is therefore no one to whom it may rightly be imputed except the will.' And a little later: 'Who,' I said, 'sins in that which he can in no way avoid? But sin is committed: therefore it can be avoided.' This testimony of mine Pelagius used in a certain book of his. When I had replied to that book, I wished the title of my book to be On Nature and Grace. In these and suchlike words of mine, because the grace of God is not mentioned—which was then not being treated of—the Pelagians think, or can think, that I held their opinion. But they think this in vain.

For the will, by which one both sins and lives rightly—which is what we here treated of by these words—that will, then, unless it be freed by the grace of God from the servitude by which it has become a slave to sin, and be aided that it may overcome vices, cannot be lived by mortals rightly and piously. And this divine benefit, by which it is freed, unless it went before it, would already be given to its merits and would not be grace, which indeed is given freely.

This we have dealt with sufficiently in our other little works, refuting those enemies of this grace, the new heretics; although in these books, which were written not at all against them—for they did not yet exist—but against the Manichees, On Free Will, we did not by any means keep silent about that grace of God which by abominable impiety they attempt to take away. For we said in the second book that not only great but also the least goods cannot be except from Him from whom are all goods, that is, God. And a little later: 'The virtues,' I said, 'by which one lives rightly are great goods; but the forms of any bodies whatsoever, without which one can live rightly, are the least goods; and the powers of the mind, without which one cannot live rightly, are intermediate goods.'

No one uses the virtues badly; but the other goods, that is, the intermediate and the least, anyone can use not only well but also badly. And therefore no one uses virtue badly, because the work of virtue is the good use of those things which we can also use not well; and no one, by using well, uses badly. Wherefore the abundance and greatness of God's goodness has provided not only the great but also the intermediate and the least goods to exist. His goodness is more to be praised in the great than in the intermediate, and more in the intermediate than in these least goods; but more in all of them, than if He had not bestowed all. And in another place:

'Do you only,' I said, 'hold fast an unshaken piety, so that no good may present itself to you—whether you perceive it, or understand it, or think of it in any way whatsoever—which is not from God.' And likewise in another place I said: 'But since man cannot rise of his own accord, just as he fell of his own accord, let us hold with firm faith the right hand of God stretched out to us from above—that is, our Lord Jesus Christ.' And in the third book, when I had said that which I mentioned Pelagius also to have used from my little works—'For who sins in that which he can in no way avoid? But sin is committed: therefore it can be avoided'—I immediately went on and added: 'And yet certain things done even through ignorance are disapproved and judged to be corrected, as we read in the divine authorities.'

For the Apostle says: 'I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly'; and the prophet says: 'The sins of my youth and my ignorances remember not.' There are also things done by necessity that are to be disapproved, where a man wills to do rightly and cannot. For whence are those voices: 'For the good that I would I do not, but the evil that I hate, that I do'; and that: 'To will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I find not'; and that: 'The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. For these are contrary to one another, that you may not do the things that you would'? But all these belong to men coming from that condemnation of death. For if this is not the punishment of man, but his nature, these are no sins at all.

For if one does not depart from that mode in which he was naturally made, so that he cannot be better, he does what he owes when he does these things. But if he were a good man, he would be otherwise; as it is now, however, because it is so, he is not good, nor has he it in his power to be good—whether by not seeing what he ought to be, or by seeing and not being able to be what he sees he ought to be. Who can doubt that this is a punishment? But every punishment, if it is just, is the punishment of sin and is called a penalty. But if the punishment is unjust—since no one doubts that it is a punishment—it has been imposed on man by some unjust one holding dominion. But since it is the mark of a madman to doubt concerning the omnipotence and justice of God, this punishment is just and is paid for some sin.

For no unjust lord could either snatch man away as if from a God who was ignorant, or wrest him from an unwilling God as though from a weaker one, either by terrifying or by throwing Him into confusion, so as to torment man with an unjust punishment. It remains, therefore, that this just punishment comes from the condemnation of man. And in another place: 'To approve,' I said, 'false things for true, so that one errs unwillingly, and, with the pain of the carnal chain resisting and torturing, not to be able to abstain from lustful works—this is not the nature of man as instituted, but the punishment of one condemned. But when we speak of the right will of doing, we speak, namely, of that in which man was made.' Behold, so long before the Pelagian heresy had arisen, we discussed thus, as though we were now discussing against them.

For when goods were said to be from God—that is, both the great and the intermediate and the least—among the intermediate goods, indeed, free choice of the will is found, because we can use it also badly; but nevertheless it is such that without it we cannot live rightly. And the good use of it is already virtue, which is found among the great goods, which no one can use badly. And because all goods, as has been said—both the great and the intermediate and the least—are from God, it follows that from God is also the good use of free will, which is virtue and is numbered among the great goods. Then it was said from what misery—most justly inflicted on sinners—the grace of God delivers, because man could fall of his own accord, that is, by free choice, but could not also rise.

To which misery of just condemnation belong the ignorance and difficulty which every man suffers from the beginning of his birth; nor is anyone freed from this evil except by the grace of God. This misery the Pelagians refuse to derive from just condemnation, denying original sin—although, even if ignorance and difficulty were the natural first beginnings of man, God would not thus be to be blamed, but praised, as we discussed in that same third book.

This discussion is to be held against the Manichees, who do not accept the holy Scriptures of the Old Testament, in which original sin is narrated, and who contend that whatever is read on that subject in the apostolic letters was inserted with detestable impudence by corrupters of the Scriptures, as though it had not been said by the apostles. But against the Pelagians this is to be defended, which both Scriptures commend, which they profess to accept. This work begins thus: 'Tell me, I pray you, whether God is not the author of evil.' CHAPTER IX. ON GENESIS AGAINST THE MANICHEES, TWO BOOKS. Now, being established in Africa, I wrote two books on Genesis against the Manichees.

For although in the earlier books whatever I discussed—whereby I might show that God is the supremely good and immutable creator of all mutable natures, and that no nature is evil, whether it be substance, in so far as it is nature and substance—our attention was on guard against the Manichees; nevertheless these two books were published most openly against them, in defense of the old Law, which they attack with the vehement zeal of a raving error: in the first, from that which is written, 'In the beginning God made heaven and earth,' until the seven days are completed, where it is read that God rested on the seventh day; but in the second, from that which is written:

'This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth,' until Adam and his wife were sent away from paradise, and a guard was set over the tree of life. Then at the end of the book I opposed to the error of the Manichees the faith of catholic truth, briefly and clearly comprehending what they say and what we say. But as to what I said—'That light, however, does not feed the eyes of irrational birds, but the pure hearts of those who believe God and turn themselves from the love of visible and temporal things to fulfilling His precepts, which all men can do if they will'—let not the new heretics, the Pelagians, suppose that it was said in accordance with their view. For it is altogether true that all men can do this, if they will.

But the will is prepared by the Lord and is increased only by the gift of charity, so that men become able. This was not said here for the reason that it was not necessary to the question then before me. As for what is read there — namely, that the blessing of the Lord, of which it was said, 'Increase and multiply,' is to be believed to have been converted into carnal fecundity after sin, if it cannot be seen to have been said in any other way except that those men are supposed not to have been going to have children unless they had sinned — this I by no means approve.

Neither does it follow that, for this reason, it should be understood as to be taken only allegorically — namely, that in the books of Genesis the green herbs and fruit-bearing trees are given as food to every kind of beast and to all birds and to all serpents — merely because there are also quadrupeds and flying creatures that seem to live on flesh alone. For it could come to pass that they too should be nourished by men from the fruits of the earth, if, on account of the obedience by which men themselves served God without any iniquity, they deserved to have all beasts and birds serving them in every way. Likewise, what I said concerning the people of Israel may cause difficulty:

'That people, still serving the law with bodily circumcision and sacrifices as though amid the sea of the nations, since among the nations it could not sacrifice' — just as even now we see that they have remained without sacrifices, unless perhaps the fact that at Passover they slay a lamb should be reckoned as a sacrifice. In the second book also, what I set down — that by the name of 'fodder' (pabulum) life can be signified — the codices of a better reading do not have 'pabulum' but 'faenum' (hay); and this does not seem aptly said. For the name of hay does not fit the signification of life in the way that 'fodder' does. Likewise I do not seem to have rightly called those words 'prophetic' in which it is written, 'Why is earth and ashes proud?' — because it is not read in that book which we may be certain ought to be called a prophet.

Nor did I, when I was expounding what is written — 'God breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made into a living soul' or 'into a living being' — understand that saying of the Apostle, where he brings forward a testimony from Genesis, saying, 'The first man Adam was made into a living soul,' in the way that he intended it to be expounded. For the Apostle brought forward that testimony in order to prove that there is an animal body; but I thought that from this it was to be shown that man was first made animal — not the body of man only. As to what I said, that sins harm no nature save their own, I said it because he who harms a just man does not truly harm him, since he increases his reward in the heavens;

but by sinning he truly harms himself, since on account of the very will to harm he shall receive that with which he did harm. The Pelagians can indeed drag this statement to their own dogma and thereby say that the sins of others have not harmed little children, because I said that sins harm no nature save their own — not observing that little children, who assuredly belong to human nature, contract original sin for this reason: because in the first men human nature sinned, and thus no sins harmed human nature save its own. For through one man, in whom all sinned, sin entered into the world; for I did not say that sins harm no man, but that they harm no nature save its own.

Likewise in what I said a little after — that there is no natural evil — they can seek a similar hiding-place, unless this saying be referred to such a nature as was first created without fault. For it is truly and properly called the nature of man; but we use the word in a transferred sense when we also call 'nature' that as which man is born, according to which manner of speaking the Apostle said, 'For we too were once by nature children of wrath, even as the rest.' This work begins thus: 'If the Manicheans would choose whom they might deceive...' CHAPTER X. ON THE SIX BOOKS 'ON MUSIC.' Then, as I mentioned above, I wrote six books On Music.

Of these the sixth in particular became well known, since in it a matter worthy of knowledge is treated: namely, how from corporeal and spiritual, yet mutable, numbers one may arrive at the immutable numbers which are already in immutable Truth itself; and thus how the invisible things of God are beheld, being understood through the things that are made. Those who cannot do this, and yet live by faith in Christ, come to behold those things more surely and more blessedly after this life; but those who can, if they lack faith in Christ, who is the one Mediator between God and men, perish together with all their wisdom. In this book, that which I said — 'For bodies are the better the more numerous they are with such numbers' —

'but the soul, by doing without these things which it receives through the body, becomes better, when it turns itself away from the carnal senses and is reformed by the divine numbers of wisdom' — this is not to be taken as though there will be no corporeal numbers in incorruptible and spiritual bodies (since they will be more beautiful and more comely), or as though the soul will not perceive them when it is in its best state, in the way that here it becomes better by doing without them. For here it has need to turn itself away from the carnal senses in order to grasp intelligible things, because it is weak and less fit to apply its attention to both at once; and in these corporeal things enticement must now be guarded against, so long as the soul can be enticed to base delight.