書信與論戰集（CSEL） 第 43 章

That this is the intention of the law when it convicts: namely that, because through it transgressions are committed, men may take refuge in the grace of the Lord who has mercy — as by a schoolmaster shutting them up unto the faith which was afterwards revealed — where both the things done amiss may be forgiven, and by the help of that same grace they may not be done. For it is the way of those who make progress; although those who make good progress are called perfect travellers: yet that is the supreme perfection, to which nothing is added, when the goal toward which one strives has begun to be possessed.

Now as for what is said to them, 'Are you yourself without sin?' — this in truth does not pertain to the matter about which the question is being raised. But when he says that it is rather to be imputed to his own negligence that he is not without sin, he indeed says well; yet let him deign also thereupon to pray the Lord, that this iniquitous negligence may not have dominion over him. It was Him whom a certain man was asking when he said, 'Order my steps according to thy word, and let not any iniquity have dominion over me': lest, while he trusts in his own diligence as though in his own powers, he attain neither here to true righteousness, nor there, where without doubt perfect righteousness is to be desired and hoped for. And as for what is said to them by certain persons, that nowhere is it written in these exact words that a man can be without sin,

he easily refutes it: 'because the question there is not with what words any statement is expressed.' Yet perhaps it is not without cause that, while men are several times found in the Scriptures said to be 'without blame,' no one is found who is said to be 'without sin,' except one alone, of whom it is plainly said, 'Him who knew no sin'; and in that place where holy priests were being spoken of, 'For he was in all points tempted, after the likeness, without sin' — namely in that flesh which had the likeness of the flesh of sin, although it was not the flesh of sin; which likeness, however, it would not have had, unless all the rest of human flesh were the flesh of sin.

Now as to how this is to be understood, 'Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin, and cannot sin, because his seed remaineth in him' — seeing that the Apostle John himself, as though he were not born of God, or were speaking to those who were not yet born of God, has plainly set down, 'If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us' — I have taken care to explain this as best I could in the books which I wrote to Marcellinus on this matter. And as for what is said, 'cannot sin,' being said in the sense of 'ought not to sin,' his assertion of this does not seem to me to be disapproved. For what madman would say that one ought to sin, since it is for this very reason a sin, that it ought not to be done?

Truly, what the Apostle James says, 'But the tongue can no man tame,' does not seem to me to be understood as he wished to expound it, 'as if said by way of reproach,' as though it were said: 'Can then no man tame the tongue?' — as though rebuking them, saying: 'You can tame wild beasts, and cannot tame the tongue?' — as though it were easier to tame the tongue than beasts. I do not think this is the sense in this place. For if he had wished it to be understood of the ease of taming the tongue, the rest would follow in the comparison of the beasts. But as it is, there follows: 'an unruly evil, full of deadly poison,' more harmful indeed than that of beasts and serpents; for that kills the flesh, but this kills the soul.

For 'the mouth that lieth slayeth the soul.' It was not, therefore, as though this were easier than the taming of beasts, that holy James pronounced that sentence, or wished it to be pronounced with that meaning; but rather to show how great is the evil of the tongue in man, so that it can be tamed by no man, whereas even beasts are tamed by men. Nor did he say this in order that we should suffer the dominion of this evil to persist within us through negligence, but that for the taming of the tongue we should beg the help of divine grace. For he does not say, 'no one can tame the tongue,' but 'no man,' so that, when it is tamed, we may confess that it is done by the mercy of God, by the help of God, by the grace of God. Let the soul therefore endeavour to tame the tongue, and while it endeavours, let it beg for help;

and let the tongue pray that the tongue may be tamed by the gift of Him who said to his own, 'For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you.' Thus by the commandment we are admonished to do that which, when we endeavour it and are not strong enough by our own powers, we should implore the divine help. Accordingly he too, when he had emphasized the evil of the tongue, saying among these things, 'these things ought not so to be, my brethren,' straightway, having finished what he was saying on this point, admonished by what help these things might not be done which he said ought not to be done. 'Who is a wise man,' he says, 'and endued with knowledge among you? let him show out of a good conversation his work in the meekness of wisdom.'

'But if ye have bitter zeal and strifes in your hearts, glory not, and be not liars against the truth. This is not the wisdom that descendeth from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish. For where zeal and strife are, there is inconstancy and every evil work. But the wisdom that is from above is first indeed chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy to be persuaded, full of mercy and good fruits, without judging, without dissimulation.' This is the wisdom that tames the tongue: descending from above, not springing up from the human heart. Does anyone dare to deny even this to the grace of God, and with most arrogant vanity place it in the power of man? Why then is it prayed for that it may be received, if it comes from man that it may be possessed?

Or is even this prayer contradicted, lest injury be done to free will? But if a man is sufficient of himself by the possibility of his nature to fulfil all the precepts of righteousness, then let contradiction be made also against this same Apostle James, admonishing and saying, 'But if any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God, who giveth to all men liberally and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him. But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering.' This is the faith unto which the commandments constrain us: that the law may command, and faith may obtain. 'In many things we offend all.' For this too the same Apostle did not pronounce in any other manner than that which he said, 'the tongue can no man tame.'

Nor let anyone object to these men, in favour of the impossibility of not sinning, that which is said: 'The wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God. For it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. And they that are in the flesh cannot please God.' For he said 'the wisdom of the flesh,' not the wisdom that descends from above; and it is manifest that those signified as being 'in the flesh' are not those who have not yet departed from the body, but those who live according to the flesh. But there the question that is being handled does not lie.

This is what I await to hear from this man, if I can: as to those who live according to the spirit, and who on this account, even while still living here, are now in a certain manner not in the flesh — whether they live according to the spirit by the grace of God, or are sufficient of themselves, by the possibility of nature already given when they were created, in their own proper will; seeing that the fulfilling of the law is nothing but charity, and 'the charity of God is shed abroad in our hearts,' not by ourselves, but 'by the Holy Spirit who is given unto us.' This man also treats of the sins of ignorance, and says that 'a man ought to keep watch beforehand lest he be ignorant, and therefore ignorance is to be blamed, because a man is ignorant, through his own negligence, of that which, had diligence been applied, he ought to have known.'

while yet he disputes about everything, rather than pray and say, 'Give me understanding, and I shall learn thy commandments.' For it is one thing not to have cared to know those things whose sins of negligence seemed even to be expiated by certain sacrifices of the law; another thing to wish to understand and not be able, and to act against the law by not understanding what it wishes to be done. Whence we are admonished to ask wisdom of God, 'who giveth to all men liberally' — namely to all those who so ask and so much ask, in what manner and in what measure so great a thing is to be asked. Yet he confesses that sins committed are to be expiated by God, and that the Lord is to be entreated for them, namely for the sake of obtaining pardon:

because that which has been done, that power so greatly praised by this man — the nature and will of man — cannot, even by his own admission, make undone; wherefore by this necessity it remains that a man should pray to be forgiven. But that he should be helped so as not to sin — this he has nowhere said, nor read it here. Wonderful is the utter silence on this matter, seeing that the Lord's Prayer admonishes us that both are to be asked: both that our debts be forgiven us, and that we be not led into temptation — the one that past sins may be expiated, the other that future ones may be avoided. And although this does not happen unless the will is present, yet for it to happen the will alone is not sufficient. Therefore for this thing neither superfluous nor shameless is the prayer offered up to the Lord; for what is more foolish than to pray that you may do what you have in your own power?

Now then, see what pertains most to the matter: how he tries to show human nature as though it were altogether without any fault, and delights, against the most manifest Scriptures of God, in 'the wisdom of speech, whereby the cross of Christ is made void.' But surely that will not be made void; rather this wisdom will be overthrown. For when we have shown this, perhaps the mercy of God will be present, so that he too may repent of having said these things. 'First,' he says, 'we must dispute about that whereby nature is said to have been weakened and changed by sin. Whence before all things,' he says, 'I think it must be asked, what sin is: some substance, or a name lacking all substance, whereby is expressed not a thing, not an existence, not any body, but the act of a deed wrongly done.' Then he adds:

'I believe it is so,' he says, 'and it is truly so: how could that which lacks substance weaken or change human nature?' See, I pray you, how in his ignorance he strives to overthrow the most wholesome words of the medicinal oracles. I said: 'Lord, have mercy upon me; heal my soul, for I have sinned against thee.' What is healed, if nothing is wounded, nothing hurt, nothing weakened and corrupted? Moreover, if there is something to be healed, whence was it corrupted? You hear him confessing; why do you seek him disputing? 'Heal,' he says, 'my soul.' Ask of Him whence that was corrupted which he asks to be healed; and hear what follows: 'for I have sinned against thee.'

Let this man question that one; let him ask of him what he thinks ought to be asked, and say: 'O you who cry, Heal my soul, for I have sinned against thee — what is sin? Some substance, or a name lacking all substance, whereby is expressed not a thing, not an existence, not any body, but only the act of a deed wrongly done?' That one replies: 'It is as you say. Sin is not any substance, but only by this name is expressed the act of a deed wrongly done.' And on the contrary this one: 'Why then do you cry, Heal my soul, for I have sinned against thee? How could your soul be corrupted? It needs a physician, because it is not whole. All the good things indeed which it has in its constitution — life, sense, mind — it has from the most high God, its Creator and Maker;

but the vice which darkens and weakens these natural goods, so that it has need of illumination and healing, was not contracted from the blameless Maker, but from original sin, which was committed by free will. And through this, the penal nature belongs to a most just punishment. For if we are now in Christ a new creature, yet we were by nature children of wrath, even as others. But God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ, by whose grace we are saved.'

This grace of Christ, therefore, without which neither infants nor those of full age can be saved, is not rendered for merits, but is given freely, on which account it is also called grace: 'being justified,' he says, 'freely by his blood.' Whence those who are not delivered by it — whether because they could not yet hear, or because they would not obey, or even because, being by reason of age unable to hear, they did not receive the laver of regeneration which they could have received, and through which they would have been saved — are justly condemned: because they are not without sin, whether that which they drew from their origin, or that which they added by evil habits, for all have sinned, whether in Adam or in themselves, and come short of the glory of God. The whole Mass, therefore, owes punishment;

and if to all were rendered the due punishment of damnation, without doubt it would be rendered not unjustly. Those therefore who are thence delivered by grace are called, not vessels of their own merits, but 'vessels of mercy.' Of what mercy, but His 'who sent Christ Jesus into this world to save sinners,' whom he foreknew and predestinated and called and justified and glorified? Who then would rave so utterly and madly as not to render unspeakable thanks to the mercy which delivers whom it willed, seeing that he could rightly in no way blame the justice of Him who condemns absolutely all?

If we are wise according to the Scriptures in this matter, we are not compelled to dispute against Christian grace and to say things whereby we would attempt to demonstrate that human nature neither in little ones has need of a physician, because it is whole, and in the greater is able of itself to suffice for righteousness if it will. These things indeed seem to be said acutely, but 'in the wisdom of the word, whereby the cross of Christ is made void.' This is not the wisdom that descendeth from above. I am unwilling to say what follows, lest we be thought to do injury to our friends, whose most strong and keen talents we wish to run not into the crooked but into the straight.

With however great a zeal, therefore, the author of this book which you sent is kindled against those who seek a patronage for their sins from the weakness of human nature, with so much and far more ardent a zeal it behoves us to be kindled, lest the cross of Christ be made void. And it is made void, if in any way it be said that righteousness and eternal life can be attained apart from His sacrament: which is done in this book — I do not wish to say by one who knows, lest I should judge him who wrote it to be not even a Christian, but rather, what I more readily believe, by one who does not know, and who is indeed of great powers; but I would have those powers sound, not such as the frenzied are wont to have.

For first he distinguishes that it is one thing to ask whether something can be, which pertains to possibility alone, and another whether it actually is. That this distinction is true, no one doubts: for it is consequent that what is, could have been; but it is not consequent that what can be, also is. For because the Lord raised up Lazarus, without doubt he could; but because he did not raise up Judas, must it be said, 'he could not'? He could, then; but he would not; for if he had willed, he would have done this also by the same power, since 'the Son also quickeneth whom he will.' But observe whither, by this true and manifest distinction, he tends, and what he strives to effect. 'We,' he says, 'treat of possibility alone;'

'concerning which, unless something certain be established, we say that to pass over to another most weighty matter is out of order.' This he turns over in many ways and with lengthy discourse, lest anyone should think that he is asking about anything other than the possibility of not sinning. Whence among the many things by which he pursues this, he also says this: 'The same thing I repeat again: I say that a man can be without sin. What do you say? That a man cannot be without sin? Neither do I say,' he says, 'that a man is without sin, nor do you say that a man is not without sin: we contend about being able and not being able, not about being and not being.'

Then he mentions that some of those things which are wont to be brought forward against them from the Scriptures do not pertain to this question, in which it is asked whether or not a man can be without sin, thus: 'For,' he says, 'the words "none is clean from filth," and "there is not a man who sinneth not," and "there is none righteous upon earth," and "there is none that doeth good," and other things like these,' he says, 'avail toward not being, not toward not being able. For by examples of this kind it is shown what sort of men some were at some time, not that they could not have been otherwise: whence they are also rightly found to be blameworthy. For if they were such for this reason, that they could not be otherwise, they are free from fault.' See what he has said.

But I say that a little one born in that place where it could not be succoured through the baptism of Christ, being cut off by death, was for that reason such — that is, departed without the laver of regeneration — because it could not be otherwise. Let him therefore absolve it, and open to it, against the sentence of the Lord, the kingdom of heaven. But the Apostle does not absolve it, who says: 'By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so it passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned.' Rightly therefore, by that damnation which runs through the universal mass, it is not admitted into the kingdom of heaven, although it not only was not a Christian, but could not even have been one.

But it is not condemned, they say, because 'all have sinned in Adam' was said not on account of sin drawn by the origin of birth, but on account of imitation. If therefore Adam is called the author of the men who followed, of their sins, because he was the first sinner among all, why is not Abel rather than Christ set as the head of righteous men, because he was the first righteous man among all? But I do not speak of the infant. A young man or an old man has died in that region where the name of Christ could not be heard: could he have become righteous through nature and free will, or could he not? If they say he could, behold, this is to make void the cross of Christ, to contend that without it anyone can be justified through the natural law and the choice of the will.

Let us also say here: 'then Christ died in vain.' For all could do this, even had He not died for them, and, if they were unrighteous, they would be so because they willed it, not because they could not be righteous. But if without the grace of Christ he could not be justified at all, let him, if he dares, absolve even this man too according to his own words, because, 'if he was such for the reason that he could not be otherwise, he is free from fault.' But he objects to himself, as though it were said by another, and says: 'It can indeed be, but by the grace of God, you will say.' Then, as though replying, he adds: 'I give thanks to your humanity, that you are not only not content not to oppose, or merely to confess, the assertion of mine which a while ago you were assailing, but do not even refuse to approve it.'

'For to say, "it can indeed, but by this or by that" — what else is it than not only to consent that it could be, but also to show in what way or by what manner it could be? No one, therefore, more approves the possibility of anything than he who confesses also its quality; for quality cannot exist apart from the thing.' Having said these things, he again objects to himself: 'But you,' you will say, 'seem in this place to be denying the grace of God, since you do not mention it.' Then he replies: 'Do I deny it, who in confessing the thing must of necessity confess also that by which the thing can be effected? Or do you, who by denying the thing, without doubt deny also whatever that is by which the thing is effected?'

He has forgotten that he is now replying to one who does not deny the thing, whose objection he had a little before set forth, saying: 'It can indeed be, but by the grace of God.' How then does he deny that possibility, for which this man labours so much, when he already says to him, 'It can be by the grace of God'? Nevertheless, since, having dismissed this man who now confesses the thing, he still acts against those who deny that it is possible for a man to be without sin — what is that to us? Let him act against whom he will, provided only that he confess this, which is denied with most wicked impiety, that without the grace of God a man cannot be without sin. He says, therefore:

'Whether by grace, or by help, or by mercy, and whatever that is by which a man can be without sin — whoever confesses the thing itself confesses it.' I confess to your charity, that when I read these things, I was suddenly suffused with joy, that he did not deny the grace of God, by which alone a man can be justified: for this is what I most detest and shudder at in the disputations of such men. But going on to read the rest, I first began to hold him suspect from the similitudes he gave. For he says: 'Now if I shall say, "a man can dispute, a bird can fly, a hare can run," and shall not also mention the things by which these can be effected — namely tongue, wings, feet — have I denied the qualities of the functions, I who have confessed the functions themselves?'

It certainly appears that he has mentioned things which avail by nature: for these members were created for natures of this kind — tongue, wings, feet. He has not put forward anything of such a kind as we wish grace to be understood, without which a man is not justified — where the matter concerns natures to be healed, not to be established. Hence, now made anxious, I began to read the rest, and found that I had not suspected falsely. But before I come to that, see what he has said. When he was treating the question of the difference of sins, and objected to himself that certain sins often rush in, so that all cannot be avoided, he denied that a man ought to be reproved even with the lightest reproof, if they cannot altogether be avoided — surely not heeding the Scriptures of the New Testament, where we have learned…