書信與論戰集（CSEL） 第 39 章

III. TWO BOOKS ON THE GRACE OF CHRIST AND ON ORIGINAL SIN. BOOK ONE. ON THE GRACE OF CHRIST. How greatly we rejoice over your bodily and especially your spiritual welfare, most sincere brethren beloved of God, Albina, Pinianus, and Melania—since we cannot express it, we leave it for you to consider and believe, so that we may now rather speak of those things about which you consulted us. For, since the bearer is in haste, amid our occupations, which are far more crowded at Carthage than anywhere else, we have dictated these things as we could, so far as God deigned to grant. You wrote to me that you had dealt with Pelagius, that whatever was said against him he should condemn in writing, and that he said, in your hearing:

'I anathematize whoever either holds or says that the grace of God, by which Christ came into this world to save sinners, is not necessary not only through the several hours or the several moments, but also through our several acts; and let those who try to take this away receive eternal penalties.' Whoever hears this and is ignorant of his meaning, which he has expressed clearly enough in his books, thinks—not in those which he says were unemended and foisted upon him, or wholly denies to be his own, but in those which he mentions in the letter which he sent to Rome—that he altogether holds what the truth holds;

but whoever notices what he says more openly in them ought to hold even these words suspect; because, even if he places the grace of God, by which Christ came into the world to save sinners, in the mere remission of sins, he can fit these words to this meaning, saying that it is therefore necessary through the several hours, through the several moments, and through the several acts, in order that, always retaining in memory and remembering that our sins have been forgiven us, we may not sin further—being helped not by any supply of virtue, but by the powers of our own will as it recalls, through the several acts, what was granted to it by the remission of sins.

Likewise, since they are wont to say to us that Christ furnished us help against sinning in this, that by living justly himself and teaching justly he left an example, they can also fit these words to this, so as to say that this kind of grace is necessary to us through the several moments, through the several acts—that is, that in our whole manner of life we may look upon the example of the Lord's manner of life. But your faith perceives how this confession is to be distinguished from the confession of grace, of which the question is; and yet it can be veiled by the ambiguity of those words of theirs. But what wonder is this?

Since Pelagius himself—when in the episcopal acts he condemned, without any refusal, those who say that the grace of God and his help are not given for individual acts, but consist in free will or in the law and teaching (where we thought that all his evasions concerning this matter had been used up), and when he also condemned those who teach that the grace of God is given according to our merits—yet in the books which he published in defense of free will, of which he makes mention in the letter which he sent to Rome, is shown to hold nothing other than that very thing which he seemed to have condemned.

For the grace of God and the help by which we are helped not to sin, he places either in nature and free will, or in the law and teaching, so that, namely, when God helps a man to turn away from evil and do good, he is believed to help by revealing and showing what ought to be done, not also by cooperating and inspiring love, so that a man may do what he has come to know ought to be done. For when he establishes and distinguishes three things by which he says the divine commandments are fulfilled:

possibility, will, action—that is, possibility by which a man can be righteous, will by which he wills to be righteous, action by which he is righteous—of these three the first, that is, possibility, he confesses to be given by the Creator of nature and not to be in our power, but that we have it even if we are unwilling; but the two remaining, that is, will and action, he asserts to be our own, and so attributes them to us that he contends they are from none but ourselves.

Finally, he asserts that the grace of God helps not these two, which he wants to be altogether our own—that is, will and action—but that which is not in our power and is ours from God—that is, possibility; as though those things which are ours, that is, will and action, are so strong for turning away from evil and doing good that they do not need the divine help, while that which is ours from God, that is, possibility, is so weak that it is always helped by the aid of grace. But lest anyone perhaps say that we either do not rightly understand what he says, or with malevolent mind twist into another sense things not so said, receive now his very words. 'We,'

he says, 'thus distinguish these three, and setting them out as it were in a fixed order, we divide them. In the first place we set possibility ('to be able'), in the second willing, in the third being; possibility we locate in nature, willing in the will, being in the effect. That first, that is, being able, pertains properly to God, who conferred it on his creature; but the two remaining, that is, willing and being, are to be referred to man, because they descend from the fountain of the will. Therefore in the good will and work is the praise of man—nay, of both man and God, who gave the possibility of that very will and work, and who always helps that possibility itself by the aid of his grace. But that a man is able to will good and to accomplish it, is of God alone.'

'That one thing, therefore, can be, even if these two are not; but these cannot be without that. Thus it is free for me neither to have a good will nor a good action, but in no way can I not have the possibility of good; it is in me, even if I am unwilling, nor does nature ever admit any respite of itself in this. Let some examples make this meaning clearer to us. That we can see with our eyes is not ours, but that we see well or ill, this is ours; that we can speak is God's, but that we speak well or ill, this is ours. And, to comprise all things generally: that we can do, say, think every good is his who gave this being able, who helps this being able;'

'but that we do, or speak, or think well, is ours, because we can also turn all these to evil. Whence—which must be repeated often on account of your calumny—when we say that a man can be without sin, and by confessing the possibility received we praise God, who bestowed this being able upon us, there is here no occasion of praising man, where the cause of God alone is treated; for the discussion is not of willing nor of being, but only of that which can be.'

Behold, this is the whole dogma of Pelagius, expressed carefully in his third book in defense of free will, in these very words, by which he took such pains, with so great subtlety, to distinguish these three—the one which is being able, the second which is willing, the third which is being, that is, possibility, will, action—so that whenever we read or hear him confessing the help of divine grace, that we may turn away from evil and do good, whether he places it in the law and teaching or anywhere else, we may know what he is saying, and may not err by understanding him otherwise than he means.

For we ought to know that he believes neither our will nor our action to be helped by divine aid, but only the possibility of the will and of the work, which alone among these three he affirms that we have from God—as though this were weak, which God himself placed in nature, while the other two, which he wished to be our own, are so firm and strong and self-sufficient that they need none of his help, and therefore he does not help us to will, does not help us to act, but only helps us so that we may be able to will and to act. On the contrary, the apostle says: «Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling.»

And that they might know that they are divinely helped not only in that they can work—for this they had already received in nature and in teaching—but also in that they actually work, he did not say: «For it is God who works in you to be able,» as though they now had both to will and to work of themselves and did not need his help in these two; but he said: «For it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish,» or, as it is read in other and especially Greek manuscripts, «both to will and to work.»

See whether the apostle, by the Holy Spirit, did not foresee so long beforehand those who would be adversaries of the grace of God, and did not say that God works in us these two things, that is, both to will and to work, which this man wished to be so much our own as though they themselves were not helped by the aid of divine grace. Nor let Pelagius here deceive the incautious and the simple, or even himself, in that, when he had said 'therefore in the good will and work is the praise of man,' he as it were corrected himself and added: 'nay, of both man and God.' For he did not say this because he wished it to be understood according to sound doctrine, that God works in us both to will and to work; but he showed clearly enough why he said this by immediately subjoining:

'who gave the possibility of that very will and work.' But that he places this possibility in nature is clear from his earlier words. Yet lest he should seem to have said nothing about grace, he added: 'and who always helps that possibility itself by the aid of his grace;' he did not say: the will itself or the operation itself—which, if he said it, would seem not to be at variance with apostolic doctrine—but he said:

'that possibility itself,' namely that one of the three which he located in nature, 'he always helps by the aid of his grace;' so that, that is, in the will and action the praise is not both of God and of man because a man so wills that God nevertheless inspires into his will the ardor of love, and so a man works that God nevertheless cooperates—without whose help what is a man?—but he added God to this praise for this reason: that unless there were a nature in which he created us, whereby we might be able to will and to act, we would neither will nor act. But that he confesses this natural possibility to be helped by the grace of God, it is not here open what grace he means, or how far he holds nature to be helped by it;

But as may be understood from other passages in which he speaks more plainly, he means nothing else by grace than the law and teaching by which the natural capacity is assisted. For in one place he says: 'Here the most ignorant of men suppose that we do injury to divine grace, because we say that it in no way perfects holiness in us apart from our own will — as though God had commanded something of His grace and did not also supply the help of His grace to those to whom He gave the command, so that what men are bidden to do by free choice they might more easily fulfil through grace' — and as though about to explain what grace he means, he went on to add, saying:

'which we confess to exist not, as you suppose, in the law alone, but also in God's help.' Who would not here desire that he should show what he wishes to be understood by grace? For on this account above all we ought to expect of him that he should state what he means when he says that he confesses grace to be not in the law alone. But while we are held in suspense by this expectation, observe what he has added. 'For God helps us,' he says, 'by His teaching and revelation, when He opens the eyes of our heart; when He shows us things to come, that we may not be engrossed with things present; when He lays bare the snares of the devil; when He enlightens us with the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace.'

Then, concluding his statement with a kind of summing-up, 'He who says these things,' he says, 'does he seem to you to deny grace, or does he confess both man's free choice and God's grace?' In all these things he has not departed from commending the law and teaching, diligently inculcating that this is the assisting grace, and carrying out what he had proposed when he said: 'but we confess it to be in God's help.' In short, he thought that God's help was to be conveyed in manifold ways by mentioning teaching, and revelation, and the opening of the heart's eyes, and the showing of things to come, and the disclosing of the devil's snares, and the enlightenment of the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace — all this, assuredly, that we may learn the divine precepts and promises.

This, therefore, is to place the grace of God in the law and teaching. Hence, then, it appears that he confesses that grace by which God shows and reveals what we ought to do, not that by which He bestows and helps us to do it — since the knowledge of the law rather avails to this, if the aid of grace be wanting, that transgression of the commandment should be committed. For 'where there is no law,' says the Apostle, 'neither is there transgression'; and: 'I had not known lust, unless the law had said: Thou shalt not covet.'

And by this, law is so far one thing and grace another, that the law not only profits nothing, but even greatly hinders, unless grace assists; and this usefulness of the law is shown, in that, whom it makes guilty of transgression, it compels to flee for refuge to grace to be set free, and to be helped that they may overcome their evil lusts. For it commands rather than helps; it teaches that there is a disease, it does not heal it; nay, rather, by it that which is not healed is increased, that the medicine of grace may be sought more attentively and more anxiously — because the letter kills, but the spirit gives life. For if a law had been given which could give life, righteousness would altogether have been by the law. Yet insofar as the law does help, he adds and says:

'But the Scripture hath concluded all things under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe.' 'Therefore,' he says, 'the law was our schoolmaster in Christ Jesus.' This very thing, then, is useful for the proud — to be shut up more strictly and more manifestly under sin, lest they presume, as it were by the proper powers of free choice, to work righteousness, but that every mouth may be stopped and all the world may become guilty before God, because by the law no flesh shall be justified in His sight; for by the law is the knowledge of sin. But now, apart from the law, the righteousness of God has been manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets. How then manifested apart from the law, if witnessed by the law?

Not therefore manifested apart from the law, but the righteousness apart from the law — because it is the righteousness of God, that is, which is ours not from the law but from God; not the righteousness which, when He commands it, is feared by knowing it, but that which, when He bestows it, is held fast by loving it — that he who glorieth may glory in the Lord. What then is it, that this man reckons the law and teaching to be the grace by which we are helped to work righteousness — which, however much it helps, helps to this end, that grace should be sought? For no one can fulfil the law through the law; for love is the fulfilling of the law, and the love of God has been shed abroad in our hearts not through the law, but through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. Accordingly, through the law grace is shown, that the law may be fulfilled through grace.

For what does it profit Pelagius that in different words he says the same thing, so that it may not be understood that he places grace in the law and teaching, by which he asserts that the capacity of nature is assisted? So far as I judge, he is on this account afraid to be understood, because he condemned those who say that the grace and help of God is not given for individual acts, but lies in free choice, or in the law and teaching; and yet he thinks himself concealed while he turns over the meaning of law and teaching in one phrase after another. And indeed in another place, when he had at length asserted that a good will is wrought in us not by the help of God but out of ourselves, he set against himself a question from the Apostle's epistle, and said: 'And how,' he says, 'shall that saying of the Apostle stand:

'For it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish'? Then, in order as it were to solve this objection, which he saw to be vehemently contrary to his own doctrine, he went on to add: 'He works in us to will what is good, to will what is holy, while He kindles us — given over to earthly desires and, after the manner of dumb animals, loving only things present — by the greatness of future glory and the promise of rewards; while by the revelation of wisdom He rouses our astonished will into the desire of God; while He persuades us' — a thing which elsewhere you do not fear to deny — 'to all that is good.' What could be plainer than that he says grace, by which God works in us to will what is good, to be nothing else than the law and teaching?

For in the law and teaching of the holy Scriptures the greatness of future glory and of rewards is promised; to teaching it also belongs that wisdom is revealed; to teaching it belongs when all that is good is urged upon us. And if there seems to be some difference between teaching and urging, or rather exhorting, yet this too is included under the generality of teaching, which is contained in any words or writings whatever; for the holy Scriptures both teach and exhort, and in teaching and exhorting there can be also the working of man.

But we wish that these men would at some time confess that grace by which the greatness of future glory is not only promised, but also believed and hoped for; nor is wisdom only revealed, but also loved; nor is all that is good only urged, but also carried into effect by persuasion. For not all have faith who hear through the Scriptures the Lord promising the kingdom of heaven; nor are all persuaded who are urged, that they should come to Him who says: 'Come unto me, all ye that labour.' But whose is the faith, and to whom it is given by persuasion that they come to Him, He Himself has sufficiently shown, where He says:

'No man comes to me, unless the Father who sent me draw him'; and a little later, when He was speaking of unbelievers, 'I said unto you,' He says, 'that no man can come unto me, unless it were given him of my Father.' This grace Pelagius ought to confess, if he wishes not only to be called, but also to be, a Christian. But what shall I say of the revelation of wisdom? For no one would easily hope that in this life he could attain to the greatness of the revelations of the Apostle Paul; and surely in these what else is to be believed to have been usually revealed to him, than what pertained to wisdom? And yet he says: 'Lest I should be exalted by the greatness of my revelations, there was given to me a thorn in my flesh, an angel of Satan, to buffet me.'

'For this thing I besought the Lord thrice, that it might depart from me; and He said unto me: My grace is sufficient for thee; for strength is made perfect in weakness.' Without doubt, if the highest love, to which nothing could be added, and which could in no way be puffed up, had then already been in the Apostle, would there have been need of an angel of Satan, by whose buffeting the elation might be repressed which could arise in the greatness of the revelations? But what else is elation than inflation? And assuredly of love it has been most truly said: 'Love envieth not, is not puffed up.' This love, therefore, even in so great an Apostle, was surely being increased from day to day, so long as his inner man was being renewed from day to day — to be perfected, without doubt, where it could no longer be puffed up.

But at that time his mind was still such that it might be puffed up by the greatness of the revelation, until it should be filled up with the solid building of love; for he had not yet by attaining laid hold of that toward which by advancing he was running. And therefore, to one unwilling to endure the trouble by which his elation was restrained, before there was in him the last and highest perfection of love, it is most rightly said: 'My grace is sufficient for thee; for strength is made perfect in weakness' — in weakness, that is, not, as he supposes, of the flesh only, but both of flesh and of mind; because the mind also, in comparison with that highest perfection, was weak, when it might be exalted.

Accordingly, the thorn in the flesh, the angel of Satan, was understood to have been given, although in comparison with carnal or animal men who do not yet perceive the things which are of the Spirit of God he was most firm. Wherefore, if strength is made perfect in weakness, whoever does not confess himself weak is not made perfect. But this grace, by which strength is made perfect in weakness, leads the predestined and those called according to purpose on to the highest perfection and glorification. By this grace it is brought about not only that we know what things are to be done, but also that we do the things we know; nor only that we believe the things to be loved, but also that we love the things we believe.

If this grace is to be called teaching, let it certainly be so called in such a way that God is believed to pour it in more deeply and inwardly with ineffable sweetness, not only through those who plant and water outwardly, but also through Himself, who secretly ministers His own increase — so that He not only shows the truth, but also imparts love. For thus God teaches those who are called according to purpose, giving them at once both to know what they should do and to do what they know. Whence the Apostle speaks thus to the Thessalonians: 'But concerning brotherly love ye have no need that I write unto you; for ye yourselves are taught of God to love one another.' And to prove that they had been taught of God, he added:

'For indeed ye do this toward all the brethren in the whole of Macedonia' — as though this were the most certain sign that you have been taught of God, if you have done that which you have learned. In this manner all are called according to purpose, as it is written in the Prophets, 'taught of God.' But he who indeed knows what ought to be done and does it not, has not yet been taught of God according to grace, but according to the law; not according to the spirit, but according to the letter — although many seem to do what the law commands through fear of punishment, not through love of righteousness, which the Apostle calls his own righteousness, which is of the law, as though it were commanded, not given. But if it is given, it is not called our righteousness, but God's, because it so becomes ours that it is from God for us. For he says:

'That I may be found in Him, not having my own righteousness which is of the law, but that which is of the faith of Jesus, the righteousness of God.' So great, then, is the distance between the law and grace, that although the law is not doubted to be of God, yet the righteousness which is of the law is not of God, but the righteousness which is consummated through grace is of God. Because that righteousness is said to be of the law which is done for fear of the law's curse, that righteousness is said to be of God which is given through the benefit of grace, so that the commandment may be not terrible but sweet — as it is prayed in the Psalm: 'Thou art sweet, O Lord, and in Thy sweetness teach me Thy righteousness'; that is, that I may not be servilely compelled by dread of punishment to be under the law, but may delight, in free love, to be with the law.

For the precept makes free him who does it willingly. And in this way whoever learns, does entirely whatever he has learned is to be done. Concerning this manner of teaching the Lord also says: 'Every one that hath heard of my Father, and hath learned, cometh unto me.' He therefore who has not come, it is not rightly said of him, 'He indeed heard and learned that he ought to come, but he will not do what he learned' — this is by no means rightly said, of that manner of teaching by which God teaches through grace. For if, as the Truth speaks, every one who has learned comes, then whoever does not come has assuredly not learned. But who does not see that a person both comes and does not come by the choice of the will? Yet this choice can be alone, if he does not come;

but if he comes, it cannot but be helped — and so helped that he not only knows what is to be done, but also does what he has known. And by this, when God teaches not through the letter of the law but through the grace of the Spirit, He so teaches that whatever each one has learned he not only sees by knowing, but also seeks by willing, and accomplishes by doing. And by this divine manner of teaching, the will itself and the working itself, and not merely the natural capacity of willing and working, is assisted. For if only our power were aided by this grace, the Lord would have said thus: 'Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned, is able to come to me'; but He did not say so, but 'Every one,' He says, 'that hath heard of the Father and hath learned, cometh unto me.'

Pelagius places the ability to come in nature, or even, as he has just begun to say, in grace — of whatever kind he understands it — 'by which,' as he says, 'the very capacity is assisted'; but coming is now in the will and work. It is not, however, a consequence that he who can come also comes, unless he has willed and done it. But every one who has learned of the Father not only can come, but comes; where now there is both the advance of capacity, and the affection of will, and the effect of action. What then do his examples aim at, except that they have indeed made his meaning clearer to us, as he had promised — not that we should hold those views, but that we should more manifestly and openly know what he himself held?

'What we can see with our eyes,' he says, 'is not ours; but that we see well or ill, this is ours.' Let the Psalm answer him, where it is said to God: 'Turn away mine eyes, lest they behold vanity.' For although this was said of the eyes of the mind, thence assuredly proceeds into these eyes of the flesh the seeing either well or ill — not in the way that those are said to see well who gaze with sound eyes, and ill who are bleary-eyed, but to see well unto relieving, to see ill unto coveting. For although through these outward eyes both the poor man is seen, who is relieved, and the woman is seen, who is coveted, yet from the inward parts, unto seeing ill or well, mercy or lust proceeds. Why then is it said to God: 'Turn away mine eyes, lest they behold vanity'?

Why is that asked for which belongs to our own power, if God does not help the will? 'That we can speak,' he says, 'is of God; but that we speak well or ill, is ours.' He does not teach this who speaks well; 'for it is not ye,' He says, 'that speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaketh in you.' 'And that I may generally,' he says, 'comprehend all things: that we can do, say, think every good thing, is of Him who bestowed this power, who assists this power.' Behold, here also he repeats the earlier meaning, that of those three — namely, capacity, will, action — only the capacity is assisted.

Then, in adding, so as to accomplish what he intends, 'but that we act,' he says, 'or speak or think well, is ours.' He has forgotten what he had, as it were, corrected above, where, when he had said: 'Therefore in a good will and work is the praise of man,' he added and said: 'Nay, both of man and of God, who gave the very capacity of the will and work.' Why has he not, even in these examples, remembered this, so that at least at their close he might say: 'That we can do, say, think every good thing, is of Him who bestowed this power, who assists this power; but that we act well, or speak, or think, is both ours and His'? He did not say this, but, unless I am mistaken, I seem to myself to see what he feared.

For when he wished to show why it is ours, 'because,' he says, 'we can turn all these things also to evil.' That, therefore, he feared, lest he should say 'it is both ours and God's,' lest it should be answered him: If, in that we act, speak, think well, it is therefore both ours and God's, because He bestowed this power upon us, then also in that we act, speak, think evil, it is both ours and God's, because He bestowed the power for both; and thus — which be far from us — as we are praised with God in good works, so we should be blamed with Him in evil ones. For that capacity which He gave makes us able for good as much as for evil. Concerning this capacity Pelagius, in his first book in defence of free choice, speaks thus:

'We have,' he says, 'the capacity for either side, implanted by God, as it were, so to speak, a certain fruitful and fertile root, which brings forth and bears diverse things from the will of man, and which is able, at the choice of its own cultivator, either to shine with the flower of virtues or to bristle with the thorns of vices.' Here, not observing what he says, he sets up one and the same root of goods and evils, contrary to evangelical truth and apostolic teaching. For the Lord says that neither can a good tree bring forth evil fruits, nor a bad tree good ones; and the Apostle Paul, when he says that covetousness is the root of all evils, admonishes us assuredly to understand that love is the root of all goods.

Whence, if the two trees, the good and the bad, are two men, the good and the bad, what is a good man but one of good will, that is, a tree of a good root? And what is a bad man but one of bad will, that is, a tree of a bad root? For the fruits of these roots and trees are deeds, words, thoughts, which good things proceed from a good will, and evil things from an evil one. But a man makes a tree good, when he receives the grace of God; for he does not make himself good out of evil by his own self, but out of Him and through Him and in Him who is always good. Nor only that the tree may be good, but also that it may bring forth good fruits, it is necessary that it be assisted by the same grace, without which it can do nothing good.

For He Himself cooperates with the fruit in good trees, who both outwardly waters and tends by any minister whatever, and by Himself gives the increase inwardly. But a man makes a bad tree, when he makes himself bad, when he falls away from the unchangeable good; for from that falling away is the origin of the evil will. Which falling away does not begin any evil nature, but corrupts that which was created good; and when the fault has been healed, no evil remains, because the fault was indeed in the nature, but the fault was not the nature. That capacity, therefore, is not, as this man supposes, one and the same root of goods and evils; for love, the root of goods, is one thing, and covetousness, the root of evils, is another, and they differ from each other as much as virtue and vice.

But clearly that capacity is capable of either root, because a man not only can have love, by which he may be a good tree, but can also have covetousness, by which he may be a bad tree. But the covetousness of man, which is a fault, has man for its author, or man's deceiver, not man's creator; for it is itself the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the ambition of the world, which is not of the Father, but is of the world. And who does not know that Scripture is wont to call by the name of 'world' those by whom this world is inhabited? But love, which is virtue, is to us from God, not from ourselves — Scripture being witness, which says: 'Love is of God, and every one that loveth is born of God and knoweth God, for God is love.'

According to this love, that saying is better understood: 'He who is born of God sins not,' and 'because he cannot sin' — because love, according to which he is born of God, does not act perversely nor think evil. When, therefore, a man sins, he sins not according to love, but according to covetousness, according to which he is not born of God, since that capacity, as has been said, is capable of either root. Since, then, Scripture says: 'Love is of God,' or, what is more, 'God is love,' when the Apostle John most openly cries out:

'Behold what manner of love the Father hath given us, that we should be called, and should be, the sons of God' — how does this man, hearing that God is love, still to this day contend that of those three we have from God only the capacity, but that we have the good will and the good action from ourselves? As though indeed a good will were anything else than love, which Scripture cries out to us to be from God, and given by the Father, that we might be His sons. But perhaps our preceding merits brought it about that it should be given to us — as this man thinks concerning the grace of God in that book which he wrote to a holy virgin, of which he also made mention in the letter which he sent to Rome. For there, having interposed the testimony of the Apostle James, in which he says:

'Be subject to God, but resist the devil, and he will flee from you,' he subjoins and says: 'He shows how we ought to resist the devil, namely, if we are subject to God, and by doing His divine will merit His grace, and more easily resist the wicked spirit by the aid of the Holy Spirit.' Behold with how truthful a heart he condemned, in the ecclesiastical judgment of Palestine, those who say that the grace of God is given according to our merits! Or do we still doubt that he holds this and most openly preaches it? How then was that confession truthful in the episcopal examination? Or perhaps he had already written this book, in which he most openly says that grace is given according to our merits — a thing which in the Eastern synod he condemned without any refusal?

Let him then confess that he once held this view, but now holds it no longer, so that we might most openly rejoice over his correction. But now, when among other things this too had been objected against him, he answered: 'Whether these are the views of Caelestius, let those see who say that they are Caelestius's; but I never held them thus, and I anathematize those who hold them thus.' How did he never hold them thus, if he had previously composed this book? Or how does he anathematize those who hold them thus, if he composed this book afterward?

But lest perchance he answer that he here said 'by doing God's divine will we merit grace' in the sense that grace is added to the faithful and to those living piously, by which they may resist the tempter strongly, although they had nevertheless received grace even at the first, in order to do God's will — lest, therefore, he answer thus, receive other words of his on this matter. 'He who runs,' he says, 'to the Lord and desires to be ruled by Him, that is, who suspends his own will upon His will, who by cleaving to Him continually becomes, according to the Apostle, one spirit with Him — this he effects by nothing but the liberty of choice.' See how great a thing he has said is effected by nothing but the liberty of choice; and by this he supposes that we cleave to God without the help of God.

For this is what 'by nothing but the liberty of choice' means: that when we have cleaved to Him without His helping, then indeed, because we have cleaved, we may merit even to be helped. For he goes on and says: 'And whoever uses this well' — that is, whoever uses the liberty of choice well — 'so,' he says, 'delivers himself wholly to God, and mortifies all his own will, that he may be able to say with the Apostle: I live, yet now not I, but Christ liveth in me; and he places his heart in the hand of God, that God may incline it whithersoever He wills.' A great help of divine grace, indeed, that God Himself should incline our heart whithersoever He wills!

But this so great a help, as this man dotes, we then merit, when without any help, by nothing but the liberty of choice, we run to the Lord, desire to be ruled by Him, suspend our will upon His will, and by cleaving to Him continually are made one spirit with Him. These, forsooth, such enormous goods, we effect, according to this man, by nothing but the liberty of choice, so that by these preceding merits we may so obtain His grace that He may incline our heart whithersoever He wills. How then is it grace, if it is not given freely? How is it grace, if it is repaid as a debt? How does the Apostle speak truly: 'Not of yourselves, but it is the gift of God;'

'not of works, lest perchance any man be lifted up'; and again, 'But if of grace,' he says, 'then no more of works, otherwise grace is no more grace'? How, I say, is this true, if such great works precede which make for us the merit of obtaining grace, so that it is not given to us gratuitously, but repaid as a debt? Is it then that, in order that we may arrive at the help of God, we run to God without the help of God? And that, cleaving to God, we may be helped by God, do we, unhelped by God, cleave to God? What greater or what like thing could grace itself bestow on man, if already, without it, he could be made one spirit with the Lord by nothing but the liberty of choice?

But I could wish that this man would say whether that Assyrian king, whose bed the holy woman Esther abhorred, when he was sitting on the throne of his kingdom and was clothed with all the raiment of his splendour, all glittering with gold and precious stones, and was exceedingly terrible; and having lifted up his face inflamed with brightness, he looked upon her as a bull in the onset of the fury of his indignation;

and the queen was afraid, and her colour was changed through faintness, and she leaned upon the head of her delicate maid who went before her — I could wish, therefore, that this man would tell us whether that king had already run to the Lord, and desired to be ruled by Him, and had suspended his own will upon His will, and by cleaving to Him continually had been made one spirit with Him by nothing but the liberty of choice; whether he had delivered himself wholly to God, and had mortified all his own will, and had placed his heart in the hand of God. I think that a man does not merely dote, but is mad, whoever thinks these things concerning that king, such as he then was; and yet God turned and transformed his indignation into gentleness.

But who does not see that it is a far greater thing to turn and transfer indignation from its opposite into gentleness, than to incline a heart, preoccupied by neither affection but midway between the two, in some direction? Let them therefore read and understand, let them behold and confess, that not by law and teaching sounding forth from without, but by an inward and hidden, wondrous and ineffable power, God works in the hearts of men not only true revelations, but also good wills. Let Pelagius therefore now cease both to deceive himself and others by disputing against the grace of God.

The grace of God must be proclaimed not merely on account of one of those three things—that is, on account of the possibility of a good will and of a good work—but also on account of the good will itself and the good working toward us; for he defines that possibility as availing for both alternatives. And yet our sins are not on that account to be ascribed to God, just as, on account of that same possibility, he wishes to ascribe to Him our good works. Nor is the help of divine grace to be commended only because it aids our natural possibility. Let him cease to say: 'That we are able to do, say, or think any good thing is His who granted this power and who aids this power; but that we do, or speak, or think well is our own.' Let him cease, I say, to say such things.

For God has not only granted and aids our power, but also works in us both to will and to work—not because we do not will or do not act, but because without His help we neither will anything good nor do it. For how can it be said, 'That we are able to act well is God's, but that we do act is our own,' when the Apostle says that he prays to God on behalf of those to whom he was writing, that they may do no evil and may do what is good? For he does not say, 'We pray that you may be able to do no evil,' but 'that you may do no evil'; nor 'that you may be able to do good,' but 'that you may do good.' Since concerning those of whom it is written:

'For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God'—assuredly, that they may do what is good, they are led by Him who is good. How does Pelagius say, 'That we are able to speak well is God's, but that we speak well is our own,' when the Lord says, 'It is the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you'? For He does not say, 'It is not you who have given yourselves the power of speaking well,' but He says, 'It is not you that speak'; nor does He say, 'It is the Spirit of your Father who gives you, or has given you, the power of speaking well,' but He says, 'who speaketh in you'—not signifying the advance of a possibility, but expressing the effect of a co-operation. How does the puffed-up asserter of free choice say:

'That we are able to think well is God's, but that we do think well is our own'? To him the humble preacher of grace replies: 'Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God.' For he does not say 'to be able to think,' but 'to think.' Let even Pelagius openly confess this grace of God, which is manifest in the divine oracles, and let him not cloak with a most shameless shame the fact that he so long held a contrary opinion, but let him lay it open with a most wholesome grief, so that holy Church may not be troubled by his stubborn obstinacy, but may rejoice at his truthful correction.

Let him distinguish knowledge and love, as they are to be distinguished, for 'knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth'—and knowledge does not puff up when charity edifies. And although both are the gift of God, yet one the lesser, the other the greater, let him not here exalt our righteousness above the praise of Him who justifies us, so as to ascribe the lesser of these two to the divine help but claim the greater for the human will; and if he grants that we receive charity by the grace of God, let him not so think as though any good merits of ours preceded it. For what good merits could we then have, when we did not love God? For that we might receive the love by which we should love, we were loved while we did not yet have it.

This the Apostle John most plainly declares: 'Not that we loved God, but that He loved us'; and elsewhere he says, 'Let us love, because He first loved us.' Excellently and most truly indeed. For we should have nothing whereby to love Him, unless we received this from Him, when He first loved us. But what good should we do, unless we loved? Or how do we not do good, if we love? For although God's commandment sometimes seems to be fulfilled not by those who love but by those who fear, yet where there is no love, no work is reckoned good, nor is it rightly called a good work, because 'whatsoever is not of faith is sin,' and faith 'worketh by love.'

And therefore let him who wishes to confess truly so confess the grace of God—by which the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us—that he doubts not that nothing good at all pertaining to piety and true righteousness can be done without it. Not as this man does, who, when he says 'that grace is given for this reason, that what is commanded by God may be more easily fulfilled,' shows plainly enough what he thinks of it, namely, that even without it, though with less ease, what is divinely commanded can nevertheless be done. For in his book to a consecrated virgin, which I have also mentioned above, when he says: 'Let us merit the divine grace and more easily resist the wicked spirit by the help of the Holy Spirit.'

He assuredly indicates what he thinks. For why else did he insert this word, namely 'more easily'? Was the sense not complete—'that we may resist the wicked spirit by the help of the Holy Spirit'? But how great a detriment he has done by this addition, who does not perceive? Wishing, of course, it to be believed that the powers of nature are so great—which by extolling he casts down headlong—that even without the help of the Holy Spirit, though with less ease, yet in some way the wicked spirit is resisted. Likewise in the first book On Free Will he says, 'But since we have within us a free choice so strong and so firm against sinning, which the Creator has generally implanted in human nature, we are again fortified, by His inestimable kindness, with His daily help.'

What need is there of this help, if free choice is so strong and so firm against sinning? But here too he wishes it to be understood that the help is for this, that what he thinks can be done apart from grace, though with less ease, may be done more easily through grace. Likewise in the same book, in another place, he says, 'that what men are bidden to do by free choice they may be able to fulfill more easily through grace.' Take away 'more easily,' and the sense is not only full but even sound, if it be so put: 'that what men are bidden to do by free choice they may be able to fulfill through grace.' But when 'more easily' is added, it is suggested by a silent implication that the accomplishment of a good work can come to pass even without the grace of God. This sense he refutes who says:

'Without me ye can do nothing.' Let him amend all these things, lest, if human weakness has erred in the profundity of great matters, there be added to this error even a diabolical falsehood or animosity—whether by denying what he held, or by defending what he wrongly held—since he has come to know, by the plain truth here recalled, that he ought not to have held it. For this grace, indeed, by which we are justified—that is, by which the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us—in the writings of Pelagius and Caelestius, whatever I was able to read, nowhere did I find them confessing it as it ought to be confessed; utterly never did I perceive them acknowledging, as they ought to be acknowledged, the children of promise, concerning whom the Apostle says:

'Not they who are the children of the flesh are the children of God, but the children of the promise are reckoned for the seed.' For what God promises, we do not accomplish by choice or by nature, but He Himself accomplishes it by grace.

For, to say nothing meanwhile of the little works of Caelestius or of his pamphlets which he brought forward in the ecclesiastical proceedings—all of which, together with other letters we deemed necessary, we have taken care to send you, so that, all these being diligently examined, you may perceive that he places the grace of God, by which we are helped either to turn away from evil or to do good beyond the natural choice of the will, in nothing but law and teaching, so that he even asserts that prayers themselves are necessary only for this, that it may be shown to a man what he should desire and love—to pass over these matters for the present, then: Pelagius himself has recently sent both a letter and a book of his faith to Rome, writing to Pope Innocent of blessed memory, whom he did not know to be dead.

In this letter, then, he says that there are 'two things concerning which men try to defame him: one, that he denies to little children the sacrament of baptism and promises the kingdom of heaven to some without the redemption of Christ; the other, that he so says a man can avoid sin as to exclude the help of God and trust so entirely in free choice that he repudiates the assistance of grace.' But concerning the baptism of infants, although he concedes that it must be given to them, how perversely he thinks against the Christian and catholic truth, this is not the place to discuss more diligently; for now what we have undertaken concerning the help of grace must be carried through. Wherefore let us see what he here answers even to that which he has proposed.

For, to pass over his invidious complaints about his enemies, when he comes to the matter, he speaks thus. 'Behold,' he says, 'let this letter clear me before your Blessedness, in which we say purely and simply that we have an entire free choice to sin and not to sin, which in all good works is always aided by the divine help.' You certainly perceive, according to the understanding which the Lord has given you, that these words of his do not suffice to settle the question. For we still ask by what help he says free choice is aided, lest perchance, as he is wont, he wishes law and teaching to be understood. For if you ask why he said 'always,' he could answer, because it is written: 'And in His law will he meditate day and night.'

Then, when he had interposed certain remarks about the condition of man and his natural possibility for sinning and for not sinning, he added, saying: 'This power of free choice we say to be generally in all—in Christians, Jews, and Gentiles. In all there is free choice equally by nature, but in Christians alone is it aided by grace.' Again we ask: by what grace? And he could still answer: by Christian law and teaching. Then, whatever grace he means, he says that grace is given to them according to merits—although he has already condemned, by that famous acquittal of his in Palestine, as I have recalled above, those who say this. For these are his words:

'In them,' he says, 'the good of their condition is naked and unarmed'—he speaks of those who are not Christians—then, weaving in the rest, 'but in these,' he says, 'who belong to Christ, it is fortified by the help of Christ.' You see that it is still uncertain by what help, according to what we said above. But he goes on further concerning those who are not Christians, and says: 'They are therefore to be judged and condemned, because, though they have free choice through which they could come to faith and merit the grace of God, they misuse the liberty granted them. But these are to be rewarded, who, using free choice well, merit the grace of the Lord and keep His commandments.'

Surely it is manifest that he says grace is given according to merits—whatever grace, or of whatever kind, he may mean, which nevertheless he does not openly express. For when he says that those are to be rewarded who use free choice well, and therefore merit the grace of the Lord, he confesses that it is rendered to them as a debt. Where then is that saying of the Apostle: 'Being justified freely by His grace'? Where is that also: 'By grace ye are saved'? And lest they should think it by works, he added: 'through faith.' Again, lest they should think that faith itself was to be attributed to them apart from the grace of God, he says, 'And this not of yourselves, but it is the gift of God.' Assuredly, then, that from which everything begins which we are said to receive by merit, we receive without merit—that is, faith itself. Or if it is denied to be given, what is the meaning of what is said:

'According as God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith'? But if it is so said to be given as to be rendered to merits, not bestowed, what is the meaning of what he again says: 'Unto you it is given for Christ's sake not only to believe on Him, but also to suffer for Him'? For he has testified that both are given—both that one believes in Christ and that one suffers for Christ. But these men so attach faith to free choice that grace seems, forsooth, to be rendered to faith not as gratuitous but as owed; and by this it is now no longer grace, because unless it is gratuitous it is not grace. But from this letter Pelagius wishes the reader to pass to the book of his faith, of which he made mention to you, in which he discussed many things about which he was not questioned.

But let us look at those very things concerning which we are dealing with them. For when he had ended, as extensively as he wished, his disputation from the unity of the Trinity down to the resurrection of the flesh—which no one asked of him—he says, 'And we hold one baptism, which we say ought to be celebrated with the same sacramental words in infants as in adults.' This indeed you have said you heard even from him when present; but what does it profit that he says the sacrament of baptism is celebrated with the same words in little children as in adults, when it is the reality, not the words alone, that we seek from him?

It is more that he replied to you as you questioned him with your own mouth, as you write, 'that infants receive baptism unto the remission of sins.' For here too he did not say 'in the words of the remission of sins,' but he confessed that they are baptized unto that very remission; and yet, if you should ask of him what sin is believed to be remitted to them, he would contend that they have anything. Who would believe that under this seemingly manifest confession a contrary meaning lay hidden, had not Caelestius disclosed it? He, in his little book which he brought forward in the ecclesiastical proceedings at Rome, confessed that 'little children too are baptized unto the remission of sins,' and yet denied that 'they have any original sin.'

But now let us attend not to the baptism of infants, but rather to the help of grace, to what Pelagius thought even in the book of his faith which he sent to Rome. 'Free choice,' he says, 'we so confess as to say that we always need the help of God.' Behold, again we ask by what help he confesses that we have need, and again we find it ambiguous, since he can answer that he means Christian law or teaching, by which that natural possibility is aided. But we require in their confession that grace of which the Apostle says: 'For God hath not given us the spirit of fear, but of power and of love and of self-control.'

For it does not follow that he who has the gift of knowledge, by which he may know what he ought to do, has also the gift of love, that he may do it. Those books too, or writings, which he mentions in the same letter which he sent to Pope Innocent of holy memory as his own, I have read—except one letter, which he says he sent, a brief one, to the holy bishop Constantius—and nowhere have I been able to find that he confesses this grace, by which not only the natural possibility of will and action (which he says we have even if we neither will nor do good), but the very will and action itself is aided by the ministration of the Holy Spirit.

'Let them read,' he says, 'that letter which we wrote to the holy man Paulinus the bishop about twelve years ago, which in perhaps three hundred lines confesses nothing else than the grace and help of God, and that we can do absolutely nothing good without God.' This letter, then, I have read, and found that through almost the whole of it he dwells on nothing but the faculty and possibility of nature, and there almost sets up the grace of God only in that; but the Christian grace he touches with such brevity, by the mere mention of the name, that he seems to have done nothing but fear to be silent about it.

Yet whether he wishes it to be understood in the remission of sins, or also in the teaching of Christ (where there is also the example of His life, as he does in several places of his little works), or whether he believes some help of doing well to be joined to nature and teaching through the inspiration of a most ardent and most luminous charity—this does not appear at all. 'Let them also read,' he says, 'the letter to the holy bishop Constantius, where indeed briefly, but plainly, I joined the grace and help of God to the free choice of man.' This letter, as I said above, I have not read; but if it is not unlike the rest, which he mentions as known to me, neither does it itself contain what we seek.

'Let them read also,' he says, 'the letter which we composed in the East to the sacred virgin of Christ, Demetrias, and they will find that we so praise the nature of man as always to add the help of God's grace.' This one indeed I have read, and it had almost persuaded me that he confesses that grace concerning which is the question—although in many places of that work he seemed to contradict himself; but when there came into my hands other things also, which he composed later and more amply, I saw how he could even there name grace under an ambiguous generality, hiding what he thought, yet by the word of grace breaking the ill-will and turning aside the offense. For in the very beginning of it, where he says: