But it was said thus, because each one of us ought to reckon every man as that which he wishes him to become, even if he has not yet become it. Just as the Lord showed the alien Samaritan to be the neighbour of him with whom he did mercy. A neighbour therefore he is to be held, not an alien; one with whom this is to be done, lest he remain an alien; and if, because of that which he is not yet — a partaker made of our faith and sacrament — certain true things are to be hidden from him, not for that reason are false things to be spoken to him. For there were, even in the times of the apostles, some who preached the truth not with truth, that is, not with a truthful mind: of whom the apostle says that they announced Christ not purely, but out of envy and strife.
And by this even then some were tolerated who announced the truth not with a pure mind; yet none were praised as announcing with a pure mind a falsehood. Finally, of them he says: whether in pretence or in truth, let Christ be announced; but in no way would he say, that afterward Christ may be announced, let him first be denied. Wherefore in many ways indeed can hidden heretics be tracked down, without the catholic faith being disparaged and without heretical impiety being praised. But if in no other way at all could heretical impiety be drawn out of its caverns, unless the catholic tongue turned aside from the path of truth, more tolerably would the former be kept hidden than the latter be cast down headlong;
more tolerably would the foxes lie hidden in their dens, than that the hunters, in order to capture them, should fall into the pit of blasphemy; more tolerably would the perfidy of the Priscillianists be covered under the veil of truth, than that the faith of catholics — lest it be praised by lying Priscillianists — should be denied by believing catholics. For if for this reason lies are just — not any sort of lies, but blasphemous ones — because they are done with this intent, that hidden heretics may be uncovered, then in this way, if they be done with the same intent, adulteries could be chaste. What then?
For if some woman from the number of the unchaste Priscillianists should cast her eye upon a catholic Joseph, and should promise him that she would betray their hiding-places, if she obtained defilement from him, and it were certain that she, if consent were given her, would fulfil what she promised, shall we judge that it must be done? Or shall we understand that goods of this kind are by no means to be purchased at such a price? Why then do we not buy heretics to be captured by flesh melting into adultery, and think they must be purchased with a mouth fornicating in blasphemy?
For either it will be lawful to defend both on equal grounds, so that these are said to be not unjust because they were done with the intention that the unjust might be caught; or, if sound doctrine does not wish us, even for the sake of finding heretics, to mingle with unchaste women at least in body, though not in mind, then surely neither does it wish us, even for the sake of finding heretics, at least with our voice, though not with our mind, either to preach the unclean heresy or to blaspheme the chaste catholic faith; because the very command of the mind itself, to which every lower motion of man ought to be obedient, will not lack its deserved reproach, when that is done which ought not to be done, whether by a member or by a word. And yet even when it is done by a word, it is done by a member, since the tongue is a member by which the word is made;
nor is any deed of ours brought forth by any member, except what is first conceived in the heart, or rather, when already conceived within by thinking and consenting, is brought forth outwardly by doing through the member. The mind therefore is not excused from the deed, when something is said to be done not from the mind, which nevertheless would not be done, unless the mind decreed that it must be done. It matters indeed very much for what cause, to what end, with what intention anything is done; but those things which are established to be sins are to be done under no pretext of a good cause, no as-it-were good end, no seemingly good intention. For those works of men which are not sins in themselves, according as they have had good or bad causes, are now good, now bad:
just as to give food to the poor is a good work, if it is done for the cause of mercy with right faith; just as conjugal intercourse, since it is done for the cause of begetting, if it be done with such faith that those born may be born again. These and things of this kind, according to their causes, are works good or evil, because these very same things, if they have evil causes, are turned into sins: as if a poor man is fed for the cause of boasting; or intercourse is had with a wife for the cause of lust; or children are begotten, not that they may be nourished for God, but for the devil. But when the works themselves are already sins, such as thefts, defilements, blasphemies, or other such things, who is there that would say they must be done for good causes, so that either they may not be sins or — what is more absurd — may be just sins? Who is there that would say:
in order that we may have what to give the poor, let us commit thefts against the rich, or sell false testimonies, especially if thereby the innocent are not harmed, but rather the guilty are rescued from judges about to condemn them? For two goods come from the selling of this lie: both that money may be taken whereby the needy is fed, and that the judge may be deceived, that a man may not be punished. Testaments too, if we can — why do we not suppress the true and substitute the false, so that inheritances or legacies may not be had by the unworthy, who work no good from them, but rather by these, by whom the hungry are fed, the naked clothed, strangers received, captives ransomed, churches built? For why should not those evils be done for the sake of these goods, if for the sake of these goods those are not even evils?
But now if some unclean and wealthy women should seem ready even to enrich their lovers and seducers, why should not the merciful man too take up these roles and arts, which he might use for so good a cause, that he may have wherewith to bestow lavishly on the needy, and not hear the apostle saying: let him who stole steal no more; but rather let him labour, working with his hands that which is good, that he may have to give to him who has need? For if so, then not only theft itself, but even false testimony and adultery and every evil work will not be evil, but good, if it be perpetrated for this cause, that there may be wherewith good may be done. Who would say these things, except one who tries to subvert human affairs and all morals and laws?
For what most wicked crime, what most shameful outrage, what most impious sacrilege would not be said to be able to be done rightly and justly, and not only with impunity, but even gloriously, so that in perpetrating it not only would no punishments be feared, but even rewards be hoped for, if once we grant that in all the evil works of men what must be asked is not what is done, but why it is done, so that whatever things are found done for good causes, not even they are to be judged evil? But if justice deservedly punishes a thief, even one who should say and show that he took away the superfluous goods of the rich, in order to supply necessities to the poor;
if it deservedly punishes a forger, even one who should teach that he corrupted another's testament for this reason, that he might be heir who was going to make lavish alms from it, not he who would make none; if it deservedly punishes an adulterer, even one who should demonstrate that he committed adultery out of mercy, in order that through her with whom he did it he might free a man from death; finally — that we may come nearer to the matter about which the question is — if it deservedly punishes him who mingled in adulterous intercourse with some woman of the Priscillianists who was privy to their turpitude, in order that he might reach their hiding-places: I beseech you, since the apostle says:
neither present your members as weapons of iniquity unto sin, and therefore we ought not to present either hand or the genitals of the body or other members to shameful deeds, in order that we may be able to find the Priscillianists — how does the tongue, how does our whole mouth offend, that we should present these as weapons unto sin, and so great a sin, wherein we blaspheme our God without the excuse of ignorance, in order that we may rescue the Priscillianists, once apprehended, from the blasphemies of ignorance? Someone will say: is then any thief to be equated with that thief who steals out of a will to mercy? Who would say this? But of these two, neither is good because the one is worse. For he is worse who steals out of covetousness than he who steals out of mercy;
but if all theft is sin, from all theft one must abstain. For who would say that one must sin, even though one sin be damnable, another venial? But now we ask: if anyone does this or that, who will not sin — or rather, who will sin — not who will sin more gravely or more lightly. For thefts themselves are indeed punished more lightly by the law than defilements; yet both are sins, though some lighter, some graver, so that a theft committed out of covetousness is held lighter than a defilement committed to relieve. For within their own kind, those things are made lighter than other sins of the same kind which seem to be committed with a good mind, while nevertheless they too are found to be graver than sins of another kind that are by their very kind lighter.
For it is graver to commit theft out of avarice than out of mercy, and likewise it is graver to perpetrate defilement out of lust than out of mercy, and yet it is graver to commit adultery out of mercy than to steal out of avarice. Nor is it now dealt with what is lighter or graver, but which things are sins or are not. For no one would say that one ought to have sinned where it is established that there is sin; but we do say that one ought, if it be sinned in this way or that, to be pardoned or not pardoned. Yet, what must be confessed, certain compensatory sins so disturb human minds that they are even thought to deserve praise, and rather to be called rightly done. For who would doubt that it is a great sin, if a father should prostitute his daughters to the fornications of the impious?
And yet there arose a cause whereby a just man judged that he ought to do this, when the Sodomites with a nefarious onslaught of lust were rushing upon his guests. For he says: I have two daughters, who have not known man; I will bring them out to you, and use them as it may please you; only do no wrong to these men, because they have come under the shelter of my roof-beams. What shall we say here? Do we not so shudder at that crime which the Sodomites were attempting to commit against the guests of that just man, that we judge that whatever might be done ought to have been done, so that this should not be done?
Moreover the person of the doer moves us most, who by the merit of righteousness was being delivered from the Sodomites, so that — since it is a lesser evil for women than for men to suffer defilement — even this is said to have pertained to the righteousness of that just man, that he preferred this to be done to his daughters rather than to his guests, not only willing it in mind, but even offering it in word and, if they had assented to him, about to fulfil it in deed. But if we open this way to sins, that we should commit lesser ones lest others commit greater ones, then by a broad boundary — nay rather by no boundary, but with all limits shaken loose and removed — all things will enter over an infinite space and reign.
For when once it has been determined that a man must sin less, lest another sin more, then surely by our thefts the defilements of others will be guarded against, and incests by defilements, and if some impiety should seem even worse than incests, incests too will be said by us to be committed, if it can be managed in such a way that that impiety may not be committed by others:
and in each several kind of sins, thefts for thefts, and defilements for defilements, and incests for incests, and sacrileges for sacrileges will be thought fit to be committed — ours for others', not only lesser for greater, but even, if one comes to the very highest and worst, fewer for more — if the onrush of events so turns itself that some men will not otherwise abstain from sins, unless we sin somewhat less, but nevertheless sin; so that entirely, whenever an enemy who has power of this kind should say: unless you be wicked, I will be more wicked, or: unless you commit this crime, I will do more such things, we should seem to ourselves to commit crime, if we wish to refrain from crime.
To be thus wise, what is it but to be unwise, or rather to be insane? For from my own iniquity, not from another's — whether perpetrated against me or against others — I must guard against damnation; for the soul that has sinned, it shall itself die. If therefore we ought by no means to sin, lest others sin more gravely either against us or against whomsoever, it must be considered in that which Lot did, whether it be an example which we ought to imitate, or rather which we ought to avoid.
For it rather seems that we should attend to and note this: that, when so horrible an evil from the most flagitious impiety of the Sodomites threatened his guests — which he desired to drive away but could not — even so a just man's mind could be so disturbed that he wished to do what the misty tempest of human fear, not the calm serenity of divine law, prompted; whereas divine law, if it be consulted by us, will cry out and command that it ought not to be done, and command rather that we should so guard against our own sins as not to sin through fear of anyone else's sins whatsoever. For that just man, by fearing others' sins — which cannot defile except those who consent — being disturbed, did not attend to his own, whereby he wished to subject his daughters to the lusts of the impious.
When we read these things in the holy Scriptures, let us not, because we believe they were done, therefore believe they are to be done, lest we violate the precepts while we everywhere follow the examples. Or indeed, because David swore that he would slay Nabal and by more considered clemency did not do it, shall we therefore say that he is to be imitated, so that we should rashly swear that we will do what afterward we see ought not to be done? But just as fear disturbed the former, that he wished to prostitute his daughters, so anger disturbed the latter, that he swore rashly. Finally, if it were lawful for us to inquire of both, asking them to say why they did these things, the former might answer: fear and trembling came upon me, and darkness covered me; the latter also might say:
my eye was troubled because of anger — so that we should not wonder that either the former in the darkness of fear, or the latter with a troubled eye, did not see what ought to have been seen, that they should not do what ought not to have been done. And of holy David indeed it could more justly be said, that he ought not even to have been angry, however ungrateful and rendering evil for good; but even if anger crept up on him as on a man, it certainly ought not to have prevailed so far that he should swear he would do what either by raging he would do or by perjuring he would not do; while as for the former, set amid the lustful madnesses of the Sodomites — since who would dare to say:
even if your guests in your house, into which you compelled them to enter by a most violent hospitality, being seized and overpowered by the shameless ones, should suffer effeminate things, fear nothing, care for nothing, be not terrified, shudder not, tremble not? Who, even of those wicked associates, would dare to say this to the pious host? But most rightly indeed it would be said: do whatever you can, that what you rightly fear may not happen, but let not that fear compel you to do what your daughters, if they should be willing, would do with the Sodomites — wickedness by your prompting; but if they should be unwilling, they will suffer from the Sodomites — violence by your prompting. Do not commit your own great crime, while you shudder at another's greater one:
for however much distance there be between your own and another's, this will be yours, that another's. Unless perhaps in defence of this man someone should constrain himself into these straits, so as to say: since it is better to receive than to do injury, and those guests were certainly not going to do injury, but to suffer it, the just man preferred that his daughters should suffer injury rather than his guests — by that right whereby he was lord of his daughters and knew that they would not sin, if it were done, because they would rather, without sin of their own, endure the sinners to whom they would not consent. And finally, they did not offer themselves to be defiled, though women for those men, in place of those guests, lest not the suffering of another's lust, but the consent of their own will, should make them guilty.
Nor did their father permit this to be done to himself, when those attempted to do it to whom he did not betray his guests, although it were a lesser evil that it should be done to one than if it were done to two; but he resisted as much as he could, lest any consent of his own should also defile him — a consent which lustful fury, even if it had prevailed by the body's strength, would nevertheless not have defiled another who did not consent. But in his daughters not sinning, neither did he himself sin, because he did not make them sin if they were overpowered against their will, but made them, being sinned against, to bear it: as if he offered his own servants to be beaten by the wicked, lest his guests should suffer the injury of a beating.
About which matter I will not dispute, because it is long — whether even a master by the right of his own power rightly so uses it upon a servant, that he causes his own innocent servant to be beaten, lest his friend, himself also innocent, be thrashed in his house by the violent wicked. But certainly David is in no way rightly said to have been obliged to swear that he would do what he afterward perceived he ought not to do. Whence it is established that not all things which we read done by holy or just men are we to transfer into our conduct, but even from this to learn how widely it extends and to whom it reaches, that which the apostle says:
Brethren, even if a man be overtaken in any trespass, you who are spiritual, instruct such a one in the spirit of gentleness, considering yourself, lest you also be tempted. For these are overtakings, in which one trespasses, while either at the moment it is not seen what ought to be done, or he who sees it is overcome, so that the sin is committed, when either the truth lies hidden or infirmity compels. But in all our actions, compensatory sins disturb even the good most of all, so that they are not even reckoned sins, if they have such causes for which they are done, and in which it seems that one rather sins if they are not done.
And especially concerning lies has this prevailed in men's opinion, that those lies are not thought to be sins — nay rather are believed to be even rightly done — when anyone lies for the advantage of him whom it is expedient to deceive, or lest he harm others, who seems about to do harm, unless he be turned away by lies. For defending these kinds of lies, very many examples from the holy Scriptures are thought to lend support. But to conceal the truth is not the same as to bring forth a lie. For although everyone who lies wishes to conceal what is true, yet not everyone who wishes to conceal what is true lies. For most often we hide true things not by lying, but by keeping silent. For neither did the Lord lie, where he says:
I have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. He kept silent about true things, he did not speak false ones, judging them less fit to hear these truths. But if he had not indicated to them this very thing — that is, that they could not bear the things he was unwilling to say — he would nonetheless have concealed something of the truth, but perhaps we would not know that this can rightly be done, or we would not be confirmed by so great an example. Whence those who assert that at times one must lie do not fittingly recall that Abraham did this concerning Sarah, whom he called his sister. For he did not say: she is not my wife, but he said: she is my sister — which was in truth so close in kindred that she could not falsely be called sister.
Which also afterward, when she had been restored to him by the one who had carried her off, he confirmed, answering him and saying: and truly she is my sister by my father, not by my mother — that is, of paternal kindred, not of maternal. Something true, therefore, he kept silent, he did not say something false, when he kept silent that she was his wife, and said she was his sister. This his son Isaac also did; for we know that he too obtained a kinswoman for his spouse. It is not therefore a lie, when by keeping silence the truth is hidden, but when by speaking a falsehood is uttered. But as for what Jacob did at his mother's prompting, so that he seemed to deceive his father, if it be diligently and faithfully attended to, it is not a lie, but a mystery.
If we should call these things lies, then all parables and figures for signifying any things whatsoever — which are not to be taken according to their literal sense, but in which one thing is to be understood from another — will be said to be lies: which be utterly far from us. For whoever thinks this can bring this same charge against all the so very many tropical modes of speech, so that even that which is called metaphor — that is, the transferred use of some word from a proper thing to a thing not proper — could by this reasoning be called a lie.
For when we say 'the crops billow, the vines bud into gems, flowering youth, snowy old age', without doubt, since we do not find billows, gems, flower, snow in those things onto which we have transferred these words from elsewhere, they will by these people be reckoned lies. And 'the rock is Christ' and 'the stony heart of the Jews', likewise 'the lion is Christ' and 'the lion is the devil', and innumerable such things, will be said to be lies. What of this? That this tropical mode of speech even reaches that which is called antiphrasis, so that a thing is said to abound which does not exist, a thing is called sweet which is sour, a grove (lucus) because it does not shine (luceat), the Fates (parcae) because they do not spare (parcant). Whence is that in the holy Scriptures:
if he does not bless you to your face — which the devil said to the Lord about holy Job, and it is understood as 'curse you'. By which word also the fabricated crime of Naboth was named by his slanderers. For it was said that he blessed the king, that is, cursed him. All these modes of speech will be reckoned lies, if figured speech or action is to be counted as a lie.
But if it is not a lie, when things signifying one thing by another are referred to the understanding of the truth, then assuredly not only that which Jacob did or said to his father, that he might be blessed, but neither that which Joseph spoke as if to mock his brothers, nor that David feigned madness, nor other things of this kind, are to be judged lies, but prophetic utterances and actions to be referred to those things which are to be understood as true. Which are for this reason covered over with figurative garments, as it were, so that they may exercise the sense of him who piously seeks, and lest, being naked and ready, they grow cheap. Although those things which we have learned to be said openly and manifestly in other places, when these very things are dug out from hidden places, are in a certain manner renewed in our knowledge, and being renewed grow sweet.
Nor is it grudged to the learners that they are obscured by these modes, but they are rather commended, so that being as it were withdrawn they may be more ardently desired, and being desired may be more delightfully found. Yet true things, not false, are spoken, since true things, not false, are signified, whether by word or by deed. For what are signified are indeed themselves spoken. But they are thought to be lies, because not those true things which are signified are understood to be said, but those things which are false are believed to have been said. That this may become plainer by examples, attend to that very thing which Jacob did. He certainly covered his limbs with kids' skins. If we seek the proximate cause, we shall think him to have lied; for he did this, that he might be thought to be who he was not;
But if this deed is referred to that thing for the signifying of which it was in truth done, then by the goatskins sins are signified, and by him who covered himself with them was signified the One who bore not his own sins but the sins of others. A truthful signification, therefore, can in no way rightly be called a lie. And as it is in the deed, so it is also in the word. For when his father had said to him, 'Who art thou, my son?' he answered, 'I am Esau thy firstborn.' If this be referred to those two twins, it will seem a lie; but if it be referred to that thing for the signifying of which these things were done, spoken, and written down, then He is here to be understood in His body, which is His Church, who, speaking of this matter, says:
'When you shall see Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and all the prophets in the kingdom of God, but you yourselves being cast out. And they shall come from the east and the west and the north and the south, and shall sit down in the kingdom of God. And behold, they are last who were first, and they are first who were last.' For thus in a certain manner the younger brother took away the birthright of the elder and transferred to himself that of his brother. Since therefore things so true and so truly are signified, what here ought to be thought done or said in a lying way? For since the things that are signified are indeed not lacking in truth, but are either past or present or future, without doubt the signification is true and there is no lie.
But it is too long a task to search out with full precision all things in this prophetic signification, in which the truth holds the palm, since as they were foretold by signifying, so they became manifest by fulfilment. Nor did I undertake this in the present discourse, which pertains rather to you, who have laid bare the hiding-places of the Priscillianists, so far as concerns their false and perverse dogmas, lest they should seem to have been investigated as though they were to be taught and not to be refuted.
Do rather, then, that these things which you have made to lie exposed by disclosure should lie vanquished, lest, while we wish to arrive at tracking down deceitful men, we allow those very falsehoods to remain as if insuperable, when rather we ought both to destroy falsehoods in the hearts of those who lurk, and not, by sparing the falsehoods, to discover deceivers. Furthermore, among those dogmas of theirs which are to be overthrown, this too is certainly one which they lay down as doctrine: that for the concealing of religion the religious ought to lie, to such a degree that not only concerning other matters not pertaining to the teaching of religion, but even concerning religion itself, one must lie, lest it be laid open to strangers—namely, that Christ is to be denied, so that the Christian may be able to lie hidden among his enemies.
This impious and wicked dogma also, I beseech you, overthrow: the dogma for the establishing of which they, arguing from the Scriptures, gather testimonies whereby lies may seem not only to be pardoned or tolerated, but even to be honoured. It pertains, therefore, to you, when you refute this detestable sect, so to show how these testimonies of the Scriptures are to be received, that either you may teach that those are not lies which are thought to be lies, if they be understood in the way in which they ought to be understood; or that even those which are manifestly lies are not to be imitated; or at least, finally, that concerning at least those matters which pertain to the teaching of religion, one must in no way lie. For thus they are truly overthrown from the very foundations, when that is overthrown wherein they take cover: