And there was evening and there was morning, the fourth day. If you consider those days which the rising and setting of the sun distinguish, this is not the fourth but perhaps the first day, so that we may suppose the sun rose at that time at which it was made, and set until the rest of the stars should be made. But he who understands that the sun is elsewhere when with us it is night, and that night is elsewhere when the sun is with us, will investigate the enumeration of these days more sublimely. And God said: Let the waters bring forth creeping things of living souls, and flying things flying above the earth beneath the firmament of heaven. And so it was done. The animals that are swimming were called 'creeping things' because they do not walk on feet; or is it because there are others which creep beneath the water in the earth?
For there are also winged creatures in the waters, such as fish which have scales, or others which do not have them but nonetheless rely on fins. Whether these are to be numbered here among the flying things can be doubted. For also, as to why he attributed the flying things themselves to the waters and not to the air, there is no small question. For we cannot here understand only those birds to which the waters are familiar, such as divers and ducks and whatever is of this kind. For if he had spoken only of these, he would not have omitted to speak in another place of the other birds, among which some are so far removed from the waters that they do not even drink. Unless perhaps he called this air adjoining the lands 'water,' since it shows itself to be moist even on the most serene nights by its dew, because it is also condensed into cloud.
Now cloud is water, as all perceive who have had occasion to walk among the clouds on mountains or even among the mists on the plains. It is indeed in this air that birds are said to fly. For in that higher and purer air, which has truly been called 'air' by all, they cannot; for its thinness does not sustain their weight. In that air, moreover, neither are clouds said to gather nor anything stormy to arise — since indeed there is no wind at all there, as on the summit of Mount Olympus, which is said to exceed the region of this moist air, where certain letters are reported to be wont to be made in the dust, and after a whole year to be found intact and unharmed by those who ceremonially ascended that renowned mountain.
Wherefore it can not unreasonably be supposed that in the divine Scriptures the firmament of heaven is called such all the way to these regions, so that even that most tranquil and most pure air may be believed to pertain to the firmament. For by this name of 'firmament' the very tranquillity and a great part of things can be signified. Hence I judge that this also is said in several places in the Psalms: and thy truth reaches unto the clouds. For nothing is firmer and more serene than truth. But clouds gather beneath that region of the purest air.
And although this is taken as spoken figuratively, it is nevertheless drawn from those things which have a certain likeness to these, so that the bodily creation, more constant and pure, which is from the height of heaven down to the clouds, may rightly be seen to hold the figure of truth — that is, down to the murky and stormy and moist air. Therefore the flying things flying above the earth beneath the firmament of heaven are fittingly attributed to the waters, because not unfittingly is this air named 'water.' Hence too it is given to understand that nothing was said of the air, how or when it was made, because this air is comprised under the name of waters, but that other under the name of firmament; and thus no element was passed over. But perhaps someone may say: if by what was said,
'let the water be gathered together,' we understand water to have been made out of that confused mass of matter, and this gathering God called 'sea,' how can we there understand this air to have been made, which is not called sea, even if it can be called water? Wherefore it seems to me that in what was said, 'let the dry land appear,' not only the form of the earth but also that of this thicker air was intimated. For through this the earth is illumined, so that it may be visible to us. Therefore in the one word by which it was said, 'let it appear,' all things were intimated, without which it could not appear; that is, both its form and its being stripped bare of the waters and the overspreading of the air, through which light is transmitted into it from the upper part of the world. Or rather, in what is written:
'let the water be gathered together,' is the form of this air commended, because this air, when it is condensed, seems to produce this water? And so perhaps he called the compression into density 'the gathering of the water,' so that sea might come to be; but that which was not gathered, that is, not thickened, is that water which floats above and can sustain the flying birds — a water fitted to either name, so that it can be called both a subtler water and a thicker air. But why is it not said when this was made?
Or is it perhaps true, as some hold, that by the moist exhalations of the sea and the earth these breezes are produced, thus thicker than that upper and liquid air, so as to be fitted for carrying the flight of birds, but on the other hand more tenuous than these waters in which the body is washed, so that in comparison with them they are perceived as dry and airy? And because it had already been said of the earth and the sea, what need was there to speak of their exhalations, that is, of the waters of the birds, once you have understood that purest and most tranquil air to be attributed to the firmament? For neither is it said of the springs and rivers how they were made.
For those who inquire and discourse upon these matters more scrupulously say that by an ethereal gliding-over, sweet vapor is invisibly drawn from the sea by those ascensions which we can in no way perceive; that thence the clouds are massed together, and that thus the earth, moistened by rains, drips and sweats into more hidden caverns only so much as, being compressed and sliding down through diverse channels, bursts forth into springs, whether small ones or ones suited to giving rise to rivers. Of which matter they wish this to be proof: that the vapor of sea-water, when boiled, caught by a curved lid, presents sweet moisture to those tasting it. And it is manifest to nearly all that springs, when diminished, feel the want of rains.
The divine history also bears witness to this, when Elijah in a time of drought was asking for rain; for he commanded, while he himself was praying, that Elisha should look toward the sea. Whence, when he saw a very small cloud arising, he announced that rain was at hand for the anxious king, by which soon, even as he fled, the king was drenched. And David says: O Lord, who callest up the water of the sea and pourest it out upon the face of the earth. Wherefore, the sea having been named, it would be superfluous to speak of the other waters — whether of those dew-bearing ones which by their tenuity furnish breezes to the flying birds, or of those of springs and rivers, if the former come to be by exhalations and the latter flow forth by the recurring rains which the earth absorbs. Let the waters bring forth creeping things of living souls. Why is 'living' added? Or can there be souls unless they live?
Or did he wish to commend that more manifest life which is in sentient animals, since plants lack it? And flying things flying above the earth beneath the firmament of heaven. If the flying things do not fly in that purest air, where no clouds arise, from this it is manifest that it pertains to the firmament, because it was said that the flying things fly beneath the firmament of heaven above the earth. And so it was done. That order is preserved, and therefore it is added, as in the rest, except for the light, which was made first. And God made the great sea-monsters and every soul of creeping animals which the waters brought forth according to their kind, and every winged flying thing according to its kind.
Let us indeed remember that 'according to their kind' is said of those creatures which are renewed by seminal propagation; for this has already been said of herbs and trees. And every winged flying thing. Why is 'winged' added? Or can there be a flying thing which does not have wings? But if there can, did not God make this kind, since there is no place found where it was made? Or can anything at all fly without wings? For bats and locusts and flies, and whatever is of this kind that lacks feathers, do not lack wings. But 'winged' was added lest we should understand birds alone, since fish are winged and fly above the earth beneath the waters; therefore it was not said 'birds,' but 'and every winged flying thing,' 'flying things' generally.
And God saw that it was good. Here too it is to be understood as in the other places. And God blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply and fill the waters of the sea; and let the flying things multiply upon the earth. He willed the blessing to avail toward fecundity, which appears in the succession of offspring, so that by that blessing, by which weak and mortal things were created, they might preserve their kind by being born. But since plants too by being born hold the likeness of the things that pass away, why did he not bless them? Or is it because they lack sense, which is near to reason? For it is perhaps not without significance that God uses the second person in blessing, so that he addresses these living creatures as though they were listening, by saying: Increase and multiply and fill the waters of the sea.
Yet he is not found to remain in the same person to the end of the blessing; for there follows: and let the flying things multiply upon the earth; he did not say: multiply, you, upon the earth. Unless perhaps by this very thing it is signified that the sense of living creatures is not so near to reason that it can perfectly receive one who addresses it, as do those which understand and can use reason. And so it was done. Here plainly anyone, however slow, ought now to awaken, so as to understand what kind of days these are that are being enumerated.
For since God has given to living creatures fixed numbers of their seeds, keeping a wondrous constancy by a fixed ordering — so that within a fixed number of days each according to its own kind both carry the conceived in the womb and warm the eggs once laid — the establishing of which nature is preserved by the wisdom of God, which reaches mightily from end to end and orders all things sweetly: how could they in one day both conceive and grow heavy in the womb and warm what was brought forth and nourish it and fill the waters of the sea and multiply upon the earth? For thus it is added: and so it was done, before the coming of evening. But doubtless, when he says, 'there was evening,' he calls to mind formless matter; but when he says, 'there was morning,' he calls to mind the form which was impressed upon the matter by that very operation.
For thus, after the operation, he concludes the completed day. Yet God did not say: Let there be evening, or: Let there be morning; for it is a most brief commemoration of the things made — matter and form being signified by evening and morning — which God had already been said to have made; whereas the very defect itself, that is, when there is a tending from form toward matter and toward nothing (if we rightly think this is intimated by the name of night), he did not say was made, but only ordered by God, when he said above: God divided between the light and the darkness. So that by the term 'evening' is signified formless matter, which, although it was made out of nothing, nevertheless is, and has the capacity for forms and shapes.
By the name of darkness there can also be taken utter nothingness itself, which God did not make, and out of which he deigned to make whatever, according to his ineffable goodness, he deigned to make, since he is omnipotent, who out of nothing made things so great. And there was evening and there was morning, the fifth day. Here, after he said, 'and so it was done,' he did not add, as he is wont, the execution, as though they were made again; for it had already been said above. Nor was any new nature fashioned by that blessing which pertains to the begetting of offspring; but the things that had been made were being preserved through succession. And therefore neither is it said: and God saw that it was good; for the thing itself had already pleased him, which was only to be preserved in its offspring.
Nothing therefore is here repeated, except that he says: and so it was done; and immediately there is subjoined about evening and morning, by which, when named, it was said to be signified that the works were accomplished from formless matter and from form which is imposed. Unless perhaps something better and more sublime shall occur to those inquiring. And God said: Let the earth bring forth the living soul according to its kind: of four-footed beasts and of serpents and of the beasts of the earth according to their kind, and cattle according to their kind. And so it was done. Since it was said 'soul,' why 'living' is added, and what 'according to their kind' is, and concerning the customary conclusion by which it is said, 'and so it was done,' are to be considered and taken as was treated above.
But since in the Latin tongue by the name 'beasts' every irrational animal is generally signified, here nonetheless the species must be distinguished, so that by 'four-footed' we understand all beasts of burden, by 'serpents' all creeping things, by 'beasts' or 'wild beasts' all untamed four-footed animals, but by 'cattle' those four-footed animals which help not by working but give some produce to those who pasture them. And God made the beasts of the earth according to their kind, and the cattle according to their kind, and all the serpents of the earth according to their kind. This repetition of what was said, 'and God made,' when it had already been said, 'and so it was done,' is to be considered according to the earlier rule. Indeed here by the name 'cattle' I think all the four-footed animals are signified which live under the care of men. And God saw that it was good:
to be taken as customary. And God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness. And here a certain conjunction and distinction of living creatures is to be observed. For he says that man was made on the same day as the beasts; for all earthly living creatures are together. And yet, on account of the excellence of reason, according to which man is made to the image and likeness of God, it is said of him separately, after it had been customarily concluded of the other earthly living creatures by saying: and God saw that it was good. That also is to be considered, that in the rest God said: Let there be, and it was made; but here God said: Let us make, so that in this way too the Holy Spirit willed to intimate the pre-eminence of human nature. But to whom is it now said:
'Let us make,' if not to him to whom it was said in the rest: 'Let there be'? For all things were made through him, and without him was made nothing. But what do we think is meant otherwise by 'Let there be,' if not that he himself should make at the command of the Father, and otherwise by 'Let us make,' if not that both should make together? Or does the Father make all that he makes through the Son, and therefore now 'Let us make' was said, so that to man himself, for whose sake this very Scripture was made, it might be demonstrated in him that those things which the Son does at the Father's word the Father himself also does — so that what in the rest was said, 'Let there be,' and 'it was made,' here may be expounded to have been not separately the utterance and separately the effecting, but both together, when here it is said: 'Let us make'? And God said:
Let us make man to our image and likeness. Every image is like that of which it is the image; nor yet is everything which is like anything also its image. Just as in a mirror and in a picture, because they are images, they are also alike; yet, if the one is not born of the other, neither of them can be called the image of the other. For it is then an image, when it is expressed from something. Why then, when it had been said 'to the image,' was 'and likeness' added, as if an image could be unlike? It would suffice, therefore, to say 'to the image.'
Or is 'like' one thing and 'likeness' another, just as 'chaste' is one thing and 'chastity' another, 'brave' one thing and 'bravery' another — so that, just as whatever things are brave are brave by bravery, and whatever things are chaste are chaste by chastity, so also whatever things are like are like by likeness? But our image is not quite properly said to be our likeness, although it is properly said to be like us; so that there is that likeness by which whatever things are like are like, where there is also that chastity by which whatever things are chaste are chaste. But chastity is not chaste by participation in anything, but by participation in it whatever things are chaste are chaste.
Which chastity is assuredly in God, where there is also that wisdom which is wise not by participation, but by participation in which whatever soul is wise is wise. Wherefore also the likeness of God, through which all things were made, is properly called likeness, because it is like not by participation in some likeness, but is itself the first likeness, by participation in which whatever things God made through it are like. Therefore it is perhaps an explanation that, when 'to the likeness' was added, when it had already been said:
to the image, so that it might be shown that that which was called 'image' is not like God as though participating in some likeness, but is this very likeness itself, in which participate all things that are said to be like. Just as there is chastity by participation in which souls are chaste, and wisdom by participation in which souls are wise, and beauty by participation in which whatever things are beautiful are beautiful. For if he said only 'likeness,' he would not signify that it was begotten from him; but if he said only 'image,' he would indeed signify that it was begotten from him, but would not signify it to be so like that it was not only like but was likeness itself.
But as nothing is more chaste than chastity itself, and nothing wiser than wisdom itself, and nothing more beautiful than beauty itself, so nothing more like than likeness itself can be called or thought or in any way be. Whence it is understood that his likeness is so like the Father that it most fully and most perfectly fills up his nature. But how much the likeness of God, through which all things were made, avails for imposing form upon things — although it most deeply surpasses human thoughts — may nevertheless be somehow conjectured, if we consider that all nature, whether it presents itself to the senses or to the reasoning faculties, preserves the figure of the universe by parts like one another.
For from the wisdom of God rational souls are called wise, and this name is not extended further; for we cannot call any cattle wise, and much less trees or fire or air or water or earth, although through that very wisdom of God all these things also exist in so far as they exist. But indeed we call both stones and animals and men and angels like one another.
Now further, in individual things as well, earth comes to be earth precisely because it has parts similar to one another; water in any given portion is similar to its other portions, nor could it have been water otherwise; and any quantity of air, were it unlike the rest, could in no way have been air; and a particle of fire or of light, because it is not unlike its remaining parts, comes to be what it is. So too, concerning any single one of stones or trees, or the body of any living creature whatever, it can be discerned and understood that these would not exist, not only in company with other things of their own kind but even each in itself, unless they had parts similar to one another. And a body is the more beautiful the more it consists of parts more similar to one another.
Now moreover, not only is the friendship of some souls with others formed by similar characters, but even within each single soul the similar actions and virtues, without which there can be no constancy, betoken the blessed life. Yet all these things we can call similar, but not Similitude itself. Wherefore, if the universe consists of things similar to one another, so that each thing is whatever it is and all together fill up that very universe which God both founded and governs, then assuredly through the likeness of Him who founded all things — a likeness surpassing, unchangeable, and undefilable — such things were made that they are beautiful by parts similar to one another; yet all things were not made after that Similitude itself, but only the rational substance was:
for this reason all things were made through It, but not all things after It. And so the rational substance was both made through It and after It; for there is no nature interposed between them, seeing that the human mind — which it does not perceive except when it is most pure and most blessed — cleaves to nothing save that very Truth, which is called the Likeness and Image of the Father and the Wisdom. Rightly therefore is it understood according to that which is the inner and governing part of man, that is, according to the mind: 'Let us make man to our image and likeness.' For a man is to be reckoned wholly according to that which holds primacy in him, which sets him apart from the beasts.
The rest of him, although beautiful in its own kind, is nevertheless shared in common with the beasts, and on this account is to be lightly esteemed in man. Unless perhaps the fact that the shape of the human body was set upright for gazing upon heaven also carries some weight, so that the body itself might be believed to have been made to the likeness of God — that just as that Likeness is not turned away from the Father, so the human body is not turned away from heaven, as the bodies of other animals are turned away, since they are stretched forward prone toward the belly. And yet this is not to be taken in every sense; for our body differs very greatly from heaven.
But in that Likeness which is the Son, there cannot be anything unlike Him to whom He is like, since whatever other things are similar to one another are also in some part dissimilar; but Similitude itself is not in any part dissimilar. The Father alone is Father, nor is the Son anything other than Son; for even when He is called the Likeness of the Father, although this shows that no dissimilarity intervenes, nevertheless the Father is not alone, if He has a Likeness. 'And God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness.' The things said above sufficiently expound, according to that sense, these words of Scripture in which we read that God said:
'Let us make man to our image and likeness,' so that the Likeness of God, to which man was made, may be taken to be the very Word of God, that is, the only-begotten Son — not indeed as though man himself were that same image and likeness equal to the Father. Yet man too is the image of God, as the Apostle most plainly shows, saying: 'A man indeed ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God.' But this image, made to the image of God, is not equal to and co-eternal with Him whose image it is; nor would it be, even if it had never sinned at all. That sense, however, is rather to be chosen in these divine words, so that we may understand it was said, not in the singular but in the plural:
'Let us make man to our image and likeness,' because man was made not to the image of the Father alone, nor of the Son alone, nor of the Holy Spirit alone, but to the image of the Trinity itself. This Trinity is a Trinity in such a way that it is one God, and is one God in such a way that it is a Trinity. For He does not say, speaking to the Son, 'Let us make man to your image,' or 'to my image,' but says in the plural, 'to our image and likeness'; and from that plurality who would dare to separate the Holy Spirit? Since this plurality is not three gods but one God, we must therefore understand that Scripture afterward brought in the singular and said:
'And God made man to the image of God,' so that it should not be taken as though God the Father made man to the image of God, that is, of His own Son. Otherwise, how is that which was said true — 'to our image' — if man was made to the image of the Son alone? And on this account, because it is true what God says, 'to our image,' it was thus said, 'God made man to the image of God,' as though it were said 'to His own image,' which is the Trinity itself. Some, however, think that the likeness was for this reason not repeated, and that it was not said 'And God made man to the image and likeness of God,' because man was then made only to the image, while the likeness was being reserved for him afterward in the resurrection of the dead — as though there could be any image in which there is no likeness.
For if it is not similar at all, then beyond doubt it is not an image either. Yet, so that we may not seem to establish this by reason alone, the authority of the Apostle James is also to be brought in, who, when he was speaking of the tongue of man, said: 'With it we bless God, and with it we curse men, who have been made to the likeness of God.'