Since therefore it was not permitted to offer sacrifices except in the tabernacle, to which the temple afterwards succeeded — whence also Jeroboam, king of Israel, dared to make calves for the people to sacrifice to, lest by the necessity of this law those who were under his kingdom should be led away from him while they went to Jerusalem to offer their sacrifices in the temple of God, for which deed he was condemned by the Lord — it is rightly asked how Elijah could lawfully sacrifice outside the temple of God, when he both obtained fire from heaven and confounded the prophets of demons. This seems to me to be defended by no other reasoning than that by which Abraham's deed too is defended, that being commanded he was willing to immolate his son to God.
For when he who established the law commands something to be done which he forbade in the law, the command itself is held in place of law, since it belongs to the author of the law. For other miracles could not have been lacking, besides the sacrifice, by which the prophets of the groves might be overcome and confounded; but the Spirit of God, who was in Elijah — whatever he did in this matter — cannot be against the law, because he is the giver of the law. What does it mean that, forbidding the eating of blood, he says: the soul of all flesh is its blood? This whole passage he thus explains: and the man, any man of the children of Israel, or of the proselytes who are added among you, whoever shall eat any blood, I will set my face against the soul that eats blood, and I will destroy it from among its people.
For the soul of all flesh is its blood; and I have given it to you to make entreaty for your souls upon the altar: for its blood shall make entreaty for the soul. Therefore I said to the children of Israel: no soul of you shall eat blood, and the proselyte who is added among you shall not eat blood. Surely, if we call the blood the soul of a beast, is the blood also to be thought the soul of a man? God forbid. How then did he not say: the soul of all flesh of a beast is its blood, but: the soul, he says, of all flesh is its blood? For in 'all flesh' the flesh of man too is reckoned.
Or is it that, because there is something vital in the blood, since it is chiefly through it that life is lived in this flesh — the blood which is diffused through all the veins throughout the whole body — he called that very life of the body the soul: not the life that migrates from the body, but that which is ended by death? By which manner of speech we say that this life is temporal, not eternal, mortal, not immortal, whereas the nature of the soul is immortal — that soul which was carried away by angels into Abraham's bosom, and to which it is said: today you shall be with me in paradise, and which burned in the torments of hell. According to this signification, therefore, by which even this temporal life is called 'soul,' the apostle Paul said: for I do not make my soul precious to myself. Where he wished to show himself even prepared to die for the gospel.
For according to the signification by which 'soul' is said of that which migrates from the body, he was rather making it precious, for which he was acquiring so great a merit. There are also other locutions of this kind. This temporal life, therefore, is chiefly contained in the body by the blood. But what does it mean that he says: I have given it to you at the altar of God, that it may make entreaty for your soul? — as though soul should make entreaty for soul. Surely not blood for blood, as though we were anxious about our own blood, when we wish entreaty to be made for our soul? This is absurd. But it is much more absurd that the blood of a beast should make entreaty for the soul of a man;
which cannot die, since Scripture manifestly testifies in the epistle to the Hebrews that that blood of victims profited nothing for making entreaty to God for the sins of men, but signified something that would profit. For it is impossible, he says, that the blood of goats and bulls should take away sins. It remains, therefore, that since that Mediator makes entreaty for our soul — he who was prefigured by all those sacrifices which were offered for sins — that be called 'soul' which signifies the soul. Now it is customary that the thing which signifies be named by the name of the thing which it signifies; as it is written: the seven ears are seven years — for he did not say: they signify seven years — and: the seven oxen are seven years, and many things of this kind.
Hence it is that it was said: the rock was Christ; for he did not say: the rock signified Christ, but as though it were this — which certainly by substance it was not, but by signification it was. So too blood, since on account of a certain vital corporeality it signifies the soul, is in the sacraments called 'soul.' But if anyone thinks that the blood of a beast is its soul, there is no need to labor over this question: only it must be most earnestly guarded against, that the soul of a man — which quickens human flesh and is rational — be not thought to be blood; and this error must by all means be refuted.
Locutions must also be sought in which, through that which contains, is signified that which is contained; so that, since the soul is held in the body by the blood — for if it be poured out, the soul departs — the soul is more fittingly signified through it, and has taken the name 'blood.' As the place in which the church is gathered is called 'church'; for the church is the men, of whom it is said: that he might present to himself a glorious church. Yet that the house of prayer itself is also called by this name, the same apostle is witness, where he says: have you not houses to eat and drink in? or do you despise the church of God?
And this the daily usage of speaking has also established, that one is not said to 'go into the church' or 'take refuge in the church' unless he goes or takes refuge to the place itself and its walls, by which the congregation of the church is contained. It is also written: and he that sheds blood, who defrauds the wages of the hired laborer. He called the wages 'blood,' since by them that life is sustained which is called by the name of blood. But since the Lord says: unless you eat my flesh and drink my blood, you will not have life in you, what does it mean that the people are so greatly forbidden the blood of the sacrifices which were offered for sins, if by those sacrifices this one sacrifice was signified, in which true remission of sins takes place?
— from whose sacrifice's blood, when taken as nourishment, not only is no one forbidden, but rather all are exhorted to drink, who wish to have life. It must therefore be inquired what it signifies, that a man is forbidden in the law to eat blood and is ordered to pour it out to God. For concerning the nature of the soul — why it is signified by blood — we have said, as much as for the present seemed sufficient. The nakedness of your father and the nakedness of your mother you shall not uncover; for it is their nakedness. He forbids lying with one's mother; for there is the nakedness of father and mother. For afterwards he forbids the stepmother too, where he says: the nakedness of your father's wife you shall not uncover; for it is your father's nakedness.
Where he explained how in the mother there is the nakedness of both, that is, of father and mother; but in the stepmother, only of the father. The nakedness of your sister, from your father or from your mother, who was born at home or who was born abroad, you shall not uncover their nakedness. 'Who was born at home' is understood as from the father; 'who was born abroad' is understood as from the mother — if perchance the mother had conceived her by a former husband and had come into the house with her, when she married his father, whom Scripture warns not to uncover the nakedness of his sister. Here he seems not to have forbidden, and as it were to have passed over, intercourse with a sister born of both parents; for he does not say: you shall not uncover the nakedness of your sister from father and from mother, but: from father or from mother.
But who would not see that this too is forbidden, and much more strongly? For if it is not permitted to uncover the nakedness of a sister born of either parent, how much more of both! But what does it mean that, after inserting the prohibition of intercourse even with one's own granddaughters, whether by son or by daughter, it follows and says: the nakedness of the daughter of your father's wife you shall not uncover? For if he had said only thus far, we would understand that intercourse was forbidden even with the stepmother's daughter, whom the stepmother had borne by a former husband and who was not the sister of this man who is forbidden, either by father or by mother; but when he added:
she is your sister from the same father, you shall not uncover her nakedness — he makes clear that this prohibition was made concerning a sister, since she was from the father and from the stepmother, of whom he had already spoken above. Or did he for this reason wish again to forbid this more openly, because above it was somewhat obscure? For Scripture often does this. The nakedness of your father's brother you shall not uncover, and you shall not go in to his wife. He explained what he meant by 'the nakedness of your father's brother,' that is, of your paternal uncle, 'you shall not uncover'; for this is 'you shall not go in to his wife.' Indeed, in the uncle's wife he wished the uncle's nakedness to be understood, as in the father's wife the father's nakedness. The nakedness of your brother's wife you shall not uncover; it is your brother's nakedness. It is asked:
whether this is forbidden while the brother is alive or after he is dead — and it is no small question. For if we should say that Scripture spoke of a living brother's wife, by that one general precept by which a man is forbidden to approach another's wife, this too is certainly contained. What then does it mean that it so diligently distinguishes these persons, whom it calls 'domestic,' by proper prohibitions from the rest? For what it forbids concerning the father's wife, that is, the stepmother, is not to be taken of the living father but rather of the dead. For while the father is alive, who does not see that it is much more strongly forbidden, if any man's other's wife is forbidden to be defiled by adultery?
Concerning these persons, therefore, it seems to speak — those who, not having husbands, could come together in matrimony, unless forbidden by law, as is said to be the custom of the Persians. But again, if we understand it forbidden, the brother being dead, to marry the brother's wife, there occurs that which, for the sake of raising up seed, Scripture orders to be done if he had died without children. And on this account, comparing this prohibition with that command, lest they be mutually opposed, an exception is to be understood: that is, that it is not permitted to anyone to marry a deceased brother's wife if the deceased left descendants; or else that this too was forbidden, that it should not be permitted to marry a brother's wife who had even departed from a living brother by divorce.
For then, as the Lord says, on account of the hardness of the Jews Moses had permitted them to give a bill of divorce, and through this dismissal it might be thought that anyone could lawfully join to himself his brother's wife, where he need fear no adultery, since she had departed by divorce. The nakedness of a woman and her daughter you shall not uncover: that is, lest anyone think it lawful for himself to marry the daughter of his wife. For it is not lawful to uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter at the same time, that is, to have union with both, both mother and daughter. The daughter of her son and the daughter of her daughter you shall not take. He also forbade taking the granddaughter of one's wife, by either son or daughter. You shall not take a wife in addition to her sister as a rival.
Here he did not forbid taking an additional wife, which was permitted to the ancients on account of the abundance of propagation; but he did not wish a sister to be brought in over a sister. This Jacob seems to have done, either because it had not yet been forbidden by law, or because he was deceived by the fraud of another substituted for her, and she came rather by agreement, whom he received later; but it would have been unjust that the former be dismissed, lest he cause her to commit adultery. But this that he says, 'as a rival' — is it put for this reason, lest there be rivalry between sisters, which between those who were not sisters was not to be despised? Or is it rather for this reason, lest it be done on this account, that is, lest it be done with this intent, that a sister be brought in over a sister as a rival? And to a woman in the separation of her uncleanness you shall not approach to uncover her nakedness:
that is, you shall not approach a menstruating woman: for she was set apart according to the law on account of uncleanness. Since he had already sufficiently forbidden this above, what does it mean that here too he wished to add it to these same precepts? Or perhaps, because in the earlier passages what was said might be thought to be taken figuratively, here too it is placed, where such things are forbidden as, even in the time of the New Testament, with the observance of the old shadows removed, must without doubt be kept? This too the Lord seems to have signified through the prophet Ezekiel, who, among those sins which are not of figurative but of manifest iniquity, mentions this also — if anyone approach a menstruating woman — and among the merits of righteousness, if he does not approach.
In which matter nature is not condemned, but it is declared harmful to the offspring to be conceived. And to your neighbor's wife you shall not give your seed for intercourse, to be defiled with her. Behold, here again he forbids adultery, which is committed with another's wife, which is also forbidden in the decalogue. Whence it appears that those women whose nakedness he forbids to be uncovered are so forbidden that, even after their husbands are dead, they are not taken as wives. And of your seed you shall not give to serve a prince. Here I do not see what is understood except a prince who is worshiped in place of God. For he does not say douleuein, but latreuein in the Greek, which the Latin is not accustomed to translate except by saying 'to serve'; but there is a very great difference.
For to serve men as slaves serve, which is not latreuein but douleuein, Scripture does not forbid; but to serve according to that which is latreuein is not commanded toward men, but only toward the one true God, as it is written: you shall adore the Lord your God, and him only shall you serve. And not only by this word, that he says latreuein, does he sufficiently signify whom he calls a 'prince,' that is, one to whom worship is offered as to God, but also by this which he adds: and you shall not profane the holy name — whether of God, from whose people to serve a prince in that manner is granted, or the holy name of the people of Israel itself. On account of which it is said: you are holy, since I too am holy. Most opportunely here too he adds:
I am the Lord — thereby certainly admonishing that to him alone is owed latreia, that is, that servitude by which God is served. As for what he says: and the land abhorred those who dwell upon it, on account of their evil deeds which he mentioned above — it is not to be thought said on the ground that the land has a sense by which it perceives and abhors these things, but by the name of 'land' he signifies the men who are upon the land. Accordingly, when men do these evil things, they defile the land, because the men who imitate them are defiled; and the land abhors, because the men abhor who neither do nor imitate them. You shall not steal, nor shall you lie, nor shall each one bring a false charge against his neighbor. That about theft is placed in the decalogue. But as for what he says:
'Neither shall you lie, nor shall anyone slander his neighbour.' It is a wonder if this is not already contained in that commandment set down there: 'You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour,' since slander cannot occur without falsehood, which is comprehended under the general heading of false witness. But whether these things may be admitted with some counterbalancing consideration is a great question — just as concerning lying it seems to nearly everyone that where no one is harmed, one ought to lie for the sake of safety. Is it then likewise so concerning theft as well? Or can theft not occur where no one is harmed? Nay rather, it can occur even when the very one against whom it is committed is being looked after, as if someone should steal a sword from a man who wishes to kill himself.
For as to slander, I do not know whether it can be done to anyone for his own benefit — unless perhaps in the sense that it was done for a greater joy which they would afterwards enjoy, as when Joseph brought a false charge against his brothers concerning the cup, upon whom he had also fastened the false accusation of spying. Yet if we try to determine these matters by definitions, perhaps there is no theft except when a neighbour is harmed by something belonging to another being secretly taken away; and there is no slander except when a neighbour is harmed by the imputation of a false charge; but we cannot say that lying exists only when a neighbour is harmed; for when something false is stated by one who knows it to be false, it is beyond doubt a lie, whether or not anyone is harmed by it.
Accordingly, the great question about lying — whether a lie can ever be just — might perhaps be easily resolved if we considered only the precepts and not also the examples. For what is more absolute than this precept: 'You shall not lie'? For it is stated just as: 'You shall not make for yourself an idol' — which act can never be just — and as it is said: 'You shall not commit adultery' — for who would say that adultery could ever be just? — and: 'You shall not steal' — according to that definition of theft a theft can never be just — and: 'You shall not kill,' since when a man is justly put to death, the law kills him, not you. Can it in this way be said: when a man justly lies, the law lies? But the examples make the question most difficult.
The Egyptian midwives lied, and God rewarded them with good things; Rahab lied on behalf of the spies of the land, and therefore she was delivered. Should it be understood that, from the moment it was said in the Law, 'You shall not lie,' from that moment lying is not permitted even in such a cause as that in which Rahab is read to have lied? But it is more credible that, because the lie was unjust, it was therefore forbidden — not that, because it was forbidden, the deed thereby became unjust. Perhaps, then, as we said concerning the midwives, what was rewarded in them was not that they lied, but that they saved the Hebrew infants — so that on account of this mercy that sin was made venial, yet it is not to be supposed that it was not a sin.
So too concerning Rahab it must be understood that she was rewarded for that deliverance of the spies, so that on account of that same deliverance pardon was granted to the lie. But where pardon is given, it is manifest that there is sin. Yet this must be guarded against: that no one should suppose that, in the case of other sins as well, pardon can likewise be granted if they are committed for the sake of delivering men. For many evils, intolerable and utterly detestable, follow from this error. 'You shall not harm your neighbour.' If it were clear to men what it is to harm and not to harm, this general precept might perhaps suffice for the keeping of innocence. For all the things that are forbidden to be committed against a neighbour are to be referred to this one thing which was said: 'You shall not harm your neighbour.' For what follows —
'You shall not seize by force' — unless it be referred to this, that no harm be done by seizing, it sometimes happens that a man does harm by not seizing. For a sword must be snatched from a madman; and if one fails to do what he ought, he will have done greater harm. What does it mean that, when it had said above, 'You shall not hate your brother in your heart; you shall surely reprove your neighbour and shall not incur sin because of him,' it consequently added, 'and your hand shall not be avenged'? Is it for what is meant by 'is not punished'? For you act with a good mind when you impose discipline on a sinning neighbour, lest by neglecting him you incur his sin. For to this pertains what it set down before: 'You shall not hate your neighbour in your heart.'
For it can seem to the one who is reproved that you hate him, even though it is not in your heart. Or does 'your hand shall not be avenged' rather admonish this: that you should not seek to avenge your hand, nor be carried away by the lust for revenge? For what else is it to wish to be avenged than to rejoice or find consolation in another's misfortune? And therefore it was said: 'You shall not be angry with the children of your people.' For thus anger is rightly defined as being a lust for revenge. But certain manuscripts have: 'and your hand shall not be avenged,' that is, in reproving do not wish to avenge yourself, but rather to look after the good of the one whom you reprove. 'And you shall not make incisions over a soul in your body.' By 'over a soul' it means 'over the corpse of a dead person,' for the grief is over the soul which has departed.
To this grief belongs mourning, in which mourning some nations have the custom of cutting their bodies. God forbids this to be done. 'So that they play the harlot after princes from among their people.' It is not 'princes from their people,' but 'after their people they play the harlot.' For here he wishes those to be understood as princes who were worshipped in place of gods; as the Apostle says: 'according to the prince of the power of the air,' and in the Gospel the Lord: 'now the prince of this world is cast out,' and: 'behold, the prince of the world will come and will find nothing in me.' 'Any man whatever who commits adultery with the wife of a man, or whoever commits adultery with the wife of his neighbour, let them die the death.' He said in the plural 'let them die the death,' that is, he who committed adultery and she who was made an adulteress.
Here he wished to make some distinction between any man whatever and a neighbour, although in many places he sets down 'neighbour' for every man. But what manner of expression is this, that, when he had already spoken of 'a man,' he repeated the same thing concerning 'a neighbour,' since it is a natural consequence that one must abstain much the more from a neighbour's wife if one must abstain from the wife of any man whatsoever? For if he had spoken first of the neighbour, then, lest it be thought permissible to commit adultery with the wife of one who is not a neighbour, it would have had to be added concerning any man whatever; but now, if what is the lesser thing is not permitted, how much less is that permitted which is the greater evil! For if it is not permitted to commit adultery with the wife of any man whatsoever, how much more with a neighbour's wife!
Or perhaps this repetition, as it were, expounds what was said first, so that a man may thereby understand how great an evil it is to commit adultery with a man's wife — because, if he does this, he commits adultery with a neighbour's wife. For every man is a neighbour to a man. 'And the woman who approaches any beast to be mounted by it — you shall kill the woman and the beast; let them die the death; they are guilty.' It is asked how a beast can be guilty, since it is irrational and in no way capable of law. Is it that, just as words are transferred by that mode of expression which in Greek is called metaphora, from an animate thing to an inanimate one — as when we say a 'wicked wind' or an 'angry sea' — so here too there is a transfer from the rational to the irrational?
For it must be believed that the beasts were commanded to be killed for this reason: because, having been defiled by such an outrage, they renew the unworthy memory of the deed. 'Whoever takes his sister, from his father or from his mother, and sees her nakedness, and she sees his nakedness, it is a reproach; they shall be exterminated in the sight of their kindred; he has uncovered his sister's nakedness, they shall bear their sin.' What does it mean here by 'sees,' except 'knows by lying with her'? As it is said in the Law: 'he knew his wife,' for 'he was joined to her.' And what does it mean, 'they shall bear their sin,' when it was speaking of their punishment, except that it wished even the punishment of the sin to be called sin? 'Whoever lies with his kinswoman has uncovered the nakedness of his kinswoman;'
'they shall die without children.' It is asked to what degree this kinship is to be understood, since from a distant degree it is certainly permitted to take a wife, and always has been. But it must be understood from those degrees which he forbade, that it is not permitted, and that it was said with reference to those very degrees: 'Whoever lies with his kinswoman' — where he also left some things unmentioned but to be understood, such as a sister from both parents, or the wife of a mother's brother, that is, of a maternal uncle. For concerning the wife of a father's brother he forbade it first, although this is called not kinship but affinity. But what does 'they shall die without children' mean, since children from such unions have both been born before and are born today? Or is this to be understood as ordained by the law of God, that whoever are born of them
are not to be reckoned as children, that is, they succeed to their parents by no right while living? 'And you shall not make your souls execrable, whether in beasts or in birds or in all the creeping things of the earth which I have set apart for you as unclean.' It seems here to signify that these things are not unclean by nature, but by some sign of a mystery, since it says: 'which I have set apart for you as unclean,' as though they would not be unclean to them if they had not been set apart for them. 'And a man or a woman, if there be in him a ventriloquist or an enchanter, let both die the death; you shall stone them with stones; they are guilty.' Is it the man and the woman, or the man and the ventriloquist, or the woman and the ventriloquist or enchanter? But rather this: both the one who has it and the one whom he has.
'A harlot and profane woman they shall not take, nor a woman put away by her husband, for he is holy to the Lord his God.' Above he had said 'they shall not take,' but now 'for he is holy,' not 'for they are holy.' He was speaking of several priests who exist at one time, and of each one of them he said 'for he is holy,' with that manner of expression which Scripture is accustomed to use. For that one supreme priest he mentions afterwards, who used to enter into the Holy of Holies. For he also concluded in the plural, saying: 'and you shall sanctify him: he offers the gifts of the Lord your God; he is holy, for holy am I, the Lord who sanctifies them.' Now as far as concerns the gifts, since he said:
'He offers the gifts of the Lord your God,' not only did that supreme priest offer them, but the second-order priests also. And by this that he says, 'A harlot and profane woman and one put away by her husband they shall not take,' the second-order priests too are forbidden this; for concerning the supreme priest he speaks afterwards, who moreover was commanded to take none but a virgin. 'And the priest who is great among his brethren' — that is, he who is great among his brethren, namely that one great priest — 'upon whose head oil from the anointing has been poured' — Scripture calls the oil itself 'the anointing' (christ). 'And whose hand has been consecrated to put on the vestments' — those, namely, which are described most elaborately as belonging to the priestly garb.
'He shall not uncover his head from the turban, and shall not rend his garments, and shall not go in to any dead soul.' It is understood that he is forbidden to do those things which he mentioned above in mourning, that is, to bare his head of the turban and to rend his garments. For to rend the garments belonged to the mourners of old, as it is written concerning Job, when the ruin of his sons crushed and was announced to him. But to bare the head of the turban could belong to a mourner because it is a removal of adornment. But as to what he says, 'he shall not go in to any dead soul,' how he should call a dead body a 'dead soul' is difficult to understand; yet this is a customary expression of the Scriptures, which is most unusual to us.