書信與論戰集（CSEL） 第 5 章 第 77/118 段

Or must it perhaps be said that in the little one the flesh alone is of sin, but a new soul is made for it, by which — living according to God's commandments, in the help of the grace of Christ, and with the flesh itself subdued and brought into subjection — even for that flesh the merit of incorruption might be obtained? But because in the little one the soul is not yet able to do this, if he receives the sacrament of Christ, through this grace there is acquired for his flesh what it could not yet acquire by its own conduct; whereas if the soul of the little one departs without that sacrament, the soul itself indeed will be in eternal life, from which no sin could separate it, but his flesh will not rise again in Christ, since the sacrament was not received before his death?

This opinion I have never heard, never read; but I have plainly heard and believed, and for that reason also I have spoken, that the hour will come when all who are in the tombs shall hear His voice and shall come forth: they who have done good, unto the resurrection of life — this is that of which it is said: And through one man the resurrection of the dead; this is that by which in Christ all shall be made alive — but they who have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment. What then is to be understood here about those infants who, before they could do either good or evil, were stripped of the body without baptism? Nothing has been said here about such as these.

But if their flesh therefore will not rise again because they did nothing either of good or of evil, then neither will the flesh of those rise again who, having received the grace of baptism, died at that age in which they could do nothing either good or evil. But if these shall rise among the saints, that is, among those who have done good — among whom shall those others rise, unless among those who have done evil, lest we believe that some human souls will not receive their bodies, either unto the resurrection of life or unto the resurrection of judgment? Which opinion, before it is refuted, already displeases by its very novelty. Then who could bear it, if those who run with their little ones to baptism should believe that they run for the sake of their flesh and not for the sake of their souls?

The blessed Cyprian indeed, framing no new decree but preserving the most firm faith of the Church, in order to correct those who thought a little one ought not to be baptized before the eighth day of birth, said that it was not the flesh but the soul that must not be lost, and judged, together with certain of his fellow bishops, that a newborn could rightly be baptized. But against some opinion of Cyprian, where perhaps he did not see what needed to be seen, let each think what he pleases; only let no one think against the most manifest apostolic faith, who proclaims that through the offence of one all are led into condemnation — from which condemnation none is freed save the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, in whom alone all are made alive, whoever are made alive;

let no one think against the most well-grounded custom of the Church, whereby, if men ran to baptism only for the sake of the little ones' bodies, dead infants too would be offered to be baptized. Since these things are so, the cause must be sought and rendered why souls are damned which are newly created for each one at birth, if the little ones die apart from the sacrament of Christ. For that they are damned, if they thus depart from the body, both holy Scripture and the holy Church is witness. Wherefore that opinion about the creation of new souls, if it does not attack this most well-grounded faith, let it be mine too; if it attacks it, let it not be yours either. I do not want it to be said to me that, in support of this opinion, that which is written ought to be accepted: Who formed the spirit of man within him, and:

Who fashioned severally their hearts. Something most strong and most invincible must be sought, which does not compel us to believe God the condemner of any souls without some fault. For to create is perhaps of as much or even more force than to fashion; and yet it is written: Create in me a clean heart, O God. Nor for that reason can the soul be thought in this place to wish itself to be made before it was anything. As therefore, already existing, it is created by the renewal of righteousness, so, already existing, it is fashioned by the conformation of doctrine. Nor does that which is written in Ecclesiastes — Then shall the dust return into the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return to the Lord who gave it — confirm this opinion which we wish to be ours;

for this rather favours those who think all souls are from one. For, they say, just as the dust returns into the earth as it was — and yet the flesh, of which this is said, does not return to the man from whom it was propagated, but to the earth from which the first man was made — so also the spirit, propagated from the spirit of that one man, nevertheless does not return to him, but to the Lord by whom it was given him. But because this testimony so sounds in their favour that it does not seem in every way contrary to this opinion which I wish to defend, I have thought only to warn your prudence, lest by such testimonies you try to draw me out of these straits.

For although no one, by wishing, brings it about that what is not true should be true, yet, if it could be done, I would wish this opinion to be true, just as I wish that — if it is true — it may be defended by you most clearly and most invincibly. But this difficulty also follows those who think that souls already existing elsewhere, and prepared by God from the beginning of the divine works, are sent into bodies. For of these too the same thing is asked: if the blameless souls come obediently whither they are sent, why are they punished in the little ones, if they end this life unbaptized? The difficulty is exactly the same in both opinions.

Those seem to themselves to escape more easily from this question who assert that souls, according to the merits of a former life, are severally entangled in several bodies. For they think that this is to die in Adam — namely, in the flesh which was propagated from Adam — to pay penalties; from which guilt, they say, the grace of Christ frees the little ones together with the great. This indeed is rightly, truly, and excellently said, that the grace of Christ frees from the guilt of sins the little together with the great. But that souls sinned in another, higher life, and were thence cast down into fleshly prisons, I do not believe, I do not acquiesce, I do not consent:

first, because by I know not what cycles these men so contrive it that, after I know not how many revolutions of ages, one must return again to this burden of corruptible flesh and to penalties to be paid — than which opinion I know not what more horrible could be imagined; next, what just man, when he dies, ought we not — if these men speak the truth — to be anxious for, lest, sinning in the bosom of Abraham, he be cast down into the flames of that rich man? For why could one not sin also after this body, if one could even before it? Lastly, it is far one thing to have sinned in Adam, whence the Apostle says: In whom all have sinned; and another thing to have sinned outside Adam, I know not where, and therefore to be thrust into Adam — that is, into the flesh which was propagated from Adam — as into a prison.

That opinion, however, that all souls come from one, I do not wish even to discuss, unless it be necessary; and would that this one of which we now treat, if it is true, may be so defended by you that this be no longer necessary. But although I desire, ask, with ardent vows long for, and await, that through you the Lord may take away from me ignorance of this matter, yet, if — which God forbid — I should by no means deserve it, I would ask of the Lord our God patience for myself, in whom we so believe that, if some things are not opened to us even when we knock, we ought in no way to murmur against Him. Let us remember that it was said to the very Apostles: I have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now.

In these matters, as far as concerns me, let me count even this: that I do not, because I know this, disdain myself as unworthy — lest by this very thing I be convicted the more unworthy. For there are many other things I likewise do not know, which I cannot recount or number; and I would bear this ignorance tolerably, did I not fear lest some one of these opinions should creep upon incautious minds against that which we hold by most firm faith. But before I know which of them is rather to be chosen, this I profess I feel not rashly: that the one which is true is not opposed to that most robust and well-grounded faith by which the Church of Christ believes that not even little human beings, most recently born, can be freed from damnation except through the grace of the name of Christ, which He commended in His sacraments. CLXVII.

ON THE OPINION OF THE APOSTLE JAMES. Since what I wrote to you, my brother Jerome, worthy of honour in Christ, inquiring about the human soul — whether new souls are made severally for each one born, even up to now, and where they contract the bond of sin which we do not doubt must be loosed by the sacrament of the grace of Christ even in newly-born infants — since this went on into no small volume, I did not wish to burden it with any other question. But what presses more sharply is much less to be neglected. Accordingly I ask, and by the Lord I beseech, that you expound to me — what I judge will profit many — or, if you already have it expounded either by yourself or by someone, that you direct it to us: how is that to be received which is in the epistle of the Apostle James:

For whoever keeps the whole law, but offends in one point, is become guilty of all. This matter is of such a kind and so great that I much regret not having written to you about it long ago. For this question turns upon the present life to be lived — how we may attain to eternal life — not upon a past to be scrutinized, which oblivion has utterly sunk, as is that which I thought must be inquired about the soul. And it is related that a saying was elegantly uttered which suits this matter aptly enough. When a certain man had fallen into a pit, where there was so much water that it rather received him, that he might not die, than choked him, that he might not speak, another approached, and, seeing him, in pity said: 'How did you fall in here?' But he replied:

'I beseech you,' he said, 'how you may free me from here — do not inquire how I fell in here.' So, since we confess and hold by the catholic faith that even the soul of a little infant must be freed by the grace of Christ from the guilt of sin as from a pit, it is enough for it that we know the manner by which it may be made safe, even if we should never know how it came into that evil. But therefore I thought it must be inquired, lest perhaps out of those opinions about the soul's incarnation we should hold some one too incautiously, which would contradict that the soul of the little one must indeed be freed, denying that it is in that evil.

Holding this, then, most firmly — that the soul of the little one must be freed from the guilt of sin, and freed in no other way than by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord — if we can also come to know the cause and origin of that evil itself, we resist more readily and more equipped the empty talkers, not disputants but wranglers; but if we cannot, then, because the beginning of the misery lies hidden, the office of mercy ought not on that account to grow sluggish. And against those who seem to themselves to know what they do not know, we are the safer in this: that we are not ignorant of this our ignorance. For it is one thing that it is evil not to know; another, that either cannot be known, or need not be known, or is indifferent to the life we seek.

But this, which I now inquire about from the letter of the Apostle James, is concerned with this very life in which we live and, that we may live forever, strive to please God by our action. How then is it to be understood, I beseech you: 'whoever keeps the whole law, but offends in one point, is become guilty of all'? Is it so, that he who commits theft — nay rather, who says to the rich man: Sit here, but to the poor: Stand there — is guilty also of homicide and adultery and sacrilege? And if he is not, how is it that he who offends in one is become guilty of all? Or does that which I said about the rich man and the poor not pertain to those things of which, if anyone offend in one, he becomes guilty of all?

But we must recall whence this sentence came, and what preceding words gave it birth, and to what things it is connected and depends upon. My brethren, he says, do not, in respect of persons, hold the faith of the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ. For if there enter into your assembly a man having a gold ring, in white apparel, and there enter also a poor man in sordid dress, and you have regard to him who is clothed in splendid apparel, and say: 'You sit here well,' but to the poor man you say: 'You stand there,' or: 'Sit under my footstool' — have you not judged among yourselves, and become judges of unjust thoughts? Hear, my beloved brethren: has not God chosen the poor in this world, rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom

which God promised to those who love Him? But you have dishonoured the poor man — namely for the sake of that one to whom it was said: You stand there, when to him who had the gold ring it was said: You sit here well. And then he follows, more widely turning over and unfolding the same sentence: Do not, he says, the rich oppress you by their power, and themselves drag you to judgments? Do they not themselves blaspheme the good name which is invoked over you? If indeed you fulfil the royal law according to the Scriptures: 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself,' you do well; but if you accept persons, you commit sin, being reproved by the law as transgressors. See in what manner he calls transgressors those who say to the rich man: Sit here, and to the poor:

Stand there — as transgressors. Whence, lest they should think it a contemptible sin to transgress the law in this one matter, he went on to add: But whoever keeps the whole law, but offends in one point, is become guilty of all. For He who said: 'You shall not commit adultery,' said also: 'You shall not kill.' But if you do not kill, yet commit adultery, you have become a transgressor of the law — on account of that which he had said: reproved by the law as transgressors. Since these things are so, it seems to follow — unless it be shown that it must be understood in another way — that he who has said to the rich man: Sit here, and to the poor:

Stand there — bestowing on the one an ampler honour than on the other, is to be judged an idolater and a blasphemer and an adulterer and a murderer, and — not to recount all, which would be tedious — guilty of all crimes; since indeed, offending in one, he is become guilty of all. But then, he who has one virtue has all, and he who lacks one has none. If this is true, that sentence is confirmed. But I wish it to be expounded, not confirmed — a sentence which of itself is, with us, firmer than the authorities of all the philosophers. And that indeed about virtues and vices, if it is truly said, it does not follow that on this account all sins are equal.

For that about the inseparability of the virtues — although perhaps I am mistaken, yet, if I remember truly what I scarcely remember — pleased all the philosophers who said that these same virtues are necessary for the conduct of life. But that about the parity of sins only the Stoics dared to argue, against every sense of the human race; and this vanity of theirs, in that Jovinian who in this opinion was a Stoic, but in hunting after and defending pleasures an Epicurean, you refuted most lucidly from the holy Scriptures. In which most delightful and most excellent disputation of yours it appeared plainly enough that it did not please our authors — or rather Truth itself, which spoke through them — that all sins are equal.

But how it can come about that, even if this about the virtues is true, we are nevertheless not thereby compelled to confess the equality of all sins, I will try, as far as I can, with the Lord's help, to make plain. And if I accomplish it, you will approve; where I fall short of the cause, you will supply it. Certainly they persuade us of this — that whoever has had one virtue has all, and that all are lacking to him who has lacked one — because prudence can be neither cowardly nor unjust nor intemperate; for if it were any of these, it would not be prudence. Further, if prudence will then exist, when it is also brave and just and temperate, then assuredly, where it exists, it has the rest with it. So too fortitude cannot be imprudent, nor intemperate, nor unjust;

so temperance must needs be prudent, brave, and just; so justice does not exist, unless it be prudent, brave, and temperate. Thus, where any one of them is true, the others likewise are; but where the others are lacking, that one is not true, even if it somehow seem to be similar. For there are, as you know, certain vices contrary to the virtues by an open distinction, as imprudence is to prudence; but there are certain others which, only because they are vices, are therefore contrary, yet by a kind of deceptive appearance similar — as to that same prudence not imprudence but cunning is contrary. For now I call cunning that which is more usually understood and named among the malicious, not as our Scripture is wont to speak, which often puts cunning in a good sense, whence it is:

Cunning as serpents; and that: That He may give cunning to the innocent. Although even among those pagans the most eloquent of the Roman tongue said: 'Nor yet was guile or cunning lacking to him for taking heed' — putting cunning in a good sense; but among them it is most rare, while among ours it is most frequent. Likewise, in the parts of temperance, most openly contrary is prodigality to thrift; but that which is even commonly called tenacity is indeed a vice, yet similar to thrift not by nature but by a most deceptive appearance. Again, by a manifest dissimilarity injustice is contrary to justice; but the lust of avenging is wont as it were to imitate justice, yet it is a vice. Cowardice is plainly contrary to fortitude;

Hardness, however, differs in its nature, yet deceives by its resemblance. Constancy is a certain part of virtue; from this, inconstancy stands far removed and undoubtedly opposes it, whereas obstinacy affects to be called constancy and is not, because the former is a virtue and the latter a vice. Therefore, so that it be not necessary to recall the same things again, let us set down something by way of example, from which the rest may be understood. Catiline, as those who were able to know him have written of him, could endure cold, thirst, and hunger, and was 'patient of fasting, cold, and want of sleep beyond what is credible to anyone'; and by this he seemed to be endowed, both in the eyes of his followers and of himself, with great fortitude. But this fortitude was not prudent, for it chose evils in place of goods; it was not temperate.

For he was defiled by the most shameful corruptions; it was not just, for he had conspired against his fatherland; and therefore it was not fortitude either, but hardness, which imposed upon itself the name of fortitude in order to deceive the foolish. For if it were fortitude, it would be not a vice but a virtue; and if it were a virtue, it would never be forsaken by the other virtues as by inseparable companions. Wherefore, when it is asked concerning the vices also, whether these too are alike and all present together — so that where one shall be, either none are present where the one is not — it is a laborious thing to demonstrate this, for the reason that two vices are wont to be set against one virtue: both that which is openly contrary and that which is shadowed forth under the appearance of a resemblance.

Hence that quality of Catiline, since it was not fortitude — for it did not have the other virtues along with it — was the more easily seen through; but that it was cowardice, where there was the practice of enduring and bearing the heaviest hardships whatsoever 'beyond what is credible to anyone,' can only with difficulty be believed. Yet perhaps to those who look more keenly that very hardness appears to be cowardice, because he had neglected the labour of good pursuits by which true fortitude is acquired. Nevertheless, since there are bold men who are not timid, and again timid men who are far from bold, and since each is a vice — because he who is brave with true virtue neither rashly dares nor unadvisedly fears — we are compelled to confess that the vices are more numerous than the virtues.

Hence sometimes a vice is removed by a vice, as the love of money by the love of praise; sometimes one gives way so that several succeed it, as when one who was a drunkard, if from stinginess and ambition he has learned to drink moderately. Vices therefore can give way even when other vices succeed them, not virtues; and for that reason they are more numerous. But virtue, wherever it has once entered, since it brings the rest with it, assuredly all the vices whatsoever were present will give way; for not all were present, but sometimes just as many, sometimes more gave way to fewer, or fewer to more. Whether these things are so must be more diligently inquired into. For that is not a divine sentence by which it is said: He who has one virtue has all, and to him none belongs who has lacked one.

But this seemed so to men indeed very ingenious, studious, and at leisure — yet men nonetheless. As for me, I do not know. How am I to say — I do not say of a man, from whom virtue is said to take its name, but even of a woman who keeps to her husband the fidelity of the marriage-bed — that, if she does this on account of God's precept and promise and is faithful first of all to Him, she does not have chastity, or that it is no virtue, or a small one? And likewise of a husband who keeps this same fidelity to his wife. And yet there are very many such, none of whom I would say to be without some sin; and assuredly that sin, of whatever kind, comes from some vice.

Hence conjugal chastity in religious men and women, though beyond doubt it is a virtue — for it is neither nothing nor a vice — yet does not have all the virtues along with it. For if all were present there, no vice would be present; if no vice, then no sin at all; but who is without some sin? Who then is without some vice, that is, without a certain kindling or as it were root of sin, when he cries out who reclined upon the Lord's breast: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us? Nor need this be argued with you at greater length, but I say it for the sake of others who may perhaps read these things.

For you indeed, in that same splendid work against Jovinian, have carefully proved this too from the holy Scriptures, where from this very Epistle — whose words we are now seeking to understand — you also cited what is written: For in many things we all offend. For he did not say 'you offend,' but he said 'we offend,' though it was Christ's apostle who spoke; and though in this place he says: Whosoever shall have kept the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all — there he said that men offend not in one but in many things, and not certain men but all.

But far be it that any believer should suppose that so many thousands of Christ's servants — who truly say that they have sin, lest they deceive themselves and the truth be not in them — have no virtue, since wisdom is a great virtue. And He said to man: Behold, piety is wisdom. But far be it that we should say that so many and so great believers and pious men of God have no piety, which the Greeks call either eusebeia or, more expressly and fully, theosebeia. And what is piety but the worship of God? And whence is He worshipped but by love? For love out of a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned is a great and true virtue, since it is itself also the end of the commandment.

Rightly is it called strong as death, whether because none overcomes it, as none overcomes death, or because in this life the measure of love is even unto death, as the Lord says: Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends; or rather because, as death tears the soul away from the senses of the flesh, so love tears it away from carnal desires. To this, knowledge is subservient, when it is useful; for without it, it puffs up; but what love shall have filled by building up, there this knowledge will find nothing empty to puff up. Moreover, He showed useful knowledge by defining it, where, when He had said: Behold, piety is wisdom, He immediately added: And to abstain from evils is knowledge.

Why then do we not say that he who has this virtue has all, since love is the fulfilling of the law? Or is it that the more it is in a man, the more he is endowed with virtue, but the less it is, the less virtue is present — because it is itself virtue — and the less virtue is present, the more there is vice? Where then that love shall have been full and perfect, nothing of vice will remain. Accordingly the Stoics seem to me to be deceived in this, that they will not allow a man who is progressing in wisdom to have wisdom at all, but to have it only then, when he shall have been altogether perfect in it — not because they deny that he is advanced, but because, unless by emerging from a certain depth he suddenly flashes forth into the free airs of wisdom, they hold him to be in no part wise.

For just as it makes no difference to a man's being drowned whether he has water many furlongs deep above him or but a palm's or a finger's breadth, so they say that those who strive toward wisdom do indeed make progress, like men rising from the bottom of a gulf into the air, but that unless by progressing, as it were by emerging, they have escaped their whole folly like the water overwhelming them, they have no virtue and are not wise; but once they have escaped, they at once have the whole of it, and nothing of folly remains from which any sin whatsoever could arise.

This comparison, in which folly is set as it were as water and wisdom as air, so that the mind, as though emerging from the drowning of folly, suddenly breathes into wisdom, does not seem to me sufficiently suited to the authority of our Scriptures, but rather that other, whereby vice or folly is compared to darkness, and to light, virtue or wisdom — insofar as such likenesses can be drawn from corporeal things to intelligible ones. It is not, therefore, like one rising from the waters into the air, where, when he has passed their surface, he is suddenly and sufficiently given breath, but like one advancing from darkness into light, who by proceeding little by little is gradually illumined.

And until this is fully accomplished, we nevertheless already say of him — as of one coming forth from a most hidden cave — that he is breathed upon by the nearness of the light the more, the nearer he approaches the exit; so that what shines in him is assuredly from the light toward which he advances, while what is still dark is from the darkness whence he comes forth. And so: No living man shall be justified in the sight of God — and yet the just man lives by faith. And: The saints are clothed with righteousness, one more, another less; and no one here lives without sin, and this too one more, another less; but the best is he who has the least. But what am I doing? As if forgetting to whom I speak, I have become like a teacher, when I had proposed what I wished to learn from you.