These things, then, might suffice for the defense of the great Council of Chalcedon. But as it is, the council did not praise Theodore himself, but pronounced orthodox the letter of one who praised him, on account of the right faith which it contains: a thing which what prudent man, if he diligently attends to the case, could fail to know is something different? For it could be that, even if certain sayings of Theodore seemed blameworthy, and the synod neither was ignorant of them nor could interpret them better, it nevertheless believed that they could have escaped the notice of Ibas, just as the Eutychians believe that they could have escaped the notice of the holy Fathers John of Constantinople and Gregory of Nazianzus, and of the whole Church which observed Theodore himself teaching, so that the same Theodore was not condemned while he yet survived.
Therefore, just as the holy synod ought to judge the ancient Church, of which the aforementioned Fathers were a part, not from its communion with and praise of Theodore—or even if it knew him to have erred in some things—but from the proper faith of that Church itself (which the Eutychians confess along with us), so it was fitting that it should judge that letter also, not from its praise of Theodore, but from the proper faith of its own writer, which is read therein.
But how should the synod not believe that the most reverend Ibas could be unaware of Theodore's sayings, which are said to have been written before Nestorius, when it saw Ibas's own faith opposed to the Nestorian dogma? Yet let us grant this too to the Eutychians, that the Council of Chalcedon believed the most reverend Ibas not to have been ignorant of those sayings of Theodore which seem blameworthy; was it for that reason not bound to pronounce his letter orthodox on account of the right faith which it contains? Especially since the same venerable Ibas could have praised Theodore and his teaching for this reason: that he believed the things which he judged reprehensible in his books to have been either inserted by heretics, or reprehended by Theodore himself—as we have shown—or corrected.
and his doctrine ought not to have been judged from the fact that, taking the beginning of writing, he sometimes wrote something reprehensible, or fell into it through a slip of speech; but rather from this, that if anything in it seemed blameworthy, he himself reprehended and corrected it. For if no wise man believes the Church to be heretical because it praises the doctrine of blessed Cyprian, bishop of Carthage and martyr—although he, not only privately, as seemed good to him, but also in a gathered council, decreed that every heretic returning to the Church should be baptized, and for this was blamed by Stephen, bishop of Rome, and resisted him, and, writing his opinion (Cyprian, Epist.
14) to Pompeius, defending it with all the human argumentation he could, treating injuriously that same blessed Stephen by whom he had justly been blamed—how could the letter of the venerable Ibas justly be called heretical because it praised the doctrine of Theodore; who, though in a council he defined nothing contrary to the truth, yet even those things which had been ill composed by him in private, he spontaneously reprehended, and where he was reproved by others for a slip of speech, he hastened not to return the injury, but to correct the offense?
Therefore, just as the Church—not approving the definition of blessed Cyprian and of his predecessor Agrippinus, who had decreed this before him, concerning the rebaptizing of all heretics—nevertheless ascribes not only them, but also all the bishops who defined this together with them, to the Fathers, and judges their faith and doctrine, and most of all Cyprian's, shining throughout the whole world, to be praiseworthy: so the venerable Ibas too could praise the doctrine of Theodore, even while not ignorant that it was in some points blameworthy, without approving of those blameworthy things. But whether blessed Cyprian and Agrippinus, and the other bishops decreeing the same things along with them; or Theodore, even if he too be believed not to have amended his errors—
or the other teachers of the Church, from whose opinions heretics attempt to construct their errors—they are, by the intention of their mind and their purpose (as we judge), defended from the charge of heresy, because before the Church's definition, remaining in its communion, with an excessive or immoderate zeal against heretics, they either decreed such things or said them—not after the Church's sentence in the same question, when, as heretics already separated, by constructing such things they assailed the Church itself. Perhaps someone may say: The synod ought then, if not Theodore (because he died in the peace of the Church), nor his whole doctrine (since he spoke many things rightly), at least to have condemned those very sayings of his which give offense.
First, what synod's example would it follow in doing this? But let any synod be pointed out that condemned the sayings, culled out in great number, of some most learned man who persevered in the Church—and then at least let them complain of the Council of Chalcedon. Next, when would so many books of Theodore be unrolled, that there might be sought in them, most diligently and most scrupulously, what could offend the readers? For if it had to be done, that synod ought to have examined all his writings, lest, if it reproved him in part, it should seem to have approved the rest: and what time would suffice for this? Or when would the number of so many priests, item by item, come together into one opinion;
since the minds of hearers are moved in diverse ways, and what offends one, another with a better understanding receives without offense? But if we are not to be enslaved to the will of the Eutychians, why should anyone say that in that synod the sayings of Theodore alone, and not of all the ancients who departed this life in the Church, ought to have been gone over and sifted? For if it had blamed only certain writings of Theodore, it would seem to have approved everything of everyone, whereas the truth does not teach that all things are to be approved. And who would know even the names of all who have written on the Christian religion? Since, then, the synod could not examine all the writings of all men, it was not fitting that it should condemn the sayings of Theodore: for the apostle's sentence suffices us in this, by which it is said: Prove all things;
hold fast that which is good (1 Thess. v, 21). But if this had not been the reason, what modest and prudent judge passes judgment except upon the causes and questions set before him? But when the accusers brought nothing against bishop Ibas concerning his praise of Theodore, who died in the communion of the Church, was it fitting that the holy synod, gathered for the faith and peace of the general Church, should introduce a new question into a private cause between litigants, and spend time upon it? As though it were not enough that they had litigated in so grievous and long-drawn-out a collision, in such great trials, without its adding something worse, either to the obstinacy of the accusers, or to the calamity of the bishop who was accused:
especially since that man bewailed his lot, seeking help from the piety of the holy synod, that he had already changed prison more than twenty times, and had come to it from forty stages of journey. What man, save the Eutychians, would say this—men whom reason together with piety has deserted, and in whom only the name of human remains? But let the reader remember that we have said these things in defense of the great synod, compelled by no necessity, in order to trample down and utterly crush the pride of the senseless Eutychians.
For it has pleased us to make sport of them, and to set up the case as though Theodore had written certain blameworthy things and not amended them, and as though not only the aforesaid Council of Chalcedon had known them, and could not interpret them better, but also the venerable Ibas, not ignorant of these very things, had praised his doctrine: none of which has been proved, but we have granted these things of our own accord, so that thereby it might the more appear how foolishly these same Eutychians complain of the sentence pronounced by the synod concerning the letter of Ibas, since not even with all these things granted could it be proved reprehensible.