You do not seem to me to have spoken fittingly in saying that matter has qualities from the beginning. For if this is so, of what will God be the maker? For if we shall say substances, we are declaring that these pre-exist; and if again qualities, these too we say exist. Therefore, since both substance and qualities exist, it seems to me superfluous to call God the craftsman.
But, lest I seem to be constructing some argument for myself, answer me now as you are questioned: in what manner do you say that God is the craftsman? Is it because He turned the substances so that those no longer exist as they once were, but others have come to be instead of them; or because He preserved those substances which existed before this, but turned their qualities?
COMPANION: It does not at all seem to me that some change of substances has occurred; for this too seems to me absurd to say. But I say that a certain turning of the qualities has occurred, according to which I say God is the craftsman. And just as, for example, one might say that a house has come to be out of stones — concerning which one cannot say that the stones, having become a house, no longer remain in their substance —
for I say that the house has come to be by the quality of the composition, the former quality of the stones obviously having been turned — so it seems to me also concerning God: that, the substance remaining, He has effected a certain turning of its qualities, according to which I say that the coming-to-be of this world has occurred by God.
ORTHODOXUS: Since, then, you say that a certain turning of the qualities has occurred by God, answer me, as I purpose to learn a few things. Say, then: does it seem to you too that the evils are qualities of the substances? COMPANION: It does.
ORTHODOXUS: And were these qualities in matter from the beginning, or did they take a beginning of being? COMPANION: I say that these qualities coexist with matter without having been created.