ORTHODOXUS: Then if the evils are qualities of matter, and God turned its qualities toward the better, it is necessary to inquire whence come the evils. For the qualities did not remain such as they once were by nature.
Or, if the qualities were not evil before, but you say that from God's turning the first qualities such evil ones have come to be about matter, then God will be the cause of the evils, having turned the qualities that were not evil into being evil. Or do you think God did not turn the evil qualities toward the better, but the remaining ones only, all that happened to be indifferent, and these you say were turned by God for the sake of the ordering? COMPANION: Thus I held it from the beginning.
ORTHODOXUS: How then do you say that He left the qualities of the base things as they were? Was He able to do away with those too, but did not will it; or did He not have the ability? For if you shall say He was able but did not will it, it is necessary to call Him the cause of these, because, being able to make the evils not be, He allowed them to remain as they were — and especially when He began to fashion matter.
For if He had no concern at all for matter, He would not be the cause of the things He allowed to remain; but since He fashions some part of it, and lets some part of it be so, being able to turn that too toward the better, He seems to me worthy to incur the blame, having left a portion of matter to be wicked for the destruction of the portion which He fashioned.
Moreover, it seems to me that in this respect it has been most grievously wronged — that very portion of matter which He fashioned, now sharing in the evils. For if one should examine matters accurately, he will find matter now in a worse plight than its former disorder. For before it was distinguished, the perceiving of the evils was not present to it; but now each of its parts takes perception of the evils.
And take for me the example of man. For before he is formed into an image and made a living being by the Craftsman's art, he had from nature the not perceiving any of the evils. But from the time he becomes a man by God, he also takes on the perception of the evil that draws near. And this, which you say came to be by God for the benefit of matter, is found rather to have accrued to it for the worse.
But if you say that the evils have not ceased because God is not able to do away with the evils, you will be declaring God to be powerless. And the powerlessness will be either because He is by nature weak, or because, conquered, He has been enslaved by fear to some stronger being.
If, then, you shall dare to say that God is by nature weak, you seem to me to be endangering yourself concerning Him. But if it is because He is conquered by fear of some greater being, you will be calling the evils greater than God, as conquering the impulse of His resolve — which seems to me absurd to say concerning God. For why shall these things not rather be God, since, according to your argument, they are able to conquer God — if indeed we call that 'God' which has authority over all things?