I wish to learn a few things from you also concerning matter itself; so come, tell me: was matter something simple or composite? For the difference among the things that have come to be brings me round to such an examination of this argument. For if matter happened to be something simple and of one form, while the world is composite and has its constitution out of different substances and mixtures, it is impossible to say that this world has come to be out of matter, since composite things cannot have their constitution out of one simple thing; for the composite signifies a mixture of certain simple things.
But if again, on the other hand, you should wish to say that matter is composite, you will by all means assert that it has been compounded out of certain simple things. And if it was compounded out of simple things, then the simple things existed once by themselves, by whose being compounded matter came to be — out of which it is shown to be created as well.
For if matter is composite, and composite things have their constitution out of simple things, then there was once a time when matter was not — that is, before the simple things came together. But if there was once a time when matter was not, while there was never a time when the uncreated was not, then matter will not be uncreated.
out of which matter was compounded, there will not be two and only two uncreated things. — And does it seem to you that none of the things that are is opposed to itself? COMPANION: It does. ORTHODOXUS: And is water opposed to fire? COMPANION: It appears to me to be opposed. ORTHODOXUS: And likewise darkness to light, and heat to cold, and besides these moisture to dryness? COMPANION: So it seems to me to be. ORTHODOXUS: Then if none of the things that are is opposed to itself, but these are opposed to one another, they will not be one matter, nor will they be out of one matter. — And I wish to learn from you again a certain argument like to this.
Does it seem to you that the parts are not destructive of one another? COMPANION: It does. ORTHODOXUS: And that fire and water are parts of matter, and likewise the rest as well? COMPANION: So I hold. ORTHODOXUS: What then? Does it not seem to you that water is destructive of fire, and light of darkness, and the others, all that are like these? COMPANION: It does.
ORTHODOXUS: Then if the parts are not destructive of one another, but these happen to be destructive of one another, they will not be parts of one another; and if they are not parts of one another, they will not be of one matter. Moreover, neither will they themselves be matter, by virtue of the fact that none of the things that are is destructive of itself, according to the account of the opposite.
For nothing is opposed to itself; for opposites are by nature opposed to other things. For instance, the white is not opposed to itself, but is said to be opposed to the black; and light likewise is shown not to be opposed to itself, but appears to be so disposed toward darkness; and so likewise very many others. If, then, there were some one matter, it would not be opposed to itself. But since the opposites are thus disposed, it is shown that matter is not.
Since I think that you too are ready to make the inquiry concerning evil, it seems to me good to leave aside the argument concerning matter. For toward the demonstration that matter does not exist, it appears to me to have been said sufficiently.