2-13:1
Ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν κακῶν ἐξέτασιν ἔρχεσθαι δεῖ καὶ ἀναγκαίως ἀναζητεῖν τὰ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις. τὰ παρ ἀνθρώποις κακὰ πό τερον εἴδη τυγχάνει κακοῦ ἢ μέρη; εἰ γὰρ εἴδη ταῦτα ἐκείνου φάναι θέλοις, οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερον παρὰ ταῦτα καθ ἑαυτὸ τὸ κακὸν τῷ τὰ γένη ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἐξετάζεσθαι· οἷον τὸ ζῷον γένος ἐστὶν κατ εἶδος κατηγορούμενον, τουτέστιν κατά γε ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ὅσα τε ἔμψυχα ὄντα τὴν προαιρετικὴν κίνησιν ἔχει· ἄλλ οὐχ οἷόν τε δείκνυται τοῦτο. οὐ γὰρ γένος εἶναί φαμεν ἕτερόν τι καθ ἑαυτὸ ὑπάρχον παρὰ τὰ εἴδη· οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κακοῦ λέγειν ἀνάγκη. τὸ γὰρ γένος εἴπαμεν τὴν σύστασιν ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἔχειν, μὴ εἶναι δέ τι ἕτερον καθ ἑαυτό. εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει, γενητὸν ἔσται τὸ κακόν· τὰ γὰρ εἴδη γενητὰ ὄντα δείκνυται, οἷον φόνος καὶ μοιχεία καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια. εἰδ αὖ πάλιν μέρη τινὸς κακοῦ ταῦτα εἶναι ἐθέλοις, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτα γενητά, ἀνάγκη κἀκεῖνο γενητὸν ὑπάρχειν. ὧν γὰρ τὰ μέρη γενητά, ταῦτα ὁμοίως ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι γενητά· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον ἐκ μερῶν συνέστηκεν. καὶ τὸ μὲν ὅλον οὐκ ἔσται μὴ τῶν μερῶν ὄντων, ἔσται δὲ τὰ μέρη, κἂν μὴ τὸ ὅλον παρῇ. οὐδενὸς δὲ τῶν ὄντων μέρος μέν ἐστιν γενητόν, μέρος δὲ <πάλιν> ἀγένητον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συγχωρήσαιμι τῷ λόγῳ, ἦν ποτε τὸ κακόν, ὅτε ὁλόκληρον οὐν ἦν, τουτέστιν πρὶν δημιουργῆσαι τὴν ὕλην τὸν θεόν. τότε δὲ ὁλόκληρον γίνεται, ὅτε πρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος· τῶν γὰρ μερῶν τοῦ κακοῦ ἄνθρωπος ὑπάρχει ποιητής. καὶ τοῦ ἐντεῦθεν τοῦ ὁλόκληρον εἶναι τὸ κακὸν αἴτιος ἔσται δημιουργήσας ὁ θεός, ὅπερ οὐκ εὖ ἔχειν μοι τοῦτο περὶ θεοῦ <λέγειν> δοκεῖ, εἰ οὐδ ὁπότερον τούτων εἰπεῖν ἐθέλοις, πρᾶξιν δέ τινος κακοῦ εἶναι λέγοις, γενητὸν αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν μηνύεις· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ τινὸς πρᾶξις ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι λαμβάνει. πρὸς δὴ τούτοις οὐδὲν ἕτερον παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ κακὸν εἰπεῖν ἔχεινς. ποίαν γὰρ πρᾶξιν κακὴν ἑτέραν παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις δεικνύειν ἔχεις; ὅτι γὰρ ὁ ἐνεργῶν οὐ κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον ὑπάρχει κακία, κατὰ δὲ τὸν τῆς προαιρέσεως τρόπον, τοιαῦτα πράττειν ἐπαναιρούμενος, ἐξ ὧν τοῦ κακῶς λέγεσθαι τὴν προσηγορίαν λαμβάνει, προλαβὼν ἔδειξα τῷ λόγῳ
But we must come to the examination of the evils, and of necessity inquire into the things among men. Are the evils among men species of evil, or parts of it? For if you should wish to say that these are species of that, there is nothing else besides these that is evil in itself, since the genera are examined within the species. For instance, 'living being' is a genus predicated according to species — that is, according to man and the like, all that, being ensouled, have voluntary motion; but it is shown that this cannot be the case. For we do not say that the genus is some other thing existing in itself apart from the species; thus indeed it is necessary to speak also concerning evil. For we said that the genus has its constitution within the species, and is not some other thing existing in itself. And if this is so, the evil will be created; for the species are shown to be created — for instance, murder and adultery and the things like these. But if again, on the other hand, you should wish these to be parts of some evil, while these are created, it is necessary that that too be created. For things whose parts are created are likewise of necessity created; for the whole is composed of parts. And the whole will not exist if the parts do not exist, while the parts will exist even if the whole is not present. But of none of the things that are is one part created and another part again uncreated. And even if I should concede this to the argument, there was once a time when the evil was, while it was not whole — that is, before God fashioned matter. And it becomes whole then, when man came to be by God; for man is the maker of the parts of evil. And of evil's being thereafter whole, the cause will be God who fashioned — which it does not seem to me to be well to say this concerning God. And if you should wish to say neither of these, but should say that it is a certain action of some evil, you signify that it is created; for the action of someone takes a beginning of being. Moreover, besides these, you cannot say that evil is anything else besides these. For what other evil action can you point to besides those among men? For that the one who acts is evil not according to the account of substance, but according to the manner of choice, choosing to do such things from which he takes the appellation of being called evil — this I showed beforehand in the argument.
但我們必須來到對惡的察驗，且必然要探究人間的事。人間的惡究竟是惡的種類，還是它的部分？因為你若願說這些是那惡的種類，那麼除這些以外，就沒有別的「惡自身」存在，因為類是在種類之內加以察驗的。譬如「活物」是按種類所論定的類——就是按人以及類似的，凡有魂、具有自願運動的；但這已顯出是不可能的。因為我們並不說「類」是脫離種類、自身另外存在之物；論到惡也必須照樣說。因為我們已說過，類是在種類之內有其組成的，並非自身另外存在之物。若是這樣，惡就是受造的；因為那些種類已顯出是受造的——譬如凶殺、姦淫，以及類乎這些的。但反過來，你若願這些是某惡的部分，而這些既是受造的，那惡也必然是受造的。因為凡部分是受造之物，照樣必然是受造的；因為整體是由部分所組成的。整體若無部分就不存在，部分卻縱使整體不在也仍存在。然而凡存在之物，沒有一部分是受造、另一部分又是非受造的。縱使我把這點讓給這論證，那麼曾有一時惡是存在的，卻尚不完整——就是在神塑造物質之前。它乃是當人藉神而生成時才成為完整的；因為人是惡之諸部分的製造者。而此後惡之為完整，其緣由就要是那塑造的神——這在我看來，對神這樣說乃是不妥的。你若這二者都不願說，卻說它是某惡的某種行動，你就指明它是受造的；因為某人的行動是取得存有之開端的。再者，除這些以外，你不能說惡是別的甚麼。因為除人間的那些以外，你還能指出甚麼別的惡的行動呢？因為那行動者之為惡，不是按本質的道理，乃是按抉擇的方式，他既選擇去作這樣的事，便從這些得著被稱為「惡」的名稱——這我先前已在論證中顯明了。