Since, then, you have spoken concerning evils, wishing to show that evils exist and that men are the makers of them, I wish to inquire again briefly: whether men possess the impulse from themselves—that is, whether they themselves have become the inventors of such a use—or whether they have become such by God, or whether again there is some other one who incites men toward such things.
ORTHODOX: That men have been made such by God does not seem to me to be a thing one should say. Rather I say that the first man was made self-determining—that is, free—from whom the successors of the race also inherited the like freedom. I declare, therefore, that man was made free, yet serving whomever he wills.
For this, I say, has been granted to him by God as the greatest gift. For all other things serve the divine command of necessity: for if you name the heaven, it stands bearing its Master, not moving from its appointed place; and if you wish to speak of the sun, it accomplishes its appointed motion, not declining its course, but serving the Master by a certain necessity. And likewise you see the earth fixed fast and carrying out the command of the One who ordered it.
And in like manner the other things too serve their Maker of necessity, none of them being able to do anything other than that for which it was made. Therefore we do not praise these things for thus obeying their Master, nor is any better hope laid up for them, because they kept the command unwillingly.
But man received the authority to obey whomever he wills, bringing himself into servitude—not being overpowered by the necessity of nature, nor being deprived of his power. This, I say, has been granted to him for the sake of better things, that he might receive from the Greater One something more than what he has; and this comes to him from his obedience, and he demands it as a debt due from his Maker.
For I say that man was not made thus for his harm, but for the sake of better things. For if he had been made as one of the elements, or of those things that likewise serve God of necessity, he would no longer receive a reward worthy of free choice, but would be like an instrument of the Craftsman, irrationally bearing the blame for whatever was not done well; for the user of it would be the cause of these. Moreover, man would not even have known the better, knowing nothing else but that one thing for which he was made.
I declare, therefore, that God, choosing thus to honour man and to make him knowing of the better things, gave him the authority to be able to do what he wills, and exhorts him to turn his authority toward the better—not again taking away his self-determination, but wishing to point out the better. For the power to act is present with him, even when he receives the commandment, but God exhorts and turns the choice of that power toward the better.
For just as a father exhorts a son who has the authority both to learn his lessons and not to learn, to cleave rather to his lessons, pointing out that this is better—and does not take away the son's authority to be able to do otherwise, even if he is unwilling to learn—so it seems to me that God too, in urging man to obey His commands, does not take away his authority of free choice, the power both to obey and not to obey His commands.
For in the very beginning, that He exhorts in this way shows that He did not take away the authority. He commands, in order that man may be able to enjoy the better things; for this follows upon obeying the command of God. So that He does not wish to command in order to take away the authority He gave, but in order to bestow something better, as upon one worthy to obtain greater things, in return for his having obeyed God while yet possessing the authority not to obey.