The Emperor Justinian Augustus to John, prefect of the praetorium, twice ex-consul and patrician. To us indeed, while we deliberate calmly by what means some good thing, and one that may please God, may through us be conferred upon our subjects, it most plainly comes to pass that we are engaged in cares and vigils long, both day and night. Nor do we undertake that vigilance of mind in vain or beside the purpose; but whether by day we do something, or by night we use the night equally with the day, we expend it upon so many counsels, in order that our subjects, while we bear all things on their behalf openly, may be settled with all freedom from anxiety, in safety and the utmost tranquility.
For we proceed with every searching and careful inquiry, desiring to bring about those things which may bring benefit to our subjects, and at the same time that they may be quit of every burden and loss which has been introduced from somewhere beyond the public assessment and the just and customary levy. For we have found that very much iniquity has crept into the commonwealth, which, brought in not at the beginning but a few years ago, drives our subjects to poverty, so that there is danger lest they sink to the utmost want of all things, and lest, according to the public assessment, they be unable to pay even the accustomed and usual and truly pious public tributes without grievous expense and necessity.
And since those too who in past years held some office not quite honorably desired to gain some profit for their own affairs through the conferral of offices, and the most glorious prefects of the praetoria deservedly followed them, how could it ever have come to pass that the taxpayers could suffice, through that kind of iniquity, for the extraordinary expenses together with the customary and most full public exactions? There came therefore into our mind the thought, by what deed at last we might be able, by one general act, to bring over to better things whatever harmful thing exists anywhere in our provinces.
And in fact we have perceived that this will come about, if we take pains that the governors of the nations, who administer the civil offices in the provinces, use clean hands and abstain from all plunder, content with these things alone which are furnished from the public treasury. And this indeed will not happen unless they too have received their offices free of charge, giving nothing under the pretext (as they call it) of suffrages — neither to those who hold the magistracies, nor to anyone else whatsoever.
For although no small revenue thereby falls away from the empire, we have nevertheless observed that, if our taxpayers are preserved unharmed and unhurt by the judges, receiving a vast increase, both the empire and the public treasury will fare well, having its subjects always wealthy and ready for its needs; and that, this single order being introduced, an ample and ineffable abundance of all things will arise. Or is it not manifest to all that he who gives gold, and who in this way redeems an office, gives not only that which is devised under the pretext (as they call it) of suffrages, but accumulates besides much more from without, in order first to win favor with those who are accustomed either to confer an office or to canvass for it?
And thus, once one absurd principle has been admitted, he who has once begun to lavish must of necessity pass through many hands; and whatever amount of gold it is, he perhaps furnishes it not from his own but taken on loan; and in order that he may be able to receive the loan, being liable to loss, he reckons with himself that it is fitting to receive from the province as much as may suffice either for discharging his own debt, both in principal and in interest, and also the loss which he sustained in order to take the loan, or, during the time of his administration, to supply both to the judge and to those who attend on him
larger expenses than they made before; or, after the office has been laid down — at which time perchance he will be without authority — to lay it up for himself for longer use as it were a revenue; so that what is exacted from our taxpayers exceeds threefold, or rather (if one ought to speak the truth) tenfold, that which was given by them — whereby the fisc too will feel detriment. For the things which ought to have been brought into the fisc, if he who obtains the office used clean hands, after he who holds the office has converted them to his own uses, the taxpayer being utterly reduced to want, he then reckons this man's want, brought on by himself, to our account. Besides, whatever things are done impiously are deservedly referred to the occasion of such future evils.
For if the governors of the provinces are bent upon gain and plunder, they acquit many guilty defendants once money has been taken for the crime, and again they condemn many innocent men in order to do a favour to the guilty. Nor do they do this only in cases concerning money, but also in public criminal trials, where a man's life is at risk. Hence flights arise out of the provinces; hence from all places everywhere there flow together hither, groaning, priests, decurions, members of the official staff, plebeian heads of households, and country folk, indignant at the robberies and injuries of our judges, though these had the best right to be just. Nor indeed do these things alone come to pass, but in the cities also seditions and popular disturbances are (for the most part) both stirred up and put down for the sake of money.
In sum, this is the cause of all evils, and to amass money from public offices is the beginning and end of every disgraceful deed. And truly, as the sacred oracles teach, it is a thing at once worthy of wonder and most true, namely that avarice is the mother of all evils, and especially when it springs up not in the souls of private men but of magistrates.
For who would not steal without fear of danger, who would not rob in safety, when he turns his eyes to the magistrate and sees him holding all things for sale for gold, confident that he can commit nothing so base that he cannot redeem it by paying money? Hence come murders, adulteries, the assaults of robbers, woundings, the rape of virgins, the disruption of markets and public assemblies, the contempt of laws and of magistrates, since all men reckon that these things are set out for sale like some cheap slave.
And so we are not able even to grasp in thought, much less to set forth in speech, how many atrocious things arise from the thefts of the provincial magistrates, since no one dares to rebuke them freely, for they at once plead the purchase of their administration as an excuse.
All these matters having been set before ourselves for deliberation, and our most pious consort, given to us by God, having afterwards been taken into the fellowship of our counsel, and the affair having moreover been communicated with your Excellency—though it was undertaken at the suggestion of your advice—we have arrived at this divine law, by which we decree that no proconsular administration, nor (as up to now they have been called) vicarial, nor the Count of the East, nor any other administration whatever, whether consular or corrector's (of which the table appended to this our divine law makes express mention, and which alone we bring under this law), shall render any suffragium, or anything in respect of office, to any magistrate or to those about the magistrates, or to any other person under the name of patronage; but since they obtain their offices free of charge, they shall furnish only a small payment under the name of the codicils and documents which are customarily given for each appointment.
For we have appended a table to this our divine law, which declares what it is fitting that each office should furnish—whether in our sacred register, or in the court of your Excellency—under the name of codicils, instruments, or warrants, yet so reduced to moderation that it brings to him no great burden or loss. This indeed we decree: that the vicar of the Asian province, who is also governor of Pacatian Phrygia, shall no longer be called by that name, but henceforth shall bear the name of Count of Pacatian Phrygia, and shall draw from the treasury under the title of provisions and head-tax the same amounts which he has hitherto received for both offices, nothing being thereby diminished.
And let him not employ two cohorts, but from both—that of the governor and that of the vicar—mingled together at once, let one Count's cohort be established in both substance and name, the risk of the public tributes pressing upon him and upon all together; namely, one cohort being established and in no way at all divided, but all serving jointly as it were in one college; likewise drawing from the public funds the provisions and head-payments on account of the doubled risk, which both cohorts previously drew.
Yet let him—as before the vicar, but now the right honourable Count of Pacatian Phrygia—not usurp to himself any power or rule whatever over the remaining provinces of the Asian region, but just as he holds the title of right honourable Count of Pacatian Phrygia, so also let him be content (as we have said before) with Pacatian Phrygia alone. This very same thing we also lay down concerning the other of the vicars who were before appointed throughout the Pontic region: that henceforth there shall not be two, but one only, who indeed shall be called Count of First Galatia, but shall have (as he does today as well) authority also over the soldiers, and shall draw the provisions of both offices.
Yet so that outside First Galatia (for we permit him no other at all) he shall obtain no power over any Pontic province, but only through First Galatia, with the cohort likewise mingled, and understood and reckoned (as we have said) as one Count's college in substance and name, none of them holding any distinction at all over the others; but let there be one cohort for those who are subject to one governor, the ruler of one province, the whole cohort together with its governor bearing the risk concerning the tributes. To no judge whatsoever, neither civil nor military, do we at all grant leave to send through the cities of the province over which he presides those who are called keepers of the place (loci servatores):
they knowing that if they do any such thing, they themselves shall fall from their administration for presuming to raise others into their office. The same thing we say also concerning the most illustrious Count of the East and the most illustrious governor (for there too we make one administration out of both), so that he shall have the name of right honourable Count of the East, but shall command one Count's cohort alone in substance and name, and shall rule only First Syria and the Cyrrhestic territories, and shall enjoy the provisions of both offices alike. For we set him also as equal to the vicars, so that he too, together with the cohort obedient to him, shall bear the risk for the exaction of the tributes and for the preservation of civil and public order.
Furthermore, we will that absolutely all men be made subject to the governors of our provinces. Plebeians indeed (as is proper to jurisdiction) in all cases and on whatever occasion, both pecuniary and criminal. But those who are honoured with military rank and assigned to their own judges—these too shall nonetheless in all things be subject to them on occasion of tributes and crimes. But neither let the governors of the provinces suffer those who come, from any court whatsoever, to execute any sentences, to receive anything more, under the name of customary dues or sportulae, than has been promulgated by our sacred constitution, knowing that if they neglect this, they themselves shall make good every loss which is thereby inflicted upon our subjects.
And we grant them leave, not only that they may report these things to those judges by whom they were sent, but also to us, so that we too, on learning of them, may pursue the deed itself with fitting chastisement. Moreover, if they discover any men, swollen with the pride of dignity or of the belt, to be doing injury to our taxpayers, we grant them leave both to take cognizance of the misdeed, and to strip the belt from those who are caught guilty, and to discharge our office in the provinces—a thing that was promulgated also by the ancient laws. For just as we keep them from all unjust gain, so we decree that those who conduct themselves with integrity in their offices shall enjoy every honour, reverence, and authority. And so, the magistracies having been thus distinguished by us,
it is fitting that this be done in this way: that with mention made of God in our presence—or (if so much leisure should not be available to us) in the presence of your Highness and those who shall ever have adorned your seat, and in the presence of him who shall ever be the most glorious Count of our sacred largesses, and of the most glorious Quaestor of our sacred palace, and of the most glorious Count of our private property established everywhere, with the most magnificent chartularius of our sacred bedchamber, who is over us in the matter of the codicils, being likewise present for the time—he who has undertaken the magistracy shall give an oath that he has given nothing to anyone,
neither in any way whatever has given or promised it under the title of gift or of patronage, nor has bargained to send it from the province—whether to the most glorious prefects, or to others endowed with power, or to those accustomed to be about them, or to anyone whomsoever—I say, under the title of patronage; but just as he receives and takes the magistracy gratuitously, and moreover the provisions from the public funds (which alone we permit him to receive), so also he shall keep it with pure hands, being about to render account thereof to God and to us alike.
For let your Highness know, and those who shall ascend the same throne after you, that if either they themselves, or those whose service they employ in the part of the commonwealth committed to them, or your cohort, or those who set out to the aforesaid offices, or anyone else whatsoever, shall presume to receive anything beyond the customary dues defined for them by us (which alone, deeming them sufficient, we have decreed to be given):
a penalty by no means light shall be inflicted; but the supreme magistrates, who shall have dared either themselves to receive anything from those who set out to the aforesaid offices, or to permit their cohort to do anything of the like, or who shall not have corrected what was reported to them, shall not only restore fourfold of that which they received, but shall also incur grievous indignation, and shall be anxious lest they be endangered in respect of their authority. But if those who are about them, and the cohort obeying them, shall attempt to receive anything beyond what has been granted by us, they shall be held, both they themselves to a fourfold restitution to those who have suffered loss, and beyond this, besides being subjected to the penalties which their offences shall have merited, they shall also be stripped of their goods and
the belt. Since therefore they undertake their offices gratuitously, above all things they must take pains to watch diligently over the tributes, and to exact with the utmost vigour from the undevoted and the intractable, and from those who need compulsion, yielding in nothing—and not on that account seeking any gain—while toward the devoted they are to conduct themselves with a fatherly affection.
Next, that they may keep our subjects unharmed in every part, receiving nothing whatever from any of them, but show themselves fair in deciding controversies, fair in preserving public order; in prosecuting crimes indeed rendering the innocent free from false accusations, but imposing the lawful penalties upon guilty defendants; and exercising rule among their subjects in no other way than fathers are wont to do among their sons, so that they may love them indeed, if they are free of crime, but correct and punish them if they appear to be liable to crimes; in short, dispensing justice to them both in public cases and in private contracts.
And not that they alone should do this, but that they should take to themselves an assessor and all those accustomed to be about them, who are like themselves, lest at any time, while they themselves are without fault, they should seem to offend and to steal through others, and (what is much fouler) to enlist accomplices in their misdeeds. Wherefore it shall concern your Highness to send to the offices those who both excel others in gravity of character and have skill in public accounts, such as the decurions are wont to be, and others who have given proof of their goodness, and are fit for conducting magistracies.
And who would not love him, and reckon him to abound in every honourable quality, who sets out to office approved not only by our decree and the judgement of your eminence, because he is a frugal and good man, but who, moreover, having undertaken the administration gratuitously, and not at all given over to any vicious thing throughout the province—neither how he may scrape together the money paid out for the office, nor whence he may gather gold for his own uses—but bends his zeal toward this alone, that he may render himself commended to God and to us, and obtain a good and memorable name, and procure for himself the hope of an ample reward from us in the future?
But if anyone shall have done anything contrary to these things, let him know that even during the time of his administration, while he is judge, he shall be prosecuted as guilty of theft. And indeed, if he shall be seen to have given gold either to obtain the magistracy or to recover from the magistracy (for both alike cleave to the crime), he shall not only suffer the confiscation of his goods, and exile, and tortures and punishments applied to his body, but he shall also involve in enormous evils the one who (as we have said before) received it from him. For we require pure hands from the governors of the provinces, that we may on every side keep our subjects unharmed and abounding in a plenty of all things.
And these penalties indeed, both from the laws and from the magistrates, shall be inflicted upon those who shall have perpetrated any such thing, even while they are in the aforesaid offices. And we grant also among the provincials this leave: that if the governor shall have done anything contrary to right throughout the province, or shall perhaps have exposed the taxpayers themselves to losses or expenses, the most God-loving bishop and the chief men of that place, enumerating the governor's offences, may direct their petitions to us. For we, on learning the matter, shall send into the province someone to examine these things, so that he may suffer the penalties of his offences there where he also offended, and so that another, looking to this example, may not presume to do the like.
According to the ancient constitutions, he who lays down his magistracy is under necessity, having deposited the belt, to remain in the province for fifty days under public view, and to receive all the actions brought against him. But if, before he completes the fifty days, he flees and is seized like some cheap slave, we grant the taxpayers leave both to detain him there in the place, and to exact in full, under the title of theft, whatever he gave them—the most God-loving bishop being present, of course, and hearing the case without written record—until he restores the whole of what he shall be seen to have plundered.
And so we permit even to the provincials themselves, if they perceive a robbery on the governors' part, the leave—or rather the necessity—of reporting these things to us, so that we, being instructed that he holds justice altogether for sale for gold, may, beyond the heavenly punishments to which he is liable as a violator of the oath under which he undertook the magistracy, subject him also to the aforesaid penalties. But if for any cause whatsoever he shall have wished, before the fifty days are completed, to flee from the province, then, being seized wherever he is seen to dwell, he shall indeed be recalled into the province in which he was administering; and let him restore fourfold whatever he shall be found to have received.
This indeed being observed: that in no other matter is it permitted to our subjects to do these things against the governors except on account of robberies. For if in exacting the tributes against the undevoted, or in the prosecution of crimes, he has seemed a little too vehement, we will not permit the subjects to attempt anything against him. Nay, on the contrary, we will rather subject them to the most bitter penalties of all, if they shall presume to inflict injuries, after he has laid down his magistracy, upon those who have used pure hands and have applied themselves with all care and diligence to the exaction of the tributes, and shall pursue with unjoyful acclamations those leaving the provinces after the appointed time.
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For the most illustrious governors of the provinces of our dominion, who shall come after this law, ought not only to revolve in their minds how great a glory awaits them if they show themselves to be such, but also into how great difficulties they will fall, if (so far as in them lies) they shall presume to dissolve this law and to hold it as abrogated.
For it would be absurd if they themselves should chastise those caught in petty thefts, and subject them to torments, and grant them no pardon until they have restored the things carried off, while they themselves, being guilty of the greatest thefts, should be acquitted of guilt without any pleading of cause, and should not be ashamed of the example which they set their subjects in this matter—since, meanwhile, if they abstain from these things, they would be able not only to be reckoned among the honourable, who live nobly and are heaped with all praise, but also to obtain a good testimony from us.
Indeed, that we too may guard for them honour and reverence, and that they in turn may render to us integrity and goodwill, we grant power neither to the right honourable generals nor to anyone else to usurp to themselves any prerogative against them, or to inflict injury, or in any way to intermeddle in civil affairs.
For let all our subjects know that it is on account of their own advantages—namely, that they may suffer no loss in any part, that they may live under a tranquil and happy state of all things, and that they may not be compelled to abandon their own dwellings and to endure miseries on foreign soil—that we have on this account composed the present law, dedicating it at once to God and to the venerable, great, and public festival days that are now at hand, so that all may understand that they shall have the governors rather as fathers than as thieves and like the basest slaves.
And since you know, O our taxpayers, how great a care we have laid up in our mind on your behalf, it is fair that you too should pay the public tributes with the alacrity of a great spirit and without any loss, not waiting for the compulsion of the governors—nay, rather show yourselves so eager and devoted of your own accord, that from your very deeds an indication may be given to us that, in return for so ample a benevolence toward the human race, you represent to us your devotion, and that you may deservedly obtain, on occasion of your devotion, the highest favour and providence from the governors.
And since the risk of the tributes wholly threatens the governors, and it is acknowledged that they set out to their offices at their own risk—and this too you recognize—it is fitting that you also, knowing these things, should by every means avoid undevotedness, and not so divert your reckonings and counsels to disobedience that there should be need of their vehemence, which it is necessary for them to assume on account of the unavoidable exaction of the tributes.
For it is known to you also, O our subjects, that military expenses and the pursuit of enemies both need great assiduity and can in no way at all be accomplished without money, since that matter admits of no delay, nor do we endure to look with equal eyes upon the dominion of the Romans diminished; but rather, all Libya being now recovered and the Vandals reduced to servitude, we hope that we shall daily receive and accomplish far greater things than these from God—for which it is fitting that the public tributes be exacted without loss, and with alacrity, and at the appointed times.
And therefore, if you too shall devotedly come forward to the governors for payment, and they shall gladly and readily see to it that the tributes are conveyed to us, we shall both praise the governors for their diligence, and also embrace you for your ready will; and there shall be a certain fair and everywhere harmonious accord between those who preside and those over whom they preside. Therefore let all together offer praises to the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ for this law, which shall grant to them that each may dwell securely in his own homeland, each possess his own goods, and moreover reap the fruit from the justice of the governors.
And indeed we too have established this very thing for this cause: that through this equity of the law we might the more easily reconcile ourselves to God, and render our empire commended to Him, and that we might not seem to despise, oppressed by injury, the men whom God has handed over to us for this purpose—that, following His goodness, we might in all things deal mercifully with their account. Whence (so far as concerns us) let it be consecrated to God on this account, that we omit none of those good things which come into our mind for the protection of our subjects.
For wishing to abolish those illiberal and servile thefts, and to protect our taxpayers, lest they suffer anything harsh from the governors of the provinces, we have on this account taken pains to confer the offices upon them gratuitously, that they may have no occasion for offending and for plundering the subjects—for whose sake we sustain no lack of any toil—disdaining to imitate those who before us were set over the empire, who, by conferring offices for money, took away from themselves the means of justly rebuking those who conducted themselves unjustly in their offices: worthy indeed to have their heads covered with a cloak on account of the money basely accepted for the offices, since they could neither rescue their own taxpayers from wicked governors, nor on the aforesaid account restrain the governors themselves.
But we judge that the revenues are sufficient for the empire if the taxpayers contribute only the public tributes alone, and that there is no need for other and other things to be scraped together extraordinarily day by day, which would shake the whole order of life for the subjects. But what was said by us a little before, that very thing we have judged ought to be fortified with a still greater and more exquisite legislation, so that the purpose of our mind may shine forth to all.
For we decree that the most illustrious governors of the provinces subject to us, created without any giving of money, and mindful of the oath furnished by them, shall also obtain this right from us: that there be no privilege of jurisdiction at all before them—whether it concern violence inflicted upon any persons, or crimes and the injuries arising therefrom, or public suits and trials, or the exactions of the public tributes—but that all alike be subject to their jurisdiction, they themselves not waiting until they receive orders from the magistrates to whom they are subordinate, or until they refer to them, but content with this our law, through which we deliver to them full power, no one at all having leave in the aforesaid cases to use any privilege, or thence to assume for himself authority to offend with impunity.
For the governors, if they abstain from every bribe, will set nothing above the fear of God, of the law, and of us, but looking to this, they will preserve justice for their subjects, both judging and acting all things according to our laws. And to such governors we subject even the soldiers who reside in the provinces, who indeed do not need for this any special order, whether from us or from our nobles, but only employing the present law, and the governors showing it to the soldiers, so that they may be of aid to them as they use the power of their office—knowing that if they do not do this, they shall not only suffer the loss of their provisions and military service, but shall also come into peril concerning their body.
So that we may have no further need of any other magistrate, nor of brigand-hunters (latrunculatores), nor of those whom they call appointed for restraining violence (nay rather for exercising depredations), nor of disarmers standing out, bearing titles honourable enough in appearance, but in the very deed perpetrating the most shameful of all things. For if the governors of the provinces fill the place of each and of the greatest magistrates, and are in the stead of many other judges for the provinces, and, so far as in them lies, deliver sentences according to our laws, who would dare, before them, to use either a privilege of jurisdiction or anything else of that kind?
And we forbid both the most glorious Master of the Soldiers throughout the East, and absolutely all our magistrates, to send into the provinces either brigand-hunters, or those appointed for restraining violence, or disarmers, or others of that kind. For let those who shall presume to be appointed to these things after this our law know that, being captured by our judges of the provinces, they shall even be put into chains, and, the cause being reported to us, they shall sustain the highest peril from us; and those who shall have handed down precepts of this kind shall sustain a penalty of thirty pounds of gold, and shall moreover experience our greater and more vehement indignation.
It behooves the governors of the provinces, therefore, having been honored by us with so great an authority, so to conduct themselves in the management of affairs that—so far, however, as justice and the laws permit—they may be feared by all; knowing that, if they use the administration committed to them ill and beyond the dignity of the power entrusted by us, they shall be subject to the penalties aforesaid: enduring these, that is, while they are still in office, and after laying it down exposed to even greater perils of being put to the test. For we deny to them, in the provinces which they have governed, the license to depart before the lawful period of fifty days is completed, whether on the occasion of a writ of recall, or under pretext of flight, or for any other cause whatsoever:
they knowing that, whether (as we said before) they tarry in this nurturing City, or anywhere else, they shall be brought back again to the province which they governed and shall receive the punishments we have foretold. They shall moreover take an oath, here indeed according to the form expressed above. But if it please anyone that the codicils of administration be sent to those who are in the provinces, they shall take the oath before the most God-beloved bishop of the metropolis and the foremost men of that city, and so undertake the administration of affairs, your Highness of course providing for it, whether someone receives a magistracy here in this great City, or his codicils are sent into the province by your Highness:
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he who receives it shall give security to the treasury concerning the exacting of the tributes without complaint, exactly as you yourself shall altogether have determined. And let this law of ours be applied to all who henceforth, by our express nomination, receive offices free of charge. For past matters shall be subject to the laws laid down before, none of the penalties defined in this our law threatening those who up to now administer offices, unless perchance they too, after the promulgation of this law, be caught having seized something. All these things, therefore, your Highness, learning thoroughly,
let him take care, that they may become manifest among all the nations placed under him, by sending, after the custom, instructions to all the rulers of the provinces, that, acknowledging our zeal toward our subjects and our resolve concerning the appointing of governors, they themselves may know how great benefits we have conferred upon them—we who, that they might enjoy a better fortune, have not even spared the royal household. Given on the seventeenth day before the Kalends of April at Constantinople, in the consulship of Belisarius, most distinguished man.