1-43:43
Ὅπως δὲ μή τινες ἐκ τῶν προλελεγμένων ὑφ ἡμῶν δοξάσωσι καθ εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκην φάσκειν ἡμᾶς τὰ γινόμενα γίνεσθαι, ἐκ τοῦ προειπεῖν προεγνωσμένα, καὶ τοῦτο διαλύσομεν. Τὰς τιμωρίας καὶ τὰς κολάσεις καὶ τὰς ἀγαθὰς ἀμοιβὰς κατ ἀξίαν τῶν πράξεων ἑκάστου ἀποδίδοσθαι διὰ τῶν προφητῶν μαθόντες καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀποφαινόμεθα· ἐπεὶ εἰ μὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καθ εἱμαρμένην πάντα γίνεται, οὔτε τὸ ἐφ ἡμῖν ἐπτιν ὅλως· εἰ γὰρ εἵμαρται τόνδε τινὰ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τόνδε φαῦλον, οὔθ οὗτος ἀπόδεκτος οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνος μεμπτέος. Καὶ αὖ εἰ μὴ προαιρέσει ἐλευθέρᾳ πρὸς τὸ φεύγειν τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι τὰ καλὰ δύναμιν ἔχει τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος, ἀναίτιόν ἐστι τῶν ὁπωσδήποτε πραττομένων. Ἀλλ ὅτι ἐλευθέρᾳ προαιρέσει καὶ κατορθοῖ καὶ σφάλλεται, οὕτως ἀποδείκνυμεν. Τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν μετέλευσιν ποιούμενον ὁρῶμεν. Εἰ δὲ εἵμαρτο ἢ φαῦλον ἢ σπουδαῖον εἶναι, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικὸς ἦν καὶ πλειοτάκις μετετίθετο· ἀλλ οὐδ οἱ μὲν ἦσαν σπουδαῖοι, οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι, ἐπεὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην αἰτίαν (ἀγαθῶν καὶ) φαύλων καὶ ἐναντία ἑαυτῇ πράττουσαν ἀποφαινοίμεθα, ἢ ἐκεῖνο τὸ προειρημένον δόξαι ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ὀρετὴ οὐδὲ κακία, ἀλλὰ δόξῃ μόνον ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ νομίζεται· ἥπερ, ὡς δείκνυσιν ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος. μεγίστη ἀσέβεια καὶ ἀδικία ἐστίν. Ἀλλ εἱμαρμένην φαμὲν ἀπαράβατον ταύτην εἶναι, τοῖς τὰ καλὰ ἐκλεγομένοις τὰ ἄξια ἐπιτίμια, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντία τὰ ἄξια ἐπίχειρα. Οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα, οἷον δένδρα καὶ τετράποδα μηδὲν δυνάμενα προαιρέσει πράττειν, ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ἄξιος ἀμοιβῆς ἢ ἐπαίνου, οὐκ ἀφ ἑαυτοῦ ἑλόμενος τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γενόμενος οὐδ᾿, εἰ κακὸς ὑπῆρχε, δικαίως κολάσεως ἐτύγχανεν, οὐκ ἀφ ἑαυτοῦ τοιοῦτος ὤν, ἀλλ οὐδὲν δυνάμενος εἶναι ἕτερον παρ ὃ ἐγεγόνει
然而，恐怕有人因我們所說的，便以為我們在說：事情之所以發生是出於命定的必然，因為我們說這些事是被預知並預言的，所以我們也要把這點解開。我們既從眾先知學到：刑罰、懲治和美善的賞報是按各人行為的本當賜給各人的，我們便宣告這也是真的；因為若不是這樣，而萬事都是憑命運發生的，那麼根本就沒有所謂在我們權下的事了。因為若這人作善、那人作惡是命定的，那麼這人就不該稱讚，那人也不該責備。再者，若人類沒有靠自由意志躲避卑劣、選擇美善的能力，那麼無論作了甚麼，他都不必負責。但人是憑自由意志而行善、而失足，我們這樣證明：我們看見同一個人有時走相反的道路。若他作惡或作善是命定的，他就絕不會領受相反的事、屢次改變；眾人也不會有的善、有的惡——否則我們就成了宣告命運是善與惡的緣由，且自相矛盾地行事；不然，前面所說的便要顯為真，就是說根本沒有美德、沒有罪惡，只是憑意見才被算為善或惡——而這，正如真理所顯明的，乃是最大的不敬虔和不義。我們乃是說：這是不可更改的定數，就是合宜的賞賜歸給那揀選美善的人，照樣合宜的報應歸給那揀選相反之事的人。因為神並沒有把人造成像別的東西，如樹木和四足走獸那樣不能憑選擇行事；不然，他既非出於自己揀選了善，只不過被造成如此，便不配得賞賜或稱讚；他若作惡，既非出於自己如此，乃是不能成為他被造之外的別樣，也就不該公義地受刑罰了。
But lest some, on the basis of what we have said, should suppose us to be saying that things happen according to the necessity of fate, because we have said that they are foreknown and foretold, we shall resolve this too. Having learned from the prophets that punishments and chastisements and good rewards are rendered to each according to the merit of his deeds, we declare it also to be true; for if this is not so, but all things happen by fate, then there is no such thing as what is within our power at all. For if it is fated that this man be good and that man bad, then neither is the one to be commended nor the other to be blamed. And again, if the human race does not have the power by free choice to flee what is base and to choose what is noble, then it is not responsible for anything that is done in any way whatsoever. But that it is by free choice that man both does right and goes astray, we thus demonstrate. We see the same man pursuing opposite courses. But if it were fated that he be either bad or good, he would never be receptive of opposites and change so many times; nor would some be good and others bad — since then we should be declaring fate to be the cause both of good and of bad, and to act contrary to itself — or else that which was said before would seem to be true, namely that there is no virtue and no vice, but that things are reckoned good or bad by opinion only; which, as the true reason shows, is the greatest impiety and injustice. But we say that this is the unalterable destiny: that fitting rewards come to those who choose the noble, and likewise fitting recompense to those who choose the opposite. For God did not make man like the other things, such as trees and four-footed beasts, which can do nothing by choice; for then he would not be worthy of reward or praise, not having chosen the good of himself but having merely been made so; nor, if he were bad, would he justly meet with punishment, not being such of himself but unable to be anything other than what he had been made.